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‘The US doesn’t have a policy on Gaza, does not have a peace plan…’

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Vali Nasr, former senior adviser to the US State Department, spoke to Harici: “The US does not have a policy on Gaza. The US doesn’t have a peace plan, does not have a ceasefire plan, does not have a long-term stability plan for the region…” 

Vali Nasr is the Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins-SAIS. Nasr, an Iranian-American, is one of the most prominent figures in the field of US-Iranian relations and US policies in the Middle East.

A former member of the US State Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board, Nasr served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2009 and 2011.

A nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations CFR, Nasr is the author of several books including, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, The Shia Revival and How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.

Vali Nasr answered journalist Esra Karahindiba’s questions on the Biden administration’s position on the Gaza conflict, US Middle East policy, the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the future of Gaza.

 ‘If Iran and the US escalation happens, Iran will go back to a more aggressive nuclear policy’

Before the Gaza war, there was news about an unofficial nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States. Is that agreement still in place or has Iran accelerated its nuclear work because of the Gaza war?

I don’t think the Gaza War has yet has a direct impact on the change of policy in Iran. But what the Gaza war did was to escalate tensions between the United States and Iran. So as soon as the Gaza War happened, the United States put a new freeze on the money that had gone from South Korea to Iran, the $6 billion in exchange for the release of American prisoners in Iran. And so, both countries have now are seeing an escalation of tensions between them. There have been attacks by Iranian backed forces in Syria and Iraq on American positions. And there have been American bombing of those same targets. Iran has said that it might sell advanced ballistic missiles to Russia. So, what we’re seeing is that is a gradual escalation of tensions between Iran and the US. If that escalation happens, then inevitably, it translates into Iran basically going back to a more aggressive nuclear policy.

‘If there’s population expulsion, the US would confront a much wider war in the region’

Although Iran is not in favor of the expansion of the war, the Houthis and Iranian-backed militias continue to attack US forces in the region. Do you think Iran will increase its influence in the region after the Gaza war? How will this affect the US policy in the region?

Three things here: One is that, yes, I don’t think Iran or Hezbollah or any other force in the region wants an expansion of the war but at the same time this access of resistance that includes Iran, Hezbollah militias in Iraq, in Syria and the Houthis and Hamas, they want to show support for the Palestinians. And they want to show that they are doing something while many other Arab countries are right now not doing anything militarily. They might be doing some things diplomatically but not militarily. So, partly they are making these attacks as a way of showing support for Hamas. But I also think it’s warning shots at the US. It’s not so much escalation as I think they want to sort of tell the United States that if Israel attacks without any kind of a restraint if it tries to completely finish off Hamas and Gaza, if too many Palestinians die, if there’s population expulsion that the US would, then, confront a much wider war in the region. So, I think we’re at that stage that both sides are sending signals. The Americans hit Iranian or militia positions in the region as a way of suggesting that they are prepared to counterattack. But I think the Houthis, Hezbollah militias in Iraq are also sending their own signals.

Secondly, I do think Iran’s position has become stronger because when the Palestinian issue becomes front and center for people across the region that’s an issue that Iran has always tried to rely on and has always championed. I think whereas other countries in the region, saw their interests best served by call and even having either secret or open relations with Israel. Abraham Accords, maybe normalization between Saudi and Israel, relations between Türkiye and Israel… These are all now jeopardized. So, the country that actually benefits most from this shift is actually Iran. And in the short run also Israel is now busy with Gaza as opposed to be being busy with Iran. The United States is now also busy with the Palestinian issue which until October 6, it thought that the Palestinian issue was over. I think Iran is been the big beneficiary of the region and some of the issues. That maybe people in the Sunni world, in the Arab world had anger towards Iran because of its support for the Assad regime in Syria. I think all of that’s forgotten. Now that everybody’s thinking and crying for the Palestinians, Iran or Hezbollah is seem to be on the right side for them. So, it’s a big success for Iran. Now, whether this translates into longer term benefit for Iran, it all depends. I’m not sure about that. Also, the future of us Iran relations in the region, I think, is it all depends on how this war ends, what kind of a vision the United States has for the end of the war, and what comes after this war. If after this war we see more escalation on the nuclear issue between Iran and the US, if we see increasing tensions between Iran and Israel attacks, semi-attacks and etc., then I think the region could be for a prolonged period of instability.

‘The only US policy of Gaza is to let Israel conduct the war’

The US allies in the Middle East did not support it on Ukraine. OPEC countries continue to cut oil prices. Now the US’s unlimited support for Israel has led to a further loss of credibility in the region. Do you think Washington has started to lose its political weight in the Middle East after the crises in Ukraine and Israel?

I think Ukraine was never central to the Middle East. It was a war somewhere else. So, people in the Middle East may have had opinions about it but it was never important to average Arabs, it was maybe more for Turks because Turks sit on the Black Sea and maybe for them is more important. But people, I would say, in Egypt or Jordan or or the Persian Gulf region, they didn’t sleep at night and wake up in the morning thinking about Ukraine. The governments were looking at basically what’s their interest. Saudi Arabia has oil interests with Russia. Türkiye has a balancing relationship, it has relations with Russia it also has relations with Europe. So, I think the Middle East basically reacted to Ukraine not based on what America wants but based on how to protect their own interests, how to basically be supportive of Europe but also be supportive of Russia. I think nobody wanted to be sucked into the Ukraine war in a direct way

I think Gaza is different. Yes, there is a lot of anger towards America’s moral stance on the Palestinian issue that the US basically has supported Israeli policy wholeheartedly and has not been critical on the number of people died in Gaza. But I think the larger issue is not the US’s moral credibility because I never thought that was very strong in the Middle East. I think people of the Middle East always thought that the US is biased towards Israel. They always thought that the US is Islamophobic. They were angry at the Iraq War. There were many reasons why the middle easterners had anger towards the US’ double standards in the Middle East. I think the critical credibility issue is lack of a US policy, because even the times when the United States was very unpopular for its moral stances, nevertheless it had a very clear sense of what it wanted to do and ability to deliver. But what we are actually seeing is that the US does not have a policy on Gaza. Its only policy is that they’re going to sit back and let Israel conduct this War based on it’s own objectives and however it wants to conduct the War. The US doesn’t have a peace plan, does not have a ceasefire plan, does not have a long-term stability plan for the region. That is where the credibility issue is because with a superpower its credibility doesn’t come from its moral position. It comes from its ability to construct policy and to implement policy. I think those are the issues that are now in doubt so if you asked any country and I don’t mean people in the street but you asked any government in the region what is American policy for how to end this war and how to make sure that the war doesn’t start and how to make things better bring stability back to the region, I don’t think they can answer.

‘Beijing visit of Arab leaders mean; we will invite China into the Middle East issues’

What that the reason why the ministers of the Arab countries visited China as the first stop on their trip to find a solution for Gaza. What do you think this means? Has the US failed in its policy of balancing China in the Middle East?

I think it was important. I think the more important issue is when Saudi Arabia decided to invite all the leaders of the Islamic and Arab countries together, and so for the first time, leaders of countries that don’t usually talk to each other like we’re all in the same place, in the same photograph, Iran and Egypt, Assad and Erdoğan. That was very significant. In other words, the first time that basically the region said “you know what, there is no American policy, we’re going to get together, and see how we can solve this.” So, I think that was the most important statement that they were not happy with where the US was going. Now they made the decision that they were going to visit the capitals of all of the five members of the security Council. But the significance was that they decided to start with Beijing, not end with Beijing. So, I think it was the significant part is that. But, and yes, I do think that not that they think that China can bring solution, but I think they want to signal their displeasure for lack of US policy by basically saying “we’re not only not going to cut ties with China, we’re actually going to try to invite China into the Middle East issues”.

 ‘The right candidate for the mediation is Saudi Arabia’

In your article for Foreign Affairs, you wrote that the United States could manage its relations in the Middle East through Riyadh, thereby easing its responsibility in the region. Is the model you propose compatible with the current Saudi foreign policy perspective, which is based on a multilateral win-win approach. How do you convince a country that has joined BRICS to return to a US-oriented model again?

I don’t think the Saudis can have to choose between this and that. In fact, that they have chosen BRICS. The fact that they have relations with Iran, they have relations with China, is exactly what makes Saudi Arabia the sort of the right candidate because a country that is very close to the United States only, then is not able to bring in Türkiye and Iran and other actors also into the picture which are very important for the stability of the Middle East. But Saudi Arabia increasingly has very close ties with America, but also has close ties with China, has close ties with Russia, has now built it relationship with Türkiye after many years of relationships being very cold and frosty, has rebuild its relations with Iran, has repaired its relations with Qatar and so. And also, it has some leverage on Israel because the Israelis still want normalization with Saudi Arabia so they sit in a right position to exercise this influence if the United States is willing to support that role and where the United States has greatest leverage is actually on Israel. When you want to cut a deal that would bring stability in the region, every actor in the region has to agree to it. Americans don’t talk to Iranians right now, so they cannot discuss this with Iran. The Chinese talks to Iranians. And the Saudis talk to Iranians. And the Chinese and the Saudis depend on one another at the same time. The Russians have to support this and not undermine it. Tehran and Ankara have the best relationship with Russia right now of getting it to beave. The Americans have the best relationship with Israelis. So, as a result, the US’s policy right now is only supporting an Israeli War. But if you actually want stability in the region, the stability will not come with just supporting Israel conducting the war. The stability will come by supporting a broader sort of a regional security agreement that everybody has to accept and agree to. And there is no single actor who speaks to everybody basically and also has leverage with Israelis as well. And Saudis can play that role.

‘None of the regional countries will want to take part in the Gaza’s reconstruction unless there is an agreement for a final settlement’

The Biden administration wants a revitalized Palestinian Authority to administer post-war Gaza, but Netanyahu said they would not accept that. “After the war, Gaza must be demilitarized under Israeli responsibility,” he said. What does this mean? What kind of political situation do you think awaits Gaza after the war? Can regional countries play an effective role in the reconstruction of Gaza?

It all depends on how and when the most of the war ends. If we thought about Ukraine, when the Russians went into Ukraine, they thought they’re going to take all of Ukraine. Then the Ukrainians thought, they’re going to win the war themselves and push Russia all the way out of Ukraine. Where we are is that neither side is winning. It’s a new reality. Right now, we’re in the middle of a war that where Israel thinks it can have everything. It can destroy Hamas, take over large parts of Gaza. So, it all depends on whether does it get its way or does the war stop somewhere else. So, it all depends on when and how this war stops. When does it end? Does it end in total victory by Israel or Israel is forced to stop the war at some point without winning total victory? Once the war stops, then there’s a question of what’s the order that can be negotiated for postwar. I think that’s where we don’t know what the case is going to be. I do think the countries in the region have a role in the future security of Gaza but also in reconstruction of Gaza. But it all again their involvement in Gaza will depend on what is the final scenario in Gaza. I don’t think anybody wants to go in to own a disastrous territory. Everybody wants to go in believing that there is an agreement between United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Türkiye, even Iran quietly from afar about a situation. Then, say, “okay, we can support that”. But if there is no internationally agreed situation for Gaza, then I don’t think any Arab country or Türkiye would want to go in a situation where there’s no international or regional support for. It’s a recipe for disaster. It’s similar to the situation in Syria. Because there is no agreement about the final end to the war in Syria. Countries are in Syria basically protecting their own military positions but there’s no agreement about reconstruction. So, I think you have to first have an agreement political agreement over what happens to Gaza when the war stops. That itself depends on how the war stops. And then, countries in the region would come in to support a final settlement of Gaza. They won’t come in before there is an agreement on a final settlement for Gaza.

‘YPG involves Americans more than Syrians’

Can you also comment about the frozen normalization initiative of Türkiye towards Syria? It’s now for a year and a half that we were discussing a lot if whether Bashar Assad and President Erdoğan will meet or not, whether the normalization will be fully applicable. But we see that now it’s frozen…

Repairing relations is going to take time because these two were on the opposite sides of the war and the war hasn’t even concluded completely. There is again much like we discuss about Gaza, there is no other final settlement, internationally recognized final settlement for the for the war in Syria. There is basically a de facto situation on the ground. “So, the fighting has stopped”, “Assad controls here”, “Turkish troops are there”, “Americans control this piece”, “Iranians control that piece”. But there is no sort of an agreement about the future. I think there are some big issues for Türkiye on the table. One is the future of Idlib, the other one is the future of YPG group which actually involves the Americans more than it involves the Syrians. Of course, Assad would want to see Turkish troops leave Syrian land. I mean any leader of an Arab country would say the same thing. But on the other hand, Türkiye also wants no more refugees to come to Türkiye. So, if they leave Idlib, and you know Syrian troops go into Idlib, and another million Syrians are pushed into Syria. That’s an issue. On the other hand, they actually want Assad to provide security guarantees that would allow many of the Syrian refugees in Türkiye to return home. Then, the question is also about the Kurdish movement in Northeast Syria, it’s military capabilities etc. So, I think we’re far apart on those things.

And then the other thing that’s happened is that the Gaza War has taken the attention off of the Syria issue. I think we were reaching a point where in a different kind of a Middle East setting, different kind of an American relations with the Middle East, it was possible to sort of imagine that there was a political space for even Americans to think differently about Syria, let alone Türkiye and Syria. So, we saw that the Arab world was getting closer to Assad in the sense of accepting him in the Arab League. But still the issue of returning; the Assad will not agree to the return of refugees until economic sanctions on are lifted so that they can actually feed the people who come back. The sanctions will not be going to be lifted it because of the United States will not lift them. So, everything is sort of in a way is tied together. So, things may move ever so slightly, but I think it’s going to be very difficult to untangle this in the short-term period.

‘Ukrainians don’t care about the motivations of the West as long as they get the support’

I want to ask you about the statements of David Cameron, the British Foreign Secretary. He was in Washington and he said “You spend an extra 10% of your defense budget, and with the courage of the Ukrainians, you destroy 50 percent of Russia’s pre-war defense equipment and people. Without losing the lives of the Americans and the British. This is a great investment.” Is this a type of confession that what is going on in Ukrainian land is a semi-proxy war?

I think for Ukrainians this is a real war. It’s about their territory. It’s no different for them than it was for Turks in 1921 when their country was being divided up and given to different European powers, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rallied the Turkish military to unite the Turkish Republic. For them, it’s an act of nationalism. But I think that what David Cameron said, unfortunately is exactly the way Putin thinks. He thinks that the Ukraine war is really a western proxy war. I think what David Cameron meant to say is to encourage the US Congress to continue to support the war by saying it’s a very small price to pay to keep Russia weak and prevent it from becoming a great power by keeping it busy in Ukraine. But it’s going to be read the wrong way to mean that the Ukraine war is a proxy war. But I don’t think that’s the reality. I think for the Ukrainians the war is real. They’re defending their territory. They need the Western support. I don’t think Ukrainians care about what motivates the West as long as they get the support. So, I mean how Ukrainians see the war is very different from somebody sitting in London or in Madrid or in Amsterdam or in Washington may see the war. For them it might very well be about keeping Russia weak. But for the Ukrainians it’s about protecting their country.

Interview

Daniel Davis warns US strategy fails against Iranian defense grid

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Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and military analyst Daniel Davis discussed the US military operation against Iran, decision-making mechanisms in Washington, US-Israel relations, transformations in modern warfare doctrine, and the global balance of power in an interview with Harici Media.

Answering questions of Harici Editor-in-Chief Tunç Akkoç regarding the Iran war, retired Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis stated that the US administration lacks an achievable military strategy on the ground. Davis said: “I would say the US has a desire, not a strategy. It wants to subjugate the Iranian side, corner them, seize control of the Strait of Hormuz, prove they pose no threat to anyone in the region, and ensure they never possess nuclear weapons. That is our desire. But there is no strategy to achieve any of these goals.”

Drawing on his past military experience, Davis detailed the geographical and technical challenges on the ground: “As a soldier with direct combat experience, having gained combat experience in some of these mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, I know that many of the mountains inside Iran belong to the same mountain category. I knew what a difficult military task it would be to conquer a country as large as most of Western Europe, where such mountain ranges cover the entire western front. Therefore, I knew you could do nothing on the ground. However, I also knew that you could not subjugate a country with this kind of defense capacity and of this nature through air power alone.”

Pointing out that Iran’s defense infrastructure spans many years, Davis continued: “You cannot do this, especially when they have anticipated this for twenty years and made all kinds of preparations by constructing underground caves, production facilities, and storage facilities, and developing production capabilities for their unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles. There is no way you can defeat them. Because such facilities were designed not only to withstand all our strike missiles, such as Tomahawk, Jasmine cruise missiles, PSM, or ATAC, but also to survive. Most are capable of surviving nuclear explosions as well. I have been inside some of these here in the US. I have been in some physically located beneath a mountain. I know they were specifically designed when constructed to withstand the largest nuclear weapons the Soviet Union might possess. The ones there are of the same kind. If you know before embarking on an act of starting a war that the enemy is this large, possesses these types of defenses, and everyone knows these are resistant to our non-nuclear conventional munitions, why would you start a war to force them into something you clearly cannot achieve?”

Addressing the assumptions behind the war decision, Davis said: “I think this is a fantasy stoked by Benjamin Netanyahu. It was said, ‘If we assassinate their leaders, the same thing will happen as happened to Maduro in Venezuela. You went there, captured him, and disabled him; when you did that, you took control of the entire government, they basically handed the country over to you, and the same will happen here.’ Anyone who thinks Venezuela is like Iran has paid attention to nothing. The culture, history, religion, experiences, and everything that has transpired over the last 47 years are radically different from those in Venezuela, and you do not have an insider to facilitate the process as we had in Venezuela. But President Trump appears to have thought this way.”

“When he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate; we lost this war”

Pointing to inconsistencies in US President Donald Trump’s decisions and the trajectory of the operation, Davis stated: “This situation is proof that he is stuck. Because, in my view, when he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate. We lost this war. Even if it is ongoing right now, there is no logical way for us to win it. Because we cannot eliminate the trump card held by the Iranian side.”

Stating that military pressure mechanisms are insufficient, Davis explained: “We still have our missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, and all such elements. That is why it appears feasible. It is thought, ‘Maybe if we make a good enough deal, or put enough pressure on them, or impose a blockade and leave the public in a dire enough position to change the government’s mind.’ This is a fantasy. This is the only thing President Trump has. Because if he were acting based solely on military reality, strategic reality, and cultural and religious reality, he would know this was an unwise move, but he does not know.”

Describing Trump’s negotiation approach and the breakdown of the reached agreement, Davis used the following expressions: “He is a transactional individual who wants relationships resolved overnight. For example, during the memorandum of understanding period, this duration was to be 60 days. After starting the war, no achievable military objectives remained. Whatever your desires were, you can no longer reach them because you have confronted reality. Now he is trying to find an exit route, but even within this understanding, he cannot arrive at a rational and consistent perspective. Any rational person would think that when the memorandum of understanding was signed on June 17, it provided him with an exit route. You implement the terms of this memorandum, the crisis is resolved, the dual blockade is lifted, and the Strait of Hormuz could reopen.”

Addressing the clauses of the agreement text and subsequent developments, Davis said: “The terms Trump signed stated that Iran had administrative control of the Strait of Hormuz but could not demand any transit fees for 60 days. Iran accepted this, but accepted only one condition: the ‘for 60 days only’ stipulation. Subsequently, they publicly announced that they would collect fees later, but not during these 60 days. The US was not mentioned in the text in any way. We had no say. The authority to decide how operations would run was left to Iran together with Oman. We gave them 30 of the 60 days to prepare their plan for this. But after four or five days passed, the US suddenly declared a new southern corridor together with Oman.”

Detailing the process of reversing the decision, Davis noted: “While a step to reopen the strait had been agreed upon, traffic had risen to approximately one-third of pre-war levels, and many shipments had passed directly on the first day, Trump personally turned back this development toward finding a reasonable exit route from the unfolding disaster. According to reports from some sources in Washington, he came under intense pressure from pro-war figures in his inner circle and those on the Israeli side. He backed down under this pressure and modified the terms by inserting himself into the fifth paragraph. He never made Israel implement the first paragraph, which covered Lebanon and envisioned a ceasefire on all fronts. We did not even give them 30 days; we intervened before five days had passed. Trump has a goal, fails to reach it, puts forward another condition, and then withdraws that as well. He is very easily manipulated; he reaches a decision, then someone speaks with him, and he changes his mind.”

Recalling that a similar situation occurred in relations with Saudi Arabia, Davis said: “He said he made a great deal with Saudi Arabia, and the next day he changed the condition by saying, ‘as long as they sign the Abraham Accords.’ Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, announced that this was not part of the agreement and had never been discussed. This situation shows that President Trump constantly makes concessions when pressured. On this basis, how can any agreement be reached with the US? This situation means that no military or diplomatic exit point remains because he does not permit it.”

“Control is no longer an economic matter; it is a national security imperative”

In response to a question about whether a mutual exit opportunity remains from the current impasse, Davis said: “We had the memorandum of understanding; we had secured this agreement. However, President Trump and his Secretary, Scott Bessent, said, ‘as long as it is a deal we like, we want a new deal.’ You already had a deal; what deal are you talking about now? Why would the Iranian side negotiate a new deal that differs from an agreement made two months ago? This is completely illogical. The Iranian side holds military superiority through its missile cities and half a dozen alternative methods to control the strait. As their official authorities stated on social media, control of the strait is no longer merely an economic matter; it is a national security imperative because it is the only tool with which they can balance their American adversary, who is far stronger militarily.”

Evaluating the impact of the oil crisis, Davis stated: “Strategic Petroleum Reserves are declining. This situation has prevented a crisis so far, but it cannot cover products like jet fuel, diesel, and fertilizer. If it continues this way and the problem is postponed, the reserves will be depleted one day, and economic activity cannot be sustained without oil. Pressure is on President Trump, and the Iranian side is aware of this. They know the blockade will harm them, but they have calculated that they can endure much longer and deeper pain than our side. This is an existential matter; they know that if they surrender their only trump card to an unpredictable president, they will be attacked again later.”

“Reflexive support for Israel in society has been broken”

Touching upon relations between the US and Israel, Davis said a clear divergence has begun in American society. Davis noted: “In the past, across all segments of society and all generations, it was reflexively said, ‘Of course we are pro-Israel, they are our democratic ally.’ This situation continued until the Gaza process following October 7. Israel was attacked on October 7, and no one found it strange that it responded. However, what happened afterward created problems. Israel used this opportunity to destroy the Gaza Strip, increase pressure in the West Bank, bring in new settlers, and discuss annexation.”

Describing the rift between political elites and the public, Davis explained: “There is a major divide in America. Elites are unaffected by genocide or the killing of women and children in the West Bank and Gaza; they close their eyes, arguing that Israel is an ally. However, the eyes of the American public are not closed. They see human suffering on social media and do not carry the memorized assumptions of the past. These elites are not merely bought with money; for decades, they genuinely believed that our interests and Israel’s interests were one and the same. In their minds, saying something negative about Israel is equivalent to saying something negative about the US. Younger generations in particular, and a growing portion of all generations, recognize that our interests are not the same.”

Drawing attention to the cost of the war to the US, Davis noted: “We elected President Trump to apply the America First principle, not Israel first, Britain first, or Germany first. There is anger against those who sacrificed America’s needs by entering the war. According to figures reflected in the public domain, at least 600 Americans were injured; according to what I have heard, this number is over a thousand. Money has been spent, our facilities have been damaged, and our aircraft destroyed; around 40 to 50 of our aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Our bases were ruined and will likely never be rebuilt. We have also lost our geopolitical influence in the region. I doubt that relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait can return to their former state. Because the foundational assumption of this entire structure was that we could protect them; we could not even protect ourselves.”

“We are still living as if it were 1992”

Evaluating the shift in military technology, Davis stated that the US has lost its traditional military superiority. Davis said: “A large number of people in America are still living as if it were 1992. The Soviet Union had just collapsed, China was a peasant army developing militarily and economically, and we held absolute dominance following Operation Desert Storm. We are no longer in 1992. The Russians corrected their mistakes after the initial phase of the Ukraine war in 2022; they became a much stronger land force, missile, and drone force. China, meanwhile, reached immense technological and industrial capacity.”

Explaining the current situation through the example of Iran, Davis said: “We thought we could crush Iran like a fly, but we could not do so due to their missile cities and technologies. If we cannot eliminate Iran, what can we do against China or Russia, which possess power far beyond that? We have fallen behind in categories such as hypersonic missiles and the new Oreshnik missile. When I saw the Bayraktar TB2 vehicles used by the Turks in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, as someone with an armored unit background, I understood that the nature of war had changed. The US, meanwhile, talks about producing 300,000 drones by 2030. In an environment where tactics change every six weeks on the Ukrainian and Russian battlefield, our systems remain extremely slow. Ukrainian soldiers mocked the tank platoon manual published last year, saying that with these methods, one could not survive on the battlefield for even ten minutes.”

“The idea of containing China is a fantasy”

Criticizing the US military approach toward China, Davis evaluated: “There is talk of a strategy to militarily contain China. Will you prevent their activities within their own borders, their technological developments, or the expansion of their military? You cannot stop a country with a strong economy and a massive population. We can achieve no result other than entering a war with China in the Asia-Pacific region and losing it. China’s shipbuilding capacity is approximately 200 times ours; they are vastly superior to us in artillery ammunition, aircraft, and missile production. Our methods left over from the Cold War no longer work. What we need to do is keep our own defense strong and ensure deterrence, not spend billions of dollars in the region to establish forward bases that will be hit.”

Touching upon the potential for diplomatic relations between the two countries, Davis said: “I think President Trump personally knows that going to war with China is unwise. However, the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex view China as a constant enemy, demanding more budget, more bases, and more missiles every year. No one considers diplomacy. Yet we can develop peaceful, stable relations with China based on mutual benefit, even if not friendly. Regarding Taiwan as well, I think leaders realize after seeing what occurred in the Middle East and Ukraine that help will not come, and they will adopt a more cooperative stance by withdrawing independence rhetoric. China does not want to start a war; it desires a model similar to Hong Kong. Even if a conflict breaks out in the worst-case scenario, it is between China and Taiwan; the US should not choose to join the war and lose.”

Emphasizing that the arms lobby inside the US maintains its power, Davis stated: “The military-industrial complex remains extremely powerful and holds all levers of power. They maintain control through members of Congress, the media, and public relations networks; I see no sign that this structure is weakening.”

“They did not want someone who would tell the truth about Israel”

Providing information about the process surrounding the cancellation of his appointment within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Davis recounted the issue in these words: “When Tulsi Gabbard came to me and asked me to become the number three executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I said I would be honored to serve my country. However, I stated that I had openly opposed the policies pursued by Israel since October 7 and the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and that these views might not be welcomed within the administration. She thought my accurate past analyses would compensate for this situation. One of my duties was to present the daily intelligence briefing to the president.”

Describing the stage at which his candidacy was withdrawn, Davis said: “Articles against me appeared in the Israeli press and American media. I never hid my views; I said Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies were harming Israel and dragging us down as well. I advocate the ‘America First’ principle, but there are many people within the administration who say ‘Israel First’ and have zero tolerance for any criticism directed at Netanyahu. They did not want someone who would tell the truth regarding Israel. The process expanded following posts by figures like Laura Loomer. On the day I passed the CIA polygraph test and was set to begin duty, Susie Wiles was informed that I had put the president in a difficult position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. While Trump was saying there would be a ceasefire, I stated on my program that Vladimir Putin would not agree to a ceasefire given his current advantage. Although I stated that I supported a ceasefire, this was made a pretext, and my appointment offer was withdrawn,” completing the interview.

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Interview

Quincy Institute expert says the United States had no plan B

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In an interview with Harici Media, Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, stated that global unipolarity is coming to an end, transitioning into an increasingly multipolar order.

Parsi addressed shifting global power dynamics, US foreign policy toward China, structural domestic pressures in Washington, and the strategic miscalculations surrounding the ongoing US conflict with Iran.

Parsi noted that while many analysts declare the arrival of a post-American world, the transition will not be an abrupt moment. Instead, he described a phased emergence where it becomes clear that no single superpower possesses deterministic influence over global affairs.

Parsi observed that many governments have been slow to internalize this reality or adjust their policies accordingly, creating the superficial illusion that a unipolar system remains intact. “Whether it’s fully multipolar or other configurations, we can be debated. What I think is clear is that the unipolarity is coming to an end,” Parsi said.

“Unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality”

Regarding Washington’s readiness for a multipolar world, Parsi asserted that the US political establishment remains unprepared and has historically denied the shift. He recalled that during the first two years of the Biden administration, describing the world as multipolar was dismissed as a Russian propaganda narrative.

However, Parsi highlighted a shift under US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who stated in a February 2025 interview that unipolarity was an anomaly. Parsi explained, “He actually went further. He said that unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality, a historical accident. If you believe that it’s a historical accident, if you believe that it’s an abnormality, then I think it comes from that, that any effort to try to restore unipolarity should be rejected.”

Addressing US policy toward China, Parsi noted that despite the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, there is no structural indication that Washington views Beijing as a potential partner rather than a rival.

He contrasted the Biden administration’s aggressive posture—which assumed an existential struggle for dominance—with the Trump administration’s softer but poorly planned approach.

Parsi argued that neither power can decisively defeat the other, making mutual coexistence and co-governance essential to avoid a catastrophic zero-sum confrontation.

“An effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe for disaster”

Parsi rejected the feasibility of military containment against Beijing, warning of severe consequences. “I think an effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe that will bring about great power competition and a confrontation between the US and China that is going to be completely disastrous,” Parsi stated.

He observed that despite significant US strategic errors, such as the conflict with Iran, China has exercised restraint rather than exploiting American vulnerabilities. Parsi argued that if Beijing were dead-set on aggressive power competition, it would have acted differently.

Economically, Parsi argued that containing China through tariffs or Soviet-era containment models is a losing proposition.

Unlike the Soviet Union, which maintained an isolated economic model, China is deeply integrated into global trade and serves as the primary trading partner for most nations, including those in Latin America such as Brazil. Parsi emphasized that economic containment is unviable against a state with such vast global integration.

“This confrontation will be the deadliest conflict in human history”

Evaluating the risk of the “Thucydides Trap,” Parsi criticized the Washington foreign policy establishment for its structural inability to envision peaceful coexistence.

He noted that the political culture in Washington is built around zero-sum competition and conflict rather than diplomatic management.

Parsi emphasized that while historical precedents exist, humanity is not bound to repeat them, particularly when the stakes involve existential risks. Parsi warned that an unmanaged confrontation between the US and China “would be the deadliest conflict in human history if it is allowed to happen,” threatening human survival itself.

Parsi attributed this narrow strategic focus to structural domestic forces, particularly the US military-industrial complex and influential lobbying groups. Working alongside the grand strategy of liberal hegemony, these forces require US military dominance worldwide, especially in Asia.

Parsi explained that institutional inertia makes it extraordinarily difficult for Washington to alter its strategic trajectory.

“The US had an unrealistic plan A and no plan B”

Turning to the conflict with Iran, Parsi asserted that Washington lacks a coherent strategy, having relied on an unrealistic plan that failed within the first three days.

He stated that the US expected a swift regime collapse or surrender within four days, but faced horizontal escalation from Iran, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz and regional strikes.

“The United States had a very unrealistic plan A and no plan B, and it’s been stuck in that situation ever since,” Parsi said, adding that Washington has been improvising and executing tactical operations without strategic success.

Parsi attributed President Trump’s shifting decisions on Iran to this absence of strategy and his personal demand for immediate results. When military action failed to yield swift progress, Trump turned to diplomacy, only to lose patience within three weeks and resume military strikes. Parsi questioned whether the global community could afford a superpower acting in such an erratic manner.

“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran”

Addressing Israel’s role, Parsi stated that Israeli pressure was a decisive factor in driving US policy toward confrontation with Iran.

“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran. Without Trump agreeing to the Israelis, there would not have been a war with Iran. Both of them were needed,” Parsi remarked, noting that Israeli efforts since 1995 elevated Iran into a primary US national security concern disproportionate to actual US interests in the region.

Parsi identified a growing divergence between US and Israeli interests in the Middle East. While the US benefits from reducing its regional military footprint of 50,000 troops, Israel requires continuous US military presence and intervention to maintain a favorable regional balance of power.

Parsi noted that this divergence has created a visible rift between Washington and Tel Aviv following the poor execution of the war and subsequent diplomatic maneuvers.

“Israel’s standing amongst the American public has plummeted”

Parsi highlighted a major shift in American public opinion regarding Israel, noting that sympathy for Palestinians has surpassed sympathy for Israel across almost every demographic category, except Republicans over the age of 65.

He attributed this decline directly to Israel’s military actions in Gaza and its perceived role in drawing the US into a disastrous war with Iran, which mirrored earlier public grievances over the Iraq War.

Regarding a resolution to the conflict, Parsi stated that a dignified exit for both the US and Iran remains possible, though the window is narrowing due to personal hostility and political miscalculations.

Finally, addressing Trump’s political image, Parsi clarified that Trump was never strictly anti-war, but rather anti-risk.

He explained that Trump entered the conflict because Israeli officials convinced him that war with Iran posed little risk and would be concluded within 100 hours. Parsi concluded that had Trump not been misled into believing the operation would be a swift success, he would not have initiated it.

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Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?

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Conflicting statements from the US and Iran regarding the potential resumption of diplomatic negotiations have emerged, while ongoing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have once again brought global energy concerns to the fore.

Addressing these developments on the Harici live broadcast of Strategic Compass, international relations scholar Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal and Alptekin Dursunoglu, journalist, author, and Editor-in-Chief of Yakin Dogu Haber (YDH), evaluated the internal, regional, and strategic dimensions of the conflict. The discussion focused on the shift in Iran’s military doctrine, the political strain within the US administration, the economic vulnerability of Gulf monarchies, and the broader realignments reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?

Opening the discussion, Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal offered a sharp critique of the political rhetoric originating from Washington, contrasting executive declarations with the tactical outcomes on the ground. Unal argued that public statements made by former US President Donald Trump increasingly lack analytical consistency, complicating efforts to decipher official US strategy.

“He has reached a point where he tells more lies than the daily meowing of stray cats,” Unal remarked during the broadcast. “I do not know which part of his statements we ought to analyze, but if we evaluate him within a broader framework, it becomes possible to reach certain conclusions.”

Unal described the military confrontation between Washington and Tehran as an uneven cycle of escalation, noting that US forces continue to suffer casualties and incur immense financial costs without altering the strategic baseline. “The situation has effectively transformed into something like a defeated wrestler who never grows tired of wrestling; America repeatedly approaches and confronts Iran, yet the outcome is obvious from the outset,” Unal stated. He added that American military personnel are being deployed into conflict zones where national interests remain obscure: “I am certain that American soldiers there largely believe they have no personal interests at stake… and that it serves at most the interests of Israel.”

Dursunoglu contextualised the current phase of hostilities as part of an extended campaign, comparing the recent clashes to a second round of a broader regional conflict following earlier engagements in 2025. He noted that despite assertive claims from Washington regarding the destruction of Iranian military infrastructure, operational continuity on the Iranian side forced a shift in US messaging.

Reflecting on official declarations from US Central Command (CENTCOM) and executive statements following intensive strikes, Unal highlighted the internal contradictions in Washington’s narrative: “Trump claimed Iranian naval forces were sent to the bottom of the sea, the air force beyond the atmosphere, and the ground forces deep into the magma. Yet suddenly he declared, ‘I have forgiven Iran,’ while CENTCOM figures suggested they had reached ‘target saturation’—as if there was simply nothing left to hit.”

Is Iran insisting on its conditions regarding the Strait of Hormuz?

A central focus of the analysis was Iran’s response mechanism following the breakdown of initial ceasefire frameworks. Dursunoglu highlighted a significant structural transition in Tehran’s military posture, moving from traditional reactive containment to proactive deterrence across multiple theatres.

Dursunoglu pointed out that during the escalation, Iran did not restrict its target matrix to immediate points of contact. Instead, Iranian forces conducted strikes against US installations and logistical networks across the region, including facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman.

“Iran’s traditional defence doctrine was defensive and based on proportional retaliation,” Dursunoglu explained. “However, after the US halted strikes, Iran proceeded to target assets in Jordan and Kuwait without immediate prior attacks on those specific vectors. This indicates that Iran has begun executing preemptive strikes, effectively adapting its strategic posture.”

Unal underscored the severity of these strikes on regional logistics, noting that Iranian counter-strikes targeted the port of Aqaba and airport infrastructure in Jordan, alongside American operational facilities in the Gulf. “According to the accounts, Iranian forces began hitting American installations in Gulf states and Jordan within minutes of initial strikes, effectively neutralizing the operational depth the US relied upon,” Unal noted.

The operational status of the Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive point of leverage. Under previous draft frameworks negotiated through Omani mediation, administrative oversight of maritime traffic through the Strait was slated to transition to Iran in coordination with regional littoral states. However, subsequent US efforts to establish an independent naval corridor along the Omani coast triggered a fresh wave of Iranian interdictions.

Dursunoglu outlined the ongoing negotiations surrounding the maritime passage, noting that attempts to bypass Iranian oversight proved unviable for commercial shipping. Under the latest proposals under discussion via Omani channels, incoming maritime traffic into the Gulf would pass through Iranian-designated corridors under Iranian authorization, while outgoing traffic would proceed along Omani coastal waters following notification and approval.

“If an agreement is finalized on these terms, it represents an explicit recognition of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz by the US regime,” Dursunoglu said. He noted that while initial terms provided free passage during a temporary 60-day window, long-term frameworks anticipate structured administrative mechanisms for commercial vessels. Unal added: “Whether designated as transit fees, environmental charges, or security provisions, formalizing maritime oversight secures a permanent structural advantage for Tehran.”

Under what conditions will negotiations begin?

The economic ramifications of maritime disruption have also altered the calculations of Gulf export nations. Following attempts by Saudi Arabia to engage Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces in Yemen, retaliatory actions against critical infrastructure—including the Yanbu crude oil pipeline on the Red Sea—severely constrained alternative export routes.

“By drawing Yemeni forces back into active conflict, Saudi Arabia inadvertently placed its secondary export avenues under direct fire,” Unal observed. “The vulnerability of the Yanbu pipeline demonstrates that reliance on the Gulf cannot be bypassed easily, effectively increasing regional dependence on stability within the Strait.”

Beyond the maritime domain, the broadcast addressed heavy Iranian military engagements in northern Iraq, targeting opposition groups including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, Pak, and Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) along the Erbil-Suleimaniyeh axis.

Dursunoglu and Unal noted that cross-border strikes destroyed substantial ammunition depots established near border regions, followed by reported ground operations conducted by specialized Iranian units.

“Iranian special forces executed targeted ground operations across the border,” Dursunoglu stated, pointing to secondary explosions captured in operational footage as evidence of extensive pre-positioned armaments.

Unal noted that these operations underscored the strategic limitations of non-state actors aligned with Washington: “The expectations placed on armed factions in northern Iraq collapsed when confronted with direct military pressure. The narrative that these groups could serve as an internal wedge against Tehran proved to be a costly miscalculation for US planners.”

Reports indicating the start of a repositioning of US personnel and heavy military equipment from bases in Iraq and the Gulf toward Jordan and Israel were identified as a direct consequence of this vulnerability. “US forces are consolidating toward Jordan and Israel because their facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait sustained structural operational damage,” Dursunoglu observed. “When a state can no longer defend its forward command centers—such as the 5th Fleet infrastructure in Bahrain—it is forced to retreat to secondary defensive perimeters.”

How effective is the pressure from Gulf countries for negotiations?

Concluding the evaluation, Unal and Dursunoglu examined the broader diplomatic landscape, focusing on security dialogues among regional powers, including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Both analysts agreed that any sustainable security architecture in the Middle East must incorporate Iran rather than seek its exclusion.

“How can you construct a new regional order by excluding the very nation that demonstrated the capacity to neutralize external military dominance?” Dursunoglu questioned. “An architecture that relies on Western guarantees or Israeli alignment fails to address the underlying security dynamics of the region.”

Unal reflected on the historical trajectories of Turkish foreign policy, criticizing past ideological approaches that fuelled regional fragmentation and sect-based antagonisms. He noted that realpolitik dictates close functional coordination between Ankara and Tehran despite historical differences.

“Iran’s resistance ultimately prevented the imposition of a security framework dictated entirely by external actors,” Unal concluded. “Responsible analysis requires recognizing that stability in the Middle East cannot be achieved through foreign intervention or regional fragmentation, but through direct, autonomous security coordination among the region’s core nations.”

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