Opinion

Trump’s push for Russia-Ukraine peace turned into a strategic dilemma

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On May 22, Russian President Putin announced that he had decided to establish a necessary security buffer zone along the border with Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nikolenko immediately responded, stating that Putin’s remarks showed that Russia is the true obstacle to peace. Generally, creating a buffer zone along the border or front line implies that one or both warring parties intend to consolidate existing conflict results and establish a new long-term ceasefire or even de facto boundary of control. Russia’s decision signals that, in terms of territorial disputes, the three-year-long Russia-Ukraine war has tipped clearly in Russia’s favor. With this as a foundation, Russia seeks to shift the conflict to peace talks and thus reshape the geopolitical landscape and establish a new security order.

On the same day, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine was striving to ensure the next round of bilateral talks would happen soon but noted that Russia had not yet demonstrated equal readiness. Zelensky’s remarks showed a similarly unyielding position, indicating no willingness to make major territorial concessions.

In contrast, U.S. President Donald Trump, who once confidently promised a quick resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, appears to have lost both confidence and interest, having encountered unexpected difficulties. Trump has no intention of offending Putin, whom he admires, nor can he influence Zelensky, whom he disparages. Thus, the idea of restarting a peace process upon returning to the White House has become an easily burst illusion. In fact, the positions of Russia and Ukraine are not only far apart, but the U.S. and Europe also hold diverging views. The Trump administration failed to realize that the slogan “Defend Ukraine” had become a strategic consensus among European allies for mutual support and collective defense. As a result, the Trump administration’s peace efforts are mired in strategic difficulties due to the lack of consensus.

Before and after taking office, Trump cooperated with Israel to defeat nearly all its regional adversaries, effectively ending what could be seen as the “Sixth Middle East War” by dismantling the “Axis of Resistance.” Currently, only Yemen’s Houthis are actively resisting Israel in support of the embattled Palestinian Hamas. Moreover, Trump successfully visited three Gulf nations, strengthened ties with Turkey, reconciled with longtime foe Syria, and is working to foster a historic breakthrough in Syrian-Israeli relations.

Despite having the capacity to reshape the Middle East, Trump is powerless in the complex Russia-Ukraine war. He admitted that his campaign claim to “end the war in 24 hours” was an offhand remark. His pressure on Ukraine and Europe failed, and he has even lost the initiative in leading peace talks.

On May 16, Russia and Ukraine resumed direct negotiations after three years, with Turkey—maintaining good relations with both sides—serving as a mediator. Apart from a humanitarian agreement to exchange 1,000 prisoners of war, no other progress was made due to the vast differences in peace conditions. Half the Ukrainian delegation wore military uniforms, signaling their readiness to fight to the end.

Russia’s conditions are well-known: Ukraine must relinquish its claim to Crimea, cede four eastern and southern regions to Russia, and vow never to join NATO. Ukraine’s bottom line is to cede no territory and continue its NATO membership pursuit.

After the Istanbul talks, Putin inspected the fully recaptured Kursk region and will soon visit Donbas, controlled by Russian forces. This over three-year war has now entered a new stalemate phase marked by a temporary Russian victory. With overwhelming military strength and vast occupied territory, Russia refuses Ukraine’s call for a ceasefire before negotiations and instead favors negotiating while fighting. This strategy prevents Ukraine from regrouping and aims to drive Ukrainian forces out of the remaining contested areas, securing full control of the four regions. The “border buffer zone” Putin spoke of essentially represents a redefined Russia-Ukraine boundary, securing complete victory in the war.

Russia holds battlefield initiative and strategic upper hand, Ukraine refuses to yield, and European countries are unwilling to abandon Ukraine. This complex situation has gradually drained the Trump administration’s confidence, patience, and courage, increasingly signaling a hands-off approach.

Trump once threatened Russia that if it refused to reach an agreement, the U.S. would impose “secondary tariffs” on its oil exports. However, after a two-hour phone call with Putin on the 19th, Trump completely discarded this verbal threat. Subsequently, in consultations with European leaders, Trump even openly indicated that the U.S. not only had no intention of sanctioning Russia but also planned to fully withdraw and let Russia and Ukraine resolve it themselves. Trump clearly emphasized: This is not America’s war — “This is Europe’s problem, and it should always remain Europe’s problem.”

Russian TASS commentator Hoffman stated after the Trump-Putin call that the conversation was less about future U.S.-Russia trade relations and more about Washington’s acknowledgment of a new geopolitical reality — one in which Russia defines the key parameters of a long-term solution. Another Russian commentator, Ivanikov, emphasized that the call opened the door to historic peace, needing only legal formalization. He also believed that “Trump obviously shares Russia’s perspective on the root causes of the Ukraine conflict.”

Trump’s efforts to resolve the Russia-Ukraine war have been severely frustrated due to several factors. First, he and his advisors overestimated the influence of American leadership in persuading European allies to compromise their core interests, mistakenly treating the territory and sovereignty of other nations as tradable commodities. Second, his advisory team consists largely of political amateurs, many of whom blindly idolize him and follow his lead without question. They lack strategic minds akin to Kissinger or Mearsheimer, turning U.S. mediation into empty talk, detached from geopolitical realities and national interests. Third, Trump and many of his cabinet members lack a deep understanding of European history and fail to grasp the basic rule that wars are easy to start but hard to end.

From the perspective of European history, today’s Russia-Ukraine crisis, conflict, and war are a continuation and repetition of centuries-old tensions between Russia and European nations. It reflects the cultural rejection of Russia by the West, despite its attempts to integrate; the collision between Russia’s quest for “imperial space” due to its deep-seated insecurity and the West’s entrenched Russophobia. It also echoes a long-term struggle between Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy over religious authority and legitimacy.

Throughout this long history of European land-based conflict, the more Russia fought, the more its territory expanded, with neighboring adversaries either eliminated or fragmented into small states. This has heightened Russia’s westward ambitions and intensified the defeated parties’ fear of Russia. The Baltic states repeatedly changed hands in power struggles involving Russia and its powerful neighbors; Poland was partitioned four times, including by Russia (and later the Soviet Union). A fragmented Europe, after WWII, had to rely on the distant yet powerful U.S. across the Atlantic to establish NATO — aiming to prevent a third German resurgence and to counter Russia’s long-term strategic pressure.

The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc led the West to continually erode Russia’s strategic space through EU and NATO expansion, undermining Russia’s national confidence and directly triggering conflicts such as the Georgia war, the two Nagorno-Karabakh wars, and today’s Russia-Ukraine war.

Therefore, European countries—whether small nations bordering Russia or traditional powers like Germany, France, and the UK farther from the frontlines—are unlikely to “reward” Russia by ceding Ukrainian territory. Instead, they are resolutely increasing military spending, strengthening defense capabilities, and continuously supporting Ukraine. This is part of a long-term strategy to independently defend Ukraine and Europe if the U.S. eventually betrays its allies completely.

Under such circumstances, Trump’s wishful thinking—hoping to exchange Ukrainian territory for European peace or sacrificing European security interests for U.S.-Russia reconciliation—will inevitably meet with collective resistance from both Ukraine and most European countries.

Of course, the awkward reality is that NATO remains under absolute U.S. leadership. European nations are unable to independently deploy NATO forces to defeat Russia or help Ukraine reclaim lost territory. The idea of an independent European military isn’t even at the stage of being a comforting illusion. Without full U.S. support, Europe becomes a “strategic orphan” composed of many dwarves—fragmented, bloated, and powerless. It can neither act alone nor together to confront a powerful neighbor like Russia. The new reality of Ukraine losing half its territory is also difficult to reverse.

The Trump administration is gradually abandoning leadership of the Western world and relinquishing its dominant position in NATO. Its focus on making America strong alone means it will never bleed to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity or help Europe fulfill its strategic dream of containing Russia. Although the Russia-Ukraine war has entered a new phase of direct negotiations, there is no chance for a win-win outcome. Ukraine and Europe’s best hope at present is to maintain the status quo and wait for the Republican administration to step down, hoping that a Democratic administration will return to the previous hardline policies. Even so, Ukraine and Europe are unlikely to win the war—unless a dramatic internal change occurs in Russia, or the country disintegrates. A united, nationalist Russia remains undefeated, especially not on its own doorstep.

History has long witnessed the power struggles between Russia and Europe. It shows that Russia has never willingly returned land it has occupied or annexed unless it was truly defeated—especially not places like Crimea or the four eastern and southern Ukrainian provinces, which are historically connected and home to many generations of ethnic Russians.

Three years ago, shortly after the Russia-Ukraine war broke out, the author predicted that this century’s war would end with a tragic Russian victory and a disastrous Ukrainian defeat. The forecast was that this continental war involving multiple actors would first become “Afghanistan-ized,” and eventually “Palestinian-ized.” Unfortunately, reality is step by step confirming this prediction.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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