Opinion
Ways to stay in power

General, man is very useful
He can fly and he can kill
But he has one defect: He can think.
(Brecht)
A people on the brink of extinction
An online database called UALosses purportedly tracks Ukrainian casualties based on official Kiev declarations. According to this site, as of January 29th, the total confirmed deaths for the Kiev regime are 68,437. While the overall figure is likely inflated, the age breakdown of the reported deaths is noteworthy. The data indicates the following distribution: 10.2% in the 17-24 age group, 14% in the 25-29 age group, 15% in the 30-34 age group, 17% in the 35-39 age group, 16% in the 40-44 age group, 15% in the 45-49 age group, and 9% in the 50-54 age group. Although the total casualty numbers are questionable, these proportions likely offer a reasonable reflection of the age distribution of losses.
This age distribution suggests a significant depletion of the nation’s most dynamic human capital.
Recently, The Economist, following a trend of estimating the actual casualty figures in the conflict, compiled data from US leaks and official statements. In August 2022, Pentagon leaks suggested total casualties (dead and wounded) of 125,000-131,000. Shortly after, the White House claimed the death toll was under 10,000. By February 2023, the Pentagon estimated 70,000 deaths, while the White House put total casualties (dead and wounded) at 180,000-190,000. After a period of silence from US sources, by autumn of last year, total casualty estimates (dead and wounded) reached 308,000 and then 480,000. The Economist, citing “intelligence officials,” reported up to 100,000 deaths. (Subsequently, the former comedian president of the regime stated the death toll at 31,000.) A financial publication, in a detached manner, proposed different figures: “The proportion of those too seriously wounded to continue fighting is even higher: if one assumes that for every one Ukrainian soldier killed in action, six to eight Ukrainian soldiers are seriously wounded, then one in 20 men of fighting age must have died or been too seriously wounded to continue fighting.”
Let us examine this last estimate more closely. While concrete data is lacking, reasonable assumptions can lead to certain conclusions.
In a previous analysis discussing a potential armistice, I noted, “the Ukrainian population has fallen from around 40 million at the beginning of 2022 to 29 million by mid-2024 according to the best estimates,” and further, “according to Kiev’s own data, 3.2 million people left the country during the year.”
Alexander Dubinsky, a former parliamentarian from the comedian president’s party, arrested for “treason” in late 2023, posted on his Telegram channel last week (Dubinsky, though technically under arrest, appears to be active online based on his frequent updates):
‘If the coefficient of grain consumption (6 million tonnes in 2024) is used to assess the number of the remaining population, the Ukrainian population can be estimated at 21-24 million.’
However, according to official Kiev data, the population by mid-2024 is 35.8 million.
Instead of focusing on the exact number of deaths, let us assume a remaining population of 22 million for calculation purposes. Besides those killed in combat, it’s likely that men constitute the majority of those who have emigrated. Based on this, let’s make an optimistic assumption that 40% of the remaining population is male. Furthermore, for another optimistic estimate, let’s assume the child population is 25%, which is slightly lower than typically seen in population structures (e.g., Turkey’s population pyramid). While we assume an even gender split among children, it’s plausible that more boys have been evacuated. In short, even with these overly optimistic conditions, the adult male population is estimated to be around 7 million.
If, as US leaks from last autumn indicated, the Kiev regime’s casualties total 480,000, this would represent approximately 7% of the adult male population in our optimistic calculation. The Economist’s estimate seems reasonably based, albeit slightly inflated, assuming actual losses are around 500,000. However, if losses approach 1 million, as Russia claimed late last month (General Staff Chief Gerasimov stated on December 18th that total regime losses were 977,000, with 365,000 irreversible), this percentage would double.
In any case, between 7% and 14% of Ukraine’s remaining adult male population have perished on the battlefield or sustained injuries preventing their return to combat.
This situation constitutes a demographic crisis of unprecedented scale.[1]
Ways to stay in power
Sociology offers several approaches to understanding war fatigue. The central aim is to identify a metric that quantifies public dissatisfaction with prolonged conflict. While employing mathematical constants to explain social dynamics is common in sociology, it is not necessarily unhelpful even from a historical perspective. One such approach can be summarized as follows: if, in a country losing war initiative, the sum of (a) the percentage of the population directly or indirectly involved in the war and (b) the percentage of total casualties within that group exceeds 100%, socio-political upheaval is likely. Ranges below this threshold suggest varying probabilities: 80-100% indicates a high likelihood, 60-80% an average likelihood, and below 60% a low likelihood of such upheaval. In Napoléon’s France in 1814, Russia in July 1917, and Imperial Germany in September 1918, this rate surpassed 100%. In Hitler’s Germany in 1945, it exceeded 400%. If we take Ukraine’s current population at 22 million, casualties (dead, seriously or slightly wounded, deserters) at 1 million, and those directly or indirectly participating in military actions for the Kiev regime at 1.5 million, Ukraine’s war fatigue rate would approximate 75%. In 2022, it was around 30%, and in 2023, around 35%.
The precision of such a mathematical approach in historical analysis is debatable, yet the current situation in Ukraine is demonstrably severe, making precise numerical ratios less critical.
The current situation is as follows:
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Kiev regime’s losses in the third quarter of last year in the Kursk direction alone exceeded 40,000. However, official reports from 8 out of 20 regions (oblasts) and 1 special region (Kiev city) still under regime control, representing approximately one-third of Ukraine’s remaining population, indicate the following death tolls for the same period: Vinnitsa 986, Zhytomyr 727, Cherkasy 633, Kiev Oblast 1185, Poltava 809, Kirovohrad 580, Chernigov 632, Sumy 736.
It is evident that the Kiev regime has exerted considerable effort to conceal its losses. While concealing losses might have been simpler through data manipulation in the past, perhaps until the early 2000s, it is considerably more difficult today. The increasing number of families losing contact with relatives at the front makes the actual scale of losses more apparent. Consequently, more sophisticated concealment methods are necessary. The primary tactic employed by the regime is to reclassify the deceased as “missing in action,” thereby excluding them from official death statistics.
A significant threat to the Kiev regime’s stability is internal power struggles. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of Vietnam in the early 1960s: Ngô Đình Diệm, while still in power, was losing US support, foreshadowing his eventual overthrow in a CIA-backed coup and assassination. History, as Marx famously quipped, does not repeat itself identically. As Marx noted, referencing Hegel’s observation, “Hegel points out in one place that great historical events and persons of world-wide significance occur, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as a great tragedy, the second time as a farce.” While the leader of the Kiev regime may be viewed critically, power provides a survival instinct, enabling them to perceive threats. Moreover, unlike Ngô Đình Diệm who relied solely on the US, this regime benefits from the backing of “The City.”
Regardless of potential corruption within the current Kiev regime, it is unlikely they could maintain power through elections. To survive, they must remain in power, and the only way to achieve this is to prolong the conflict. Without the ongoing war, the regime would lack justification for its authoritarian actions, including the suspension of elections.
However, continuing the conflict necessitates further casualties. In a nation experiencing a rapid population decline from 42 million to 22 million in three years, a shrinking pool of potential recruits, and escalating war fatigue alongside growing social unrest, sustaining the war becomes increasingly challenging, even with continued external support in arms, ammunition, and funding. Ultimately, war depends on people, not just materiel and money.
The outcomes of potential ceasefire and armistice negotiations remain crucial (and as I have argued previously, the Kiev regime’s influence is waning, with an armistice primarily offering the West a temporary respite to prepare for a larger conflict). However, even the prospect of negotiations will likely amplify the desire among mobilized Ukrainian citizens to avoid combat and survive. Similarly, the increased possibility of negotiations will diminish the willingness of military personnel to risk their lives for the regime’s objectives.
The regime’s only path to survival is to continue fighting, yet their capacity to do so is diminishing. While the idea of the “last Ukrainian” may be an exaggeration, war fatigue is intensifying and could soon evolve into widespread anger. The fundamental limitation of money, weapons, and ammunition is that people do not want to die.
Dictatorial regimes often resolve seemingly intractable problems through provocation. When faced with overwhelming opposition, a staged provocation can escalate the conflict, potentially securing the regime’s indefinite hold on power.
I began with Brecht, and I conclude with Nazım Hikmet:
“It is like no fear
The fear of those who sell their people.”
[1] In December, Nikita Vasylenko, a professor at Kiev National University, proposed a controversial solution to the demographic issue. This individual suggested that Western peacekeepers could address the population problem, reasoning that “hungry Ukrainians” would find them appealing: “At least 40,000 men with money in their pockets. … And hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian women whose husbands were killed or maimed in the war.” Vasilenko was subsequently dismissed by the university ethics committee but faced no criminal charges. It is plausible that his remarks reflect the underlying sentiments within Ukraine’s ruling elite.