The very poor performance of Biden, the sick man of the White House, in the electoral debates, the uncertainties on the Democratic front and the assassination of Trump have led the world to prepare for the return of Trump to the White House as the US presidential elections approach. Instead of assessing the prospects of the two candidates, political analysts around the world are now analysing possible scenarios in various dossiers on the future of international relations in the event of a Trump return. This situation shows the seriousness of the issue of Trump’s return.
Of course, this issue has also attracted the attention of Iran and its new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the possible effects of Trump’s return on the political future of the Pezeshkian government, Iran’s national security, the course of the country’s economy and regional security are now being discussed in Tehran.
The importance of these discussions for the current government in Tehran was evident in the election debates. Trump’s name was frequently mentioned by various parties, and indeed his actions, the reactions to them and the possibility of his return to power was one of the issues that attracted the attention of the candidates and their supporters in the Iranian presidential election a few weeks ago.
Before discussing Trump’s impact on Iran and the Pezeshkian government, it is worth mentioning the history of Tehran and Trump’s opposition to each other and their place in the collective memory. In Iranian public opinion, Trump represents the revival of memories of maximum pressure and full-scale economic warfare aimed at harming the Iranian people and pressuring the Iranian government. (This is also reflected in Iranian cinema. For example, the film Leila’s Brothers reflects the impact of Trump’s policy of economic repression on the lives of ordinary Iranian people).
During his first presidential term (2017-2021), Trump labelled the Islamic Republic of Iran as a ‘rogue regime’, despite stating that he did not want regime change.RAN has repeatedly criticised the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was negotiated and concluded in 2015 between the US and five other world powers, and finally announced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. The US action came as an incredible shock and blow to the government of Hassan Rouhani, which had based its entire economic and political strategy on the resolution of the nuclear issue and the lifting of related sanctions. After withdrawing from the nuclear deal, the Trump administration implemented a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ through economic sanctions against Iran. Trump had previously imposed a number of new sanctions on Iran by signing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in August 2017, but the policy of maximum pressure imposed an unprecedented number of economic sanctions on the Iranian government and people, numbering in the thousands.
In addition to economic pressure, the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani at Baghdad International Airport in January 2020 on Trump’s orders is another tragic event that the Iranian people remember about Trump. This terrorist act was carried out by the official government of the United States against an official security and military official of the Islamic Republic of Iran who was on an official visit to a third country, and beyond its legal aspects, it created the highest level of tension between the United States and Iran. In response to this American terrorist act, Iran launched a missile attack on the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq, a significant action in the history of international relations since the Second World War.
Hopefully, these events have created a very negative perception of Trump in Iranian public opinion and illustrate the ‘Trump phobia’ that exists in Iranian politics. he anti-Iranian statements of Trump and his deputy, J. D. Vance, in recent weeks have attracted renewed attention in the Iranian media. The main question in Tehran, and perhaps in all countries in the Middle East that could be affected by the mutual policies of Trump and Iran, is what are the possible scenarios for future relations between Iran and Trump?
First of all, despite the dark and unpleasant aspects of the past relations between Iran and Trump, developments such as the change of government in Iran, the changing geopolitical situation in the Middle East, the changing security order in Europe, the changing economic and security behaviour of China in the world and, most importantly, the internal situation in the United States, make it difficult to make a definitive judgement based on the past.
Optimistic scenario: a crisis freeze
If we prefer to take an optimistic view of future relations between Trump and Tehran, we can point to the following: the presence of a reformist president who is open to the West is an important factor that can positively influence developments. In this context, it is noteworthy that one of Pezeshkian’s first actions was to publish an article in English in which he declared his readiness to establish relations with all countries of the world on the basis of mutual respect. Indeed, Pezeshkian’s outspokenness will call into question the legitimacy of Trump’s anti-Iranian actions. rump’s disagreements with the European Union over Russia and the war in Ukraine will make Iran another bone of contention between them. Moreover, key Middle Eastern countries that supported Trump’s anti-Iran policies during his first term in the hope of limiting Iran’s regional power are now taking a different approach to Iran and trying to de-escalate tensions in the region. This may lead Trump to reconsider his anti-Iran policy.
Trump has exhausted everything except the military option against Iran, which has made Iran more prepared. In fact, Trump has implemented all his plans to cripple the Iranian economy and now has no other means to deal a serious blow to Iran, except for actions such as physical attacks on Iranian tankers in international waters. Meanwhile, Iran has developed effective alternatives to all sanctions mechanisms, has become more adept at creating conditions for sanctions evasion, and has increased its economic resilience. This is not to ignore the fact that sanctions have weakened Iran’s economic infrastructure, but it shows that America’s economic blows cannot cripple Iran and that Iran is now in a stronger position to withstand possible blows.
Today, Iran is also at an irreversible stage on the nuclear front. In 2018, Iran had a limited nuclear programme and was only allowed to enrich uranium to 3.67% and have 300 kilograms of uranium reserves under the JCPOA, but now Iran has increased its uranium enrichment rate to 60% with domestically developed centrifuges and could achieve a nuclear weapon within weeks if it so wished.
In addition to completing the cycle of nuclear deterrence, Iran has also achieved deterrence in the missile and drone fields, demonstrating to Trump that it is capable of delivering a direct blow to any threat. Iran’s missile attack on Israel on 13 April 2024 demonstrated Iran’s ability to overcome the most formidable defensive systems, significantly increasing Iran’s deterrent capability.
It is likely that Iran will take steps to soften its stance towards the West in order to deny legitimacy to possible pressure from Trump. Accepting the few remaining conditions of the FATF and being removed from the blacklist or continuing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency could be among Iran’s pre-emptive measures against Trump. The Pezeshkian government’s foreign policy can be expected to be pragmatic and Tehran will take various steps towards détente without undermining Iran’s military deterrence. By sticking to its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA – as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s reports – Iran has gained political and ethical legitimacy while demonstrating that it will not give up its red lines and accept bullying by the other side.
Given these shifting balances, some in Tehran argue that Trump will behave differently towards Iran than in the past, following the rule of measuring profit and loss, and that a period of low tensions with Trump is likely if Iran moves in the direction of playing the political game. In an interview with the Arab media, Ali Abdolalizadeh, Pezeshkian’s campaign manager, said of the possibility of new sanctions if Trump returns to power: ‘In fact, Trump’s presence increases the likelihood of sanctions being lifted because Trump is a trader and we understand the language of trade well’.
Although the words of this Iranian politician may seem somewhat optimistic, the ups and downs of political relations between Tehran and Washington over the past two decades show that the two countries’ relationship is broader than the nuclear issue and that limited negotiations will always remain fruitless due to the unfavourable general political environment between the two sides. Therefore, although the two countries need comprehensive and long-term negotiations, the Iranian side cannot be expected to have hope and confidence based on America’s political behaviour over the past four decades. Therefore, at best, the political situation in Iran and the United States in the Trump era may move towards a crisis freeze.
Pessimistic scenario: The Israeli factor
Faced with such a perspective, it is important not to lose hope, based on the strategic changes of the last four years, that Trump will be able to pursue a policy of de-escalation in Iranian-American relations, but not to lose sight of the fact that Israel is a serious variable in Iranian-American relations. Netanyahu is in the worst political situation after the Gaza crisis and needs the continuation of the conflict and Washington’s support to survive. Playing the victim to gain Washington’s support is an old policy in Israel’s history, but it is still effective, and the only country against which Israel can play the victim is Iran. Therefore, in a bad but very likely scenario, Israel could continue the genocide in Gaza, attack southern Lebanon, strike Iranian strategic targets and force Tehran to intervene militarily against it, raising the level of tension between Tehran and Washington.
It is impossible to analyse American behaviour in the Middle East without taking into account the Israeli variable and its function of compensating for the strategic weakness of the Zionist regime, which makes the situation between Trump and Tehran more complicated.
