Opinion
When the U.S. Plays with Fire, China Watches
In early 2026, less than a week after the Chinese New Year holidays ended, the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran. This was not a sudden event. Judging from the military preparations, the United States had recently concentrated a large amount of military assets in the relevant region. From the perspective of sunk costs, a “quiet withdrawal” had become highly unlikely, making some form of action almost inevitable.
However, compared with the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, the scale of these military assets was still too small. In terms of total troop strength, level of war preparation, as well as logistics and ammunition reserves, they were far from sufficient to sustain a large-scale and prolonged air–sea campaign.
More importantly, today’s Iran is not the Iraq of the past. Iran possesses advantages in military capability, strategic depth, missile technology, and the geographic convenience of potentially blocking the strait. Although there are domestic political dissenters, Iran does not face the kind of fundamental instability that Iraq once had, where a Sunni minority ruled over a Shiite majority.
Therefore, this conflict is unlikely to bring about any fundamental change. Instead, it to some extent exposes the growing difficulty the United States faces in bearing the costs of global military deployment and strategic power projection. And compared with 2003, the United States has undergone more than twenty additional years of deindustrialization. The military consequences of this trend are gradually becoming visible, such as insufficient ammunition production capacity and the difficulty of expanding defense industrial output. For all countries that regard the United States as a potential military opponent, these trends can be seen as strategically favorable signals.
Nevertheless, war itself does not serve China’s interests. China’s long-term objective is to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East, turning the region into a prosperous market and cooperative partner. This approach differs from the Middle East strategies historically pursued by Britain, France, and the United States. Colonial powers traditionally relied on a divide-and-rule approach, creating turmoil and confrontation in order to gain room for further manipulation and profit. China, by contrast, hopes to unlock the enormous economic potential of connectivity through infrastructure development and friendly relations between states.
Over the long run, deeper cooperation and shared economic interests between China and Middle Eastern countries may gradually reduce the excessive U.S. presence in the region that are no longer reasonable. As a global power, it is natural for the United States to have certain interests and a degree of presence in the Middle East. China has never sought to completely exclude the United States from any region. The issue, however, is that the United States maintains its presence in the Middle East primarily to preserve hegemony rather than to defend narrowly defined “national interests”. The United States is geographically distant from the Middle East and has already become a major oil producer itself, no longer worrying about oil supply as it once did. At the same time, it faces serious economic, political, and social problems at home. Under such circumstances, its continued presence in the Middle East increasingly appears as a sign of being trapped by the burdens of hegemony.
Yet the struggle against hegemony has never been something that can be accomplished overnight. It cannot be decided by a small-scale conflict such as this, nor will it reach a final conclusion in 2026. For China, one important bottom line is maintaining the stability of the Iranian state. Judging from the current situation, the possibility of the Iranian regime collapsing is extremely small; it is largely a wishful expectation on the part of the United States and Israel. Therefore, at the present stage, China – as in the past – will not intervene in the conflict in any way except a diplomatic one. Maintaining economic exchanges with Iran, offering political support, and promoting peace and dialogue remain the basic strategy.
The U.S. military decision in this episode has also exposed clear problems. Its overall strategic objectives appear unclear, and the decision-making process seems confused. Although the United States still possesses formidable military strength on paper, it has shown a lack of maturity in strategic planning and execution. In a certain sense, this is not a “qualified opponent.”
The United States may originally have hoped to cripple Iran quickly through a surprise strike before a meeting between the Chinese and American leaders, thereby gaining a strategic advantage. That idea has clearly failed. China’s diversification of oil imports was itself a precaution taken in anticipation of disruptions involving countries such as Venezuela and Iran.
At the same time, however, the United States still strongly hopes that high-level meetings between China and the United States will proceed as scheduled rather than be canceled. Under these circumstances, the United States has effectively fallen into a strategic dilemma.
China, in order to maintain overall stability in Sino-American relations, has shown a certain degree of goodwill. Yet this goodwill also creates a moral risk for China when facing its friends in the Middle East. Iran is a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Although the SCO engages in security cooperation- primarily in areas such as counter-terrorism – it is not a traditional military alliance and carries no mutual-defense obligations like those of NATO. Even so, a scheduled meeting between China and the US would still inevitably appear somewhat awkward.
Given the high expectations that some Middle Eastern friends place on China, a certain degree of “disappointment” may be unavoidable for quite some time. After all, China’s primary military preparations still center on two far more important tasks: ensuring the capability to liberate Taiwan island even if the United States intervenes, and ensuring credible nuclear deterrence against the United States so as not to fall behind in nuclear competition.
What about the future?
From the perspective of military technology, modern air-defense systems and the contest for air superiority have become extremely complex, far beyond Iran’s current missile technologies. If Iran hopes to establish a complete modern air-defense network, it will find it difficult to achieve this entirely through independent development and will have to rely on technological support from countries such as Russia or China.
Yet a truly comprehensive system cannot be built simply by acquiring a few advanced pieces of equipment. It requires massive, long-term, and comprehensive investment. Otherwise, the defensive network will inevitably contain gaps, which could still be exploited by opponents of the level of the United States or Israel. For this reason, China will inevitably remain highly cautious regarding military assistance, avoiding investments that would prove ineffective.
At the same time, Iran as an ancient civilization with a distinctive historical tradition, is unlikely to rely entirely on other countries to construct its security system. The extent of cooperation will also depend greatly or even decisively on Iran’s own preferences.
One question worth considering is whether China might in the future deploy a carrier strike group to the Middle East. For example, if a Chinese carrier group were to enter the Persian Gulf while maintaining an officially neutral stance, yet in practice provide a certain degree of airspace information to Iran, such a presence might offer some assistance to the latter. Of course, the United States and Israel would very likely detect such “pseudo-neutrality,” but precisely that awareness could help restrain their strategic impulses.
Nevertheless, actions of this kind would require consideration of many complex factors. For example, whether they might affect China-India relations. Although China and India have had border tensions, China generally prefers not to provoke India excessively and instead seeks stability in its neighborhood. But the long-term presence of a Chinese carrier group in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf would almost certainly make India extremely uneasy, perhaps even fearful and angry.
In countries operating under Western-style electoral systems, political leaders must often respond to public sentiment, and policies can sometimes appear changeable or unstable. Whether the presence of Chinese carrier groups might provoke an excessive reaction from India is exactly the kind of consideration that would enter China’s strategic calculations.
In such an international environment, China sometimes arguably appears like “the only adult in the room.” The analogy may be controversial, but in its diplomatic decision-making, China often weighs a broader range of long-term and complex factors.
Therefore, even in the future when China’s national strength and military power are greater and the United States has declined further, China may still employ military force with extreme caution, which may continue to “disappoint” many observers.
From a geographic perspective, Iran is not as distant as Venezuela. If China truly needed to project power there, it could do so with considerable effectiveness from a technical standpoint. But at present and likely for some time to come, there is no need to employ that capability.
Perhaps when the decline of the United States reaches a certain stage, after passing through its initial period of strategic anxiety or “Stress reaction phase”, it may come to appreciate the prudence in China’s caution with greater maturity, allowing the two sides to achieve a peaceful strategic rebalancing eventually, including in the Middle East.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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