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Why China will not provide military aid to Iran

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In June 2025, Israel and Iran engaged in a 12-day conflict. During that period, the author was attending an international conference in Istanbul on major-power competition in the Middle East, where many questions were raised about why China does not provide military aid to Iran. Today, as Israel and the United States have once again launched attacks against Iran, this question has resurfaced. In fact, for anyone with an understanding of China’s diplomatic principles, national interests, views on international norms, attitudes toward war, and China-Iran relations, it is not difficult to comprehend why China has adopted such a position. While China will not directly take part in the war against Iran or send troops to fight, it will offer support and fulfill its responsibilities as a major responsible country. At its core, China’s approach is to promote peace talks, provide support without engaging in conflict, and safeguard sovereignty and stability.

I. China’s diplomatic principles determine that it will not provide military aid to Iran.

First, China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, adhering to partnership rather than alliance and not targeting any third party. China has drawn lessons from history, especially the great-power rivalry during the Cold War, where alliances sometimes became liabilities for major powers, dragging them into confrontation and war. Although China and Iran maintain a comprehensive strategic partnership, they are not military allies, and partnership is not equivalent to “alliance” in the Western sense. Therefore, China and Iran have no mutual defense treaty, and China bears no legal or moral obligation to provide military aid.

Second, China strictly abides by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, including non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and opposition to resolving disputes through force. If China were to provide military aid to Iran, it would amount to taking sides and deeply intervening in regional conflicts, which runs counter to the fundamental norms of China’s diplomacy.

II. China’s national interests dictate that it will not provide military aid to Iran.

At present, a key priority for China in the Middle East is advancing the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative. China is well aware that deepening engagement with Middle Eastern countries under the BRI is a vital pathway to further develop China’s western regions, upgrade its opening-up, accelerate Eurasian connectivity, and strengthen the trend of globalization. Therefore, China desires a Middle East that is peaceful, stable, and prosperous. Under no circumstances will China provide direct military aid, as this would escalate conflicts, drive up oil prices, and adversely impact China’s economic and energy security. Furthermore, warfare in the Middle East would endanger China’s overseas assets, disrupt supply chains, and threaten the safety of Chinese nationals abroad.

More importantly, China has no intention of engaging in great-power rivalry with the United States in the Middle East, nor does it seek to replace the U.S. position there. Moreover, while the U.S. maintains numerous military bases and troops across many Middle Eastern countries, China has not a single soldier stationed in the region. Providing military aid to Iran would mean a direct, head-on confrontation with U.S. forces, dragging China into an all-out military rivalry with the United States. This runs completely counter to China’s commitment to strategic autonomy and its bottom line of security.

III. International rules also prohibit China from providing military assistance to Iran.

First, relevant UN Security Council resolutions impose strict restrictions on the transfer of conventional weapons to Iran, and offensive weapons may not be supplied without authorization. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China strictly abides by UN sanctions and arms control policies.

Second, China maintains good relations not only with Iran but also with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Israel in the Middle East. China pursues a balanced diplomatic strategy in the region. It will not deliberately intervene in the Middle East, disrupt the regional balance of power, trigger an arms race and chain reactions of conflicts, and undermine its overall strategic arrangement.

Third, China has always adhered to the three principles of arms export, which prohibit the supply of lethal weapons to conflict zones. China’s three principles on arms exports are statutory criteria enshrined in the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Arms Exports and the Export Control Law, and are among the strictest rules governing global arms trade. They are:1, to contribute to the legitimate self-defense capability of the recipient country; 2, not to impair the peace, security and stability of the region and the world at large; 3, not to interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient country. These three principles are not diplomatic rhetoric, but red-line provisions implemented across the entire chain from approval and production to export and traceability.

IV. The current development of China-Iran relations and Iran’s perception of China also do not support China in providing Iran with unrestricted and all-round support.

First, there are still many pro-Western and pro-U.S. factions within Iran that hold strong illusions about the United States and the West. For many years, Iran has repeatedly hoped to reach new agreements through negotiation and compromise to have sanctions lifted, sometimes even at the expense of China’s interests.

Second, Iran’s current predicament is largely due to its own economic difficulties. Although China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement, under which China sought to deepen bilateral ties through economic cooperation, the implementation and effectiveness of the agreement have been significantly undermined. This is due to Iran’s own problems: it tends to favor European and American enterprises, and also its domestic investment environment carries huge risks.

Third, Iran has long positioned itself as a standard-bearer in the global chessboard, often using cooperation with China as a bargaining chip in its rivalry with the United States. It demands China’s unconditional support for its anti-U.S. stance without fully taking into account China’s overall diplomatic arrangements.

In recent years, the international relations community has frequently discussed the so-called “China-Russia-Iran strategic triangle”. However, due to the huge gaps in national strength and divergent strategic goals among the three countries — especially Iran’s capacity constraints — such a “strategic triangle” is not a realistic concept.

On March 8, 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi answered questions from Chinese and foreign reporters on issues related to “China’s Foreign Policy and External Relations”. In response to questions concerning the situation in Iran, Wang Yi quoted two profound and enlightening ancient Chinese maxims.

One is: “Weapons are instruments of harm and must be used with the utmost caution.” This not only articulates China’s position of advocating a ceasefire and an end to hostilities but also serves as an appeal: for an immediate halt to military operations, to prevent the situation from escalating in cycles, and to avoid the spread of conflict beyond its borders.

The other is: “When benevolence and justice are not practiced, the balance between offense and defense shifts.” This points out that major powers ought to uphold fairness and righteousness, and contribute more positive energy to peace and development in the Middle East.

Recently, there have been calls for China to provide military support to Iran, but these are essentially urging China to fall into a trap that could trigger wider confrontation, even a world war. The situation in the Middle East is highly complex and intertwined, and history is replete with lessons of major-power military intervention. China maintains strategic composure, refuses to be dragged into proxy wars or a new Cold War, and stays committed to resolving issues through the United Nations and multilateral frameworks. This is not weakness; it is wisdom based on long-term considerations and the common interests of all humanity.

The Western debate over whether China is “standing by and letting Iran suffer” reflects a clash between two fundamentally distinct concepts of international relations and approaches to crisis management. One side is accustomed to dividing blocs by force and resolving disputes through military means. The other advocates dialogue over confrontation, partnership over alliance, and win‑win results rather than zero‑sum games. In the war‑torn Middle East, the latter voice may not sound “dramatic” or “radical” enough, yet it is likely the only hope to prevent more bloodshed and help the region break free from the cycle of vendetta and retaliation.

China’s decision not to provide military aid to Iran is a comprehensive embodiment of upholding principles, safeguarding national interests, abiding by international rules, and assuming due responsibilities. This does not mean China will stand idly by amid the crisis facing Iran. Instead, China adopts a stance of “urging peace without entering the war, and supporting without engaging in conflict.” Diplomatically, China has opposed unilateral sanctions and military adventurism on various occasions including the United Nations, and pushed for a ceasefire and negotiations. Economically, China has ensured the stability of energy and trade channels, and used local currency settlement to offset the impact of Western sanctions. Morally, China has firmly supported Iran in safeguarding its national sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests, and opposed external military interference. Such a position not only serves China’s long-term interests but also best contributes to regional peace and stability.

Yang Chen
Associate Professor & Executive Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Shanghai University

Opinion

India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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