Who holds the cards in Trump-Putin talks?

Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the US-based Quincy Institute, spoke to Harici: “What we don’t know is how far Trump is willing to go in terms of really guaranteeing against future NATO expansion. The Russians may also insist on NATO as an organization withdrawing its offer of NATO. Future NATO membership to Ukraine.”

Anatol Lieven is an academic, journalist, and author specializing in international relations and geopolitics. He is particularly known for his deep expertise on Russia, the former Soviet region, and Central Asia. In the 1980s and 1990s, he worked as a war correspondent in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other conflict zones, enriching his analyses with the experience he gained on the ground. He has worked for leading media organizations such as the BBC and The Times, and has closely witnessed the political transformations of the post-Soviet era.

He currently serves as the Director of the Eurasia Program at the US-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, conducting research on Russia’s foreign policy and security strategies. Combining an academic perspective with field experience, Lieven has become a respected authority both in academia and among policymakers. His books and articles are considered important resources for those seeking to understand Russia’s geopolitical position, domestic dynamics, and regional influence.

Anatol Lieven, in an interview with Harici at the Quincy Institute in Washington, answered questions from Tunç Akkoç and Sarp Sinan Hacır.

Of course, we will go into the details of the latest, news, but I first want to take a general, assessment from you about the Ukraine war. What is the current situation on the ground? Who has the more advantages and what are the disadvantages that the both sides have? What is the situation?

The situation in Ukraine at the moment is that the Russians are advancing.They do seem pretty close to capturing the, the important town and base of Pokrovsk. On the other hand, it has taken them a year to get to this position. And of course, numerous casualties because, it’s become a cliche, but contemporary military technology, as in the First World War, but in a new form of mines and drones, strongly favors the defensive.

So, the point is that Russia undoubtedly can capture more Ukrainian territory. But on the evidence so far, this will take a long time and be very costly. Now, on the other hand, as the First World War also demonstrates, you know, you can have a stalemate lasting for years. And then one side collapses and if either side collapses, it’s not going to be the Russians, because, clearly the Russians have a considerable advantage in terms of sheer numbers.

And of course, insecurity of military supply, because whatever, you know, the Europeans may say, it’s quite clear that Western aid to Ukraine is not entirely secure. So I think there is, a motive on both sides to come to a deal, because on the Russian side, you can gain more territory, but how much more territory? And while there is a chance of a Ukrainian collapse, there is absolutely no certainty on the Ukrainian side.

You will lose more territory whatever happens. And there is a risk of complete collapse. So, And of course, up to now, you have had a situation in which the Russian advantage has not been so marked in terms of numbers, because Russia is relying on a well-paid volunteer army, whereas the Ukrainians have been conscripting very large numbers of young men.

But what you now see in Ukraine, is huge resistance to conscription among the population. And according to the latest independent opinion polls, by Gallup. You see, now, a large majority of the Ukrainian population would like an early compromise peace, not surrender, not not giving up completely. But, you know, making a compromise. So I think, the advantage is definitely on Russia’s side at the moment.

When the war began in 2022, the Biden administration aimed to restore Ukraine’s 1991 borders, but a clear strategy never emerged. How did the Biden-Harris administration intend to achieve this goal?

I don’t think that they did, frankly, or at least until late in 2023. There was the hope that the Ukrainian offensive would break through and recapture at least much of the lost territory.

But even then, the CIA itself was warning very strongly against helping Ukraine to reconquer Crimea, because they were afraid that that would lead to nuclear war, that the Russians would resort nuclear weapons. But since the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in 2023, there has really been no realistic chance of Ukraine recovering its lost territories. But the problem was, I think the, the Biden administration and Western governments had nailed themselves publicly and officially so much to this principle of territorial legitimacy that they couldn’t change the policy, even when it was clear that the policy was actually dead.

And, you know, the, the then American chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Milley, actually did say in the autumn of 2023, this is the optimal moment for Ukraine to try and do a deal. It only gets worse from now on. And of course, that is pretty much what has happened.

Recent reports suggest a possible U.S.–Russia deal involving Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbass and referendums in other annexed oblasts, but Russia’s constitution claims these regions as its own. Could such a deal bring lasting peace to Ukraine?

Yeah. Nothing in international affairs is permanent. You know, who can say what the world will look like in even, you know, 50 years, let alone 100. But I think there is a chance because, you know, actually, Russia in, in this constitutional amendment never defined the borders of these provinces. So it is constitutionally open to Russia to say, yes.

We, you know, provisionally, we have what we hold now. And of course, we still claim the whole of these oblasts, but this is open to future negotiation. And the Ukrainians say the same thing. You know, we still claim the whole of these provinces, but we’re willing to negotiate and then probably, you know, as in the case of Cyprus, the negotiations go on forever.

I mean, hopefully, as in the case of Cyprus, unlike, for example, the case of Kashmir, though, we don’t go back to war again. If both sides have got enough of what they need in terms of what they see as their vital interests, and if the costs of returning to war seem too high. But of course, I mean, the thing is, this isn’t only a territorial issue.

And we we have heard that Trump is willing to make this territorial proposal. And I think this is true because without that, I don’t think that Putin would have agreed to come to the negotiating table. What we don’t know is how far Trump is willing to go in terms of really guaranteeing against future NATO expansion, because I think the Russians will not be satisfied simply with a declaration from Trump, which a future American administration can withdraw again, because that’s pretty much what happened to Russia in the 1990s. No, they will want something much more formal now. That will mean, a constitutional amendment in Ukraine restoring neutrality to the Ukrainian constitution. And it will take a lot of pressure from Washington to get the Ukrainian parliament to agree to that. The Russians may also insist on NATO as an organization withdrawing its offer of NATO. Future NATO membership to Ukraine.

Now that will be desperately humiliating for for NATO as an organization, it’s not easy to see how the existing NATO secretary general could remain in office. You know, if that is the the price of it. And that, too would take huge pressure from Trump to bring about. So these questions are open. Then there is the Russian demand for demilitarization, which they’ve never defined in detail.

So there’s plenty of room for compromise there. But we we don’t know what the Russians will demand and what America, let alone Kiev, could agree to.

Well, when you are talking about a peace deal, it always boils down to what’s going on in the ground as well. So when we look into the ground, there are, massive issues with manpower shortages that Ukraine’s suffering from.We are seeing the conscription situation is not in a good spot either, as Zelensky is being pressured into dropping the conscription aged 18, and he’s been resisting so far. If Russia believes Ukraine’s military could collapse within six months, why would it concede on its original demands?

Well, apparently the Russian generals have been telling Putin that, Ukraine will collapse within six months if Russia keeps going. But then the Russian generals have been wrong about so much, you know, have been responsible for so many disasters since the beginning of this war, that it is very hard to see why somebody who is, after all, as intelligent and cynical as Putin would take anything that they say now on trust.

And you see, when it comes to numbers, the crucial thing to remember is that Russia does not actually have such an overwhelming, superiority in numbers because Putin has never dared launch mass conscription in Russia. He is operating with. I mean, and that is a key reason why there has not been more public discontent. While you haven’t seen in Russia the kind of public discontent you see in Ukraine, because, the men going to the army are being very well paid.

This has contributed to a real boom in the economies of the provinces from which they, they come. And he is not, above all, trying to conscript people from Moscow and Petersburg. Now, the question is, I mean, how many more people can Russia recruit while paying these kind of salaries? Without, of course, simply driving inflation through the roof.

So the Russian economy, is also a major factor to continue here because you have had public statements by Russian economic officials warning of the danger of inflation if the war goes on. And obviously Putin is very, very conscious of Russian public opinion and the threat if Russian public opinion turns against him. So I think, you know, there are also serious motives for Putin to seek peace if, of course, he can get a peace that he can represent as a clear Russian victory.

From a military perspective, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine in 2022 based on maneuver warfare, but it quickly failed. They then shifted their doctrine to a Soviet-style approach relying on heavy artillery and slow advances. Over the past 2–3 years, they have lost so many armored vehicles that the army has almost entirely lost its mechanized strength. Still, I believe the Russian military would want a tactical victory on the battlefield that makes a strategic difference, rather than just a war of attrition. If problems in the Ukrainian army persist, do you think the Russians could shift back from an attritional war to maneuver warfare?

Well, it’s possible that. But as you say. I mean, the thing is that, the Russians no longer have the number of tanks that would make this a probability and also of course, drones have radically reduced the importance of and the capability of tanks on the battlefield. Tanks have become extremely vulnerable. So I think there must be grave doubts over this. Now, I’ve assumed and also been told by Russian sources that if, if Russia could conquer the whole of the Donbas, that could be an opportunity for Putin to declare victory, because going further than that means trying to capture really big urban areas.

And we’ve seen in so many different places, not just in the former Soviet Union, but around the world. How very difficult and costly is that?

Is it not also count for like cities like Sloviansk and Kramatorsk?.

They’re much smaller. You know, here you’re talking about cities of 50,000 people, 100,000 people. Zaporizhzhia is a city of 800,000 people. Kharkiv is a city of more than 2 million people.

When you think about the Russian capture of Mariupol at the beginning of the war, that took months. And, of course, in the process, the city was completely destroyed. So and then if you’re talking about Herson, that requires getting across the Dnieper River. Now, if you the sole and it’s very unless, unless the Ukrainian army just collapses completely.

It’s very hard to see that, that that is within Russia’s capability. And so, I mean, if Russia could get the whole of the Donbas through negotiation, I doubt it. Putin is not a military man. If he hadn’t been a military man, Russia might very well not have, you know, experience this disaster. But he’s not I don’t think that he is focused on military glory in this sense if, as I say, but he does need what he can present as a victory, and he is, after all, a quasi dictator, he does control the mass media, not the social media, but television and so forth.

He if he can get enough, he can present this to the to the Russian people as a victory. And if you look at the opinion polls, just as in Ukraine now, according to, Gallup, a large majority of Ukrainians would like peace now, even if it means giving up the hope of recovering the lost territories and perhaps giving up the hope of NATO membership.

So the opinion polls show that a majority of Russians would like peace. Now, even if it means giving up the ambition to capture Herson and Odessa and so on. So I think that, it is within Putin’s capacity to face down his hardliners and reach a deal if, you know, obviously, if the terms of a deal are enough for him. In terms of territory, in terms of NATO membership, above all.

You know, he’s not the president. He’s not. He has no real authority in Russia. He’s a blowhard. He’s allowed to be a blowhard like Putin. But that doesn’t mean he represents Putin. So I think, you know, classic Trump. You bluster, you threaten, and then you try to do a deal. Now the question is, though, we saw that with North Korea in Trump’s first term, and then it collapsed because Trump did not have the concrete proposals.

He was not prepared or possibly even knowledgeable enough. To do a detailed deal with the North Koreans. Could that be the case now with Putin? I hope not. And I think the stakes here for Trump are so high that I hope he will have taken really good professional advice on what he needs to offer. But another point here is that, you know, Trump has declared these, impending hasn’t been imposed yet, sanctioned secondary sanctions against India over Russian oil.

Now a large part of the US security establishment is desperate, desperate to get out of this, because, you know, India has been absolutely central to the whole of U.S. strategy in Asia when it comes to containing China Indians. Also, by the way, have an important lobby, political lobby within America. Now, this threat of tariffs has infuriated Indian public opinion and the Indian government.

It’s deeply embarrassed Modi, you know, who has portrayed himself as a close friend of Trump, and it risks doing really deep and enduring damage if these sanctions go ahead to the Indian economy. And therefore to the US Indian relationship. So, you know, I think you’ve got a lot of people saying, now, look, we we’ve, we’ve we need a deal in Ukraine so that we don’t have to impose these sanctions on India. I think that’s an important, an important point.

One final question on Ukraine situation. So obviously Europe is not on the exactly on the same page with the United States when it comes to Ukraine. And maybe some of the European countries do not mind continuing, the war by by their own support. But in a case where, United States and Russia, are not able to get into a deal, a peace deal, and the United States completely withdraws from all kinds of negotiations and also the military aid as well. Do you think Europe is capable of handling this war by itself?

No, no, I mean, in principle, yes, if you look at the overall size of the European economies, but if you look at the pressure on European budgets, from a combination of economic stagnation, the cost of European rearmament and the need, you know, to maintain, social welfare spending, no, they’re not.

And of course, the key point is that all the existing European governments and establishments are looking over their shoulder. At the populist challenge from the right and the left. And clearly, you know, when you get into a business of severely cutting health services, pensions, social welfare, in order to help Ukraine, you, you will be in a situation in which you are virtually ensuring a victory for the radicals down the line.

And in the end, I think the European establishments will opt for political self-preservation. And that’s also why I think that if some, you know, if Trump is willing to threaten this, in order to get them to agree to a, a Ukraine peace deal, which they will hate, of course, but I think they will have no choice but to fall in line.