Diplomacy
A brief history of US grievances against NATO
US President Donald Trump’s outbursts against NATO allies, claiming “we spend all the money,” left a defining mark, particularly during his second presidential term.
At the 2025 summit in The Hague, member states pledged to allocate 5% of their annual GDP to defense by 2035. This marked a monumental leap from the 2% commitment made at the 2014 Wales summit.
This 5% commitment encompasses two primary categories of defense investment. The first is “core defense requirements”: allies agreed to dedicate at least 3.5% of their GDP to meeting baseline defense needs and fulfilling NATO Capability Targets, based on the agreed definition of NATO defense expenditure.
The second is “defense and security-related expenditure”: under this heading, member states will allocate up to 1.5% of their GDP to broader defense and security-related investments, such as protecting critical infrastructure, defending networks, ensuring civil preparedness and resilience, and strengthening innovation and the defense industrial base.
According to NATO’s own figures, European allies and Canada increased their defense spending by over $90 billion in 2025, representing an approximate 20% increase compared to 2024.
Official NATO reporting also indicates that European nations and Canada have steadily increased their collective defense investments over the past decade: rising from 1.4% of their total GDP in 2014 to 2.3% in 2025, culminating in a total investment of over $571 billion in defense spending this year.
According to NATO statistics, the United States consistently spends upwards of 3.5% to 4% of its GDP on defense. In absolute terms, of course, no single NATO power can match the expenditure of the American military.
Yet the issue of “burden-sharing,” which became highly visible during the Trump era, is not new. Setting aside the debates during the detente periods of the Cold War, American defense spending and public debt began to swell significantly in the late 1990s, spinning out of control in the wake of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Coupled with the rise of China and the US declaration of a military pivot to Asia, this ignited an open debate on how the “security architecture” of the Euro-Atlantic axis would transform.
Bush’s call
Attending the 2008 NATO summit in Romania, then-US President George W. Bush laid out a lengthy list of threats, primarily featuring Iraq and Afghanistan but also spanning Iran and Northeast Asia, before outlining the measures required to shield Europe from “missile threats.”
Bush stated:
“To build a strong NATO Alliance, a strong European defense capability is also essential. Therefore, at this summit, I will encourage our European partners to increase their defense investments to support both NATO and EU operations. America believes that if Europeans invest in their own defense, we will be stronger and more capable when we act together.”
Recently, an article written on behalf of the George W. Bush Presidential Center for the Ankara summit revisited the issue of “burden-sharing.” Authored by Elizabeth Kennedy Trudeau, a former State Department official, the piece references past debates, noting: “Today, it is abundantly clear that the endless debate over burden-sharing is no longer a theoretical issue, and that is also how the public perceives it.”
According to Trudeau, “Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine,” “instability in the Middle East,” “China’s growing ambitions,” and emerging threat domains such as cyber threats, disinformation, and vulnerable supply chains have radically altered the geopolitical landscape. Consequently, NATO must adapt to this new reality.
Pointing out that European allies have increased their defense spending, the author welcomes the Continent’s steps toward assuming greater responsibility for “collective defense,” asserting: “This is not because the United States is pulling away from NATO; rather, a stronger Europe makes this powerful alliance even stronger.”
A sharp rebuke from Obama’s Defense Secretary Gates
However, the most scathing critique directed at the Old Continent from the US came during the presidency of Barack Obama.
In a university address, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates argued that Europeans’ reluctance to employ military force was “limiting NATO’s ability to conduct effective military operations.”
At the time, redrafting the NATO alliance’s core strategic concept was on the agenda. In his speech, Gates called for sweeping reforms within the organization. He remarked that NATO’s success in preventing conflicts from erupting in post-WWII Europe had inadvertently fostered a new set of concerns:
“The demilitarization of Europe—where large swaths of the public and political class are opposed to military force and the risks that go with it—has gone from being a blessing in the 20th century to an obstacle to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st.”
Gates warned that unless NATO members maintained robust militaries and made the necessary budgetary commitments to modernize their forces, Europe would remain vulnerable to threats.
The Secretary stated, “Real or perceived weakness does not merely invite miscalculation and aggression; on a more fundamental level, the resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to act and fight together to confront common threats.”
Defining NATO as “a military alliance with real-world, life-and-death obligations,” Gates noted that the ongoing effort to “rethink and reshape” the alliance’s strategic mission came at a critical juncture.
“Currently, the alliance faces very serious, long-term, systemic problems. NATO’s budget crisis is but one example, and it is a symptom of deeper issues within NATO regarding how threat perception, requirement determination, prioritization, and resource allocation are handled.”
In a speech in Brussels the following year, Gates also criticized Germany for not participating in the NATO airstrikes aimed at toppling Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. He warned that patience was wearing thin in the US Congress toward Europeans who were reluctant to stand “on their own feet”:
“The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the broader American body politic—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”
It is worth recalling that an NBC report at the time remarked, “This assessment could prompt Europeans to question the future of their defense relationship with the US, upon which they have relied for much of their security over the past six decades.”
Moreover, the controversy erupted immediately after the withdrawal of an American combat brigade from Europe as part of a significant reduction in US troop levels on the continent.
During the Q&A session following his address, Gates also remarked that his generation’s “emotional and historical attachment” to NATO was “fading over time.”
Without naming them, Gates delivered a sharp critique of “countries apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to shoulder the growing security burden left by cuts in European defense budgets.”
Warnings from Hillary Clinton
A similar theme was voiced by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton observed, “NATO is turning into a two-tiered alliance, where the proportion of member states willing and able to pay for and bear the burden of collective defense is steadily shrinking.”
Intriguingly, this assessment closely mirrored remarks by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at an annual national conference in Norway, where he noted that “the United States accounts for two-thirds of NATO’s defense spending.”
In her 2010 “Future of NATO” speech, Clinton stated:
“You will also hear this from Secretary Gates: despite historical and entirely understandable reasons why European countries have not yet committed to a level of per capita defense spending—not to the level we would like to see you reach, which is our level, but higher than where most of you are now—we believe this is a subject that must be discussed honestly. Because many of the infrastructure challenges we will face in the confrontation of these new threats—such as energy security or cybersecurity—will require member states to invest more so that we can network through NATO. It will be less about NATO doing the job than about member states coordinating and collaborating with their investments.”
Divergence in Europe
The impact of the 5% spending floor set at the Hague summit varies significantly across European states.
Reuters points out that two distinct groups have emerged since the decision: the first comprises Germany and mostly Nordic and Eastern European countries, which possess the fiscal flexibility to scale up spending; the second consists of several major actors struggling to achieve the same.
Guntram Wolff, a researcher at the economic think tank Bruegel, notes of Europe’s three largest economies after Germany: “The UK, for instance, cannot manage this. Neither can France, nor Italy.”
According to a draft budget obtained by Reuters ahead of Monday’s cabinet meeting, Germany will leverage a rule change exempting defense items from strict borrowing limits, doubling its spending to over 200 billion euros ($228.38 billion) between now and 2030.
Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia—countries where the perception of the Russian threat is most acute—have already made significant strides toward meeting the new targets. Warsaw, in particular, allocated 4.3% of its GDP to defense last year.
On the other hand, this initiative faces steep political and financial hurdles. Last week, Britain announced a plan for £15 billion in additional defense spending, to be partially funded by cuts in other areas.
However, it has emerged that a third of this sum remains unfunded, presenting an early budgetary headache for the presumptive new prime minister, Andy Burnham.
Meanwhile, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is expected to announce at the summit that Rome will increase its core and non-core defense spending to 2.8% of GDP in 2026, despite carrying one of Europe’s heaviest debt burdens.
However, because rising military expenditures are unpopular with many voters ahead of next year’s general election, most of the increase will be covered by domestic security spending, such as policing duties.
France, through detailed plans unveiled in April, aims to increase its defense spending from the current level of around 2% to 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade, all while trying to bring its overall budget deficit into alignment with Eurozone rules. With presidential elections on the horizon, how the Macron administration will generate this surplus remains a matter of curiosity.
The Spanish government, meanwhile, is not expected to waver in its commitment to cap defense spending at no more than 2.1% of GDP. Its plan is to redirect new resources largely toward technologies with civilian applications.
Furthermore, some countries appear to inspire little confidence at NATO headquarters: NATO officials have questioned claims by the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Albania that they have met the old alliance target of 2% of GDP, requesting that these nations revise and resubmit their spending figures.
Diplomacy
Ukraine targets first prototype of European Freyja missile defense system in early 2027
As Ukraine continues to lobby allies for new weapons capabilities to counter Russian missile strikes, the country aims to have a prototype of the Freyja anti-ballistic system, developed in partnership with European allies, ready in the first half of next year.
David Aloyan, deputy secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council and director of the Freyja project, stated—as reported by Reuters—that an international steering committee tasked with calculating research and development costs will meet for the first time in the near future.
The anti-ballistic coalition was officially established two weeks ago at a summit held in the French capital, Paris. The summit was attended by leaders of 10 European nations, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, alongside roughly 12 defense industry contractors.
Providing details on the timeline, Aloyan said: “We have an ambitious goal because we are working on a very tight schedule. We aim to have a viable prototype that can show its first practical results in the first half of next year.”
Ukraine remains chronically dependent on US-made Patriot air defense systems, which are currently the only weapons capable of reliably intercepting Russia’s hypersonic and high-velocity ballistic missiles. However, Patriot deliveries have faced persistent disruptions driven by political fluctuations, low inventory levels, and extended production cycles.
The Russian military intensified its ballistic missile strikes this month against the capital, Kyiv, and the southern port city of Odesa. Facing salvos of dozens of missiles, Ukraine was unable to destroy the majority of incoming targets due to a severe shortage of interceptor munitions.
The Ukrainian government has indicated that it is prepared to contribute a launch vehicle and an interceptor missile to the Freyja initiative. In comments made this month, President Zelenskyy remarked that the project has now become purely a “matter of testing,” expressing hope that the system will become operational within a year.
Kyiv expects its allies to provide specialized expertise and technology in advanced radars, sensors, and missile guidance and control electronics. Defense contractors participating in the project include Eurosam—the consortium behind the SAMP/T system—as well as Leonardo, Thales, and Saab.
Fire Point, the Ukrainian missile and drone manufacturer that developed the Flamingo cruise missile, announced that it will serve as the primary industrial partner for the project. The company disclosed last month that it had reached an agreement with German defense producer Hensoldt to supply the radar components required for the initiative.
The Freyja project stands out as an effort to construct a lower-cost alternative to the Patriot system, on which many European nations also rely. Other European air defense assets, such as the Franco-Italian SAMP/T and the German-made IRIS-T, have not yet demonstrated sufficient operational capability in intercepting ballistic missiles.
Zelenskyy likened the operational framework of the Freyja coalition to a Lego arrangement, in which defense industry leaders assemble interconnected components.
Emphasizing the flexibility of the design, Aloyan noted that manufacturers have been tasked with developing a system architecture featuring interchangeable components, stating:
“The core logic of this system is that it possesses an open architecture. If Denmark says, ‘I want a Freyja system configured with a Danish-made Weibel radar,’ that is possible. If Sweden states that it wishes to integrate a Saab system, that presents no issue either.”
Aloyan added that establishing a dedicated administrative body or fund to direct all project contributions and secure stable, continuous financing remains among the options under consideration.
The Ukrainian official stressed that direct corporate participation alongside sovereign governments would streamline bureaucracy, concluding: “The coalition must advance on practical grounds rather than political ones.”
Diplomacy
US expands Middle East air operations using German bases as regional casualties rise
Germany continues to provide crucial logistical support to the US military as Washington prepares for a major expansion of the war against Iran, utilizing its extensive network of installations across the country.
According to a report by German Foreign Policy, US fighter jets and troops are being routed through Ramstein Air Base—mirroring operations conducted prior to the outbreak of hostilities and throughout the first 40 days of the conflict—where forces remain stationed ahead of an announced wave of heavy airstrikes.
Spangdahlem Air Base is playing an equally vital role in the logistical pipeline. F-16 fighter jets stationed at the site were redeployed last week to staging areas in the Middle East, having returned from combat missions in the region only a few weeks prior.
Meanwhile, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center—the largest US military hospital outside the United States—serves as a critical medical hub. In recent days, approximately one dozen US service members, including several with severe injuries, were evacuated to the facility for treatment.
Medical staffing at Landstuhl has been expanded significantly in anticipation of a further rise in casualties.
Ramstein
The US armed forces are drawing heavily on their military infrastructure in Germany to execute troop concentrations directed at Iran.
Ramstein Air Base near Kaiserslautern—the largest US Air Force installation outside the US and headquarters for US Air Force forces in Europe and Africa—is operating continuously to facilitate the deployment.
Ramstein has long drawn international attention for housing a satellite relay station used to control US military drone operations across Africa, the Near East, and the Middle East.
Data streams for other operational maneuvers are also routed through Ramstein, specifically those serving the war in Iran.
Furthermore, the installation operates as a permanent logistical turnstile for the conflict. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilties, Spanish military aircraft that were denied permission by Madrid to participate in the war effort were rerouted to Ramstein.
In contrast to the Spanish government, Berlin has raised no objections to providing logistical support for the military campaign against Iran.
On Wednesday, a US E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) aircraft landed at Ramstein after departing Robins Air Force Base in the US state of Georgia, before proceeding toward the Middle East.
The aircraft provides real-time relay and tactical coordination between fighter jets and bombers during airborne strike operations.
Spangdahlem
Spangdahlem Air Base, located in the Eifel region, is serving as a key node in reinforcing the US Air Force presence in the Middle East ahead of a comprehensive expansion of the war.
Last week, US F-16 fighters permanently stationed at Spangdahlem were dispatched to the Middle East.
Their movement was complemented by F-35 jets deployed from RAF Lakenheath, northeast of Cambridge, and additional F-16s launched from Aviano Air Base in northeastern Italy.
The Spangdahlem-based F-16s had returned from combat operations in the war zone just weeks earlier.
These aircraft are specialized in Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions, designed to neutralize hostile air defense systems.
David Deptula, a retired US Air Force lieutenant general and dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in Washington, told the US military newspaper Stars and Stripes that deploying fighter jets in such large numbers from all three US Air Force units in Europe to the Arabian Peninsula was highly unusual.
However, Deptula noted that toward the end of the Cold War, the US Air Force maintained nine operational units in Europe rather than three, pointing to a long-term decline in overall force capacity.
Landstuhl
Alongside Ramstein and Spangdahlem, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center—the largest American military hospital outside the US—is being utilized with heightened intensity in connection with the war in Iran.
In recent days, approximately 12 severely wounded US service members were evacuated from Jordan to Landstuhl for specialized care.
The arrivals have drawn public scrutiny, in part because the Trump administration has reported US casualty figures far less frequently than previous administrations.
While the death of US military personnel must be publicly disclosed under statutory requirements, observers in the US note that these requirements do not extend to private military contractors, who constitute a significant share of personnel on US military bases.
Following recent admissions by the Pentagon that three US service members were killed in Iranian strikes near Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, investigations by US news outlets revealed that roughly 100 US military personnel were wounded between June 7 and last weekend.
Material damage from Iranian retaliation
In addition to figures on wounded US military personnel, initial investigative media reports have begun detailing the extent of structural damage inflicted on American weaponry and military infrastructure.
As reported by The New York Times on Wednesday, Iranian forces concentrated their strikes this month on nine locations with a US military presence, down from 18 during the first 40 days of the war.
Muwaffaq Salti Air Base was struck four times. According to the newspaper, drone strikes destroyed three buildings, two hangars, and structures believed to serve as living quarters.
Tower 22, a US military outpost in far northeastern Jordan along the Syrian border, also sustained severe damage.
In addition, hangars and a radar system at two other military bases in Jordan were hit, as was King Hussein International Airport, where US personnel are stationed.
In Bahrain, at least one warehouse was damaged, while a military tent was destroyed at Erbil International Airport in northern Iraq, where US troops are deployed.
Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait was also struck, and a radar system at Ahmad Al Jaber Air Base—which had been operational for only six months—was destroyed.
These incidents represent only a portion of the damage confirmed to date.
Undisclosed US casualties
Beyond Washington’s public statements, preparations behind the scenes are underscored by the recent deployment of more than 150 additional US medical personnel to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center.
Should US President Donald Trump order an expansion of US attacks, officials anticipate a parallel escalation in Iranian retaliatory strikes and a corresponding rise in US casualties.
These casualties will include severely wounded personnel who will be evacuated to Germany for medical treatment.
Servicemen killed in Iranian counterattacks are also likely to be routed through Germany before their remains are repatriated to the US. Flights operated by Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations (AFMAO) carrying fallen personnel from the combat zone to the US routinely make layovers at Ramstein.
This procedure was followed during the recent repatriation of the bodies of four US soldiers killed in the Middle East. Flights from Ramstein to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware reportedly take between nine and ten hours.
Legal implications for Berlin
To expand a war of aggression that violates international law, President Trump has formally announced upcoming US strikes on civilian infrastructure—actions that constitute war crimes.
The announcement of an intent to order war crimes carries serious legal implications for the German government.
Germany continues to allow the US armed forces to utilize military infrastructure on its territory, including Ramstein, Spangdahlem, and Landstuhl, and grants overflight rights without hesitation.
According to Michael Riegner, professor of public law, international law, and comparative law at the University of Erfurt and director of the university’s Global Justice Clinic, the argument that this support carries no legal consequences is untenable.
Riegner argues that limiting Article 26, Paragraph 1 of the German Basic Law strictly to the Bundeswehr is legally unacceptable.
The constitutional clause mandates punishment for “acts tending to upset the peaceful relations between nations, especially an act preparing for a war of aggression.”
Riegner contends that anyone who assists in the execution of a war of aggression is guilty of aiding and abetting an unlawful act.
Diplomacy
Bipartisan lawmakers raise concerns over US-Saudi nuclear agreement
Some lawmakers from both parties are warning that a newly signed US nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia could trigger a regional arms race in the Middle East.
Although the agreement stems from negotiations that began before the outbreak of the war with Iran, Democratic Senator Chris Murphy, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a longtime critic of Saudi Arabia, argued that announcing the deal now would have an immediate impact on the conflict.
“Everything that happens in Riyadh echoes in Tehran,” Murphy said. “One reason the United States was reluctant to offer Saudi Arabia this agreement was that we knew it would move Iran one step closer to a nuclear weapon, and that remains true today.”
Republican Senator John Kennedy said even the possibility that Saudi Arabia could one day enrich uranium would have the potential to rapidly alter the strategic balance in the region and beyond.
“I worry about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, Japan and South Korea,” Kennedy said.
With the Trump administration having already committed to the agreement with Saudi Arabia, the authority to reject it now rests with Congress.
Blocking the agreement, however, will be difficult, as opponents would need to secure a veto-proof two-thirds majority in both chambers.
The 30-year agreement announced on Wednesday allows private US nuclear companies to export to the Saudi market and establishes a framework for US security safeguards.
While the agreement does not guarantee that Saudi Arabia will enrich uranium, and any such capability would likely take at least a decade to develop, members of Congress argue that even this initial commitment could create a domino effect.
Republican Senator John Barrasso, also a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he was concerned the agreement could further complicate US efforts to persuade Iran to abandon uranium enrichment entirely.
“I am deeply concerned about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East because of the consequences it could produce,” Barrasso said.
The United States and Saudi Arabia have spent nearly two decades negotiating an agreement under which Washington would assist Riyadh in developing a civilian nuclear program.
According to two sources familiar with the matter, both the Biden and Trump administrations initially presented the proposal as an incentive for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel.
After the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks on Israel made normalization significantly more complicated, however, the Trump administration decided to separate the two issues.
Asked about the agreement while traveling in the Philippines on Wednesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio dismissed concerns that the arrangement could contribute to nuclear proliferation.
“The United States will not enter into any agreement with any country that creates a risk of nuclear weapons proliferation,” Rubio said.
In announcing the agreement, Energy Secretary Chris Wright said, “Rest assured, these agreements uphold the highest standards of nuclear security and nuclear nonproliferation.”
Saudi Arabia said in its own statement that the agreement is intended to strengthen cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy “in accordance with the highest international standards for nuclear security, nuclear safety and nuclear nonproliferation.”
For decades, the United States has generally avoided allowing new nuclear cooperation partners to enrich uranium domestically, instead insisting on a no-enrichment commitment known as the “gold standard,” most notably in its 2009 agreement with the United Arab Emirates.
Concerns in Washington have also focused on Saudi Arabia’s refusal to sign the document known as the Additional Protocol.
The protocol is an agreement with the UN’s nuclear watchdog that grants inspectors broader access beyond declared facilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities.
That refusal, combined with Saudi Arabia’s potential enrichment capability, leaves the new agreement well short of the “gold standard” established by the 2009 UAE agreement.
Under that agreement, Abu Dhabi accepted such inspections and renounced the right to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium on its own territory.
Critics argue that abandoning both commitments marks a departure from the template Washington has relied on for decades to prevent nuclear proliferation.
The United States announced on Wednesday that it had also reached a bilateral safeguards agreement with Saudi Arabia but did not provide further details.
Republican Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin said he was surprised the administration had negotiated an agreement that could permit Riyadh to enrich uranium, unlike previous US nuclear cooperation agreements.
“What concerns me is the enrichment potential of Iran or Saudi Arabia. But I can also envision a scenario in which it is kept completely under control,” Johnson said.
Victoria Coates, who examined whether the United States could sell nuclear technology to Riyadh while serving as a senior official during the first Trump administration, said the agreement carries risks but that “those risks can be mitigated.”
Now serving at the conservative Heritage Foundation, Coates said, “As long as we monitor the situation closely and have clear visibility into what is happening, I think it is a risk worth taking.”
Republican Senator Mike Rounds said he would not object to Saudi Arabia enriching uranium on its own territory depending on the extent of the enrichment permitted under the agreement.
“It depends on how much they enrich the uranium. If it is 60% or less, that is far above what is needed for civilian purposes. But if we are talking only about enrichment to levels that can be used in nuclear power plants, I have no problem with that. Somebody is going to do it, and it is better that we do it than someone else,” Rounds said.
Under the agreement, the United States and Saudi Arabia will jointly study the feasibility of uranium enrichment within the kingdom.
According to two sources familiar with the agreement, if both sides determine such enrichment is acceptable, it would take place under a “black box” arrangement designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia has long sought to establish its own civilian nuclear program. Some analysts argue that cooperation with the United States would be preferable to Riyadh turning to Moscow or Beijing.
Jonathan Panikoff, a former intelligence official now at the Atlantic Council, said, “Without an agreement with the United States, Riyadh would almost certainly have turned to China or Russia, whose agreements would likely not include the restrictions contained in the US deal. But that does not mean the risks associated with this type of agreement are zero.”
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