Multipolarity has begun to take hold all over the world at a pace that exceeds predictions. As an analyst who has been arguing for years that the unipolar world order under American hegemony would be balanced rapidly, I am happy to see that my predictions have not proven me wrong. Yet I must accept that I could not have foreseen that the effects of the new world order would emerge so rapidly in almost every part of the world. For example, many analysts, not just me, could not foresee that a considerable number of countries from many parts of the world would be so resistant to the impositions of the Collective West, either because they see the end of the US-centered unipolarity coming or because they want it to end. While I think/express that moving away from the U.S. dollar in foreign trade would be an expected development, I must admit that I did not expect it to be materialized in such concrete steps.
THE IRAN-SAUDI ARABIA DÉTENTE: CHINA’S DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS
One of the most important developments that I did not foresee was the starting of the comprehensive normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, thanks to China’s mediation. For decades, relations between Iran, on the eastern side of the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia, on the West Bank, have been an area of bitter rivalry. These tense and at times hostile relations were not a phenomenon that emerged with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. For instance, even in the 1960s and 70s, when both Iran and Saudi Arabia were very, very close friends/allies of the United States, relations between the two states were extremely tense and competitive. When the Shah of Iran wanted to build a large and powerful army, the U.S. told him, “Take what you want, except nuclear,” while Saudi Arabia, which was in competition with Iran in those years, continued to be America’s very close regional ally. While Iran under Shah established fairly close relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia was an active member of the Egyptian-led anti-Israel Arab Bloc countries until Nasser took a direct part in the Yemen civil war against it.
The Islamic Revolution (1979) further deepened tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. During the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), which lasted eight years due to Khomeini’s policy of ‘exporting the revolution’, Arab countries, which had previously had disagreements among themselves due to many issues, came together to form a united front against Tehran. Despite Iran’s gradual abandonment of its regime-export policies after Khomeini’s death, and despite occasional efforts at normalization between Tehran and Riyadh, the crisis of trust between Saudi Arabia and Iran has persisted. The policies pursued by the United States after its invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran’s efforts to gain influence by interfering in the internal affairs of both Iraq and the Gulf Arab countries, made the crisis of trust between Riyadh and Tehran permanent. America and its allies, who want to keep the Iranian leadership under constant pressure, have done their best to keep this crisis of trust perpetuated. On the one hand, they have sold large quantities of arms to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates, while on the other hand, they have tried to bring these countries closer to Israel and create a common front against Iran by claiming that they are protecting them against Iran. Admittedly, these policies have served American and Israeli interests in the Middle East for decades.
The fact that the normalization of the Riyadh-Tehran line with the help of Chinese diplomacy seems to have a positive outcome, despite the fact that it is conditional on Iran’s non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries in the Gulf, especially those with Shia Arab populations (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) and its willingness to compromise in the Yemeni civil war (this also applies to the Saudis), means that the order that America has established in this region for decades will be disrupted. Saudi Arabia’s move away from the U.S. dollar in oil sales seems to herald a completely different milestone. The first visible consequence of all this is that U.S. influence in the Middle East is beginning to decline. It will be necessary to keep a close eye on how this will affect Israel’s policies in the region, because even though the Arab countries that have normalized their relations with Iran are concerned about Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, they will not act as Israel’s natural allies against Iran in the short and medium term.
AS SYRIA RE-ENTERS THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM…
Another area where the decline of U.S. regional influence and prestige, which is already a result that can be expected as the world evolves into multipolarity, is clearly seen is the Syrian issue. The Arab countries are normalizing their relations with Damascus one after the other; it seems that there are not many states in the region that take seriously America’s oppression and blackmail aimed at isolating Syria. Expecting Syria to join the Arab League in a short period of time is now a very realistic scenario. Almost no country in the region takes seriously the U.S. sanctions that condemn the Syrian people to hunger and poverty, and there is a global consensus that the Damascus administration has won the war, even though the U.S. and Western states do not officially admit it…
Türkiye’s comprehensive recovery moves in its foreign policy over the last two and a half years will enable it to adapt to the extraordinary developments and new balances in the region today. For example, if we thought for a moment that we were in tense/stormy relations with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Syria, Greece and even France to the extent that we could enter an armed conflict at almost any moment, as in the second half of 2020, we would be extremely staggered by what happened today. We have taken relations with all the states except Greece and Syria to the point where they should be again, and we have clearly declared our will to normalize relations with Damascus.
The lack of sufficient progress on Syria, despite President Erdoğan’s repeated calls for normalization since early August 2022, may be related to the fact that some stereotypes in the minds of our institutions and senior officials have become obsessions. For example, the statements of senior officials such as the political settlement process, the new constitution, and the reconciliation of the opposition and the ‘Syrian regime’ reflect a perspective that does not want to accept the fact that Syria has won this war. Aside from the impossibility of imposing a new constitution on Syria, which has a national-unitary structure, it is not possible to understand the insistence on these theses when it is clear that even if such an attempt is successful, it will drag the neighboring country into a federal structure and will be the beginning of the division in a world where ethnic/sectarian federations are collapsing or cracking, and it will be possible for the PKK/PYD to become a state in the east of the Euphrates. As we discussed in detail in our previous article in Harici (https://harici.com.tr/suriye-ile-normallesme-hem-kolay-hem-de-cok-zor/), normalization with Syria is both very easy and very difficult.
It all starts with adopting a policy based on national interest and accepting the existing facts. When we put aside policies that are both wrong/erroneous and do not serve the national interest, such as imposing a constitution on Syria, the right options will emerge. In the normalization process, which has not progressed sufficiently due to the bureaucracy’s foot-dragging for months, at least the fact that top officials no longer insistently use poisonous/repellent words such as reconciliation between the regime, the opposition and the regime, the constitution and the political solution process can be considered an important and positive start. It seems that the problem is now centered on Syria’s demand for guarantees that we should withdraw from territory under Turkish control, as has been widely hyped in the media. This is again a question of whether to accept the existing facts. Since we have not gone to Syria to conquer territory, we should withdraw. The problem can be solved by setting a realistic timetable and integrating these regions into Syrian sovereignty step by step while Turkish security forces are there. If Türkiye adopts a policy of sending the refugees, jointly fighting terrorism on the basis of the Adana agreement (both the PKK/PYD and its derivatives and terrorist organizations against Syria) and ensuring that the TRNC is recognized by Damascus…
In a multipolar world, we will need nuanced foreign policies in the Middle East, as in many other regions. For example, to show that while we have good relations with Israel, on the other hand, we will not be part of the competition/hostility policies of this country against Iran or the ideological based anti-Israelism of the Tehran administration while we are in close relations with Iran… To establish as close economic and political relations as possible with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States while at the same time benefiting from their normalization process with Iran and trying to improve our foreign trade and economic relations with all these states… While expressing the legitimate rights of Palestinians and providing political/diplomatic support to the demands of the Arab states for Palestinians from Israel, to achieve this without breaking the connection with Israel… And to strive mainly for the Middle East to be a region of peace and stability, within which Türkiye will provide the most benefits in terms of trade and investment. A foreign policy based on these nuances will make Türkiye strong in the region, while isolating Greece and forcing Athens to gradually move away from its maximalist demands because of the decline in the power of the United States and the Collective West. There is no doubt that Türkiye has more than enough power and human resources to do so.
