Opinion
Developments in the Middle East and opportunities for Türkiye in a multipolar world
Multipolarity has begun to take hold all over the world at a pace that exceeds predictions. As an analyst who has been arguing for years that the unipolar world order under American hegemony would be balanced rapidly, I am happy to see that my predictions have not proven me wrong. Yet I must accept that I could not have foreseen that the effects of the new world order would emerge so rapidly in almost every part of the world. For example, many analysts, not just me, could not foresee that a considerable number of countries from many parts of the world would be so resistant to the impositions of the Collective West, either because they see the end of the US-centered unipolarity coming or because they want it to end. While I think/express that moving away from the U.S. dollar in foreign trade would be an expected development, I must admit that I did not expect it to be materialized in such concrete steps.
THE IRAN-SAUDI ARABIA DÉTENTE: CHINA’S DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS
One of the most important developments that I did not foresee was the starting of the comprehensive normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, thanks to China’s mediation. For decades, relations between Iran, on the eastern side of the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia, on the West Bank, have been an area of bitter rivalry. These tense and at times hostile relations were not a phenomenon that emerged with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. For instance, even in the 1960s and 70s, when both Iran and Saudi Arabia were very, very close friends/allies of the United States, relations between the two states were extremely tense and competitive. When the Shah of Iran wanted to build a large and powerful army, the U.S. told him, “Take what you want, except nuclear,” while Saudi Arabia, which was in competition with Iran in those years, continued to be America’s very close regional ally. While Iran under Shah established fairly close relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia was an active member of the Egyptian-led anti-Israel Arab Bloc countries until Nasser took a direct part in the Yemen civil war against it.
The Islamic Revolution (1979) further deepened tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. During the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), which lasted eight years due to Khomeini’s policy of ‘exporting the revolution’, Arab countries, which had previously had disagreements among themselves due to many issues, came together to form a united front against Tehran. Despite Iran’s gradual abandonment of its regime-export policies after Khomeini’s death, and despite occasional efforts at normalization between Tehran and Riyadh, the crisis of trust between Saudi Arabia and Iran has persisted. The policies pursued by the United States after its invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran’s efforts to gain influence by interfering in the internal affairs of both Iraq and the Gulf Arab countries, made the crisis of trust between Riyadh and Tehran permanent. America and its allies, who want to keep the Iranian leadership under constant pressure, have done their best to keep this crisis of trust perpetuated. On the one hand, they have sold large quantities of arms to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates, while on the other hand, they have tried to bring these countries closer to Israel and create a common front against Iran by claiming that they are protecting them against Iran. Admittedly, these policies have served American and Israeli interests in the Middle East for decades.
The fact that the normalization of the Riyadh-Tehran line with the help of Chinese diplomacy seems to have a positive outcome, despite the fact that it is conditional on Iran’s non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries in the Gulf, especially those with Shia Arab populations (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) and its willingness to compromise in the Yemeni civil war (this also applies to the Saudis), means that the order that America has established in this region for decades will be disrupted. Saudi Arabia’s move away from the U.S. dollar in oil sales seems to herald a completely different milestone. The first visible consequence of all this is that U.S. influence in the Middle East is beginning to decline. It will be necessary to keep a close eye on how this will affect Israel’s policies in the region, because even though the Arab countries that have normalized their relations with Iran are concerned about Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, they will not act as Israel’s natural allies against Iran in the short and medium term.
AS SYRIA RE-ENTERS THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM…
Another area where the decline of U.S. regional influence and prestige, which is already a result that can be expected as the world evolves into multipolarity, is clearly seen is the Syrian issue. The Arab countries are normalizing their relations with Damascus one after the other; it seems that there are not many states in the region that take seriously America’s oppression and blackmail aimed at isolating Syria. Expecting Syria to join the Arab League in a short period of time is now a very realistic scenario. Almost no country in the region takes seriously the U.S. sanctions that condemn the Syrian people to hunger and poverty, and there is a global consensus that the Damascus administration has won the war, even though the U.S. and Western states do not officially admit it…
Türkiye’s comprehensive recovery moves in its foreign policy over the last two and a half years will enable it to adapt to the extraordinary developments and new balances in the region today. For example, if we thought for a moment that we were in tense/stormy relations with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Syria, Greece and even France to the extent that we could enter an armed conflict at almost any moment, as in the second half of 2020, we would be extremely staggered by what happened today. We have taken relations with all the states except Greece and Syria to the point where they should be again, and we have clearly declared our will to normalize relations with Damascus.
The lack of sufficient progress on Syria, despite President Erdoğan’s repeated calls for normalization since early August 2022, may be related to the fact that some stereotypes in the minds of our institutions and senior officials have become obsessions. For example, the statements of senior officials such as the political settlement process, the new constitution, and the reconciliation of the opposition and the ‘Syrian regime’ reflect a perspective that does not want to accept the fact that Syria has won this war. Aside from the impossibility of imposing a new constitution on Syria, which has a national-unitary structure, it is not possible to understand the insistence on these theses when it is clear that even if such an attempt is successful, it will drag the neighboring country into a federal structure and will be the beginning of the division in a world where ethnic/sectarian federations are collapsing or cracking, and it will be possible for the PKK/PYD to become a state in the east of the Euphrates. As we discussed in detail in our previous article in Harici (https://harici.com.tr/suriye-ile-normallesme-hem-kolay-hem-de-cok-zor/), normalization with Syria is both very easy and very difficult.
It all starts with adopting a policy based on national interest and accepting the existing facts. When we put aside policies that are both wrong/erroneous and do not serve the national interest, such as imposing a constitution on Syria, the right options will emerge. In the normalization process, which has not progressed sufficiently due to the bureaucracy’s foot-dragging for months, at least the fact that top officials no longer insistently use poisonous/repellent words such as reconciliation between the regime, the opposition and the regime, the constitution and the political solution process can be considered an important and positive start. It seems that the problem is now centered on Syria’s demand for guarantees that we should withdraw from territory under Turkish control, as has been widely hyped in the media. This is again a question of whether to accept the existing facts. Since we have not gone to Syria to conquer territory, we should withdraw. The problem can be solved by setting a realistic timetable and integrating these regions into Syrian sovereignty step by step while Turkish security forces are there. If Türkiye adopts a policy of sending the refugees, jointly fighting terrorism on the basis of the Adana agreement (both the PKK/PYD and its derivatives and terrorist organizations against Syria) and ensuring that the TRNC is recognized by Damascus…
In a multipolar world, we will need nuanced foreign policies in the Middle East, as in many other regions. For example, to show that while we have good relations with Israel, on the other hand, we will not be part of the competition/hostility policies of this country against Iran or the ideological based anti-Israelism of the Tehran administration while we are in close relations with Iran… To establish as close economic and political relations as possible with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States while at the same time benefiting from their normalization process with Iran and trying to improve our foreign trade and economic relations with all these states… While expressing the legitimate rights of Palestinians and providing political/diplomatic support to the demands of the Arab states for Palestinians from Israel, to achieve this without breaking the connection with Israel… And to strive mainly for the Middle East to be a region of peace and stability, within which Türkiye will provide the most benefits in terms of trade and investment. A foreign policy based on these nuances will make Türkiye strong in the region, while isolating Greece and forcing Athens to gradually move away from its maximalist demands because of the decline in the power of the United States and the Collective West. There is no doubt that Türkiye has more than enough power and human resources to do so.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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