Opinion
Earthquake diplomacy with Greece, but how?
It is beyond all praise that Greece immediately sent rescue teams and humanitarian aid in the wake of the devastating disaster in Türkiye. No doubt it is also encouraging that Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias visited the region to offer condolences and that the Greek press adopted a more responsible publication strategy, helping to calm the tensions that had been rising between the two countries in recent months. The statements of good neighborliness, collaboration, and solidarity made by Greek authorities, particularly Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a substantial shift in attitude on the part of Athens and Premier Mitsotakis has already pointed to that change clearly.
1999 EARTHQUAKE DIPLOMACY EXPERIENCES
All these suggest that the Greek side expects a new earthquake or seismic diplomacy. After the two countries rushed to each other’s aid during the Gulf Earthquake in Türkiye in 1999 and the earthquake that followed in Athens, friendship and collaboration blossomed, and efforts were made to first manage the problems between the two countries and then find solutions. The efforts that began at that time and tragically floundered in the Türkiye-European Union process became fruitless since Ankara was forced to make huge concessions as if it were going to become an EU member because the process itself was toxic.
This process’s goal was not to get Türkiye into the European Union but to trick Ankara into thinking it would join in exchange for significant concessions, notably over the disputed territories of the Aegean and Cyprus. This process was highly risky in terms of downgrading crucial concerns of Turkish foreign policy since the government in those years sorely required the support and permission of the EU for its domestic efforts/initiatives to change/transform Türkiye. Thank God, the process ended before Türkiye took any tangible and lasting damage. As the late Denktaş pointed out, the Cypriot Greek-Greek fanaticism and avarice also contributed to the situation. After all, not much was achieved by the earthquake diplomacy of that period because the problems were not handled within the framework of bilateral relations and in line with common interests. In the process that Greece used its EU membership, and the other countries happily agreed to be in cahoots with it, Greece’s issues with Türkiye became the criteria that Türkiye had to satisfy to join the EU in a fashion that had nothing to do with the EU Acquis.
Therefore, when they open their mouths, all Greek officials take great pleasure in reminding Türkiye of its obligations on the Aegean and Cyprus. About two years ago, showing off in Ankara, The Greek foreign minister was calling attention to the criteria created in this EU process while explaining what Türkiye should do regarding the Aegean and Cyprus crises. He was saying the right things for himself.
THE EU PROCESS DID NOT AIM TO MAKE TURKIYE A MEMBER
While I worked at a university in Ankara, I often invited ambassadors based in the city as well as high-ranking diplomats and politicians visiting the country to deliver talks to students. Ms. Dora Bakoyannis, the elder sister of Greece’s current Prime Minister, Mitsotakis, was one of the speakers I invited to come directly from Athens. Attracting attention with her well-educated and friendly demeanor, Ms. Bakoyannis graced and participated in this series of conferences held for students, faculty, and media members in the fall of 2014. She insistently called for Türkiye to return to the toxic EU process, from which Türkiye seemed to have moved away in those years. Even though she failed to persuade many people in the room at the time that EU membership was not a pleasant issue, especially in Greece, battling with a devastating financial and economic crisis, she had given the right advice in line with her country’s foreign policy interests.
At that time, when the expectations that Türkiye would completely give up its rights in Cyprus, abandon the Turkish Cypriots, and accept the Greek theses in the Aegean were extremely high, I still remember some EU ambassadors saying, “We all know that it is not able to become a member of the EU, but we believe we can settle the Cyprus problem by persuading Türkiye as if it would happen” as I stated in my article, ‘Turkey would be better off outside the EU,’ published in the Financial Times and our exchange of views.
A RETURN TO THE EU PROCESS IS HARMFUL
Those days are gone. Türkiye has no interest in the EU process, which is based entirely on deception. Yet, the EU’s polish has been severely tarnished by the financial and economic depressions that have hit several member states since 2008. Almost everyone agrees that the EU’s political integration business in a multipolar world has largely fallen into disrepair. It would be foolish to attempt to restart negotiations for Türkiye’s EU membership at this time while also letting Greece find faults with us.
Keep in mind that Greece is not vainly willing to kickstart a fresh Türkiye-EU process by using the current outpouring of support for the earthquake victims in Türkiye. They need to de-escalate the tension that they fueled in recent months as if they might be able to gain military superiority over Türkiye in the Aegean, and that has risen after Ankara has paid back with interest, because in a multipolar world, there is no longer, or less than before, a guarantee that NATO or America will stop a Turkish-Greek conflict even at the last minute.
There is a buzzword: NATO played a role in dissolving the Soviet Union and preventing a Turkish-Greek conflict. It is correct because if we take a historical and strategic view, for example, could Athens stand this much against Ankara in a multipolar world order where there is no bipolarity and NATO-Warsaw Pact military rivalry? At a time when the potential for a conflict was growing, Greece would have been far more open to finding solutions via bilateral dialogue. The interwar period is roughly a good example. In sum, the United States and NATO successfully prevented a conflict between Türkiye and Greece, but tensions between the two countries have escalated to the point of becoming intractable owing to maximalist Greek policies and the EU carrot it used against Türkiye. Opportunities were wasted for the sake of “acting dignified and responsible” when Türkiye did not respond from within NATO to the veto threat of Athens against the EU’s determination to expand to Eastern Europe after the Cold War if the Greek Cypriot side’s application for EU membership is not evaluated under the name “Republic of Cyprus” and representing the whole island.
However, when the EU approved or was about to accept the Greek Cypriot side’s application, Türkiye might have warned that any Eastern European country willing to join NATO should first recognize the TRNC and establish embassies; otherwise, it would block their entry. The process would be frozen because these countries cannot join the EU without NATO membership. Either the Greek Cypriots’ bid for membership would be put on hold, or a Cyprus solution would be accomplished in line with the Turkish thesis. However, it did not happen since the promise of EU membership has always lulled Türkiye. Let’s also not forget the almost psychological-warfare-like writings and comments made by influential members of the media, academia, and others instrumental in this process.
Nowadays, new earthquake diplomacy with Greece is not a terrible idea, but combining it with the Türkiye-EU process might lead to significant complications. As a result, everyone has gathered to throw a few blows to a Türkiye that is taken into the fist range of the EU. We can defend neither a two-state solution in Cyprus nor our rightful arguments in the Aegean. Sweden is pleased with this process since the EU will require that we ratify the NATO membership pact; otherwise, our EU membership will be blocked. France exerts pressure on us to accept the Armenian genocide slanders, and it does everything it can to head off the political fallout of the war Azerbaijan won decisively. They transform our nation into a haven for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants and drive us to abandon our peace efforts with Syria. The previous earthquake/seismic diplomacy made us forget how Greece was caught red-handed while supporting the terrorist organization PKK. This time, Türkiye’s advantages as a mid-size powerhouse in a multipolar world, able to exert influence in multiple regions, would be lost in the EU’s garbage dump.
As it turns out, they are not needed. In a multipolar world, it will not be in their own interests for Greece and the Greeks to pursue hostile policies against Türkiye. A two-state solution in Cyprus would allow Greece to export natural gas and oil to Türkiye, and a clear demarcation of the Aegean Sea’s borders would be beneficial to future plans for Athens. It is important to highlight the positive outcomes of the cooperative management of hydrocarbon reserves, including in the tourist industry and many others. If we get into the EU trap, we will not even attempt to put any of them into words.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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