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In the first year of the intervention in Ukraine; the West and the Rest

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The first year of the Russian Federation’s intervention, justified by Article 51 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, has come to an end following the military tensions that started at the Ukrainian border, accompanied by the rejection of the Minsk agreement approved by the UN Security Council and the rejection of the two treaty proposals to the U.S. and NATO. The outlook for the international relations system is blurry. Having established a monopoly to unilaterally violate international law arbitrarily and in line with its interests through its military power, the U.S. is now facing a challenge from Russia,  after touching their sore point both historically and politically this time.

It is clear that the U.S. has consolidated its hegemony in Europe within a year, thanks to the crisis it started in Kiev in 2014 by triggering a civil war with a coup d’etat, which was interrupted under Donald Trump and then reignited with the return of the Democrats to power. But as the conflict has steadily escalated by mobilizing NATO, a front of ‘disobedience’ or ‘reluctance’ emerged in the rest of the world. While the ‘collective West’ is engaged in what it calls a ‘life-and-death war’ for its neoliberal economic and political model, the rest of the world does not seem to ‘embrace’ this perspective.

At the UN General Assembly, countries that have seen violations of international law in the last 30 years by the West, especially the United States, have condemned the Russian Federation for its military actions in Ukraine. There are analyses that draw attention to the size of the population represented by the countries that voted against or abstained in the symbolic votes at the General Assembly. It is debatable how meaningful this is. Whether they agree with the condemnation or abstain, countries that disagree with the unilateral economic sanctions of the United States and the EU, which do not have UN approval, present a more striking picture. In an environment of continued U.S. dollar-based fiscal hegemony, this is forcing the ‘collective West’ to threaten to ‘put pressure on those who try to remain in the two camps, maintaining trade ties with both Russia and the West.’ This situation is so reminiscent of the ‘you are either one of us or one of them’ approach adopted after 9/11 attacks by the Bush administration while carrying out its military actions in the invasion of Iraq, based on false intelligence.

In the Western media, there is an ongoing view that is formulated as ‘The West and the Rest.’ In particular, the concept of ‘multipolarity’, which the U.S. has been pursuing with reckless disregard in recent years, seems to have accelerated.

‘THE WORLD IS EITHER NEUTRAL OR LEAN TOWARDS RUSSIA’

‘The West and the Rest’ formula has been the subject of a lot of research in the past year.

Cambridge University researchers ‘matched’ data from surveys conducted in 137 countries in the eight months following the start of Russia’s military intervention on February 24, 2022, they came up with an interesting result. According to the study published in late October 2022, 66 percent of the 6.3 billion people living outside the West think positively about Russia and 70 percent think positively about China. 75 percent of participants in South Asia, 68 percent in Francophone Africa, and 62 percent in Southeast Asia express a ‘positive sentiment’ towards Russia.

The research yielded similar results in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Vietnam.

Of course, Cambridge researchers analyzed the results from the perspective of the division between the ‘liberal and democratic world’ and the ‘illiberal and anti-democratic world’. In Germany, it does not seem that people question how this conflict that leads to criminal laws that prosecute people for their opinions can be put into a ‘liberal’ framework.

In late January, The Economist published a graphic map of the world’s stance on the conflict in Ukraine. According to the newspaper, two-thirds of the world’s population tends towards either neutrality or Russia’s position. The reasons for this are, of course, controversial. The newspaper was based on GDP and population ratios. According to GDP, those who condemn Russia form 61 percent. The West-leaning camp accounts for 9.3 percent. The neutral form 10.1 percent. 16.8 percent represent Russia-leaning camp. 2.6 percent support Russia. On the population chart, those who condemn Russia form 16.1 percent. The West-leaning camp accounts for 20.3 percent. The neutral form 32.1 percent. 27.6 percent represent Russia-leaning camp. 3.9 percent support Russia.

The headline of the report illustrates that ‘the small number of Russian supporters’ is not a consolation. At this point, commentators appear to be sniffling at the Rest which ‘may represent more than half of the world’s population, but they make up the underdeveloped and poor half.’ And, of course, ‘the combined GDP, economic power and geopolitical weight of the West’ is highlighted, which ‘far outweighs the influence of countries that refuse to condemn intervention and impose sanctions on Russia.’

The latest report, released on the occasion of the Munich Security Conference held on February 17-20, found that countries, which make up half of the world’s population based on their positioning, oppose the isolation of Russia. Many governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America are reluctant to take action against Russia and isolate it both economically and diplomatically, the report said.

Clearly, this shows that the aforementioned states are prioritizing their own economic interests and conditions, which have become more challenging after the pandemic. Developing countries face many challenges, ranging from high debt costs and the climate crisis that has created environmental devastation, to poverty, food shortages, drought and high energy prices. For example, while the geography called ‘Global South’ has repeatedly asked for the sharing of the intellectual property rights of vaccines to save lives during the pandemic, none of the Western states seemed interested. On the other hand, Russia, China, and India rushed to the aid of many from Algeria to Egypt and from African countries to Argentina. It should also be considered that the West’s ‘colonial past’ still linger in memories. The West may try to wash it away, but today we are looking at a picture in which former colonial powers have reunited as members of the Western alliance on the front against Russia.

CLAMPING DOWN

The unilateral embargoes imposed by the U.S. and the EU on Russian oil and gas have affected not only Russia, but also some countries and companies that trade with Russia and supply energy and food products from Russia. For some, it yielded lucrative results. Hazal Yalın, author and researcher focusing on Russia, points to the capital outflow from Russia over the course of a year, while highlighting the huge decline in natural gas and oil revenues. However, he says, the West has not succeeded in destroying Russia’s economy. Indeed, the Central Bank of Russian Federation has managed to support the value of the ruble and keep the financial markets stable. In this sense, Yalın believes that the European economy is more deeply affected.

Two examples can be given from Continental Europe: Germany and the United Kingdom that has left the union with Brexit.

At the end of January, the IMF estimated that the UK economy would shrink and be worse than other advanced economies, including Russia, as the cost of living continued to hit households. The UK is projected to shrink by 0.6 percent, making it the only country in the G7 to shrink. Of course, the IMF thinks Britain is ‘on the right track.’

In Germany, Marcel Fratzscher, head of the Institute for Economic Research (DIW), said about 100 billion euros had been lost in 2022 due to the conflict in Ukraine. Surely, the recession debates take place but the industrialized vanguard of Europe and the world, Germany, will not ‘sink.’ But there are costs to losing cheap energy. According to Allianz Trade, German industry will pay 40 percent more for energy than before the crisis. Although the crisis was prevented and the electricity bills were controlled, the outlook of the German economy is described as ‘bleak.’ Allianz Trade says that rising labor costs and tighter financing conditions are putting more companies under pressure, especially in sectors exposed to energy and input prices, in response to improved expectations with increased government support. He finds the fear that the crisis will create ‘deindustrialization’ exaggerated.

The outcome will ‘not be the deindustrialization of Europe, but the militarization of European industry and its political consequences,’ Hazal Yalın anticipates. In fact, all evaluations fail to mention the ‘acceleration in the war industry.’ The West is not worried about this trajectory, but the fact that, as the New York Times put it, ‘Moscow is able to escape Western punishment with the help of its friends.’

All countries that impose an embargo on Russia are either members of the EU and NATO or close allies of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast, most countries in Asia (excluding Japan, South Korea and Singapore) and all countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America (excluding the Bahamas) have good relations with both sides.

French historian Emmanuel Todd told Le Figaro, “If the Russian economy shows long-term resistance to Western sanctions, the European economy will perish. The ability of the United States to finance monetary control over the world and the massive trade deficit will collapse.”

This extravagant assessment aside, if the neocon administration in the U.S. tends to ‘clash on two fronts’ and insists on a tough stance against China, it is of course difficult to predict the results soon.

DEMOCRACY-AUTOCRACY DUALITY

The ideological and psychological repercussions of economic and political upheavals are inevitable. At the beginning of the Russian intervention, U.S. President Joe Biden said that the West would turn Russian President Vladimir Putin into “a pariah” in the international plan. However, this does not seem to have happened for the better part of the world. Russia has developed diplomatic ties with countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America over the past year. In his latest interview with the newspaper Liberation, EU Council President Charles Michel said that these countries have not forgotten Soviet Russia’s support in the fight against colonialism, and also still remember Western interventions in Iraq and Libya. Just Iraq and Libya? What about Syria and, even earlier, the breakup of Yugoslavia, which redrew the map of Europe, and its last link, Kosovo? As you know, Kosovo is still part of Serbia, based on the rules of UN law referenced in the Ukraine conflict today.

While the Western bloc presents the Ukraine conflict through the dichotomy of ‘democracy vs. autocracy’, masking geopolitical and socio-economic objectives, the principled inconsistencies, coupled with economic conditions, present a striking picture. Let’s take a look at regions.

ASIA’S ‘DISOBEDIENT STATES’

The People’s Republic of China, which refrained from condemning Russia at the UN Security Council, has accelerated economic relations with Russia in the last year. Bilateral trade volume exceeded 170 billion dollars. The ‘Power of Siberia’ natural gas pipeline agreement is signed. Beijing imports oil from Russia and also sells Siberian liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe. China, the U.S. administration’s ‘next target’, is openly promoting the slogan of ‘multipolar globalization,’ while rejecting accusations that it has/will ‘supply arms’ to Russia.

Over the course of a year, China’s political discourse has also gradually sharpened. Beijing, which initially emphasized that it “understands the complex and historical causes” of the Ukrainian crisis, is now openly telling the world that “the United States is the biggest factor that started and fueled the Ukrainian crisis.” In calling for peaceful negotiations on the first anniversary of the conflict, the Chinese government unveiled a vision that emphasizes “the protection of the sovereign rights of all countries,” “the indivisibility of security,” and “the suspension of unilateral sanctions.” The tension in the rhetoric challenging the U.S. narrative never lets up.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said: “The US is the biggest saboteur of the international order. The rules-based international order claimed by the US is, in essence, a hegemonic order in which the US dominates the world.” Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, who attended the Munich Security Conference and gave clear messages to the U.S. and Europe, described Russia-China relations as “rock solid” in Moscow. In his meeting with Putin, he emphasized their support for “multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations,” adding that “China is ready to work with Russia to maintain strategic resolve, deepen political mutual trust, strengthen strategic coordination, expand practical cooperation and defend the legitimate interests of both countries, to play a constructive role in promoting world peace and development.”

China’s support for Moscow in the Security Council for the investigation of the September 26, 2022 terrorist attack on the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, details of which were revealed by Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, is also particularly noteworthy. China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Chiang Tyun, who has repeatedly reiterated China’s commitment to take the lead in building strategically important infrastructure facilities globally and to ‘spread development around the world,’ called for an objective, impartial and professional investigation to ‘find those responsible.’ Referring to the environmental impact of the attack as well as its repercussions on global energy markets, he reminded the UN of its ‘responsibility.’ “If we fail to identify all the circumstances and those responsible for the destruction of Nord Stream-2, it will provide even more opportunities for the conspirators,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang said, all the more remarkable given U.S. President Biden’s threat at the beginning of the crisis that “if Russia invades, we will finish Nord Stream-2.” Indeed, when Nord Stream-2 was exploded, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called it a ‘tremendous opportunity’ to get rid of Russian resources, while Victoria Nuland, the architect of the 2014 coup in Kiev, expressed satisfaction that the pipeline was ‘a pile of metal at the bottom of the sea.’ Radoslav Sikorsiy, Poland’s former defense and foreign minister and current member of the European Parliament, wrote on Twitter, “Thank you, USA,” accompanied by a photo of the explosion reflected on the surface of the sea after the September 26 attack.

In Asia, not only China, which the U.S. sees as a rival, but India, which it sees as an ally against China, is of course more important. India is the country where the U.S. has formulated its Asia-Pacific strategy as ‘Indo-Pacific’ based on its name. New Delhi abstained from the UN General Assembly vote against Russia. One of the most important buyers of discounted Russian oil. India’s Minister for Petroleum, Hardeep Singh Puri, said they had no disagreements with Moscow and it was their ‘moral duty’ to buy Russian oil to lower energy prices in the country. But it’s not just that. New Delhi buys a significant amount of weapons and ammunition from Russia. And it can remain ‘free’ from U.S. sanctions. India is also opposed to discussing new sanctions against Russia at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023.

India is balancing its relations with China through Russia, while continuing its Cold War tradition of ‘non-alignment-neutrality’ policy. Finally, it is noteworthy that it has recently started discussing border issues with Beijing, including mutual troop withdrawals.

India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, recently said that “I think it would not be fair today to reduce a very complex issue, the Ukraine conflict to a binary of are you on this side or that side. Are you for peace or for war?”

“Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems,” he added.

The other countries of Southeast Asia do not seem to be convinced of the anti-Russian sentiment either, despite the intense campaign at the ASEAN summit and the G20 summit sessions last November.

RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The situation in the Middle East seems to be in Russia’s ‘favor’ at the end of the year. Moscow is in contact with Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), their rivals such as Iran and Syria, and all countries in the region, including Israel.

Although most Arab countries condemned Russia’s military intervention in the first UN vote, the Arab League with 22 member states did not do so later. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed the Arab League during a visit to the region at the end of July 2022. Many Arab countries abstained from removing Russia from the Human Rights Council. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt did not impose sanctions on Russia. “The Gulf states continue to conduct an open dialogue with Russia and consider it necessary to maintain contacts,” the Saudi Foreign Minister stressed.

Riyadh embodied this attitude on the economic front through OPEC+. They rejected the U.S. president’s request to increase oil production. Instead, they imported Russian oil for domestic use and/or for ‘blending oil in refineries’ to export more of their own production. They said their assessment was entirely based on ‘market conditions’. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman did not answer Biden’s calls. The U.S. President paid a visit to the prince ‘personally,’ whom he had previously vowed to ‘make a pariah’. The case of Jamal Khashoggi, the man who ‘symbolized’ the liberal ideological principles of the U.S. Democrats in recent years, had to be buried.

The UAE adopted a similar attitude to the Saudis. In fact, trade volume with Russia increased by 68 percent to $9 billion in 2022.

ISRAELI LEADER REVEALS THAT THE WEST IS UNDERMINING PEACE

Israel, which is the backbone of U.S. Middle East policy, did not join the sanctions even though it condemned Russia’s intervention. There is a large Russian immigrant population in Israel. While liberal public opinion leaned toward the Banderist regime in Kiev, which openly embraced a historical legacy that ironically played a role in the Jewish genocide, the government refrained from supplying weapons.

It is not yet clear what kind of policy Israel’s new Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will pursue, who has struck a balance of “non-conflict” with Russia in the face of the imminent threat they have seen in the region in previous years. However, Naftali Bennett, who had been prime minister until recently, revealed that although Kiev and Russia were ready for the mediation trial in March 2022, the solution was completely ruled out by British leader Boris Johnson and blocked by the leaders of the U.S., Germany and France.

BORRELL’S ‘AFRICAN JUNGLE UNABLE TO THINK INDEPENDENTLY’

Britain’s Financial Times reported that at the last Munich Security Conference, the West tried but failed to align African countries against Russia. For many African countries, Russia is seen as the successor to the Soviet Union, which supported them during their anti-colonial struggles.

South Africa, a member of the BRICS Group and the continent’s leading country, has not joined the condemnation of Russia at the UN and is currently holding joint exercises with China and Russia. Russia is favored in the country of legendary leader Nelson Mandela, who said that the Soviet Union’s material and moral support inspired him to overthrow the apartheid regime.

Countries such as Ghana, Mali, Sudan, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Uganda and Mozambique have seen the political and economic support of the former Soviets. The Russian Federation is somehow considered to be an ‘ideological successor.’ For example, in 2022 and at the end of January, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov organized quite colorful African tours. He was greeted with national songs and dances at the Pushkin monument in Asmara, Eritrea. In African countries, banners read: “Putin, come and save us.” The EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, who last October compared ‘Europe to a garden and the rest of the world to a jungle’ and was criticized for ‘racism,’ this time claimed that ‘the African mind is not thinking straight because of manipulation’ following the attention Lavrov received during his visit to Mali. Speaking on February 18 at the African Union summit in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, Uganda’s Foreign Minister Jeje Odongo responded to this view: “We were colonized and we forgave those who colonized us. Now, the colonizers are asking us to be enemies of Russia, who never colonized us, is that fair? Not for us: their enemies are their enemies, our friends are our friends.”

Last year, Macky Sall, President of Senegal and the African Union, blamed Western embargoes for the food crisis, while today Russia is negotiating with many African countries to switch to trade in national currencies. The results of the U.S. administration’s December summit on Africa are yet to be seen. The State Department has even produced a video that could be seen as interference in the Nigerian elections, ‘starring’ Secretary Blinken, USAID head Samantha Fox and the ‘black’ Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US permanent representative to the UN.

THE VEIN OF LATIN AMERICA

Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba, where leftist governments are on the target of the United States, have been on the side of Russia, their traditional allies, from the very beginning. However, the region’s two strongest countries, Brazil and Mexico, as well as Argentina, which wants to join the BRICS, and Colombia, did not take a stand against Russia beyond a symbolic condemnation at the UN General Assembly and criticism of general principles.

Instead of the United States, Germany mobilized to convince the Latin front. However, Prime Minister Olaf Scholz returned empty-handed from visits to Brazil, Argentina and Chile, unable to persuade these countries to provide military aid to Kiev. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Ecuador had received Russian-made MiG transport helicopters and in some cases Russian surface-to-air missiles or anti-tank missiles, which are compatible with those of the Ukrainian army. But Latin leaders see the conflict differently from the West.

Brazil’s neofascist Jair Bolsonaro administration, which the United States paved the way for by intervening directly in its democracy during the 2016-2018 period, was on the side of those who condemned Russia in two UN resolutions last year, but did not participate in sanctions against the most important fertilizer supplier. Lula da Silva, the leftist leader who succeeded Bolsonaro after being exonerated and re-elected after being wrongfully imprisoned with the overt intervention of the U.S. Justice Department, was outspoken in his criticism of Scholz and then French President Macron: “Brazil has no interest in handing over ammunition that can be used in the war between Ukraine and Russia. Brazil is a country of peace. Our last disagreement was in the Paraguayan war, and that’s why Brazil doesn’t want any participation in this war, even indirectly. Because I think right now we need to find someone in the world who will seek peace between Russia and Ukraine. So far, peace has hardly been on the agenda. In other words, Brazil has decided not to provide this ammunition. Because we don’t want this ammunition to be used in the war against Russia.”

Lula then reiterated his stance of ‘neutrality’ during his visit to Washington on February 10. According to Brazilian sources, his message to Biden was, “No one wants this war to continue. The parties should form a negotiation team. I don’t want to join the war, I want to end it.” Of course, Lula, who survived  the coup attempt on the 8th day of his new term in power, which began on January 1, 2023, has to establish the balance within his country. He has already been accused of playing the ‘Robin Hood’ role by US-linked financial power groups. He is also facing criticism from The Economist over its plans with Argentine President Alberto Fernandez for a ‘bizarre common currency’ for the continent.

Argentina’s leader Fernández also refused to send arms to Kiev in return for his country’s poor financial situation.

But in fact, the attitude of the Social Democratic President, who took office in August 2022 of Colombia, which has been the right-wing stronghold of the United States in Latin America for years, is more interesting. “Even if they end up as scrap in Colombia, we will not hand over Russian weapons to be taken to Ukraine to prolong a war,” Colombia’s leftwing president Gustavo Petro responded “We are for peace.”

Chile’s left-liberal President Gabriel Boric, reflecting his country’s sentiment, said he condemned Russia’s invasion, even though ‘some media and opinion leaders believe that interfering in the politics of other countries is a bad decision.’ But he only offered Kyiv help with clearing mines.

Mexico’s leader, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, took the lead. In March 2022, a meeting of the Russia Friendship Group was held in the lower house of the Mexican Congress, while Obrador called for ‘neutrality’ and a ‘peaceful solution’ throughout the year. He condemned the intervention at the UN, but in his meeting with Biden in July 2022, he stated that Mexico would adhere to the foreign policy set out in its constitution, which includes ‘the principles of self-determination.’ He rejected the embargo on Russia. Without mentioning NATO and the United States, he described the policy of ‘I will supply the weapons, you will supply the dead’ as ‘immoral.’ And finally, commenting on Berlin’s decision to send Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine under U.S. pressure, “Media power is used by the oligarchies in the world to subjugate governments. Germany, for example, did not want to get too involved in the war with Ukraine. They finally gave in” he said.

The neutral stance of Latin America, which has been hit by the increase in global energy and fertilizer prices, is clear. Celso Amorim, who served as foreign minister in the past Lula governments and is still an effective advisor, says Brazil’s reasons are not related to the need for fertilizer. According to Maria Angela Holguín, Colombia’s former foreign minister, the Ukrainian conflict has brought back unwanted memories of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in Latin America. In fact, Holguin said, these countries think that Russia and China could be useful to them in the near future.

THE NEW NON-ALIGNED ERA?

Inflationary pressures and fears of recession are affecting much of the world. The rich West may be able to afford the cost of the embargo on Russia but the rest is struggling. These concerns affect their attitudes.

Of course, the dollar’s reserve currency status is still the pillar of the global economic order. However, the embargoes, the ‘arming’ of the international banking and insurance sectors, including the SWIFT system, the confiscation of assets, and the commodity agreements that had to be canceled are ‘watched with concern.’ Again, many countries are facing currency depreciation, while ways to trade with local currencies are being discussed. The ‘rest of the world‘ facing the West is already weighing the risks of a conflict in which they have no say.

The West’s long-standing ‘war on terror’ rhetoric, the controversial occupation of Iraq, the collapse and fragmentation of Libya and Syria, and the chaotic retreat of the U.S. and NATO and leaving the country to the Taliban after 20 years of fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan are all remembered.

It is noteworthy that the West, which has been marketing liberal interventions around the world for 30 years on the themes of ‘minority rights’, ‘mother tongue rights’, ‘autonomy’, ‘freedom of thought and expression’, has returned to ‘state sovereignty’, which they themselves have violated many times, by referring to the Russians and the Russian-speaking population of Donbass, bombed for eight years for refusing to accept the coup, as ‘Ukrainians’ in the Ukrainian crisis. The poor record of the alleged ‘principles’ is unlikely to go unnoticed. Global propaganda supremacy, accompanied by a heavy ‘iron curtain’ of censorship justified by ‘protecting’ their own communities, is not enough to erase Banderism, which stands out as Kiev’s official ideology. The narrative of ‘Russia woke up one day and suddenly invaded its neighbor’ turns into a tasteless ‘fast food.’ While the Zelensky regime is destroying millions of Russian-language books in the country in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi era, the rest of the world is baffled by the justification in the West for attacks on Russians and Russian culture, from vodka to cats, Tchaikovsky to Dostoevsky. In these circumstances, in light of economic realities and historical experiences, it is only natural that ‘the rest of the world’ sees multipolarity as a ground where its voice will be heard more.

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Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France

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The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.

In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.

Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.

Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.

The shadow of 17 October 1961

It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.

Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.

This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.

To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?

Looters on the streets, where are the police?

Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.

While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.

It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.

To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?

The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.

A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges

The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.

The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.

The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.

These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.

The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.

In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.

An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands

Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.

Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.

To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.

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What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?

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By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.

The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.

There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.

For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.

Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.

Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.

There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.

For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.

Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?

Let us give another example from the Turkic world.

On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?

We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?

Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.

In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?

In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?

Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?

How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?

Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?

How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?

Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?

These questions can certainly be multiplied.

Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.

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The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East

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In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.

In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.

Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.

Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.

A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East

On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.

These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.

If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.

Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.

Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.

For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.

The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again

The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.

Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.

The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.

Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.

Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.

Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.

Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.

In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.

In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.

Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.

A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.

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