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In the first year of the intervention in Ukraine; the West and the Rest

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The first year of the Russian Federation’s intervention, justified by Article 51 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, has come to an end following the military tensions that started at the Ukrainian border, accompanied by the rejection of the Minsk agreement approved by the UN Security Council and the rejection of the two treaty proposals to the U.S. and NATO. The outlook for the international relations system is blurry. Having established a monopoly to unilaterally violate international law arbitrarily and in line with its interests through its military power, the U.S. is now facing a challenge from Russia,  after touching their sore point both historically and politically this time.

It is clear that the U.S. has consolidated its hegemony in Europe within a year, thanks to the crisis it started in Kiev in 2014 by triggering a civil war with a coup d’etat, which was interrupted under Donald Trump and then reignited with the return of the Democrats to power. But as the conflict has steadily escalated by mobilizing NATO, a front of ‘disobedience’ or ‘reluctance’ emerged in the rest of the world. While the ‘collective West’ is engaged in what it calls a ‘life-and-death war’ for its neoliberal economic and political model, the rest of the world does not seem to ‘embrace’ this perspective.

At the UN General Assembly, countries that have seen violations of international law in the last 30 years by the West, especially the United States, have condemned the Russian Federation for its military actions in Ukraine. There are analyses that draw attention to the size of the population represented by the countries that voted against or abstained in the symbolic votes at the General Assembly. It is debatable how meaningful this is. Whether they agree with the condemnation or abstain, countries that disagree with the unilateral economic sanctions of the United States and the EU, which do not have UN approval, present a more striking picture. In an environment of continued U.S. dollar-based fiscal hegemony, this is forcing the ‘collective West’ to threaten to ‘put pressure on those who try to remain in the two camps, maintaining trade ties with both Russia and the West.’ This situation is so reminiscent of the ‘you are either one of us or one of them’ approach adopted after 9/11 attacks by the Bush administration while carrying out its military actions in the invasion of Iraq, based on false intelligence.

In the Western media, there is an ongoing view that is formulated as ‘The West and the Rest.’ In particular, the concept of ‘multipolarity’, which the U.S. has been pursuing with reckless disregard in recent years, seems to have accelerated.

‘THE WORLD IS EITHER NEUTRAL OR LEAN TOWARDS RUSSIA’

‘The West and the Rest’ formula has been the subject of a lot of research in the past year.

Cambridge University researchers ‘matched’ data from surveys conducted in 137 countries in the eight months following the start of Russia’s military intervention on February 24, 2022, they came up with an interesting result. According to the study published in late October 2022, 66 percent of the 6.3 billion people living outside the West think positively about Russia and 70 percent think positively about China. 75 percent of participants in South Asia, 68 percent in Francophone Africa, and 62 percent in Southeast Asia express a ‘positive sentiment’ towards Russia.

The research yielded similar results in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Vietnam.

Of course, Cambridge researchers analyzed the results from the perspective of the division between the ‘liberal and democratic world’ and the ‘illiberal and anti-democratic world’. In Germany, it does not seem that people question how this conflict that leads to criminal laws that prosecute people for their opinions can be put into a ‘liberal’ framework.

In late January, The Economist published a graphic map of the world’s stance on the conflict in Ukraine. According to the newspaper, two-thirds of the world’s population tends towards either neutrality or Russia’s position. The reasons for this are, of course, controversial. The newspaper was based on GDP and population ratios. According to GDP, those who condemn Russia form 61 percent. The West-leaning camp accounts for 9.3 percent. The neutral form 10.1 percent. 16.8 percent represent Russia-leaning camp. 2.6 percent support Russia. On the population chart, those who condemn Russia form 16.1 percent. The West-leaning camp accounts for 20.3 percent. The neutral form 32.1 percent. 27.6 percent represent Russia-leaning camp. 3.9 percent support Russia.

The headline of the report illustrates that ‘the small number of Russian supporters’ is not a consolation. At this point, commentators appear to be sniffling at the Rest which ‘may represent more than half of the world’s population, but they make up the underdeveloped and poor half.’ And, of course, ‘the combined GDP, economic power and geopolitical weight of the West’ is highlighted, which ‘far outweighs the influence of countries that refuse to condemn intervention and impose sanctions on Russia.’

The latest report, released on the occasion of the Munich Security Conference held on February 17-20, found that countries, which make up half of the world’s population based on their positioning, oppose the isolation of Russia. Many governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America are reluctant to take action against Russia and isolate it both economically and diplomatically, the report said.

Clearly, this shows that the aforementioned states are prioritizing their own economic interests and conditions, which have become more challenging after the pandemic. Developing countries face many challenges, ranging from high debt costs and the climate crisis that has created environmental devastation, to poverty, food shortages, drought and high energy prices. For example, while the geography called ‘Global South’ has repeatedly asked for the sharing of the intellectual property rights of vaccines to save lives during the pandemic, none of the Western states seemed interested. On the other hand, Russia, China, and India rushed to the aid of many from Algeria to Egypt and from African countries to Argentina. It should also be considered that the West’s ‘colonial past’ still linger in memories. The West may try to wash it away, but today we are looking at a picture in which former colonial powers have reunited as members of the Western alliance on the front against Russia.

CLAMPING DOWN

The unilateral embargoes imposed by the U.S. and the EU on Russian oil and gas have affected not only Russia, but also some countries and companies that trade with Russia and supply energy and food products from Russia. For some, it yielded lucrative results. Hazal Yalın, author and researcher focusing on Russia, points to the capital outflow from Russia over the course of a year, while highlighting the huge decline in natural gas and oil revenues. However, he says, the West has not succeeded in destroying Russia’s economy. Indeed, the Central Bank of Russian Federation has managed to support the value of the ruble and keep the financial markets stable. In this sense, Yalın believes that the European economy is more deeply affected.

Two examples can be given from Continental Europe: Germany and the United Kingdom that has left the union with Brexit.

At the end of January, the IMF estimated that the UK economy would shrink and be worse than other advanced economies, including Russia, as the cost of living continued to hit households. The UK is projected to shrink by 0.6 percent, making it the only country in the G7 to shrink. Of course, the IMF thinks Britain is ‘on the right track.’

In Germany, Marcel Fratzscher, head of the Institute for Economic Research (DIW), said about 100 billion euros had been lost in 2022 due to the conflict in Ukraine. Surely, the recession debates take place but the industrialized vanguard of Europe and the world, Germany, will not ‘sink.’ But there are costs to losing cheap energy. According to Allianz Trade, German industry will pay 40 percent more for energy than before the crisis. Although the crisis was prevented and the electricity bills were controlled, the outlook of the German economy is described as ‘bleak.’ Allianz Trade says that rising labor costs and tighter financing conditions are putting more companies under pressure, especially in sectors exposed to energy and input prices, in response to improved expectations with increased government support. He finds the fear that the crisis will create ‘deindustrialization’ exaggerated.

The outcome will ‘not be the deindustrialization of Europe, but the militarization of European industry and its political consequences,’ Hazal Yalın anticipates. In fact, all evaluations fail to mention the ‘acceleration in the war industry.’ The West is not worried about this trajectory, but the fact that, as the New York Times put it, ‘Moscow is able to escape Western punishment with the help of its friends.’

All countries that impose an embargo on Russia are either members of the EU and NATO or close allies of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast, most countries in Asia (excluding Japan, South Korea and Singapore) and all countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America (excluding the Bahamas) have good relations with both sides.

French historian Emmanuel Todd told Le Figaro, “If the Russian economy shows long-term resistance to Western sanctions, the European economy will perish. The ability of the United States to finance monetary control over the world and the massive trade deficit will collapse.”

This extravagant assessment aside, if the neocon administration in the U.S. tends to ‘clash on two fronts’ and insists on a tough stance against China, it is of course difficult to predict the results soon.

DEMOCRACY-AUTOCRACY DUALITY

The ideological and psychological repercussions of economic and political upheavals are inevitable. At the beginning of the Russian intervention, U.S. President Joe Biden said that the West would turn Russian President Vladimir Putin into “a pariah” in the international plan. However, this does not seem to have happened for the better part of the world. Russia has developed diplomatic ties with countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America over the past year. In his latest interview with the newspaper Liberation, EU Council President Charles Michel said that these countries have not forgotten Soviet Russia’s support in the fight against colonialism, and also still remember Western interventions in Iraq and Libya. Just Iraq and Libya? What about Syria and, even earlier, the breakup of Yugoslavia, which redrew the map of Europe, and its last link, Kosovo? As you know, Kosovo is still part of Serbia, based on the rules of UN law referenced in the Ukraine conflict today.

While the Western bloc presents the Ukraine conflict through the dichotomy of ‘democracy vs. autocracy’, masking geopolitical and socio-economic objectives, the principled inconsistencies, coupled with economic conditions, present a striking picture. Let’s take a look at regions.

ASIA’S ‘DISOBEDIENT STATES’

The People’s Republic of China, which refrained from condemning Russia at the UN Security Council, has accelerated economic relations with Russia in the last year. Bilateral trade volume exceeded 170 billion dollars. The ‘Power of Siberia’ natural gas pipeline agreement is signed. Beijing imports oil from Russia and also sells Siberian liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe. China, the U.S. administration’s ‘next target’, is openly promoting the slogan of ‘multipolar globalization,’ while rejecting accusations that it has/will ‘supply arms’ to Russia.

Over the course of a year, China’s political discourse has also gradually sharpened. Beijing, which initially emphasized that it “understands the complex and historical causes” of the Ukrainian crisis, is now openly telling the world that “the United States is the biggest factor that started and fueled the Ukrainian crisis.” In calling for peaceful negotiations on the first anniversary of the conflict, the Chinese government unveiled a vision that emphasizes “the protection of the sovereign rights of all countries,” “the indivisibility of security,” and “the suspension of unilateral sanctions.” The tension in the rhetoric challenging the U.S. narrative never lets up.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said: “The US is the biggest saboteur of the international order. The rules-based international order claimed by the US is, in essence, a hegemonic order in which the US dominates the world.” Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, who attended the Munich Security Conference and gave clear messages to the U.S. and Europe, described Russia-China relations as “rock solid” in Moscow. In his meeting with Putin, he emphasized their support for “multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations,” adding that “China is ready to work with Russia to maintain strategic resolve, deepen political mutual trust, strengthen strategic coordination, expand practical cooperation and defend the legitimate interests of both countries, to play a constructive role in promoting world peace and development.”

China’s support for Moscow in the Security Council for the investigation of the September 26, 2022 terrorist attack on the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, details of which were revealed by Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, is also particularly noteworthy. China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Chiang Tyun, who has repeatedly reiterated China’s commitment to take the lead in building strategically important infrastructure facilities globally and to ‘spread development around the world,’ called for an objective, impartial and professional investigation to ‘find those responsible.’ Referring to the environmental impact of the attack as well as its repercussions on global energy markets, he reminded the UN of its ‘responsibility.’ “If we fail to identify all the circumstances and those responsible for the destruction of Nord Stream-2, it will provide even more opportunities for the conspirators,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang said, all the more remarkable given U.S. President Biden’s threat at the beginning of the crisis that “if Russia invades, we will finish Nord Stream-2.” Indeed, when Nord Stream-2 was exploded, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called it a ‘tremendous opportunity’ to get rid of Russian resources, while Victoria Nuland, the architect of the 2014 coup in Kiev, expressed satisfaction that the pipeline was ‘a pile of metal at the bottom of the sea.’ Radoslav Sikorsiy, Poland’s former defense and foreign minister and current member of the European Parliament, wrote on Twitter, “Thank you, USA,” accompanied by a photo of the explosion reflected on the surface of the sea after the September 26 attack.

In Asia, not only China, which the U.S. sees as a rival, but India, which it sees as an ally against China, is of course more important. India is the country where the U.S. has formulated its Asia-Pacific strategy as ‘Indo-Pacific’ based on its name. New Delhi abstained from the UN General Assembly vote against Russia. One of the most important buyers of discounted Russian oil. India’s Minister for Petroleum, Hardeep Singh Puri, said they had no disagreements with Moscow and it was their ‘moral duty’ to buy Russian oil to lower energy prices in the country. But it’s not just that. New Delhi buys a significant amount of weapons and ammunition from Russia. And it can remain ‘free’ from U.S. sanctions. India is also opposed to discussing new sanctions against Russia at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023.

India is balancing its relations with China through Russia, while continuing its Cold War tradition of ‘non-alignment-neutrality’ policy. Finally, it is noteworthy that it has recently started discussing border issues with Beijing, including mutual troop withdrawals.

India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, recently said that “I think it would not be fair today to reduce a very complex issue, the Ukraine conflict to a binary of are you on this side or that side. Are you for peace or for war?”

“Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems,” he added.

The other countries of Southeast Asia do not seem to be convinced of the anti-Russian sentiment either, despite the intense campaign at the ASEAN summit and the G20 summit sessions last November.

RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The situation in the Middle East seems to be in Russia’s ‘favor’ at the end of the year. Moscow is in contact with Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), their rivals such as Iran and Syria, and all countries in the region, including Israel.

Although most Arab countries condemned Russia’s military intervention in the first UN vote, the Arab League with 22 member states did not do so later. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed the Arab League during a visit to the region at the end of July 2022. Many Arab countries abstained from removing Russia from the Human Rights Council. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt did not impose sanctions on Russia. “The Gulf states continue to conduct an open dialogue with Russia and consider it necessary to maintain contacts,” the Saudi Foreign Minister stressed.

Riyadh embodied this attitude on the economic front through OPEC+. They rejected the U.S. president’s request to increase oil production. Instead, they imported Russian oil for domestic use and/or for ‘blending oil in refineries’ to export more of their own production. They said their assessment was entirely based on ‘market conditions’. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman did not answer Biden’s calls. The U.S. President paid a visit to the prince ‘personally,’ whom he had previously vowed to ‘make a pariah’. The case of Jamal Khashoggi, the man who ‘symbolized’ the liberal ideological principles of the U.S. Democrats in recent years, had to be buried.

The UAE adopted a similar attitude to the Saudis. In fact, trade volume with Russia increased by 68 percent to $9 billion in 2022.

ISRAELI LEADER REVEALS THAT THE WEST IS UNDERMINING PEACE

Israel, which is the backbone of U.S. Middle East policy, did not join the sanctions even though it condemned Russia’s intervention. There is a large Russian immigrant population in Israel. While liberal public opinion leaned toward the Banderist regime in Kiev, which openly embraced a historical legacy that ironically played a role in the Jewish genocide, the government refrained from supplying weapons.

It is not yet clear what kind of policy Israel’s new Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will pursue, who has struck a balance of “non-conflict” with Russia in the face of the imminent threat they have seen in the region in previous years. However, Naftali Bennett, who had been prime minister until recently, revealed that although Kiev and Russia were ready for the mediation trial in March 2022, the solution was completely ruled out by British leader Boris Johnson and blocked by the leaders of the U.S., Germany and France.

BORRELL’S ‘AFRICAN JUNGLE UNABLE TO THINK INDEPENDENTLY’

Britain’s Financial Times reported that at the last Munich Security Conference, the West tried but failed to align African countries against Russia. For many African countries, Russia is seen as the successor to the Soviet Union, which supported them during their anti-colonial struggles.

South Africa, a member of the BRICS Group and the continent’s leading country, has not joined the condemnation of Russia at the UN and is currently holding joint exercises with China and Russia. Russia is favored in the country of legendary leader Nelson Mandela, who said that the Soviet Union’s material and moral support inspired him to overthrow the apartheid regime.

Countries such as Ghana, Mali, Sudan, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Uganda and Mozambique have seen the political and economic support of the former Soviets. The Russian Federation is somehow considered to be an ‘ideological successor.’ For example, in 2022 and at the end of January, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov organized quite colorful African tours. He was greeted with national songs and dances at the Pushkin monument in Asmara, Eritrea. In African countries, banners read: “Putin, come and save us.” The EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, who last October compared ‘Europe to a garden and the rest of the world to a jungle’ and was criticized for ‘racism,’ this time claimed that ‘the African mind is not thinking straight because of manipulation’ following the attention Lavrov received during his visit to Mali. Speaking on February 18 at the African Union summit in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, Uganda’s Foreign Minister Jeje Odongo responded to this view: “We were colonized and we forgave those who colonized us. Now, the colonizers are asking us to be enemies of Russia, who never colonized us, is that fair? Not for us: their enemies are their enemies, our friends are our friends.”

Last year, Macky Sall, President of Senegal and the African Union, blamed Western embargoes for the food crisis, while today Russia is negotiating with many African countries to switch to trade in national currencies. The results of the U.S. administration’s December summit on Africa are yet to be seen. The State Department has even produced a video that could be seen as interference in the Nigerian elections, ‘starring’ Secretary Blinken, USAID head Samantha Fox and the ‘black’ Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US permanent representative to the UN.

THE VEIN OF LATIN AMERICA

Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba, where leftist governments are on the target of the United States, have been on the side of Russia, their traditional allies, from the very beginning. However, the region’s two strongest countries, Brazil and Mexico, as well as Argentina, which wants to join the BRICS, and Colombia, did not take a stand against Russia beyond a symbolic condemnation at the UN General Assembly and criticism of general principles.

Instead of the United States, Germany mobilized to convince the Latin front. However, Prime Minister Olaf Scholz returned empty-handed from visits to Brazil, Argentina and Chile, unable to persuade these countries to provide military aid to Kiev. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Ecuador had received Russian-made MiG transport helicopters and in some cases Russian surface-to-air missiles or anti-tank missiles, which are compatible with those of the Ukrainian army. But Latin leaders see the conflict differently from the West.

Brazil’s neofascist Jair Bolsonaro administration, which the United States paved the way for by intervening directly in its democracy during the 2016-2018 period, was on the side of those who condemned Russia in two UN resolutions last year, but did not participate in sanctions against the most important fertilizer supplier. Lula da Silva, the leftist leader who succeeded Bolsonaro after being exonerated and re-elected after being wrongfully imprisoned with the overt intervention of the U.S. Justice Department, was outspoken in his criticism of Scholz and then French President Macron: “Brazil has no interest in handing over ammunition that can be used in the war between Ukraine and Russia. Brazil is a country of peace. Our last disagreement was in the Paraguayan war, and that’s why Brazil doesn’t want any participation in this war, even indirectly. Because I think right now we need to find someone in the world who will seek peace between Russia and Ukraine. So far, peace has hardly been on the agenda. In other words, Brazil has decided not to provide this ammunition. Because we don’t want this ammunition to be used in the war against Russia.”

Lula then reiterated his stance of ‘neutrality’ during his visit to Washington on February 10. According to Brazilian sources, his message to Biden was, “No one wants this war to continue. The parties should form a negotiation team. I don’t want to join the war, I want to end it.” Of course, Lula, who survived  the coup attempt on the 8th day of his new term in power, which began on January 1, 2023, has to establish the balance within his country. He has already been accused of playing the ‘Robin Hood’ role by US-linked financial power groups. He is also facing criticism from The Economist over its plans with Argentine President Alberto Fernandez for a ‘bizarre common currency’ for the continent.

Argentina’s leader Fernández also refused to send arms to Kiev in return for his country’s poor financial situation.

But in fact, the attitude of the Social Democratic President, who took office in August 2022 of Colombia, which has been the right-wing stronghold of the United States in Latin America for years, is more interesting. “Even if they end up as scrap in Colombia, we will not hand over Russian weapons to be taken to Ukraine to prolong a war,” Colombia’s leftwing president Gustavo Petro responded “We are for peace.”

Chile’s left-liberal President Gabriel Boric, reflecting his country’s sentiment, said he condemned Russia’s invasion, even though ‘some media and opinion leaders believe that interfering in the politics of other countries is a bad decision.’ But he only offered Kyiv help with clearing mines.

Mexico’s leader, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, took the lead. In March 2022, a meeting of the Russia Friendship Group was held in the lower house of the Mexican Congress, while Obrador called for ‘neutrality’ and a ‘peaceful solution’ throughout the year. He condemned the intervention at the UN, but in his meeting with Biden in July 2022, he stated that Mexico would adhere to the foreign policy set out in its constitution, which includes ‘the principles of self-determination.’ He rejected the embargo on Russia. Without mentioning NATO and the United States, he described the policy of ‘I will supply the weapons, you will supply the dead’ as ‘immoral.’ And finally, commenting on Berlin’s decision to send Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine under U.S. pressure, “Media power is used by the oligarchies in the world to subjugate governments. Germany, for example, did not want to get too involved in the war with Ukraine. They finally gave in” he said.

The neutral stance of Latin America, which has been hit by the increase in global energy and fertilizer prices, is clear. Celso Amorim, who served as foreign minister in the past Lula governments and is still an effective advisor, says Brazil’s reasons are not related to the need for fertilizer. According to Maria Angela Holguín, Colombia’s former foreign minister, the Ukrainian conflict has brought back unwanted memories of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in Latin America. In fact, Holguin said, these countries think that Russia and China could be useful to them in the near future.

THE NEW NON-ALIGNED ERA?

Inflationary pressures and fears of recession are affecting much of the world. The rich West may be able to afford the cost of the embargo on Russia but the rest is struggling. These concerns affect their attitudes.

Of course, the dollar’s reserve currency status is still the pillar of the global economic order. However, the embargoes, the ‘arming’ of the international banking and insurance sectors, including the SWIFT system, the confiscation of assets, and the commodity agreements that had to be canceled are ‘watched with concern.’ Again, many countries are facing currency depreciation, while ways to trade with local currencies are being discussed. The ‘rest of the world‘ facing the West is already weighing the risks of a conflict in which they have no say.

The West’s long-standing ‘war on terror’ rhetoric, the controversial occupation of Iraq, the collapse and fragmentation of Libya and Syria, and the chaotic retreat of the U.S. and NATO and leaving the country to the Taliban after 20 years of fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan are all remembered.

It is noteworthy that the West, which has been marketing liberal interventions around the world for 30 years on the themes of ‘minority rights’, ‘mother tongue rights’, ‘autonomy’, ‘freedom of thought and expression’, has returned to ‘state sovereignty’, which they themselves have violated many times, by referring to the Russians and the Russian-speaking population of Donbass, bombed for eight years for refusing to accept the coup, as ‘Ukrainians’ in the Ukrainian crisis. The poor record of the alleged ‘principles’ is unlikely to go unnoticed. Global propaganda supremacy, accompanied by a heavy ‘iron curtain’ of censorship justified by ‘protecting’ their own communities, is not enough to erase Banderism, which stands out as Kiev’s official ideology. The narrative of ‘Russia woke up one day and suddenly invaded its neighbor’ turns into a tasteless ‘fast food.’ While the Zelensky regime is destroying millions of Russian-language books in the country in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi era, the rest of the world is baffled by the justification in the West for attacks on Russians and Russian culture, from vodka to cats, Tchaikovsky to Dostoevsky. In these circumstances, in light of economic realities and historical experiences, it is only natural that ‘the rest of the world’ sees multipolarity as a ground where its voice will be heard more.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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Opinion

A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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