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In the first year of the intervention in Ukraine; the West and the Rest

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The first year of the Russian Federation’s intervention, justified by Article 51 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, has come to an end following the military tensions that started at the Ukrainian border, accompanied by the rejection of the Minsk agreement approved by the UN Security Council and the rejection of the two treaty proposals to the U.S. and NATO. The outlook for the international relations system is blurry. Having established a monopoly to unilaterally violate international law arbitrarily and in line with its interests through its military power, the U.S. is now facing a challenge from Russia,  after touching their sore point both historically and politically this time.

It is clear that the U.S. has consolidated its hegemony in Europe within a year, thanks to the crisis it started in Kiev in 2014 by triggering a civil war with a coup d’etat, which was interrupted under Donald Trump and then reignited with the return of the Democrats to power. But as the conflict has steadily escalated by mobilizing NATO, a front of ‘disobedience’ or ‘reluctance’ emerged in the rest of the world. While the ‘collective West’ is engaged in what it calls a ‘life-and-death war’ for its neoliberal economic and political model, the rest of the world does not seem to ‘embrace’ this perspective.

At the UN General Assembly, countries that have seen violations of international law in the last 30 years by the West, especially the United States, have condemned the Russian Federation for its military actions in Ukraine. There are analyses that draw attention to the size of the population represented by the countries that voted against or abstained in the symbolic votes at the General Assembly. It is debatable how meaningful this is. Whether they agree with the condemnation or abstain, countries that disagree with the unilateral economic sanctions of the United States and the EU, which do not have UN approval, present a more striking picture. In an environment of continued U.S. dollar-based fiscal hegemony, this is forcing the ‘collective West’ to threaten to ‘put pressure on those who try to remain in the two camps, maintaining trade ties with both Russia and the West.’ This situation is so reminiscent of the ‘you are either one of us or one of them’ approach adopted after 9/11 attacks by the Bush administration while carrying out its military actions in the invasion of Iraq, based on false intelligence.

In the Western media, there is an ongoing view that is formulated as ‘The West and the Rest.’ In particular, the concept of ‘multipolarity’, which the U.S. has been pursuing with reckless disregard in recent years, seems to have accelerated.

‘THE WORLD IS EITHER NEUTRAL OR LEAN TOWARDS RUSSIA’

‘The West and the Rest’ formula has been the subject of a lot of research in the past year.

Cambridge University researchers ‘matched’ data from surveys conducted in 137 countries in the eight months following the start of Russia’s military intervention on February 24, 2022, they came up with an interesting result. According to the study published in late October 2022, 66 percent of the 6.3 billion people living outside the West think positively about Russia and 70 percent think positively about China. 75 percent of participants in South Asia, 68 percent in Francophone Africa, and 62 percent in Southeast Asia express a ‘positive sentiment’ towards Russia.

The research yielded similar results in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Vietnam.

Of course, Cambridge researchers analyzed the results from the perspective of the division between the ‘liberal and democratic world’ and the ‘illiberal and anti-democratic world’. In Germany, it does not seem that people question how this conflict that leads to criminal laws that prosecute people for their opinions can be put into a ‘liberal’ framework.

In late January, The Economist published a graphic map of the world’s stance on the conflict in Ukraine. According to the newspaper, two-thirds of the world’s population tends towards either neutrality or Russia’s position. The reasons for this are, of course, controversial. The newspaper was based on GDP and population ratios. According to GDP, those who condemn Russia form 61 percent. The West-leaning camp accounts for 9.3 percent. The neutral form 10.1 percent. 16.8 percent represent Russia-leaning camp. 2.6 percent support Russia. On the population chart, those who condemn Russia form 16.1 percent. The West-leaning camp accounts for 20.3 percent. The neutral form 32.1 percent. 27.6 percent represent Russia-leaning camp. 3.9 percent support Russia.

The headline of the report illustrates that ‘the small number of Russian supporters’ is not a consolation. At this point, commentators appear to be sniffling at the Rest which ‘may represent more than half of the world’s population, but they make up the underdeveloped and poor half.’ And, of course, ‘the combined GDP, economic power and geopolitical weight of the West’ is highlighted, which ‘far outweighs the influence of countries that refuse to condemn intervention and impose sanctions on Russia.’

The latest report, released on the occasion of the Munich Security Conference held on February 17-20, found that countries, which make up half of the world’s population based on their positioning, oppose the isolation of Russia. Many governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America are reluctant to take action against Russia and isolate it both economically and diplomatically, the report said.

Clearly, this shows that the aforementioned states are prioritizing their own economic interests and conditions, which have become more challenging after the pandemic. Developing countries face many challenges, ranging from high debt costs and the climate crisis that has created environmental devastation, to poverty, food shortages, drought and high energy prices. For example, while the geography called ‘Global South’ has repeatedly asked for the sharing of the intellectual property rights of vaccines to save lives during the pandemic, none of the Western states seemed interested. On the other hand, Russia, China, and India rushed to the aid of many from Algeria to Egypt and from African countries to Argentina. It should also be considered that the West’s ‘colonial past’ still linger in memories. The West may try to wash it away, but today we are looking at a picture in which former colonial powers have reunited as members of the Western alliance on the front against Russia.

CLAMPING DOWN

The unilateral embargoes imposed by the U.S. and the EU on Russian oil and gas have affected not only Russia, but also some countries and companies that trade with Russia and supply energy and food products from Russia. For some, it yielded lucrative results. Hazal Yalın, author and researcher focusing on Russia, points to the capital outflow from Russia over the course of a year, while highlighting the huge decline in natural gas and oil revenues. However, he says, the West has not succeeded in destroying Russia’s economy. Indeed, the Central Bank of Russian Federation has managed to support the value of the ruble and keep the financial markets stable. In this sense, Yalın believes that the European economy is more deeply affected.

Two examples can be given from Continental Europe: Germany and the United Kingdom that has left the union with Brexit.

At the end of January, the IMF estimated that the UK economy would shrink and be worse than other advanced economies, including Russia, as the cost of living continued to hit households. The UK is projected to shrink by 0.6 percent, making it the only country in the G7 to shrink. Of course, the IMF thinks Britain is ‘on the right track.’

In Germany, Marcel Fratzscher, head of the Institute for Economic Research (DIW), said about 100 billion euros had been lost in 2022 due to the conflict in Ukraine. Surely, the recession debates take place but the industrialized vanguard of Europe and the world, Germany, will not ‘sink.’ But there are costs to losing cheap energy. According to Allianz Trade, German industry will pay 40 percent more for energy than before the crisis. Although the crisis was prevented and the electricity bills were controlled, the outlook of the German economy is described as ‘bleak.’ Allianz Trade says that rising labor costs and tighter financing conditions are putting more companies under pressure, especially in sectors exposed to energy and input prices, in response to improved expectations with increased government support. He finds the fear that the crisis will create ‘deindustrialization’ exaggerated.

The outcome will ‘not be the deindustrialization of Europe, but the militarization of European industry and its political consequences,’ Hazal Yalın anticipates. In fact, all evaluations fail to mention the ‘acceleration in the war industry.’ The West is not worried about this trajectory, but the fact that, as the New York Times put it, ‘Moscow is able to escape Western punishment with the help of its friends.’

All countries that impose an embargo on Russia are either members of the EU and NATO or close allies of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast, most countries in Asia (excluding Japan, South Korea and Singapore) and all countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America (excluding the Bahamas) have good relations with both sides.

French historian Emmanuel Todd told Le Figaro, “If the Russian economy shows long-term resistance to Western sanctions, the European economy will perish. The ability of the United States to finance monetary control over the world and the massive trade deficit will collapse.”

This extravagant assessment aside, if the neocon administration in the U.S. tends to ‘clash on two fronts’ and insists on a tough stance against China, it is of course difficult to predict the results soon.

DEMOCRACY-AUTOCRACY DUALITY

The ideological and psychological repercussions of economic and political upheavals are inevitable. At the beginning of the Russian intervention, U.S. President Joe Biden said that the West would turn Russian President Vladimir Putin into “a pariah” in the international plan. However, this does not seem to have happened for the better part of the world. Russia has developed diplomatic ties with countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America over the past year. In his latest interview with the newspaper Liberation, EU Council President Charles Michel said that these countries have not forgotten Soviet Russia’s support in the fight against colonialism, and also still remember Western interventions in Iraq and Libya. Just Iraq and Libya? What about Syria and, even earlier, the breakup of Yugoslavia, which redrew the map of Europe, and its last link, Kosovo? As you know, Kosovo is still part of Serbia, based on the rules of UN law referenced in the Ukraine conflict today.

While the Western bloc presents the Ukraine conflict through the dichotomy of ‘democracy vs. autocracy’, masking geopolitical and socio-economic objectives, the principled inconsistencies, coupled with economic conditions, present a striking picture. Let’s take a look at regions.

ASIA’S ‘DISOBEDIENT STATES’

The People’s Republic of China, which refrained from condemning Russia at the UN Security Council, has accelerated economic relations with Russia in the last year. Bilateral trade volume exceeded 170 billion dollars. The ‘Power of Siberia’ natural gas pipeline agreement is signed. Beijing imports oil from Russia and also sells Siberian liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe. China, the U.S. administration’s ‘next target’, is openly promoting the slogan of ‘multipolar globalization,’ while rejecting accusations that it has/will ‘supply arms’ to Russia.

Over the course of a year, China’s political discourse has also gradually sharpened. Beijing, which initially emphasized that it “understands the complex and historical causes” of the Ukrainian crisis, is now openly telling the world that “the United States is the biggest factor that started and fueled the Ukrainian crisis.” In calling for peaceful negotiations on the first anniversary of the conflict, the Chinese government unveiled a vision that emphasizes “the protection of the sovereign rights of all countries,” “the indivisibility of security,” and “the suspension of unilateral sanctions.” The tension in the rhetoric challenging the U.S. narrative never lets up.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said: “The US is the biggest saboteur of the international order. The rules-based international order claimed by the US is, in essence, a hegemonic order in which the US dominates the world.” Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, who attended the Munich Security Conference and gave clear messages to the U.S. and Europe, described Russia-China relations as “rock solid” in Moscow. In his meeting with Putin, he emphasized their support for “multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations,” adding that “China is ready to work with Russia to maintain strategic resolve, deepen political mutual trust, strengthen strategic coordination, expand practical cooperation and defend the legitimate interests of both countries, to play a constructive role in promoting world peace and development.”

China’s support for Moscow in the Security Council for the investigation of the September 26, 2022 terrorist attack on the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, details of which were revealed by Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, is also particularly noteworthy. China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Chiang Tyun, who has repeatedly reiterated China’s commitment to take the lead in building strategically important infrastructure facilities globally and to ‘spread development around the world,’ called for an objective, impartial and professional investigation to ‘find those responsible.’ Referring to the environmental impact of the attack as well as its repercussions on global energy markets, he reminded the UN of its ‘responsibility.’ “If we fail to identify all the circumstances and those responsible for the destruction of Nord Stream-2, it will provide even more opportunities for the conspirators,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang said, all the more remarkable given U.S. President Biden’s threat at the beginning of the crisis that “if Russia invades, we will finish Nord Stream-2.” Indeed, when Nord Stream-2 was exploded, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called it a ‘tremendous opportunity’ to get rid of Russian resources, while Victoria Nuland, the architect of the 2014 coup in Kiev, expressed satisfaction that the pipeline was ‘a pile of metal at the bottom of the sea.’ Radoslav Sikorsiy, Poland’s former defense and foreign minister and current member of the European Parliament, wrote on Twitter, “Thank you, USA,” accompanied by a photo of the explosion reflected on the surface of the sea after the September 26 attack.

In Asia, not only China, which the U.S. sees as a rival, but India, which it sees as an ally against China, is of course more important. India is the country where the U.S. has formulated its Asia-Pacific strategy as ‘Indo-Pacific’ based on its name. New Delhi abstained from the UN General Assembly vote against Russia. One of the most important buyers of discounted Russian oil. India’s Minister for Petroleum, Hardeep Singh Puri, said they had no disagreements with Moscow and it was their ‘moral duty’ to buy Russian oil to lower energy prices in the country. But it’s not just that. New Delhi buys a significant amount of weapons and ammunition from Russia. And it can remain ‘free’ from U.S. sanctions. India is also opposed to discussing new sanctions against Russia at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023.

India is balancing its relations with China through Russia, while continuing its Cold War tradition of ‘non-alignment-neutrality’ policy. Finally, it is noteworthy that it has recently started discussing border issues with Beijing, including mutual troop withdrawals.

India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, recently said that “I think it would not be fair today to reduce a very complex issue, the Ukraine conflict to a binary of are you on this side or that side. Are you for peace or for war?”

“Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems,” he added.

The other countries of Southeast Asia do not seem to be convinced of the anti-Russian sentiment either, despite the intense campaign at the ASEAN summit and the G20 summit sessions last November.

RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The situation in the Middle East seems to be in Russia’s ‘favor’ at the end of the year. Moscow is in contact with Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), their rivals such as Iran and Syria, and all countries in the region, including Israel.

Although most Arab countries condemned Russia’s military intervention in the first UN vote, the Arab League with 22 member states did not do so later. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed the Arab League during a visit to the region at the end of July 2022. Many Arab countries abstained from removing Russia from the Human Rights Council. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt did not impose sanctions on Russia. “The Gulf states continue to conduct an open dialogue with Russia and consider it necessary to maintain contacts,” the Saudi Foreign Minister stressed.

Riyadh embodied this attitude on the economic front through OPEC+. They rejected the U.S. president’s request to increase oil production. Instead, they imported Russian oil for domestic use and/or for ‘blending oil in refineries’ to export more of their own production. They said their assessment was entirely based on ‘market conditions’. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman did not answer Biden’s calls. The U.S. President paid a visit to the prince ‘personally,’ whom he had previously vowed to ‘make a pariah’. The case of Jamal Khashoggi, the man who ‘symbolized’ the liberal ideological principles of the U.S. Democrats in recent years, had to be buried.

The UAE adopted a similar attitude to the Saudis. In fact, trade volume with Russia increased by 68 percent to $9 billion in 2022.

ISRAELI LEADER REVEALS THAT THE WEST IS UNDERMINING PEACE

Israel, which is the backbone of U.S. Middle East policy, did not join the sanctions even though it condemned Russia’s intervention. There is a large Russian immigrant population in Israel. While liberal public opinion leaned toward the Banderist regime in Kiev, which openly embraced a historical legacy that ironically played a role in the Jewish genocide, the government refrained from supplying weapons.

It is not yet clear what kind of policy Israel’s new Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will pursue, who has struck a balance of “non-conflict” with Russia in the face of the imminent threat they have seen in the region in previous years. However, Naftali Bennett, who had been prime minister until recently, revealed that although Kiev and Russia were ready for the mediation trial in March 2022, the solution was completely ruled out by British leader Boris Johnson and blocked by the leaders of the U.S., Germany and France.

BORRELL’S ‘AFRICAN JUNGLE UNABLE TO THINK INDEPENDENTLY’

Britain’s Financial Times reported that at the last Munich Security Conference, the West tried but failed to align African countries against Russia. For many African countries, Russia is seen as the successor to the Soviet Union, which supported them during their anti-colonial struggles.

South Africa, a member of the BRICS Group and the continent’s leading country, has not joined the condemnation of Russia at the UN and is currently holding joint exercises with China and Russia. Russia is favored in the country of legendary leader Nelson Mandela, who said that the Soviet Union’s material and moral support inspired him to overthrow the apartheid regime.

Countries such as Ghana, Mali, Sudan, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Uganda and Mozambique have seen the political and economic support of the former Soviets. The Russian Federation is somehow considered to be an ‘ideological successor.’ For example, in 2022 and at the end of January, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov organized quite colorful African tours. He was greeted with national songs and dances at the Pushkin monument in Asmara, Eritrea. In African countries, banners read: “Putin, come and save us.” The EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, who last October compared ‘Europe to a garden and the rest of the world to a jungle’ and was criticized for ‘racism,’ this time claimed that ‘the African mind is not thinking straight because of manipulation’ following the attention Lavrov received during his visit to Mali. Speaking on February 18 at the African Union summit in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, Uganda’s Foreign Minister Jeje Odongo responded to this view: “We were colonized and we forgave those who colonized us. Now, the colonizers are asking us to be enemies of Russia, who never colonized us, is that fair? Not for us: their enemies are their enemies, our friends are our friends.”

Last year, Macky Sall, President of Senegal and the African Union, blamed Western embargoes for the food crisis, while today Russia is negotiating with many African countries to switch to trade in national currencies. The results of the U.S. administration’s December summit on Africa are yet to be seen. The State Department has even produced a video that could be seen as interference in the Nigerian elections, ‘starring’ Secretary Blinken, USAID head Samantha Fox and the ‘black’ Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US permanent representative to the UN.

THE VEIN OF LATIN AMERICA

Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba, where leftist governments are on the target of the United States, have been on the side of Russia, their traditional allies, from the very beginning. However, the region’s two strongest countries, Brazil and Mexico, as well as Argentina, which wants to join the BRICS, and Colombia, did not take a stand against Russia beyond a symbolic condemnation at the UN General Assembly and criticism of general principles.

Instead of the United States, Germany mobilized to convince the Latin front. However, Prime Minister Olaf Scholz returned empty-handed from visits to Brazil, Argentina and Chile, unable to persuade these countries to provide military aid to Kiev. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Ecuador had received Russian-made MiG transport helicopters and in some cases Russian surface-to-air missiles or anti-tank missiles, which are compatible with those of the Ukrainian army. But Latin leaders see the conflict differently from the West.

Brazil’s neofascist Jair Bolsonaro administration, which the United States paved the way for by intervening directly in its democracy during the 2016-2018 period, was on the side of those who condemned Russia in two UN resolutions last year, but did not participate in sanctions against the most important fertilizer supplier. Lula da Silva, the leftist leader who succeeded Bolsonaro after being exonerated and re-elected after being wrongfully imprisoned with the overt intervention of the U.S. Justice Department, was outspoken in his criticism of Scholz and then French President Macron: “Brazil has no interest in handing over ammunition that can be used in the war between Ukraine and Russia. Brazil is a country of peace. Our last disagreement was in the Paraguayan war, and that’s why Brazil doesn’t want any participation in this war, even indirectly. Because I think right now we need to find someone in the world who will seek peace between Russia and Ukraine. So far, peace has hardly been on the agenda. In other words, Brazil has decided not to provide this ammunition. Because we don’t want this ammunition to be used in the war against Russia.”

Lula then reiterated his stance of ‘neutrality’ during his visit to Washington on February 10. According to Brazilian sources, his message to Biden was, “No one wants this war to continue. The parties should form a negotiation team. I don’t want to join the war, I want to end it.” Of course, Lula, who survived  the coup attempt on the 8th day of his new term in power, which began on January 1, 2023, has to establish the balance within his country. He has already been accused of playing the ‘Robin Hood’ role by US-linked financial power groups. He is also facing criticism from The Economist over its plans with Argentine President Alberto Fernandez for a ‘bizarre common currency’ for the continent.

Argentina’s leader Fernández also refused to send arms to Kiev in return for his country’s poor financial situation.

But in fact, the attitude of the Social Democratic President, who took office in August 2022 of Colombia, which has been the right-wing stronghold of the United States in Latin America for years, is more interesting. “Even if they end up as scrap in Colombia, we will not hand over Russian weapons to be taken to Ukraine to prolong a war,” Colombia’s leftwing president Gustavo Petro responded “We are for peace.”

Chile’s left-liberal President Gabriel Boric, reflecting his country’s sentiment, said he condemned Russia’s invasion, even though ‘some media and opinion leaders believe that interfering in the politics of other countries is a bad decision.’ But he only offered Kyiv help with clearing mines.

Mexico’s leader, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, took the lead. In March 2022, a meeting of the Russia Friendship Group was held in the lower house of the Mexican Congress, while Obrador called for ‘neutrality’ and a ‘peaceful solution’ throughout the year. He condemned the intervention at the UN, but in his meeting with Biden in July 2022, he stated that Mexico would adhere to the foreign policy set out in its constitution, which includes ‘the principles of self-determination.’ He rejected the embargo on Russia. Without mentioning NATO and the United States, he described the policy of ‘I will supply the weapons, you will supply the dead’ as ‘immoral.’ And finally, commenting on Berlin’s decision to send Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine under U.S. pressure, “Media power is used by the oligarchies in the world to subjugate governments. Germany, for example, did not want to get too involved in the war with Ukraine. They finally gave in” he said.

The neutral stance of Latin America, which has been hit by the increase in global energy and fertilizer prices, is clear. Celso Amorim, who served as foreign minister in the past Lula governments and is still an effective advisor, says Brazil’s reasons are not related to the need for fertilizer. According to Maria Angela Holguín, Colombia’s former foreign minister, the Ukrainian conflict has brought back unwanted memories of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in Latin America. In fact, Holguin said, these countries think that Russia and China could be useful to them in the near future.

THE NEW NON-ALIGNED ERA?

Inflationary pressures and fears of recession are affecting much of the world. The rich West may be able to afford the cost of the embargo on Russia but the rest is struggling. These concerns affect their attitudes.

Of course, the dollar’s reserve currency status is still the pillar of the global economic order. However, the embargoes, the ‘arming’ of the international banking and insurance sectors, including the SWIFT system, the confiscation of assets, and the commodity agreements that had to be canceled are ‘watched with concern.’ Again, many countries are facing currency depreciation, while ways to trade with local currencies are being discussed. The ‘rest of the world‘ facing the West is already weighing the risks of a conflict in which they have no say.

The West’s long-standing ‘war on terror’ rhetoric, the controversial occupation of Iraq, the collapse and fragmentation of Libya and Syria, and the chaotic retreat of the U.S. and NATO and leaving the country to the Taliban after 20 years of fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan are all remembered.

It is noteworthy that the West, which has been marketing liberal interventions around the world for 30 years on the themes of ‘minority rights’, ‘mother tongue rights’, ‘autonomy’, ‘freedom of thought and expression’, has returned to ‘state sovereignty’, which they themselves have violated many times, by referring to the Russians and the Russian-speaking population of Donbass, bombed for eight years for refusing to accept the coup, as ‘Ukrainians’ in the Ukrainian crisis. The poor record of the alleged ‘principles’ is unlikely to go unnoticed. Global propaganda supremacy, accompanied by a heavy ‘iron curtain’ of censorship justified by ‘protecting’ their own communities, is not enough to erase Banderism, which stands out as Kiev’s official ideology. The narrative of ‘Russia woke up one day and suddenly invaded its neighbor’ turns into a tasteless ‘fast food.’ While the Zelensky regime is destroying millions of Russian-language books in the country in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi era, the rest of the world is baffled by the justification in the West for attacks on Russians and Russian culture, from vodka to cats, Tchaikovsky to Dostoevsky. In these circumstances, in light of economic realities and historical experiences, it is only natural that ‘the rest of the world’ sees multipolarity as a ground where its voice will be heard more.

Opinion

NATO 2.9: The multipolar paradox of the Atlantic front

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As computer engineers well know, denoting software as 1.0, 2.0, or 3.0 signifies the release of a major new version. It must entail changes and enhancements of a substantial enough scale compared to its predecessor to earn that “.0” suffix. If users find these updates underwhelming, a common refrain emerges: “They really should have called this 2.9!”

This is precisely the impression left by the “NATO 3.0” order that the alliance attempted to forge at the Ankara summit. The US-centric world we grew accustomed to in the 2.0 era is gone, yet this new equation lacks the substance to be deemed a true 3.0. NATO 3.0 was a concept popularized by Elbridge Colby, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, envisioning a security architecture in which Europe assumes greater responsibility. The foundations of this architecture were to be laid at the Ankara summit. This distinct framing signaled that the alliance was not merely seeking to hobble along with minor “patches” but was gearing up for a fundamental overhaul to shake off its decades-long inertia. Yet, this new design harbored an inherent paradox: if the son of the household earns his own livelihood, why should he continue to obey his father? Why, once European nations scale up their defense spending, should they align their enmities and alliances strictly with Washington’s dictates? In the absence of the American hegemony that sustained the alliance for 77 years, what is left to take its place?

A disintegrating family

Tunç Akkoç, the Editor-in-Chief of Harici, and I covered the summit on-site. On the first day, we heard “warm” and “amiable” messages, particularly from Secretary General Mark Rutte. Everyone spoke of being a family, of being a cohesive whole. Beyond good wishes and platitudes, NATO, for the first time, focused on quantity rather than quality. Dozens of military-industrial agreements aimed not just at sophisticated technologies, but at establishing production lines capable of generating sheer numerical advantage. Affordable, replenishable combat assets were the center of attention.

The messaging and the atmosphere at the panels could have been said to project a positive outlook for the future of NATO—had Trump not arrived, that is.

Fresh off the plane, the US President first reiterated his designs on Greenland, and then picked a fight with Spain. He characterized them as “an impossible country, not worth talking to” and threatened to suspend trade. As Trump hurled these aggressive remarks, Rutte, sitting right beside him, scrambled to perform damage control, looking much like the child of a collapsing family who thinks, “If I only project enough cheer, maybe I can keep everyone together.” At the press conference, I asked Rutte:

“You find Trump justified regarding operations against Iran; if conflict erupts once more and President Trump calls on the Europeans for support, will you endorse this?”

Rutte gave a lengthy but ultimately unsatisfying answer. The curious part was that he partially agreed with Trump regarding Europe’s complacency. This behavior was not unique to Rutte. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz took a similar path, stating, “It seems Trump had to tell us bluntly to increase weapons production; Trump was right about this.” Seeing that past attempts to criticize Trump—particularly over Iran—failed to yield the desired outcome, Merz apparently resorted to the proven strategy of appeasement.

Yet, this appeasement was not enough. The final communique released at the end of the summit laid bare a stark reality: NATO could no longer define its adversaries as it once did. The language concerning Russia was milder than in previous years, while Iran was subject to a vague assertion that it “cannot possess nuclear weapons,” and China was not even mentioned. In the text, the US made no commitments against Russia, nor did the EU make any promises to Trump regarding Iran or China. While support for Ukraine was earmarked at $70 billion annually, whether the US would play any role in this was left entirely ambiguous.

Let us be honest: in the near term, neither does Trump have any intention of bringing Ukraine aid packages to Congress, nor does Europe plan to provide any serious military backing regarding Iran. Both sides prefer to tell one another, “Go get ’em, tiger, you’ve got this.” But why? Why does Europe refrain from striking Iran, whom it previously designated an enemy? Why does it avoid taking a stand against China, once deemed a threat? Why does the US want to distance itself from the Ukrainian quagmire, a theater in which it was involved for years through NGOs and military assistance?

NATO’s multipolar paradox

By its very nature, NATO is an alliance that must speak with a single voice during major geopolitical crises. This was relatively easy during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. There was only one center of power. Alternatives were unthinkable. Ideological confrontations drew sharp boundaries. Today, however, it is impossible for the US to dictate common objectives and shared adversaries. Nations engage with one another unburdened by ideological affinities. Aided by globalization, they decentralize their industries and establish trade routes that are too valuable to abandon.

European nations, which point to their eager deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq to counter Trump’s criticisms, now avoid operations around the Strait of Hormuz that could prolong conflict, fearing a catastrophic shock to oil markets. (Though what European militaries could achieve that the US could not remains highly debatable). Moreover, Trump’s stubborn fixation on Greenland had previously driven Europeans straight to Beijing. How, then, could European capitals brand China as a threat today?

A similar divergence of opinion applies to the United States itself. Believing that Russia’s military capabilities have been sufficiently degraded in Ukraine, the American establishment hopes to placate Russia—both to lower the risk of nuclear confrontation and to prevent Moscow from offering Beijing a cheap source of energy. Under these circumstances, why would the US target Russia in the summit’s communique?

Furthermore, there is no real consensus even within Europe itself. From the recent tensions erupting between Poland and Ukraine, to Péter Magyar—who, despite succeeding Orbán, has brought no radical shift on Russia—dissenting voices persist across the continent. When we factor in the rise of Germany’s AfD, the UK’s Reform Party, and Le Pen in France, whose electoral future remains uncertain, they may soon look back on today’s fractured Europe with nostalgia.

Ultimately, a Europe that begins to act independently of the US (even if this is what Washington desires) will naturally prioritize its own national interests. Inevitable clashes of interest will lead to independent coalitions within NATO. Hatchets buried for a century will slowly be unearthed. In other words, for NATO to survive, it needs a Europe that assumes responsibility; yet, this very responsibility may trigger conflicts of interest that could spell the end of NATO. This is the intractable paradox of NATO 3.0. In an alliance like NATO, “co-presidency” simply does not work.

Why 2.9?

In the grip of such a paradox, European nations have yet to clearly chart their own course. They envision a NATO where they produce more and take on greater responsibility, yet they remain unable to map out their own path. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also attended the Ankara summit. Having previously declared that “Türkiye must avoid Russian and Chinese influence,” von der Leyen gave evasive answers when questioned about defense agreements signed with Türkiye. She, too, is currently unable to define Europe’s strategic trajectory. She cannot prevent European industries, struggling to keep pace with military demand in the shadow of the war in Ukraine, from partnering with Turkish firms. Nor can she stop member states from engaging with China whenever they receive a dressing-down from the US. In such a landscape, what “3.0” can we possibly speak of? In the new order, will Europe stand with the US? Will it gravitate toward China? Or will it stand alone?

There was only one sentiment that felt palpable at the Ankara summit: panic. The panic of a United States unable to pivot to the Pacific as the war in Iran—which was supposed to end swiftly—drags on, and the panic of a Europe terrified of being left stranded once stripped of American patronage.

Meanwhile, amid this crisis, Türkiye has both resolved the YPG issue and made major strides in resolving the F-35 dispute. New defense industry agreements and initiatives will ensure Türkiye is advantageously positioned when this crisis eventually subsides. For we do not know whether Europe, once it finally charts its course, will include Türkiye within its threat matrix. The measures we implement and the binding agreements we forge today will allow us to see tomorrow more clearly. In the meantime, NATO will continue to roll out minor patches to sustain its existence. It is too early for 3.0; versions 2.9.1 and 2.9.2 are still on the way.

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Opinion

Can the West afford another war with Iran?

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

Whenever U.S. administrations speak of the “military option” against Iran, public attention tends to focus on combat capabilities, advanced weapons systems, and alliance structures. Yet economists and energy analysts argue that the more pressing question is no longer whether the United States can wage another war, but rather whether the global economy can afford one.

After years of persistent inflation, supply chain disruptions, the war in Ukraine, and mounting public debt across advanced economies, the economic environment surrounding any large-scale confrontation with Iran differs fundamentally from that of previous Gulf conflicts.

Analysts increasingly contend that modern warfare is measured not only by the number of aircraft carriers, fighter jets, or precision-guided missiles deployed, but also by a nation’s capacity to finance prolonged military operations, secure reliable energy supplies, and preserve domestic political and economic stability.

The Strait of Hormuz: The World’s Strategic Chokepoint

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most strategically significant maritime corridors, carrying a substantial share of global oil and liquefied natural gas exports from the Gulf.

Energy experts warn that even a temporary disruption to shipping through the Strait could immediately affect crude oil prices, maritime insurance premiums, freight costs, and ultimately food prices, inflation, and electricity markets across the globe.

Although energy markets possess mechanisms to absorb short-term disruptions, analysts caution that a prolonged interruption would place considerable pressure on energy-importing economies and increase uncertainty across global financial markets.

Are Strategic Oil Reserves Enough?

The United States and several industrialized nations maintain strategic petroleum reserves designed to cushion short-term supply disruptions during major crises.

However, energy specialists note that rebuilding these reserves following their use in recent years requires both time and substantial financial resources. More importantly, they argue that strategic reserves are intended to mitigate temporary shocks rather than replace sustained commercial oil supplies during an extended geopolitical crisis.

Economists therefore caution against viewing emergency stockpiles as a long-term substitute for stable global energy flows.

The Price Tag of War

According to estimates published by several U.S. research institutions, a large-scale military confrontation could cost anywhere from tens to hundreds of billions of dollars, depending on the duration and scope of military operations.

The financial burden extends far beyond direct defense expenditures. It could include:

Higher global energy prices.

Rising shipping and maritime insurance costs.

Disruptions to international trade.

Declining business investment.

Increased inflationary pressures.

Higher government borrowing and debt-servicing costs.

Economists argue that these cumulative effects would ultimately be felt by consumers on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly if the conflict coincided with a broader slowdown in global economic growth.

America’s Domestic Political Calculus

The political landscape in Washington appears far less unified today regarding another major overseas military engagement.

Congress continues to debate the constitutional limits of presidential war powers, while a growing number of lawmakers advocate stronger congressional oversight before authorizing prolonged military operations.

Meanwhile, many segments of the American public have become increasingly sensitive to the economic costs of foreign interventions, particularly amid persistent inflation, elevated household expenses, and concerns over the federal debt.

Political analysts suggest that any prolonged conflict could quickly evolve into a defining domestic political issue, regardless of which party controls the White House.

NATO Faces a Complex Equation

Within NATO, member states confront widely differing economic and political realities.

Although most allies have significantly increased defense spending in recent years, they continue to grapple with sluggish economic growth, elevated energy costs, inflationary pressures, demographic challenges, and the substantial investments required for the energy transition.

Analysts believe these structural differences could complicate the Alliance’s ability to sustain a prolonged military commitment should another major regional crisis emerge.

Ukraine and the Reassessment of Military Power

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that modern conflicts are determined not solely by battlefield superiority but also by industrial capacity, manufacturing resilience, logistics, and supply-chain security.

The ability to sustain ammunition production, replace military equipment, and maintain uninterrupted defense supply chains has become as strategically important as technological superiority itself.

Defense experts argue that these lessons are prompting Western governments to reassess their readiness for any future protracted conflict.

The East: Growing Cooperation Amid Strategic Complexity

Meanwhile, recent years have witnessed expanding political and economic cooperation among Iran, Russia, and China, alongside varying forms of engagement with North Korea.

Analysts caution, however, that these relationships should not necessarily be viewed as a formal military alliance. Rather, they reflect converging strategic interests in selected economic, diplomatic, and security domains, particularly in response to Western sanctions.

Sanctions have also encouraged several of these countries to expand trade using national currencies while deepening cooperation in energy, infrastructure, advanced technology, and financial systems.

Economics and Technology: The New Strategic Battleground

Many experts argue that today’s competition between East and West extends well beyond conventional military power.

Artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, critical minerals, supply-chain resilience, cybersecurity, and technological innovation have emerged as central pillars shaping the future global balance of power.

While the United States and its allies seek to preserve their technological leadership, China and its partners continue investing heavily in indigenous innovation and reducing dependence on Western technologies.

Is There Any Winner?

Most economists agree that a major military confrontation in the Gulf would impose significant costs on all parties, albeit unevenly.

Higher oil prices could generate short-term gains for some energy exporters, yet they would simultaneously weigh on global growth, dampen investment, and increase inflationary pressures across major economies.

Financial markets could also experience heightened volatility as investors seek safe-haven assets amid growing geopolitical uncertainty.

Conclusion

Current economic and geopolitical indicators suggest that any large-scale military confrontation with Iran would carry risks extending far beyond the battlefield itself.

The central strategic question is therefore not merely which side possesses greater military capabilities, but which can sustain the economic, political, and strategic costs of a prolonged conflict.

At a time when the international system is undergoing profound transformation—and when competition over technology, energy, industrial capacity, and economic resilience is intensifying—many analysts argue that effective crisis management and de-escalation may ultimately prove far less costly than testing the limits of military power in one of the world’s most strategically sensitive regions.

Reference:

  • U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) – World Oil Transit Chokepoints.
  • International Energy Agency (IEA) – Oil Market Report.
  • Congressional Research Service (CRS) – War Powers Resolution.
  • Brown University – Costs of War Project.
  • International Monetary Fund (IMF) – World Economic Outlook.
  • Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) – Military Expenditure Database.
  • International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – The Military Balance.
  • NATO – Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries.
  • World Bank – Global Economic Prospects.
  • OECD – Economic Outlook
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Opinion

Ankara’s Second Summit: Twenty-Two Years On, NATO Returns to a Türkiye That Has Changed the Rules

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

Twenty-two years after Istanbul hosted NATO’s leaders in 2004, the Alliance has returned to Turkish soil, this time to the Beştepe Presidential Complex in Ankara, for a summit that arrives not as ceremony but as reckoning. The 36th NATO Summit, convened July 7–8, unfolds against a backdrop few of its architects in 2004 could have imagined: a Ukraine war grinding into its fifth year, a Middle East still smoldering from a direct US-Israel war with Iran, an American president openly questioning the value of the Alliance he is attending, and a host nation, Türkiye, that has quietly become indispensable to almost every crisis on NATO’s agenda.

Türkiye’s Moment: From Junior Partner to Power Broker

Hosting a NATO summit has always been a statement of strategic weight. But Ankara 2026 is different in kind. Türkiye arrives not merely as host but as leverage. Its defense-industrial base — anchored by companies like ASELSAN, which has attracted reported interest from global capital including BlackRock, with US Ambassador Tom Barrack said to be facilitating contacts and BlackRock’s Larry Fink having met President Erdoğan earlier this year — has positioned Türkiye as a rising node in NATO’s push for defense-industrial self-sufficiency. The Ankara Summit’s dedicated Defence Industry Forum, held alongside the political summit, underscores this: Türkiye is no longer simply a NATO member on the alliance’s southeastern flank but a manufacturing and innovation hub the Alliance now needs.

This is Erdoğan’s leverage point. As European allies scramble to meet the 5% GDP defense-spending pledge agreed last year, with 3.5% earmarked for core defense and 1.5% for resilience and infrastructure, Türkiye has positioned Ankara as a “delivery checkpoint” — a moment to translate commitments into contracts, and contracts into Turkish industrial gain. Analysts covering the summit have openly asked whether the gathering represents collective security or, in effect, the largest commercial handshake in Turkish defense history.

The Russia-China Question: Hedging in Plain Sight

Türkiye’s balancing act is not new, but it has rarely been more visible. Even as Ankara hosts NATO’s leaders, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met his Russian counterpart in Moscow only weeks earlier, part of a pattern of parallel engagement that Ankara has never fully abandoned since the Ukraine war began. Türkiye continues to occupy a unique lane inside NATO: a member state that supplies Kyiv with Bayraktar drones while keeping Black Sea diplomatic channels to Moscow open, and one that has deepened economic and energy ties with both Russia and China without triggering the kind of alliance discipline applied to smaller members. For Ankara, NATO membership and multi-alignment with Moscow and Beijing are not contradictions to be resolved but assets to be managed simultaneously — a posture that gives Turkish diplomats outsized room to maneuver at exactly the summit meant to reaffirm collective unity.

Ukraine: Sustaining a War Without an End

The degraded state of the Ukraine war looms over every session in Ankara. NATO is expected to affirm a pledge of roughly €70 billion in military equipment, assistance, and training for Ukraine in 2026, with allies committing to sustain at least equivalent levels into 2027. Yet the summit convenes amid reports that Italy has been resisting parts of the Ukraine funding language in the draft communiqué, exposing cracks in what NATO officials insist remains a “unity summit.” President Trump is scheduled to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines, following recent phone calls in which Trump suggested renewed prospects for a negotiated peace — even as fighting continues largely unabated and Zelenskyy has publicly flagged what he considers European inaction.

Ankara’s Trade-Off Amid the US-NATO Rift Over Iran

The most consequential subtext of this summit may be the still-raw rupture between Washington and its allies over the Strait of Hormuz. Since the US-Israel war against Iran erupted in late February — triggered by the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — Iran’s closure and periodic re-closure of Hormuz has convulsed global energy markets. When Trump called on NATO, China, Japan and South Korea to help secure the strait militarily in March, every ally declined; Germany’s defense minister flatly stated it was not Europe’s war. Trump responded by calling NATO’s refusal a “very foolish mistake” and describing the Alliance, without American backing, as a “paper tiger.”

That rift has not healed; it has merely gone quiet enough to allow a summit to proceed. A ceasefire and blockade-lifting memorandum signed in June eased the crisis, but Iran has since signaled it will impose transit fees on Hormuz shipping, with “special treatment” reportedly reserved for friendlier states — a policy Washington rejects as unworkable for any lasting deal. Strait security is now formally on this week’s NATO agenda, even though the underlying disagreement over burden-sharing on Iran was never resolved, only overtaken by events. This is the trade-off Turkish politicians are positioned to exploit: Ankara can offer itself as an indispensable interlocutor — bridging Washington’s frustration with European reluctance — while extracting defense-procurement access and diplomatic capital in return, precisely the kind of transactional leverage Erdoğan has cultivated throughout the crisis.

The Middle East Overhang: Syria, Lebanon, and a Widening Israel Rift

Türkiye’s regional posture will shape the summit’s Middle East undertone as much as any formal session. President Trump is set to hold a separate bilateral meeting in Ankara with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former rebel commander now leading Damascus. The meeting follows Trump’s repeated suggestion — first floated at the G7 — that Syrian forces could take on Hezbollah in Lebanon more effectively than Israel, a proposal al-Sharaa has consistently declined, insisting Damascus seeks only economic channels with Beirut, not a military role reminiscent of Syria’s decades-long occupation of Lebanon. The subtext is unmistakable: Washington is testing whether it can redirect regional security burdens away from an Israeli campaign in Lebanon that has produced significant civilian casualties, toward a Syrian government still consolidating power after Assad’s fall — a maneuver that would simultaneously ease pressure on Israel and open a new channel of US engagement with post-Assad Syria, independent of Iran.

Layered atop this is an open diplomatic rupture between Ankara and Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, in a CNN Türk interview days before the summit, described Israel’s policies and mindset as “a burden that humanity can no longer bear” and called for international sanctions, accusing Israel of perpetrating mass killing in Gaza. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar branded the remarks “textbook incitement to genocide,” a charge Germany’s foreign minister also distanced himself from as unacceptable rhetoric, while President Isaac Herzog denounced the comments as antisemitic. Erdoğan, for his part, dismissed Israeli criticism as an attempt to deflect from its own conduct in Gaza. That this exchange erupted just as NATO’s Israeli-aligned members prepare to sit alongside Türkiye’s delegation adds a genuinely awkward undercurrent to an Alliance summit ostensibly focused on Russia and defense spending — and gives Ankara another card to play: positioning itself as the Muslim world’s most vocal NATO-member critic of Israel, a role with real currency across the Arab and Islamic world even as it strains Türkiye’s Western alliances.

The Palestinian Case and Arab Coordination

For Cairo, Islamabad, Doha, and Riyadh, the Ankara summit is being watched less for its Ukraine communiqué than for what it signals about regional alignment on Gaza and the Palestinian file. Egypt, Qatar, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have each played mediating or coordinating roles throughout the Iran crisis and its regional spillover — Islamabad brokered ceasefire talks during the Hormuz confrontation, while Qatar helped facilitate a Lebanon ceasefire alongside the United States and Iran. That same quartet’s coordination on Gaza reconstruction, Palestinian statehood diplomacy, and pressure against further escalation in Lebanon is likely to intensify in the summit’s aftermath, particularly if Fidan’s confrontational posture toward Israel hardens into a broader Turkish push to rally Muslim-majority states — inside and outside NATO — around a unified Palestinian position. Whether Ankara’s rhetoric translates into coordinated Arab-Turkish diplomatic action, or remains a unilateral Turkish gesture aimed at domestic and regional audiences, will be one of the more consequential open questions to emerge from a summit meant, on paper, to be about Russia and the Atlantic alliance — and that has become, in practice, a referendum on how far Türkiye’s ambitions now extend.


This analysis draws on reporting from NATO’s official summit documentation, Reuters, the Congressional Research Service, The National, The Jerusalem Post, Al Arabiya, and other outlets covering the Ankara Summit as of July 7, 2026.

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