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A Capital Outflow

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A record level of capital outflow that equals 1.47 trillion rubles has taken place to the bank accounts outside Russia, in a time period between June and August, according to the Central Bank of Russia. For a comparison, the capital outflow had been recorded as  57 billion rubles in the same time period of 2021 (third quarter), which is 26 times less. For another comparison: the budget revenues for the year 2022 were recorded as 25.02 trillion rubles. This means that roughly 6 percent of all budget revenues of the nation were scooped out of the country by the bourgeoisie, only in the third quarter of the last year. Only then we can add the 543.4 billion and 550.7 billion rubles that are also scooped away in the first and the second quarters, by the “patriotic” bourgeoisie (despite all “sanctions”), who have managed to take out more than 10 percent of the national budget revenues in the last three quarters.

And the outflow did not stop after the third quarter. The Central Bank of Russia has estimated in early December that the Russian citizens had roughly 4.19 trillion rubles (or 66.65 billion USD at that time) in foreign bank accounts, as of November 1st. Also, according to the data released by the Central Bank of Russia on February 13th, the total assets of Russian citizens in foreign bank accounts have summed up to a total of 94.3 billion USD (or about 7 trillion Rubles, that is almost 30 percent of the national budget revenue of 2022). This means that the deposits in foreign bank have more than tripled over the last year. This alone is an enormous capital outflow, and it is just the tip of the iceberg. These data only shows the outflow that the Central Bank has allowed. The account deposits of Russian citizens in foreign banks had reached 0.5 billion USD in January 2022, which have risen to 4.3 billion USD in February. Almost all these transactions have taken place between February 24th and 28th. The outflow has lost its momentum between March and May, since the Central Bank of Russia had imposed harsh restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. And as soon as the banks have relaxed some these restrictions, the outflow spiked again, reaching 48.9 billion USD in the second half of the year, or making up to the 77 percent of the total annual outflow. Even this can be considered as a very modest estimate, since it is not possible to get information from the countries where the outflow has occurred to after the sanctions.

Moreover, the total capital outflow is not only these 70-100 billion USD in foreign banks. The Central Bank had estimated last July, that the total capital outflow in 2022 would be 243 billion USD. This is a record in the last 10 years, with second happening in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea, being 152 billion USD. The total capital outflow between 2012 and 2021 is around 576.5 billion USD. Capital that equals half of that in the previous 10 years, was scooped away in just one year.

Of course, this amount includes that of the foreign companies which sold their assets in Russia or, stakes that Russian companies hold in foreign countries. So, the capital outflow is often not done by carrying huge stacks of cash across the border. But it is done by shifting enormous sums to offshore companies, and that is pretty much like carrying huge bags of cash.

So, this enormous capital outflow can take place in every means and there are not much obstacles to doing this. According to the Head of the Russian Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina, who has spoken around the end of the year, saying “This is not a matter of concern for us in the current situation. We do not consider it necessary to take any special measures in this connection. “, and adding that “As confidence in macroeconomic stability, price stability strengthens, these funds will return to the Russian banking system, to rubles.”

I get goosebumps as soon as I hear “macroeconomic stability”

Another important statement from the Central Bank was that “import substitutions have been reduced to the cost of standard of living”. So, almost 400 billion USD  in assets have been frozen in western banks, there has been a capital outflows close to 250 billion USD this year, but it is import substitutions were lowered to the cost of standard of living. And this statement was made right after the announcement by the US government that American companies would be 152 billion USD of subsidies in microchip production.

One of the most prominent economists in Russia Mikhail Khazin, posted an article on Telegram that “he had initially written for a media outlet, but he did not manage to get it published”, in which Glazyev immediately posted. He claimed that the Russian “fiscal bloc” (the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank) were still represented by the liberal elite, who still wanted Russia to remain in the “necessary liberal” international community. He says, they must meet the basic requirements of the “Washington Consensus” to achieve this. Two of these requirements would be: “Prohibiting all Ruble investments and motivating further capital outflow”. And the second would be maintaining the liquidity of the global dollarization over the nation’s own interests”. Khazin explains the recent capital outflow that broke records in the first three quarters of 2022, with these theses.

And the relationship between economics and politics gets even more evident at this point, while Khazin considers this stance of the “fiscal bloc” as high treason.

Taxation Of The Grand Bourgeoisie

Putin’s speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in early September was of great programmatic importance. I have evaluated his speech under “9 crucial points” back then. And on the eighth point, I stated:

“The Kremlin keeps stressing that they have used and will continue to use ‘the market mechanisms and instruments’ to seize the ‘excess profit’ of the grand bourgeoisie. This could shows that the grand bourgeoisie has not succeeded in its lobbying efforts together with the ‘fiscal bloc”.

In his speech, Putin has described these market instruments as follows:

“These will be market instruments that are known by all: it can either be customs clearance or recovery of the excess profit in some other ways”.

The target of these words was neither the petty bourgeoisie that emerged after the crisis, nor the new middle bourgeoisie that has now started to flourish after the disqualification of the Navalniyite middle bourgeoisie after February 24th. They too, managed to accumulate an “excessive profit”, and are still accumulating, but the real target was the grand bourgeoisie, which were mainly active in the fields of telecommunications, mining industries and finances, and clearly reeked of a dangerous threat (even if Putin had given a guarantee of “private property” at the same time).

Despite Putin’s programmatic speech, the aforementioned issue has not come up for a long time. Finally, on February 15th, around four and a half months after the announcement of the program, the Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Sazanov has announced that “started working” on two resolutions on this agenda: A voluntary payment, or a kind of involuntary taxation.

Why did it take so long or why did this even come up in the end? The answer to the first question is: We would not expect the grand bourgeoisie to not resist the taxation of excess profit, imposed by the Kremlin. Moreover, the economic situation was relatively stable from the beginning of September and until December when sanctions on crude oil exports were imposed, so back then the first shock was absorbed, and the nation has turned from the brink of total collapse. This may be an exaggerated rhetoric, but definitely not a false one. The Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov has clearly stated that “the economy is at risk of collapse” on December 27th when in describing the situation in March, and that he “thinks that the economy is about to go completely out of control”. Meanwhile Belousov has addressed the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Central Bank of Russia when crediting those who managed to reverse this doomsday scenario, but did not mention anything about the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the resistance by the grand bourgeoisie must have gained more momentum in such atmosphere of a relative satisfaction.

And the answer to the second question is: The “fiscal bloc” had to stop further hindering this program, since the problem of financing the government budget, which is caused by a massive decline in the natural gas and oil revenues due to sanctions and the sabotage of Nord Stream 2 pipeline, keeps threatening to destroy the Russian economy.

The Finance Minister Siluanov spoke only two days after Sazanov and stated that he expects “industry giants” to make a “voluntary contribution” of 300 billion rubles to the government budget in return for their excessive profits in 2021 and 2022. Such funds would not cover the expected budget deficit since the budget deficit in 2023 is the expected to be around 2.9 trillion rubles (which is 2 percent of the GDP), and can reach 5 trillion rubles due to the large decrease in oil and gas revenues that occurred as a result of the sanctions. We can understand that the Ministry has alleviated the taxes on grand bourgeoisie to an enormous scale, and has reduced it to around 10 percent of the expected budget deficit even with the most optimistic estimations. But even this was not enough, so the minister tried to make it a “voluntary action”. Moreover, the ministry must have negotiated with some these “industry giants” and tried to get their consent, that is because according to Siluanov: “These industry giants are ready to share some of their profit, with the state”. And on top of that, Siluanov also announced the good news that oil and gas companies would not be charged an additional tax over their profits over these past years.

There seems to be a mismatch between the words of the minister and his deputy; While the deputy minister speaks of two resolutions, there is only one solution according to the minister. While his deputy also points out the hard way, the minister states that there is already an understanding with the grand bourgeoisie on this issue.

However the grand bourgeoisie does not seem convinced these days. Head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Aleksandr Shokhin, has made it clear that voluntary action would not work out. But this was not as if “there could not be a thing called voluntary tax, we should force it properly”, but rather something like “there cannot be a tax on excess profits, since things like private property and the free market are untouchable, we should instead reduce taxes so that the free market can invest even freer and the concept of big government is nonsense anyways” etc.

An Involuntary Volunteerism

On the exact same day that Siluanov has made the voluntary tax announcement, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov was asked about this issue at a press briefing. Peskov noted that talks are still ongoing, while similar practices are very common all over the world, and that the government is in a constant contact with representatives of large businesses on this issue, while adding: “The key word is voluntary, but, of course, the interaction between the country’s leadership and business, and the government and the business sector, is a two-way street. Therefore, of course, it is necessary that both sides, although we are all on the same side nonetheless, were clearly aware of the realities that we live in today and the needs the country has”.

That was regarded as a very diplomatic response, and although it did not imply a direct challenge to the grand bourgeoisie, which he had comforted with his message of cooperation, the warning or some may even say the threat, was clear enough. The Kremlin as it is the rational thought, has no doubt that the grand bourgeoisie will not show any voluntary willingness, therefore the formula of involuntary volunteerism must have seemed more practical. The force may bare more fruits, and with the threat of enforcing it, some giant industries may volunteer to contribute and receive a reward in the form of a state decoration, but the division of labor between those who can afford it and those who cannot is such that the Kremlin will not hesitate to introduce some new ways of encouraging volunteerism, in order to overcome the foolishness (that word can be used conditionally), of the “fiscal bloc”.

However, the “fiscal bloc” will not hesitate to look for ways to minimize the profit losses of the grand bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact, the first major move came on the exact same day, from the bloc’s one significant part, the Central Bank. Not only did the Central Bank back the Ministry’s volunteerism plan, it also proposed to cancel the debts of these companies to the government banks in return for the “voluntary contributions” of this class, that totals 300 billion Rubles (according to the report of Banksta, one of the closest affiliated outlets of the grand bourgeoisie).

This is a marvelous bribery! Let us first cancel all short, medium and long term loans, then you can “donate” us, and let us call this volunteering.

The central bank’s call for peace was quick to earn Deripaska’s approval. The owner of RUSAL wrote: “This would be a balanced decision, if not the ideal”.

The “conflicting alliance” continues, as the existence of this alliance does not stop the conflict. The Kremlin will continue its involuntary volunteerism imposition, but it can accept to cancel some of the long-term loans, while it could be a little bit difficult to cancel medium-term loans, and it will surely reject to cancel short-term loans. While it is certain that the problem cannot be solved with such negotiations, while the Kremlin will continue to go for the grand bourgeoisie to finance the government budget, the fiscal bloc will continue its efforts to fend it off, as oil and gas revenues fall rock bottom.

***

There have been two new developments confirming what I have claimed, after I have written them. So, it impossible to end this article without mentioning about them briefly.

First, Putin’s programmatic speech on February 22nd, included the announcement that they would not back down on taxation, despite the pressures from the bourgeoisie and the “fiscal bloc” (he openly admitted “things are tough”). Despite the insistence and the determination of the “fiscal bloc”, the cancellation of long-term loans was largely off the agenda after this speech.

The second is the statements made by Alexander Shokhin, the same day that of Putin’s speech. Shokhin said, they had reached an agreement with the government for a one-time “windfall tax”. The fact that this is defined as a tax, and not as a voluntary contribution, clearly shows the Kremlin’s dedication. And for Shohin, there is only one question that remains: That is how to estimate these “excess profits”.

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Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France

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The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.

In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.

Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.

Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.

The shadow of 17 October 1961

It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.

Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.

This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.

To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?

Looters on the streets, where are the police?

Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.

While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.

It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.

To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?

The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.

A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges

The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.

The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.

The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.

These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.

The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.

In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.

An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands

Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.

Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.

To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.

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What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?

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By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.

The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.

There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.

For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.

Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.

Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.

There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.

For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.

Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?

Let us give another example from the Turkic world.

On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?

We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?

Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.

In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?

In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?

Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?

How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?

Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?

How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?

Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?

These questions can certainly be multiplied.

Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.

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The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East

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In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.

In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.

Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.

Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.

A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East

On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.

These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.

If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.

Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.

Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.

For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.

The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again

The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.

Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.

The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.

Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.

Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.

Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.

Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.

In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.

In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.

Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.

A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.

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