Opinion
Iran from 2025 to 2026: A security-first state mindset
The year 2025 should be evaluated as a year in which the rules of the game changed in Iranian politics; a year so significant that security politics virtually swallowed everything else, and military-regional variables cast a decisive shadow over the entirety of the economy, domestic policy, and diplomacy. The consequences of this year are not short-term; they are of a nature that will permeate the years following 2026. 2025 must be viewed as one of the defining years in which the course of Iranian politics was recalibrated, similar to pivotal moments in the last forty years. As a result of the intensification of direct and indirect conflict with Israel, the de facto blockage of diplomatic channels with the West, and worsening economic-social pressures, Iranian politics has entered a new phase that can be defined as a transition from a policy of “tension management” to one of “security-based stability.” 2025 has been a long year for the Iranian people and the state, and it appears this situation will continue into the coming Gregorian year.
Undoubtedly, this year will be etched in memory for the “Twelve-Day War.” This war began on June 13, 2025, with Israel’s surprise attacks targeting Iran’s military and nuclear facilities, high-ranking military commanders, and nuclear scientists; it concluded on the twelfth day following American intervention, diplomatic contacts conducted by regional countries, and Iran’s final missile strikes.
Although months have passed since the war, the questions of which side emerged victorious from the field and how this war will impact the region’s security architecture remain among the fundamental topics of discussion and debate.
This war began at a time when Iran was conducting negotiations with America. In fact, on the weekend the war started, high-ranking Iranian diplomats were scheduled to meet again in Oman with Trump’s special representative, Witkoff. Due to the ongoing negotiations, the political atmosphere in Iran was shaped by the belief that Israel would not take military action while talks were in progress, and that a military conflict might only come to the fore following a potential failure of negotiations. For this reason, the security deployment in Iran was at a non-war level. Israel exploited this situation to inflict heavy blows on Iran, and these attacks—particularly in the initial hours—led officials in Tel Aviv to adopt a maximalist approach regarding the future of the war. In the early days of the conflict, Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the Iranian people directly, attempting to mobilize the masses against the Iranian state; attacks on border police stations in the country’s western regions created favorable ground for the infiltration of terrorist elements from the Iraqi Kurdistan region and the execution of sabotage activities.
However, the course of the war changed a few days later as the impact of Iran’s missile strikes increased, new dimensions of Iran’s missile capacity were revealed, and weaknesses and deficiencies in Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system were exposed. Considering the low level of social resilience within Israeli society, Iran succeeded in exerting serious military and political pressure on Tel Aviv.
For Tehran, this war clearly demonstrated several fundamental truths: the necessity of further strengthening the missile capacity that has been robustly maintained for the last twenty years; the existence of security vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored, which allowed Mossad elements to operate inside Iran; the obligation to increase the level of coordination between military and civil institutions; the need to change security protocols for individuals in influential and critical positions within the country’s politics; and, most importantly, the necessity of questioning the trust placed in international organizations and the realization that the commitments of America and Europe cannot be relied upon.
The experience that America’s political commitments cannot be absolutely trusted, combined with mistrust toward international organizations, can perhaps be evaluated as the most important and impactful lesson of this war. Before 2025, a segment of the political and administrative elite still maintained the assumption that a gradual normalization in foreign relations might be possible through a change in government or a shift in diplomatic tactics. The developments experienced in 2025 have effectively rendered this assumption invalid. The direct conflict between Iran and Israel, NATO’s full-scope cooperation with Israel, America’s deceptive activities toward Iran and its support for military operations against it, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s cooperation with Israel, have clearly revealed that the contradictions between the two sides are structural, not tactical. The crisis is not of a nature that can be contained through “soft management”; Iranian foreign policy has entered a level where the cost of not reacting is higher than the cost of reacting.
In this framework, Iran’s foreign policy paradigm has witnessed—and will continue to witness—distinct changes, both in the second half of the year and in the coming year and near future. In this new paradigm, security is treated as a decisive variable above all political calculations. This approach has shown, and will continue to show, its effect not only on foreign policy and military strategies but also on budgeting processes, domestic policy, and even Iran’s cultural and media policies. As a result of these transformations, it is noteworthy that the state presented the most contractionary budget of the last few decades to the Iranian Parliament.
Alongside the Twelve-Day War, the activation of the “snapback mechanism” (October 2025) and the implementation of the harshest sanction conditions against the country—despite Iran clearly demonstrating its readiness for all negotiations and willingness to take some significant political steps back—has been the most important development driving the dominant political mindset in Tehran toward a paradigm shift in diplomacy. With the triggering of the snapback mechanism, all United Nations Security Council sanctions resolutions became a current agenda item once again, despite ten years of cooperation by Iran to reduce its nuclear capacity; this situation created heavy economic and political pressure on the Masoud Pezeshkian government. This government, which came to power following the suspicious death of the previous president, found itself in an extremely difficult process from its very first days with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
As a result of these conditions, a discourse advocating a transition from “problem-solving diplomacy” to “deterrent diplomacy” is observed to be gaining strength within the power structure. The key concept in this discourse is active deterrence; according to this view, the cost of not displaying power is higher than the cost of displaying power in a controlled manner. In this context, it is argued that Iran must fortify its regional presence and transform military means directly into political instruments. Considering the security blows Iran suffered during the Twelve-Day War, this paradigm shift will manifest itself more distinctly in the fields of security and intelligence, directing Iran to strengthen its intelligence networks against Israel and American forces in the region.
Simultaneous with this paradigm shift, it is observed that Iran has adopted a minimum level of diplomacy in its relations with the West. Contrary to previous negotiation processes, likely future talks will be conducted not as the beginning of a comprehensive solution, but as issue-focused, temporary contacts lacking a long-term strategic horizon. In other words, in its negotiations with the European trio [E3] or America, Iran is leaning toward managing the crisis rather than trying to resolve it. Parallel to this limited interaction with the West, a deepening of relations with the East is also visible, and this trend will continue in Iranian diplomacy. Relations with Russia and China are rising from a level of “cooperation” to a level of limited strategic alignment. This rise is occurring despite the resistance of the pro-Western bureaucratic structure within Iran; with the military wing gaining strength in domestic politics, these collaborations are acquiring a more serious nature, taking on a military and security-centered character.
While this situation may have removed Iran’s foreign policy from strategic ambiguity in the short term, it has brought about a picture of economic and social freezing and uncertainty in domestic politics. The possibility of a war that could yield new and heavier economic and political consequences has dragged the Iranian economy into a state of passivity; as a natural result, a decline in economic growth, an increase in inflation, and supply-demand imbalances have emerged.
It can already be said that 2026 will be an extremely difficult year for the Iranian government. It must prepare to manage security crises arising from a potential confrontation with Israel on the one hand, while on the other, it is obliged to resolve infrastructural and managerial problems emerging from the cumulative effect of heavy sanctions that have continued for over twenty years. Indeed, a few days ago, Masoud Pezeshkian openly stated to the public that the country’s fundamental problems (such as inflation, unemployment, and sanctions) are insoluble and that he has no idea how to overcome them; these statements led to serious criticism from broad circles, including his former supporters.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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