The Munich Security Conference and the limits of American power

The 62nd Munich Security Conference, convened in Munich, Germany, has demonstrated once again that the divergences of opinion within the Atlantic alliance are far from negligible. Yet, despite the lofty rhetoric and ambitious pronouncements of European leaders, they possess neither the courage, the capability, nor the will to operationalize these words or do what is necessary.

The events unfolding within the Atlantic alliance are not novel; they are part of a longstanding debate. Western leaders face formidable challenges not only in foreign policy but also in their domestic spheres. They are besieged by difficulties ranging from poverty and unemployment to inflation and the refugee-migrant crisis. U.S. President Trump recognizes this as well. The state capacity of his country is waning. Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans can arrest the decline in America’s hegemonic capability or its dominance over the global ecosystem. The U.S. is unable to prevent the rise of adversaries such as China and Russia, nor can it impede them from forging alliances with one another.

Since international relations is a discipline predicated on necessities and imperatives rather than mere preferences, alliances shift as needs evolve. Every alliance inevitably begets a counter-alliance.

The U.S. is struggling to adapt to these shifting balances. This is the root cause of its hardening stance, its growing belligerence, and its declaration that it will no longer abide by the order for which it wrote the rules and established the institutions. This reality is already reflected in the country’s economy, diplomacy, and social structure. In a nation with a population of 343 million, 7.3 million are unemployed. The country’s federal debt is exceedingly high, standing at 38.7 trillion dollars, against an economic volume of 31.2 trillion dollars. The disparity in income distribution is at a terrifying level. The wealth of the richest 50 individuals equals that of half the population. By the end of 2025, the 10 wealthiest billionaires in the U.S. added another 698 billion dollars to their fortunes in a single year. More than 40 percent of the U.S. population—and half of its children—are classified as low-income. According to OECD data, the U.S. ranks first in relative poverty, second in child poverty and infant mortality, and second to last in life expectancy.

Therefore, when discoursing on the United States, it is imperative to look beyond its imperial character and scrutinize its economy, social structure, the systemic failures in health and education, high crime rates, and overflowing prisons. The political, social, cultural, and class chasms in the U.S. are numerous and diverse. Resolving these issues in the short term is a formidable task.

U.S. Policies Regarding China and Russia

The greatest rival to the U.S. is China. This reality is already inscribed in foreign policy, national security, defense, and strategy documents. China, alongside Russia, is characterized as an “adversary state,” a state challenging U.S. hegemony. However, despite their political and diplomatic friction, the U.S. and China both collaborate and compete on an economic scale. The U.S. owes the most debt to China, and China holds the most U.S. debt. Economic relations are defined by mutual investment, debt-credit dynamics, import-export volumes, and fierce competition. It is impossible for them to decouple from one another.

China, the world’s second-largest economy after the U.S., has surpassed the U.S. in calculations based on purchasing power parity to become the largest economy. In merchandise trade, China is the European Union’s second-largest partner after the U.S. China’s foreign exchange reserves reached 3.357 trillion dollars by the end of 2025. China overtook the U.S. in manufacturing in 2011, in merchandise trade in 2013, and in patent numbers in 2019. In 2020, it became the world’s largest consumer market. It is projected to become the world’s largest economy by 2030.

To encircle China within its immediate periphery, the U.S. spearheaded the quadrilateral alliance known as the QUAD (U.S., Japan, India, Australia). It is striving to expand this alliance further. The U.S. attempts to prevent a rapprochement between China and Russia and to neutralize institutions led or participated in by these two nations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS). It is particularly eager for India to cooperate closely with the U.S. against China, developing a specific “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to this end. Yet, thus far, it has not achieved the desired results.

As witnessed once again at the Munich Security Conference, Germany encounters friction in its relations with the U.S. whenever it articulates a desire to become a political, diplomatic, and military power commensurate with its economic, industrial, and technological might. However, despite these words, Germany cannot transition into action. It increases its defense budget and makes grand pronouncements with France regarding joint steps in defense, security, foreign policy, and even nuclear deterrence, yet it fails to do what is necessary. Let us recall that in previous years, the U.S. and Germany admitted to spying on each other’s leaders through intelligence agencies and levied massive fines on each other’s major corporations.

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the U.S. has begun to signal a more temperate stance toward Russia. Sensitivity regarding Ukraine has diminished. The U.S. has taken steps to cool the close relationship between Russia and China, though it has not found the success it hoped for.

Russia remains a major power with its rich natural gas and oil resources, high-tech defense industry, and capacity to build nuclear power plants. It possesses the largest landmass in the world and is rich in skilled human capital. Its statecraft experience, bureaucratic tradition, and the leadership prowess exemplified by Putin are robust. Russia also capitalizes on the eroding power of the U.S., particularly in Ukraine.

Türkiye’s Relations with the West

The U.S. possesses a potent and deep-rooted influence within Turkish political life, bureaucracy, civil-military security institutions, the business world, academia, and trade unions. Loyalty to NATO runs strong in both the government and the opposition in Türkiye. In the diplomatic sphere, while Türkiye occasionally experiences friction with the U.S. and the European Union, economic relations remain solid. Türkiyes largest economic partner in foreign trade is the European Union, and specifically Germany within the EU. They are followed by Russia and China. Russia is Türkiye’s largest energy supplier. Furthermore, the Russians are constructing Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Mersin.

The gravest threats to Türkiye’s independence, integrity, and sovereignty originate from the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. and the European Union are the primary supporters of anti-Türkiye terrorist organizations such as FETÖ and the PKK-PYD-YPG. Beyond terrorist organizations, U.S. support for coups and coup attempts is well documented. The U.S. is attempting to carve out a Kurdish state by dividing four countries in the region (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Türkiye). Historically, many crises have occurred—and continue to occur—between Türkiye and the U.S., including the Johnson Letter, the U-2 spy plane crisis, the missile crisis, the embargo imposed after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, the March 1st motion refusal, and in the present day, CAATSA sanctions, the F-35 fighter jet and S-400 crisis, the Halkbank case, the Pastor Brunson crisis, and support for the so-called Armenian genocide allegations. In bilateral and multilateral issues to which Türkiye is a party, the U.S. invariably positions itself against Türkiye.

The U.S. is an imperialist state. Its priorities, expectations, political culture, principles, values, objectives, interests, anxieties, threat definitions, and threat perceptions differ fundamentally from those of Türkiye. Moreover, the U.S. is not comprised solely of the White House. Congress, the bureaucracy, intelligence agencies, the Departments of Treasury, State, and Defense, as well as the business world—primarily the military-industrial complex—academia, think tanks, media, and lobbies are power centers that must absolutely be taken into account.

From the U.S. perspective, Türkiye is important due to its geopolitical location, its Muslim identity, and its possession of the second-largest army in NATO. It is not a strategic ally of the U.S., but rather a solution partner whose cooperation is valued in Middle Eastern issues. Because Türkiye purchased the S-400 air defense system from Russia, the U.S. refused to deliver the F-35 fighter jets for which Türkiye had already paid. It excluded Türkiye from the production process of these aircraft and activated CAATSA sanctions.

U.S.-Middle East Relations

The U.S. has won in Syria. It has broken the influence of Russia and Iran. Although the U.S. prioritizes China and dedicates a significant portion of its energy to containing Beijing, it will not withdraw completely from the Middle East. Even if it reduces its military presence in the region, it will never exit entirely. U.S. interest in the Middle East can be fundamentally explained by the following seven points:

First is the security of Israel. Second is U.S. efficacy over energy resources and routes. Third is regime change in Iran. Fourth is the establishment of a Kurdish state. Fifth is ensuring the security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries it leads. Sixth is reducing Russia’s influence in the region. Seventh is curbing China’s increasing weight in the region.

Due to its diminishing state capacity, as has been more clearly observed in recent years, the U.S. is pushing its allies in the region to the forefront. It prioritizes dark warfare methods, proxy wars, and hybrid warfare—including the utilization of terrorist organizations—to destabilize the region.

There is no major power in the Middle East capable of challenging the U.S. in terms of power. A state aspiring to establish global hegemony must be able to compete with the U.S. on economic, industrial, technological, and military scales. Militarily, it must possess offensive capability, deterrence, the ability to forge alliances, and the skill to deny its adversary area dominance. It must possess economic and cultural power and instruments of public diplomacy that influence other nations. It must be capable of manufacturing consent and persuading others of its leadership.

The Trajectory of Global Change

The U.S. maintains approximately 800 bases, large and small, in over 150 countries worldwide. This military presence is simultaneously the collateral for its economic power. It is the guarantee that the U.S. dollar continues to be used as the currency of circulation on a global scale. However, for the U.S., this situation is not sustainable globally. It accepts this via the Monroe Doctrine. This is the reason for its primary focus on its immediate periphery, the Americas. The fact that Trump is less willing to use military force, despite the U.S. having a navy on the open seas, is not a preference; it is a necessity.

The U.S. is striving to preserve, at any cost, the superiority it gained after the Cold War in four areas: Economy, technology, defense, and culture. However, the U.S. is not at its former strength. Today, there is no absolute, runaway U.S. hegemony. The U.S. is far from the days when it led the world not only in economy, industry, technology, and military power but also in culture, cinema, music, academia, lifestyle, fashion, sports, and dietary habits. It has ceased to be the locomotive of growth and production. It has lost its former allure.

There no longer exists a United States defined by both invasions and color revolutions across a vast geography stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia, from Africa to Latin America. The world must recognize this reality and act accordingly.