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The Munich Security Conference and the limits of American power

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The 62nd Munich Security Conference, convened in Munich, Germany, has demonstrated once again that the divergences of opinion within the Atlantic alliance are far from negligible. Yet, despite the lofty rhetoric and ambitious pronouncements of European leaders, they possess neither the courage, the capability, nor the will to operationalize these words or do what is necessary.

The events unfolding within the Atlantic alliance are not novel; they are part of a longstanding debate. Western leaders face formidable challenges not only in foreign policy but also in their domestic spheres. They are besieged by difficulties ranging from poverty and unemployment to inflation and the refugee-migrant crisis. U.S. President Trump recognizes this as well. The state capacity of his country is waning. Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans can arrest the decline in America’s hegemonic capability or its dominance over the global ecosystem. The U.S. is unable to prevent the rise of adversaries such as China and Russia, nor can it impede them from forging alliances with one another.

Since international relations is a discipline predicated on necessities and imperatives rather than mere preferences, alliances shift as needs evolve. Every alliance inevitably begets a counter-alliance.

The U.S. is struggling to adapt to these shifting balances. This is the root cause of its hardening stance, its growing belligerence, and its declaration that it will no longer abide by the order for which it wrote the rules and established the institutions. This reality is already reflected in the country’s economy, diplomacy, and social structure. In a nation with a population of 343 million, 7.3 million are unemployed. The country’s federal debt is exceedingly high, standing at 38.7 trillion dollars, against an economic volume of 31.2 trillion dollars. The disparity in income distribution is at a terrifying level. The wealth of the richest 50 individuals equals that of half the population. By the end of 2025, the 10 wealthiest billionaires in the U.S. added another 698 billion dollars to their fortunes in a single year. More than 40 percent of the U.S. population—and half of its children—are classified as low-income. According to OECD data, the U.S. ranks first in relative poverty, second in child poverty and infant mortality, and second to last in life expectancy.

Therefore, when discoursing on the United States, it is imperative to look beyond its imperial character and scrutinize its economy, social structure, the systemic failures in health and education, high crime rates, and overflowing prisons. The political, social, cultural, and class chasms in the U.S. are numerous and diverse. Resolving these issues in the short term is a formidable task.

U.S. Policies Regarding China and Russia

The greatest rival to the U.S. is China. This reality is already inscribed in foreign policy, national security, defense, and strategy documents. China, alongside Russia, is characterized as an “adversary state,” a state challenging U.S. hegemony. However, despite their political and diplomatic friction, the U.S. and China both collaborate and compete on an economic scale. The U.S. owes the most debt to China, and China holds the most U.S. debt. Economic relations are defined by mutual investment, debt-credit dynamics, import-export volumes, and fierce competition. It is impossible for them to decouple from one another.

China, the world’s second-largest economy after the U.S., has surpassed the U.S. in calculations based on purchasing power parity to become the largest economy. In merchandise trade, China is the European Union’s second-largest partner after the U.S. China’s foreign exchange reserves reached 3.357 trillion dollars by the end of 2025. China overtook the U.S. in manufacturing in 2011, in merchandise trade in 2013, and in patent numbers in 2019. In 2020, it became the world’s largest consumer market. It is projected to become the world’s largest economy by 2030.

To encircle China within its immediate periphery, the U.S. spearheaded the quadrilateral alliance known as the QUAD (U.S., Japan, India, Australia). It is striving to expand this alliance further. The U.S. attempts to prevent a rapprochement between China and Russia and to neutralize institutions led or participated in by these two nations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS). It is particularly eager for India to cooperate closely with the U.S. against China, developing a specific “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to this end. Yet, thus far, it has not achieved the desired results.

As witnessed once again at the Munich Security Conference, Germany encounters friction in its relations with the U.S. whenever it articulates a desire to become a political, diplomatic, and military power commensurate with its economic, industrial, and technological might. However, despite these words, Germany cannot transition into action. It increases its defense budget and makes grand pronouncements with France regarding joint steps in defense, security, foreign policy, and even nuclear deterrence, yet it fails to do what is necessary. Let us recall that in previous years, the U.S. and Germany admitted to spying on each other’s leaders through intelligence agencies and levied massive fines on each other’s major corporations.

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the U.S. has begun to signal a more temperate stance toward Russia. Sensitivity regarding Ukraine has diminished. The U.S. has taken steps to cool the close relationship between Russia and China, though it has not found the success it hoped for.

Russia remains a major power with its rich natural gas and oil resources, high-tech defense industry, and capacity to build nuclear power plants. It possesses the largest landmass in the world and is rich in skilled human capital. Its statecraft experience, bureaucratic tradition, and the leadership prowess exemplified by Putin are robust. Russia also capitalizes on the eroding power of the U.S., particularly in Ukraine.

Türkiye’s Relations with the West

The U.S. possesses a potent and deep-rooted influence within Turkish political life, bureaucracy, civil-military security institutions, the business world, academia, and trade unions. Loyalty to NATO runs strong in both the government and the opposition in Türkiye. In the diplomatic sphere, while Türkiye occasionally experiences friction with the U.S. and the European Union, economic relations remain solid. Türkiyes largest economic partner in foreign trade is the European Union, and specifically Germany within the EU. They are followed by Russia and China. Russia is Türkiye’s largest energy supplier. Furthermore, the Russians are constructing Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Mersin.

The gravest threats to Türkiye’s independence, integrity, and sovereignty originate from the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. and the European Union are the primary supporters of anti-Türkiye terrorist organizations such as FETÖ and the PKK-PYD-YPG. Beyond terrorist organizations, U.S. support for coups and coup attempts is well documented. The U.S. is attempting to carve out a Kurdish state by dividing four countries in the region (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Türkiye). Historically, many crises have occurred—and continue to occur—between Türkiye and the U.S., including the Johnson Letter, the U-2 spy plane crisis, the missile crisis, the embargo imposed after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, the March 1st motion refusal, and in the present day, CAATSA sanctions, the F-35 fighter jet and S-400 crisis, the Halkbank case, the Pastor Brunson crisis, and support for the so-called Armenian genocide allegations. In bilateral and multilateral issues to which Türkiye is a party, the U.S. invariably positions itself against Türkiye.

The U.S. is an imperialist state. Its priorities, expectations, political culture, principles, values, objectives, interests, anxieties, threat definitions, and threat perceptions differ fundamentally from those of Türkiye. Moreover, the U.S. is not comprised solely of the White House. Congress, the bureaucracy, intelligence agencies, the Departments of Treasury, State, and Defense, as well as the business world—primarily the military-industrial complex—academia, think tanks, media, and lobbies are power centers that must absolutely be taken into account.

From the U.S. perspective, Türkiye is important due to its geopolitical location, its Muslim identity, and its possession of the second-largest army in NATO. It is not a strategic ally of the U.S., but rather a solution partner whose cooperation is valued in Middle Eastern issues. Because Türkiye purchased the S-400 air defense system from Russia, the U.S. refused to deliver the F-35 fighter jets for which Türkiye had already paid. It excluded Türkiye from the production process of these aircraft and activated CAATSA sanctions.

U.S.-Middle East Relations

The U.S. has won in Syria. It has broken the influence of Russia and Iran. Although the U.S. prioritizes China and dedicates a significant portion of its energy to containing Beijing, it will not withdraw completely from the Middle East. Even if it reduces its military presence in the region, it will never exit entirely. U.S. interest in the Middle East can be fundamentally explained by the following seven points:

First is the security of Israel. Second is U.S. efficacy over energy resources and routes. Third is regime change in Iran. Fourth is the establishment of a Kurdish state. Fifth is ensuring the security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries it leads. Sixth is reducing Russia’s influence in the region. Seventh is curbing China’s increasing weight in the region.

Due to its diminishing state capacity, as has been more clearly observed in recent years, the U.S. is pushing its allies in the region to the forefront. It prioritizes dark warfare methods, proxy wars, and hybrid warfare—including the utilization of terrorist organizations—to destabilize the region.

There is no major power in the Middle East capable of challenging the U.S. in terms of power. A state aspiring to establish global hegemony must be able to compete with the U.S. on economic, industrial, technological, and military scales. Militarily, it must possess offensive capability, deterrence, the ability to forge alliances, and the skill to deny its adversary area dominance. It must possess economic and cultural power and instruments of public diplomacy that influence other nations. It must be capable of manufacturing consent and persuading others of its leadership.

The Trajectory of Global Change

The U.S. maintains approximately 800 bases, large and small, in over 150 countries worldwide. This military presence is simultaneously the collateral for its economic power. It is the guarantee that the U.S. dollar continues to be used as the currency of circulation on a global scale. However, for the U.S., this situation is not sustainable globally. It accepts this via the Monroe Doctrine. This is the reason for its primary focus on its immediate periphery, the Americas. The fact that Trump is less willing to use military force, despite the U.S. having a navy on the open seas, is not a preference; it is a necessity.

The U.S. is striving to preserve, at any cost, the superiority it gained after the Cold War in four areas: Economy, technology, defense, and culture. However, the U.S. is not at its former strength. Today, there is no absolute, runaway U.S. hegemony. The U.S. is far from the days when it led the world not only in economy, industry, technology, and military power but also in culture, cinema, music, academia, lifestyle, fashion, sports, and dietary habits. It has ceased to be the locomotive of growth and production. It has lost its former allure.

There no longer exists a United States defined by both invasions and color revolutions across a vast geography stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia, from Africa to Latin America. The world must recognize this reality and act accordingly.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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The U.S. Economy and NATO’s Function

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Although the U.S. President Trump has repeatedly told his counterparts and the rest of the world to “trade with the United States” and “invest in the United States,” he has so far failed to get the results he hoped for. There are several reasons for this.

First, the United States is no longer as attractive as it once was. Second, China, America’s biggest rival, stands out as a more attractive country for production and investment not only for the rest of the world but also for major U.S. companies themselves. This is because the United States simply cannot compete with China when it comes to production costs. China produces far more, at much lower cost. Moreover, it produces high-quality goods and is rapidly building global brands. For this reason, President Trump’s call on U.S. companies to dismantle their factories in China and relocate them to the United States has also failed to generate the response he expected.

Trump has repeatedly called on European entrepreneurs, investors, and business leaders to invest in the United States as well. “Build your factories in the United States. We will offer you the most favorable and lowest tax rates in the world. Otherwise, you will continue to pay high tariffs. In fact, we will raise those tariffs even further,” he said. It was virtually a threat. Yet despite this, he failed to attract the level of interest he expected from Europeans either.

It is impossible for this picture regarding the economy, trade, and tariffs not to have repercussions for politics and foreign policy. Therefore, when the United States fails to receive the response it expects to its economic invitations and trade proposals, it increasingly resorts to political pressure and foreign-policy threats. On NATO, Trump scolds his European allies. He pressures Europeans to contribute more to NATO. At times, he goes even further, virtually threatening them by saying that the United States could withdraw from NATO. Europe’s leaders, each more miserable and ignorant than the next, sit beside the U.S. president and swallow his insults. Sometimes they even applaud him.

WOULD THE UNITED STATES LEAVE NATO?

The United States will not leave NATO. Having used NATO very effectively, invested so heavily in the alliance, and gained enormous influence through NATO over its allies’ domestic and foreign policies—from their economies to their defense and security policies—the United States will not give it up. If the United States were to leave NATO, the alliance would lose its current meaning, effectiveness, and deterrent power. No NATO member could fill the vacuum left by the United States. Alongside America’s political, economic, military, industrial, and technological weight, it should also be remembered that the United States covers 14.9 percent of NATO’s common budget and accounts for 57 percent of total defense spending within the alliance.

We know that NATO’s European members have neither the strength, courage, political will, nor money to stand up to the United States in pursuit of a “more European NATO.” Nor is there any consensus among them in this regard. The idea of a European defense and security identity that is at least somewhat distinct and autonomous from NATO, occasionally championed by Germany and France, should not be taken too seriously either. Berlin and Paris have failed to persuade NATO’s other European members on this issue. Groups such as the European Political Community, which was brought to the agenda after the Ukraine-Russia war in an effort to also bring in countries such as Turkey and Britain, which are NATO members but not EU members, likewise have little function, influence, or weight.

A few years ago, President Trump demanded that NATO members raise defense spending from 2 percent to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. There was no serious objection to this demand. This alone is one indication that NATO is important to the United States not only politically and militarily but economically as well. America’s influence within NATO also benefits the U.S. arms industry, the largest in the world.

Because Trump wants to turn the United States once again into the world’s foremost manufacturing hub, increase exports, and attract more investment into the country, the defense industry is also of great importance within this broader agenda. Since lowering energy costs is essential to achieving this, Trump both sidelines environmentalist energy projects at home and, as in the case of Venezuela, abducts the leader of an energy-rich country and virtually seizes control of its energy resources. Trump knows that otherwise the United States will struggle to compete with China, and that it is impossible for America to produce more, produce more cheaply, and sell more than China, which is far ahead of the United States in global manufacturing.

That is why, as was once again evident at the NATO summit held in Turkey, discussions within NATO about strategic threats and deterrence, regional security and energy corridors, partnerships and global networks all ultimately serve U.S. priorities and interests. Whether this is explained in terms of geopolitical balances, economic interests, regional dynamics, security needs, diplomatic pressure, or all of these factors combined, NATO is an instrument of aggression and occupation serving U.S. imperialism.

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