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European carmakers turn to Chinese rivals to salvage struggling plants

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European carmakers, struggling with severe headwinds and halted assembly lines across numerous plants, are turning to Chinese rivals to salvage their operations.

A report by the Financial Times outlines the perilous situation facing factories across the continent, particularly in Italy.

The sprawling Fiat automobile plant in Cassino, located 130 km southeast of Rome and once an engine of the local economy, has taken on a desolate, near-abandoned atmosphere.

The facility’s 2,200 employees are summoned to work only a few days a month. In the first half of 2026, the plant produced just 6,700 cars, representing a minuscule fraction of its annual capacity of 300,000 units.

Denise Tisci, a 40-year-old mother of three who has worked at the plant since 2007, has not worked a shift since May and relies on a government temporary lay-off scheme alongside her colleagues.

“We have cut back on many things, even basic, simple things like taking the children out for a pizza,” Tisci said. “Having to look our children in the face is deeply humiliating.”

Fiat workers expect Stellantis, the automaker’s parent company, to seek a Chinese solution for the Cassino plant, mirroring its recent agreements in Spain and France with Leapmotor and Dongfeng.

This situation is not unique to Fiat, as a growing number of European carmakers turn to Chinese competitors to resolve issues caused in part by their rapid expansion into the region.

Emanuele Cappellano, head of European operations at Stellantis, told the Financial Times regarding the company’s recent partnerships in China:

“This is not just a way to survive and catch up with our new rivals, but also an opportunity to boost sales volume and achieve growth in Europe.”

A total closure of the group’s Italian factories has been ruled out, and Cappellano noted that a solution for Cassino will be found by the end of the year.

As the company seeks a partner to revitalize its struggling Maserati brand, a likely scenario involves collaborating with a Chinese group with which it already maintains ties.

This could involve either its electric vehicle (EV) joint-venture partner Leapmotor or state-owned Dongfeng.

“Any partner that moves its production to these factories is not a problem for us. The crisis in the automotive sector is impacting the entire economy,” said Enzo Salera, Mayor of Cassino, adding that local retailers and restaurants have also been severely affected.

European automotive production accounts for approximately 7% of the continent’s GDP and provides employment to roughly 14 million people.

With regional car sales remaining roughly 3 million units below pre-pandemic levels and Chinese rivals capturing market share, other companies have begun adopting new strategies to survive.

Nissan is collaborating with Chery in the UK, Volkswagen continues discussions with Xpeng, and Ford has signed an agreement with Geely in Spain.

Jim Baumbick, head of Ford in Europe, remarked last week while announcing the collaboration with Geely: “The environment in Europe has changed forever. The objective is to achieve the lowest possible cost.”

According to AlixPartners, plant utilization rates in the European automotive sector are running below 60%, leaving a total production capacity of approximately 2.5 million vehicles potentially idle.

Stellantis is doubling down on a strategy that some industry executives view as a short-term fix, but one that could prove self-destructive if local supply chains and technological know-how are not reinforced.

Stellantis has invited Leapmotor and Dongfeng to manufacture models at its facilities in Spain and France.

The Dongfeng agreement was broadly welcomed by French workers because it could help save a 1960s-era plant in Rennes, Brittany.

Like many other Stellantis plants in the country, the Rennes facility had been reduced to a single assembly line, with surrounding land sold off.

Laurent Oechsel, a representative of the French CFE-CGC union at Stellantis, asked: “Right now, Chinese-made cars are sitting in our ports. Do we want to keep fighting against this as the textile sector once did, or do we want to continue producing cars in France alongside the Chinese?”

The challenge for European policymakers, carmakers, and trade unions is to ensure that manufacturing partnerships preserve employment while bolstering the region’s supply chains with Chinese technology.

Currently, many Chinese vehicles marketed as being produced in Europe are equipped primarily with parts manufactured in China and shipped to the EU for final assembly.

Adolfo Urso, Italy’s Minister of Industry, told the Financial Times:

“If the objective is to establish a technological industrial partnership that can fill the factory, keep it viable, and help protect the supply chain, that is welcome. Provided, of course, that people come to Italy to produce, not merely to assemble.”

While partnerships are common among carmakers, European manufacturers hope to learn how to produce cars faster and more cheaply through Chinese alliances.

In return, Chinese brands want to scale up European manufacturing ahead of strict new local content rules that Brussels plans to enforce in mid-2027, aimed at driving investment into the continent, creating new jobs, and enabling technology and skills transfers.

Under the Industrial Accelerator Act, the EU proposes a 70% local content threshold for car parts to qualify for subsidies or public procurement. Local battery production is also expected to commence in the future.

Major uncertainties remain regarding the extent to which Chinese companies will transfer technological know-how and intellectual property rights, as well as how quickly they will begin utilizing European-sourced components.

In Spain, where the government successfully persuaded Chinese companies such as battery maker CATL, Chery, and SAIC (owner of MG) to set up factories, no guarantees have yet been secured regarding technology transfers or the proportion of local labor and components to be used.

Deep concern prevails across the automotive supply chain, where component manufacturers employ twice as many workers as carmakers.

“Those of us working in the supply chain could be at risk,” said Marco Leone, 62, an employee at a firm manufacturing sheet metal fenders for the Cassino plant.

Similar concerns surround Nissan’s agreement to share production at its Sunderland plant with Chery starting next year.

Sources familiar with the discussions stated that three models would be produced for the Chinese group, which also owns the Jaecoo and Omoda brands.

Ian Henry, an automotive manufacturing expert who leads the consultancy AutoAnalysis, warned: “Suppose that in the first year, the cars are essentially produced from kits originating in China. That is great for workers on the assembly line, but not necessarily as beneficial for employees in Nissan’s press shop, body shop, and paint shop, or for local tier-one suppliers.”

Henry added that Chery would need to rapidly increase its localization rate to export to the EU, but the timeline remains uncertain, and discussions continue over whether UK-produced cars will be included within the “Made in Europe” framework.

A source close to the talks noted that the higher cost of utilizing UK suppliers also presents an obstacle.

Chinese automotive executives stress their commitment to using local supply chains, while acknowledging that the transition will not occur overnight.

Charlie Zhang, executive vice president of Chery International, told the Financial Times:

“Localization is a gradual process; it is measured not by the calendar, but by the maturity of supply chains, cost structures, and our readiness to become part of the local industrial ecosystem.”

Analysts argue that sluggish demand in China and the pressure to boost exports represent the primary obstacles to localization in Europe.

With the government pressing manufacturers to utilize idle capacity, China’s global exports are projected to rise by 41% this year, exceeding 10 million units.

Thomas Besson, head of automotive research at Kepler Cheuvreux, noted: “Because domestic demand in China has fallen well short of expectations, the pressure on Chinese automakers to export is far greater. Despite frequently expressing their intentions, Chinese carmakers have not yet begun producing significant volumes of vehicles in Europe.”

The “Made in Europe” proposals will further drive up car manufacturing costs in Europe, potentially forcing some Chinese producers with smaller sales volumes to forgo European subsidies and continue exporting in the near term.

A senior executive at a Chinese carmaker stated: “If it becomes financially too expensive, we will pay the tariff and continue shipping cars [from China].”

For certain Chinese carmakers like BYD, joint ventures make little strategic sense.

Stella Li, top executive for international operations at BYD, described a joint venture as “impossible,” stating: “I think it is better to manage on our own. Asking for permission is very difficult. We make our decisions in five minutes.”

BYD plans to commence mass production of its vehicles in Hungary by the end of this year. However, the “Made in Europe” proposal has prompted the company to seek a second site in Spain or France before completing its factory in Türkiye as previously announced.

Not all European carmakers are pursuing Chinese partnerships. Some analysts argue that companies operating independently can react faster to market shifts, with no guarantee that Chinese partners will succeed in Europe.

“I believe companies that remain independent retain far greater control,” said JPMorgan analyst Jose Asumendi.

Europe

UK faces £258bn infrastructure gap as commission urges private funds

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Every adult in Britain would need to pay an extra £590 a year in tax to fund planned public infrastructure investments worth £258 billion.

Sir John Armitt, chair of the private sector-led Public-Private Partnerships Commission, stated that delivering vital projects, such as Thames Water’s long-delayed White Horse reservoir, would require the government to increase infrastructure investment by two-thirds—equivalent to around £25 billion annually until 2030—if financed through public funds.

The crisis surrounding the early release scheme has highlighted the UK’s need for greater prison capacity, while Ofwat has warned that population growth and climate change could leave England facing a shortfall of billions of litres of water per day over the next 25 years.

Armitt, who was the final chair of the National Infrastructure Commission before it was replaced by a new agency, noted that the government’s constrained financial position means its fiscal rules would be “put in jeopardy” if the UK attempted to finance infrastructure spending through additional borrowing.

According to the report, such an approach would add approximately £7 billion to debt interest costs by 2030, £14 billion by 2035, and £23 billion by 2040.

Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves had altered the fiscal rules to treat capital investment differently from day-to-day spending.

However, the required additional borrowing would still increase overall national debt.

Armitt, who recommended the creation of an OBR-style body for infrastructure, said:

“Those who believe that taxpayers and the public sector can close this gap alone have not looked closely enough at the public finances. If debt interest were a government department, it would be the fourth-largest in Whitehall. The UK faces a fundamental choice: do we want to provide the infrastructure that the public expects and the country needs, or do we not?”

A rise in government bond yields over the past two weeks has narrowed the government’s fiscal headroom, intensifying pressure on Reeves’s successor, John Healey, to balance the public books as Prime Minister Andy Burnham targets “growth in every postcode”.

The commission’s report, delivered by consultancy Bradshaw Advisory, also revealed that the UK has the lowest level of investment among G7 nations.

The report argues that reducing the cost and delivery times of infrastructure projects requires a comprehensive overhaul of the UK planning system, along with the elimination of political risk aversion and other regulatory obstacles.

According to the findings, rail projects in the UK take 50% longer than the international average, whilst delivery timelines for nationally significant projects doubled between 2009 and 2019.

To expedite construction and mitigate the threat of bureaucracy, the report proposes the introduction of a “parliamentary approval vote” for critical national infrastructure projects. Armitt characterised the current landscape as an “appalling cycle” of legal challenges.

The commission noted that uncertainty drives up the cost of infrastructure projects by generating “over-engineered designs to withstand any potential legal challenge and repeated consultations”.

Armitt called for greater pragmatism in Whitehall regarding the role of private investors and developers, who are more efficient than the public sector at delivering infrastructure because they must generate a return on their investments.

He also argued that the available capital pool is vastly larger. UK pension funds hold trillions of pounds in assets, yet only a small fraction is allocated to infrastructure projects.

Armitt said infrastructure investors have recently raised concerns that government efforts to increase public control have dampened their appetite for investing in the UK.

Arguing that this shift would deter investors, Armitt pointed to the windfall tax imposed on North Sea oil.

Armitt added that investors, particularly pension funds, “want long-term certainty and confidence”.

A separate Oxford Economics report commissioned last week by transport groups and infrastructure investors revealed that the UK has lagged behind every major economy except Greece on investment over the past 25 years.

Jon Phillips, chief executive of the Global Infrastructure Investor Association, said:

“Private capital is mobile by nature… at a time when the German, French, and Canadian governments are actively seeking to attract international investors, the UK risks losing ground.”

A government spokesperson said they welcomed “ideas to build the infrastructure needed across the UK”:

“Over the course of this Parliament, we have made progress by publishing the 10-year infrastructure strategy, increasing public investment by £120 billion to crowd in private finance, and delivering reforms to planning, major infrastructure, and regulation to give businesses and local leaders the stability they need to make long-term decisions.”

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Wolfgang Streeck links German polycrisis to capitalism and AfD rise

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German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck has examined the link between the conditions driving the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the capitalist crisis, calling on the left to “stop playing games and grow up.”

Writing for New Left Review (NLR), Streeck begins by asking what it means to exist within a “polycrisis.” In his view, under an increasingly “less democratic” capitalism, the countries of the rich world face “a bundle of similar crises that have emerged more or less unnoticed.”

According to Streeck, beneath these developments lies a fiscal crisis that has finally moved to the fore. In this context, “the mounting demands placed on society by the evolution of contemporary capitalism” clash with the shrinking capacity of “democratic politics” to secure the resources required to meet them.

Streeck argues that one consequence of this dynamic is the striking rise of “new-model opposition parties that are critical of the existing order and threaten to unseat the now-ageing ruling parties of the post-war era.”

Contending that nearly all of these problems in Germany stem from a policy of “stealth austerity,” Streeck points out that public investment has been deprived of resources as a result: “Stagnant [economic] growth; under these conditions any structural change assumes a zero-sum character; the deterioration of public infrastructure, including railways, bridges, and roads; a growing housing shortage and rising urban rents; the inability of both cities and rural areas to adapt to the consequences of climate change; the lack of an immigration policy to offset an ageing population alongside a sharp decline in birth rates; the decay of the education system, especially primary schools; the indebtedness of local authorities and their diminished capacity to make necessary investments and provide basic services; rising income and wealth inequality; with those most affected being chronically low-income families, particularly families headed by single mothers; and finally, widespread anxiety about the future, driven in part by fears of cuts to basic state-provided services that are becoming increasingly difficult to finance.”

According to the author, since the 1970s an ever-widening gulf has emerged between the overhead costs of capitalism and the amount that capitalist firms are willing (or can be forced) to contribute toward covering them. The progression operates as follows: these costs arise from the necessary preconditions and consequences of capitalist production, ranging from research and development and the creation of human capital to remedying environmental destruction. Yet they also stem from the need to secure legitimacy for a mode of production in which the extracted surplus value accrues to a small class of capital owners. Every form of the social wage; that is, state top-ups to the market wages of workers, such as social security and health insurance, serves to consolidate this legitimacy. As capitalist development advances and new needs arise among workers and their families, these expenditures (such as childcare facilities or eldercare) expand. At the same time, however, the scope for levying taxes on both the working classes and the classes that profit from them reaches its limits.

Streeck writes that during the neoliberal era, in order to sustain this zero-sum game; that is, to enable both capitalists and workers to carry on, states resorted to borrowing on deregulated global financial markets. Yet as sovereign debt levels escalated, the state faced the risk of losing its “creditworthiness” in the assessment of “the markets”; doubts emerged over its ability to meet interest payments from existing revenues, and even the interest itself had to be financed through borrowing.

In Germany, this development manifests through a “reform” debate conducted “under the watchful eye of the markets,” encompassing restrictions on pensions, sick leave, and labour rights.

Alongside this, the debt tap is opened to appease NATO allies and the arms industry, and perhaps as a last resort to slow down deindustrialisation.

According to Streeck, with the fiscal crisis no longer a slow-moving one, and with no hope of bringing it and the accompanying infrastructure and social welfare crises under control in the foreseeable future, traditional centrist parties have abandoned their conventional approach of “spreading cheer and optimism.”

The same holds true for the standard democratic narrative that those dissatisfied with government policy can vote for another party at the next election; the risk that this will benefit the new “anti-systemic” opposition appears too great.

Streeck writes:

“This paves the way for the formation of a party cartel in which the main parties avoid clashing with one another. In Germany this scenario seems particularly plausible: after all, the CDU and SPD were in power almost uninterruptedly throughout the long years of ‘shadow austerity’, and largely in coalition.”

Consequently, the issue ceases to be the debt crisis, rising rents, crushing living costs, shrinking public services, or growing segments of the population turning to food banks; instead, it becomes “populism,” the AfD, and neofascism.

Streeck points out that centrist parties, or “we democrats,” use this to make closing ranks mandatory once again. The logical extension of this policy is a summons to fight “against the right” and make a final stand for “our democracy,” rather than struggling against the growing power of markets over the public: “And for the sake of this, we are asked to set aside our petty squabbles over who will be subjected first, and who spared until later, to the overt austerity demanded by subsidised capital markets.”

Streeck continues:

“At first glance; from the standpoint of the ruling political class; this certainly has its appeal. Demonstrations by all sensible people against the AfD are far preferable to demonstrations against the rising cost of living; ‘firewalls’ cost far less than insulating the walls of old apartments; reports by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution are far cheaper than nurseries and schools where all children can be accommodated and educated together. Moreover, floating the idea of having a party supported by at least a third of the electorate banned by the Constitutional Court in the name of ‘militant democracy’ guarantees an exciting item on the evening news about the daily exertions of those who run the state.”

Yet Streeck believes that none of this will work, either now or in the long run. Pointing out that the current governing and political class has taken no steps to address the real problems it “wants to hide behind the AfD problem,” the sociologist says: “Even if the party is banned, trains will still not run on time, heat-related deaths will not decline, cities will not become more liveable, rents will not fall, and pensions and jobs will not become more secure.”

Streeck notes that the situation would not change if the AfD were to enter government rather than being politically or physically locked away; nevertheless, he argues that the prevailing political mentality fears giving the AfD the opportunity to fail in the face of the “polycrisis.”

Streeck believes the AfD will not be diminished by the next demonstration or the next broadcast of partisan television news. In his view, as long as the “forces of the state and democracy” exhaust themselves on a secondary battlefield such as “democracy versus populism” to divert attention from the crises unfolding under their own governance, the AfD will have an easy ride.

Reminding readers that an external enemy (Russia) has been added to the internal enemy, Streeck underlines that the two are conflated as far as possible through “conspiracy theories.”

The author notes that the drive to transform a “welfare” state into a “garrison” state and brand the AfD as the “Kremlin’s fifth column” raises the question of how a debt-laden government intends to fund raising defence spending to at least 5% of GDP: “Will it resort to even more austerity or even more borrowing, risking an ultimate rupture with the domestic population, with global financial markets, or with both?”

Arguing that the left, unlike “PR specialists,” must ask certain questions, the German author points to the following:

“How can we make capital pay the bill for the costs it imposes on society and nature? How can we prevent tax avoidance and tax evasion? How will we protect companies that provide quality jobs to people in our country from a global trading system that shows no respect for workers? How can we halt the decline in our population through immigration and better family policies? In a society in transition like ours, how will we ease the debt burden on our local authorities so that they can deliver the public services essential for everyone to lead a good life? And how must ‘our democracy’ be restructured so that it becomes a democracy for all and gives citizens the opportunity to take control of their own lives; so that they are not forced to beg for handouts from a state whose coffers are empty and will remain so for a long time to come?”

Streeck concludes his article by stating: “Playtime is over; the situation is serious, and we urgently need to grow up.”

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AfD’s Siegmund links German rearmament to remigration plans

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Ulrich Siegmund of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), who is expected to become the next state premier of Saxony-Anhalt, has stated that they do not oppose Germany’s rearmament, arguing that arms will be required during the “remigration” process.

The issue specifically concerns a factory in the Saxony-Anhalt town of Sangerhausen. Israeli defence contractor Elbit intends to establish production facilities there, though protests against the plan have been under way for some time.

The company manufactures, among other products, the Hermes combat drone, howitzers, and rocket launchers.

According to Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Mayor Torsten Schweiger, neither drones nor ammunition will be produced in Sangerhausen.

The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) had previously announced its opposition to the state becoming a defence industry hub for Israel.

Following a parliamentary group meeting, Siegmund was asked directly at a press conference about the proposed investment project.

Siegmund replied:

“Our position is very clear. We do not condemn the production of military equipment in general, because during future repatriation and deportation campaigns for migrants, we will naturally require the appropriate tools. This also applies to internal security, our own stability, and national defence. We are aware that such things do not fall from the sky.”

Siegmund also argued that a distinction exists between sending military equipment to foreign wars financed by German taxpayers and the approach they advocate.

AfD has not yet taken a final decision

Siegmund explained that the AfD is monitoring the situation in Sangerhausen and remains in contact with local political representatives.

At the same time, he noted that the economic aspects of a potential factory site should not be ignored. The party also plans to examine closely what is produced in Sangerhausen and under what conditions.

“We want to examine closely: what is produced there, and under what conditions? And do we face the risk of being drawn into foreign conflicts as a result? If so, we view this situation with great scepticism,” Siegmund said.

Siegmund also pointed to conversations he had with citizens during the election campaign. Many people, including local residents in Sangerhausen, welcomed the AfD’s stance.

However, his party has not yet reached a final decision regarding the prospective facility. “A valid decision has not yet been taken because we still do not possess all the information,” the AfD politician said.

Green light for militarisation on grounds of remigration and security

Siegmund’s remarks indicating that weapons are needed for “remigration” drew attention. The term refers to the deportation of people with an immigrant background and was coined by Austrian right-wing activist Martin Sellner. The AfD has adopted the phrase over the past few years.

Years ago, Thuringia AfD leader Björn Höcke spoke of “well-measured cruelty” in the context of deportation procedures.

AfD politicians Kay Gottschalk and Lena Kotré attended an international “Remigration Summit” held in Portugal in late May.

There, Martin Sellner of the Identitarian movement declared their aims to secure “Europe’s ethnocultural continuity”, halt all legal or illegal immigration into Europe, and remove “millions” of non-Western immigrants from the continent.

In a video recorded alongside Sellner, Dutch activist Eva Vlaardingerbroek said: “Nobody comes in, and millions go out.”

In interviews, Kotré and Gottschalk presented the mass deportation of millions of people as a panacea for the housing market, the education system, and society.

Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticised the AfD on Wednesday, stating that the concept of “remigration” amounts to nothing other than “ethnic cleansing based on skin colour and origin”.

Wagenknecht criticises “remigration”

Meanwhile, BSW, which decided unanimously to hold talks with the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt, has publicly announced its “red lines”.

Party founder Sahra Wagenknecht stated that she maintains clear red lines against the AfD, particularly regarding “remigration”.

In an interview with RTL and ntv, Wagenknecht said: “They will feel our strong opposition on this matter. I find it terrible that people are worried and frightened.”

Stating that it is unacceptable for “well-integrated citizens” to be affected, the BSW leader remarked: “And we will not yield on this.” She continued:

“If the AfD is truly serious about frightening people who came to our country, work here, are well integrated, pay taxes, and whose children grow up here; if they intend to tell them, ‘You do not belong here’ or convey the message, ‘We want to expel you’ [we will prevent it].”

Regarding the AfD’s election manifesto equating homosexuality with “sexual deviance”, Wagenknecht replied: “Naturally, we believe every individual should live and love as they wish, and that equality exists here, including legal equality. Anyone questioning this does not live in modern times.”

BSW does not back Siegmund for premier

Wagenknecht also dismissed claims that BSW would elect AfD candidate Ulrich Siegmund as state premier in Saxony-Anhalt, stating: “We have always made what we want very clear.”

Wagenknecht argued that Siegmund had given “completely contradictory statements regarding when he wants to be state premier and when he does not”.

“One gets the impression that he himself might feel it is not such a good idea after all,” Wagenknecht said.

The BSW founder called for a “respected figure across party lines” upon whom everyone could agree and who could “bring this country a little closer together”.

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