What are the structural problems in EU-Türkiye relations?

In recent days, the remarks regarding Türkiye made by European Union (EU) officials—most recently by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen—have provoked a sharp backlash within our country. Those voicing their reaction have spoken of Türkiye’s significance, the EU’s dependence on Türkiye, and the conviction that Türkiye will persevere even without the EU. Yet, the question remains: has Türkiye taken the necessary steps in response to these remarks, is it doing so now, or will it do so in the future? The answer is no. This is precisely what the EU relies upon most. Despite the far more severe rhetoric directed at Türkiye to date, has the fact that Türkiye has taken no action beyond mere verbal declarations—failing to offer any substantive response—rendered EU officials more audacious, or even insolent? Indeed, it has.

It is, therefore, prudent to examine the structural problems inherent in Türkiye-EU relations.

This is because Türkiye-EU relations are not merely about the bilateral ties between two entities; they represent something far more profound. The EU is an active participant in the internal contradictions and power struggles within Türkiye. Consequently, the struggle between those who seek to leverage European support (large capital circles, pseudo-republicans, separatist Kurds, and merchants of faith) and those who oppose this constitutes a fundamental dimension of Türkiye-EU relations. In short, the EU is a partisan actor in Türkiye’s domestic politics. It sides with political Islamists, ethnic separatists, liberals, pseudo-republicans, and sectarianists. These groups, emboldened by EU support, have sought—and continue to seek—to marginalize the Nationalists, Kemalists, patriots, republicans, and those leftists and revolutionaries whose roots are firmly planted in Anatolian soil. Türkiye witnessed this clearly during the Ergenekon, Balyoz, and Oda TV trials. While the EU championed the FETÖ terrorist organization just as it did the PKK, it failed to issue even the slightest statement in support of the commanders, journalists, authors, and scientists held captive in Silivri at that time. On the contrary, it endorsed that very lawlessness. Today, the EU remains the primary sanctuary and supporter for members of both the PKK and FETÖ.

Who does the EU support in Türkiye?

The European Union interferes in Türkiye’s internal affairs and consistently aligns itself with the opposing party in bilateral and multilateral disputes. It does so under various pretexts: sometimes invoking harmonization laws, the UN Twin Covenants, or the “Kurdish issue”; at other times through the invention of “minorities” not recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne, or by attempting to frame our Alevi citizens as an extra-Islamic minority; and further through issues such as the Ecumenical Patriarchate, so-called genocide allegations, Cyprus, the Aegean islands, the Annan Plan, or the rhetoric of democracy and freedoms.

While ethnic separatists, sectarianists, religious exploiters, pseudo-republicans, liberals, and “liberal-leftists” (whatever that may mean) in Türkiye have effectively utilized the EU for their own ends, the EU has utilized them even more productively. Through these channels, the EU has leveled hundreds of demands detrimental to Türkiye’s independence, integrity, sovereignty, and political unity. In the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), the EU has engaged in all manner of activities directed against the founding president and national hero, Rauf Denktaş, seeking to liquidate Türkiye’s presence on the island. EU officials such as Karen Fogg and Günter Verheugen drew immense ire with their remarks against Atatürk and Kemalism, as well as their statements targeting the Turkish nation, state, and history. They have persistently attempted to define citizens of the Alevi faith as a minority, just as they have done with citizens of Kurdish origin. They have provided overt support to the PKK terrorist organization.

Certain circles of large-scale capital in Türkiye have also instrumentalized the EU to strengthen their domestic standing. They have issued statements calculated to please the EU and commissioned the types of reports the Union favors. The objective here is to leave our country defenseless and fully open to the service of Western capitalism. Alongside these capital circles, several trade unions—including those claiming to be revolutionary or identifying as “on the left”—have accepted EU funding. They have engaged in vapid rhetoric about “building a Europe of Labor.”

For all these circles, the EU has functioned as a protective umbrella. Under this aegis—provided by the US and its subordinate partner, the EU—large capital, religious exploiters, ethnicists, the PKK, pseudo-republicans, and neo-liberals acted in concert to sever Northern Iraq from the mainland and establish a puppet Kurdish state. In essence, domestic power centers have utilized the prospect of EU membership—which is, in reality, impossible—as a lever against Türkiye itself.

For whom does the West desire democracy?

One must recognize this reality: the imperialist West does not desire for the rest of the world what it claims for itself. It speaks of democracy, but it practices it only for its own benefit. In the rest of the world, it supports anti-democratic regimes to further its own interests. The West is democratic unto itself; externally, it is colonialist, expansionist, predatory, racist, a staunch supporter of authoritarian regimes, and imperialist. History is replete with countless examples of this.

As Türkiye is being transformed toward federalism through the hands of feudalism, the West has supported and continues to support this process in the name of democracy, freedom, human rights, and civil society. Pro-US and pro-EU advocates have repeatedly told the Turkish nation: “This is what the EU demands; there is no other option.” In truth, however, the EU is opposed to the Treaty of Lausanne and harbors a longing for the Treaty of Sèvres.

There is more.

In foreign policy, relationships are reciprocal; they are grounded in mutual interest and a search for equilibrium. This is absent in Türkiye-EU relations. The EU is perpetually the receiving party, while Türkiye is perpetually the giver.

The US and the EU have always found partners within Türkiye. It matters little to them whether it is ANAP, DYP, SHP, CHP, or the AKP. Nor does it matter whether the figure is Kemal Derviş, Ali Babacan, or Mehmet Şimşek. Whether they are center-right, social democrat, nationalist, or conservative is irrelevant. Brussels focuses solely on what it can extract from Ankara and to what extent. It takes what it requires without regard for the political history, ideology, or economic policy preferences of those who grant the concessions. For this reason, the EU abandoned the ANAP leader—who famously claimed “The path to the EU passes through Diyarbakır”—in an instant, choosing instead to walk the path with the AKP leadership. This leadership, promising to be “one step ahead of everyone on the EU road,” supported the Annan Plan in the TRNC and publicly rebuked a national hero, Rauf Denktaş, telling him to “go and speak in his own parliament and stop blocking the solution.”

The EU secures its demands through the Customs Union

Through the Customs Union, signed on March 6, 1995, and enacted on January 1, 1996, the EU extracts more than enough from Türkiye without granting it full membership. As the first and only country to join the Customs Union without being an EU member, Türkiye has allowed the Union to establish dominance over its domestic market, its customs regime, and its foreign trade policy. The EU has secured a degree of tutelage over our country’s global economic relations to whatever extent it desires.

The EU has consistently behaved with hypocrisy toward Türkiye, applying a blatant double standard. Under normal circumstances, the EU first notifies a candidate of the membership decision and affirms that the country will be admitted. Only then do negotiations begin. The duration of negotiations and the commencement of membership are generally clear, and an approximate membership date is typically provided. None of this has applied to Türkiye. The EU has given Türkiye no guarantee of membership. It has declared the negotiations to be “open-ended,” stating that they do not guarantee accession. It has specified that even if Türkiye becomes a full member, Turkish citizens may not benefit from the right to free movement. It has emphasized that even if Türkiye is not admitted, it must remain strictly bound to EU institutions. It has asserted that even if governments approve Türkiye’s membership, any individual member state may subject the decision to a referendum. It has underlined that Türkiye’s full membership is contingent upon the EU’s “absorption capacity.”

It was for this reason that my esteemed teacher and friend, the late Prof. Dr. Erol Manisalı—one of the scholars who knew the EU best and reflected most deeply on Türkiye-EU relations—titled one of his many books Bekleme Odasında İğfal (Violation in the Waiting Room, Derin Publishing, Istanbul, 2007). He emphasized that this is not a relationship between two equals, but rather one of concubinage or a mistress-like dependency.

While debating the future of the EU, Türkiye must not forget this reality: the EU’s decision to admit Türkiye depends less on Türkiye fulfilling the EU’s demands and more on how the EU perceives itself on the global stage. If the EU aspires to be a global power and is willing to bear the associated costs, it will admit Türkiye. If it prefers to remain under the wing of the US, benefiting from NATO’s capabilities without the ambition of becoming a global power, it will not.

Most importantly, one must not overlook the current state of the EU, the condition and priorities of its leader, Germany, and the divergent views stemming from the differences in scale, priority, interest, and preference among member states.

Rather than pursuing the phantom of an EU membership that will never be granted—an EU that has, in any case, lost its allure—Türkiye should leverage the immense advantages of its geopolitical position. In a multilateral, multipolar world, Türkiye must establish relations with the East, the West, the North, and the South based on mutual benefit and common interest. It must reject the role of an actor balancing the East on behalf of the West or Asia on behalf of Europe, and instead emerge as a cornerstone of stability within its own region.