Germany’s Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) has offered to cooperate with the Alternative for Germany (AfD), challenging the country’s long-standing “firewall” policy that prevents cooperation with the far-right party.

The proposal to dismantle the political “firewall” appears, at least in part, aimed at strengthening Wagenknecht’s party by attracting AfD voters.

In a letter dated June 26, BSW leaders wrote: “From the very beginning, BSW has criticized the ‘firewall’ erected against the AfD. It is undemocratic and solves no problems.”

The AfD continues to hold a commanding lead in opinion polls ahead of two state elections in eastern Germany scheduled for September, where BSW also enjoys pockets of support.

However, it remains uncertain whether the AfD’s polling advantage will translate into political power because other parties continue to refuse to form coalition governments with it.

BSW is now attempting to bypass that political isolation by proposing cooperation with the AfD in the two eastern states, provided the AfD agrees to appoint non-party-affiliated state premiers and govern through “changing majorities” rather than a formal coalition.

Although the proposal falls short of offering a coalition government, it could potentially help end the AfD’s political isolation.

In an interview with POLITICO, BSW co-chair Fabio De Masi described the firewall against the far right as a failure and presented cooperation with the AfD as a way to prevent the party from becoming even stronger.

“If the establishment parties continue down this path, essentially always joining forces around the lowest common denominator simply to block the AfD, it will ultimately lead to the AfD securing an absolute majority, at which point it could come to power without any checks. That is why we are trying to find a third way, one that demonstrates to voters that we are solving problems and, given that the AfD is polling at 40% in Saxony-Anhalt, recognizes that the party must be included in certain political decisions,” De Masi said.

Wagenknecht founded BSW in 2024 after leaving Die Linke, launching what she describes as a “left-conservative” movement that blurs the traditional divide between the political left and right.

While advocating traditional left-wing policies such as an expansive welfare state, the party has also adopted some anti-immigration positions and pursued a foreign policy critical of the war in Ukraine.

The new party initially surged in opinion polls but suffered a major setback in last year’s snap federal election, winning 4.98% of the vote, just below the 5% threshold required to enter parliament.

Nevertheless, BSW continues to retain support in parts of the former East Germany. In Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where state elections will be held in September, the party is currently polling close to the 5% threshold needed to secure representation in the state legislatures.

The AfD is aiming to win an outright majority in both eastern states holding elections in September, which would allow it to govern without coalition partners. Polls indicate the party is close to achieving that goal in Saxony-Anhalt.

However, it is also possible that the AfD could require the support of a smaller party such as BSW to take power in one or both states.

Against that backdrop, AfD leaders have signaled they could be willing to hold talks with Wagenknecht’s party.

Daniel Tapp, spokesperson for AfD co-chair Alice Weidel, told POLITICO in a written statement: “BSW faces the challenge of clearing the 5% threshold in the upcoming state elections. If it succeeds, the AfD will, of course, be prepared to hold discussions.”

In its letter to AfD leaders, BSW also proposed a series of debates between Wagenknecht and Weidel across eastern Germany, arguing they would help circumvent what it described as Germany’s public broadcasters becoming “increasingly propaganda-oriented state media.”

Tapp rejected that proposal.

Political analysts say BSW’s attempt to win support from AfD voters by offering cooperation is unlikely to succeed.

“BSW is currently fighting for its political survival. To attract media attention, it appears willing to consider almost any strategy, including moving closer to the AfD. But AfD voters have found their political home, and they are unlikely to leave it,” Benjamin Höhne, a political scientist at Chemnitz University, said.

The European Union and its member states remain deadlocked over how to halt the decline of the Continent’s industrial base, exposing deep divisions over economic strategy as pressure mounts from global competitors.

The depth of the industrial crisis Brussels is seeking to avert was underscored by Volkswagen’s plans to lay off 100,000 workers and close four factories in Germany.

In response to such challenges, European leaders aim to finalize negotiations by the end of this year on the landmark Industry Accelerator Act (IAA). The legislation is designed to channel billions of euros in public procurement spending toward European firms, helping them withstand a surge of cheap exports from China.

“The latest news from Germany shows how urgent it is to act decisively to protect our markets from the unfair practices of our global competitors,” EU Industry Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné told POLITICO, describing the IAA as a “decisive” tool.

At the center of the legislative proposal is the “Made in Europe” preference provision, which is designed to prioritize locally manufactured goods.

While proponents argue that the time has come for the EU to defend its industrial sector, others view the provision as protectionist and are calling for the brakes to be pulled. Critics warn that the proposal risks creating a “legal labyrinth” for businesses, driving up the cost of European-made products, and potentially shut out close trading partners such as Canada, the UK, or Japan.

“What is happening at Volkswagen is worrying, but it is not an isolated case,” said Christophe Grudler, a French liberal Member of the European Parliament (MEP). “It is the result of years of European naivety, while our global competitors have pursued clear and aggressive industrial strategies.”

Negotiations between EU member states and MEPs are only now beginning, following a three-month delay by the European Commission in presenting its proposal in March. Officials acknowledge that time is running out to reach a compromise by the end of the year, a deadline set under the EU’s “Single Market” roadmap.

A primary obstacle in the negotiations is reaching an agreement on which countries should be included on a list of “trusted partners.” Products from these designated countries would be treated as equivalent to European goods in certain public procurement and funding areas.

The debate largely pits free-trade opponents, led by France, against export-oriented economies led by Germany, alongside the Netherlands and the Nordic countries.

“If we had ‘Made in Europe’ and a strong IAA, we could have cushioned this shock for Volkswagen and its employees,” Pierre Jouvet, a prominent Socialist MEP, told POLITICO. Jouvet favors establishing a restricted list of trusted partners chosen through a carefully vetted “opt-in” mechanism.

Such proposals have met with strong resistance from the European Commission’s powerful trade department, where chief negotiator Maroš Šefčovič has focused efforts on expanding, rather than restricting, the bloc’s trade relationships.

Séjourné’s industrial policy initiative is driven by the belief that the EU’s historic commitment to free trade has failed. Brussels continues to search for a coherent response to the challenge posed by China’s bilateral trade surplus with the EU, which now reaches €1 billion per day.

“We must not only think about new tools, but we must also immediately use all our existing trade instruments,” Séjourné said.

Additional measures under consideration include forcing companies to diversify their supply chains for critical inputs away from China, alongside potential trade investigations into plug-in hybrid vehicles, chemicals, and machine tools.

However, new defensive trade mechanisms may prove ineffective if member governments remain reluctant to deploy them. For example, the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI)—frequently described as the bloc’s trade “bazooka” for responding to economic bullying—has never been used.

“The IAA is only one side of the coin,” said Kathleen Van Brempt, a Belgian Socialist MEP and a lead lawmaker on the trade committee. “The Commission must also act to protect the European market with a stronger and more effective trade defense strategy.”

As the legislative process continues, questions remain over whether the IAA, despite its broad objectives, will deliver a decisive impact once enacted.

While the business community has broadly welcomed the “Made in Europe” concept, many industry representatives argue that its proposed application is too narrow to prevent entire supply chains from leaving the Continent.

“Overall, the approach presented by the European Commission does not appear sufficient to address the challenges facing European industry,” the leading Italian business lobby Confindustria wrote in a position paper. The group criticized the bill’s narrow focus on greening industry and its “trusted partners” list, which it argued remains too broad.

According to the Bruegel think tank, the IAA’s rules of origin could also backfire on major manufacturers like Volkswagen.

“Protecting the upstream aluminum sector from import competition will increase input costs for European carmakers, who rely on competitively priced, low-carbon aluminum to maintain global competitiveness in electric vehicles,” the think tank noted.

Before the legislation can take effect, a compromise must be brokered among the EU’s three co-legislative bodies: the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission. Currently, prospects for meeting the year-end deadline appear weak.

With three separate parliamentary committees reviewing the IAA, at least 150 MEPs are expected to submit formal opinions on the draft.

Furthermore, during its presidency of the Council in the first half of the year, Cyprus managed to draft compromise texts for only portions of the 100-page bill. It deferred negotiations on the highly contentious “Made in Europe” provision to the incoming Irish presidency, which begins on Wednesday.

An Ankara-based delegation led by the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, has held talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Kallas conducted the visit as part of a three-member delegation alongside Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and Commissioner for Migration Magnus Brunner.

The closed-door meeting was also attended by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Presidency Communications Director Burhanettin Duran, and Akif Cagatay Kilic, the Chief Advisor to the President on Foreign Policy and Security.

“Türkiye is a key partner in security, migration, and energy, as well as an EU candidate country. It was positive to speak with President Erdogan today about further strengthening EU-Türkiye relations and the importance of good neighborly relations,” Kallas said. She emphasized that the discussions also covered the war in Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East, and preparations for the upcoming NATO Summit in Ankara.

Kallas added that Türkiye makes a significant contribution to protecting NATO’s “Eastern Flank,” while Kos remarked, “We have a lot to gain by working closer with Türkiye.”

Ahead of the visit, POLITICO highlighted that the high-level trip aimed to forge deeper ties with Ankara at a time when the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are reshaping Europe’s security priorities.

A member of Kallas’s team told POLITICO: “Türkiye is an indispensable partner in defense, migration, trade, and regional stability. Tuesday’s [June 30] talks will address the way forward on issues such as Iran, Syria, Gaza, and Russia’s war against Ukraine—areas where Türkiye carries significant weight.”

According to the report, beyond security matters, Brussels is keen to advance plans to reduce trade barriers and develop the so-called “Middle Corridor,” a trade route linking Asia and Europe while bypassing Russia.

Speaking to POLITICO prior to the visit, Kos said: “Closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye is in all our interests. Together with Türkiye, we want to move toward increasing stability and certainty in the wider region.”

During the visit, Kallas spoke to the Anadolu Agency (AA), pointing to the significance of the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara. “Every summit is called historic, but this time it truly is. Transatlantic relations have recently come under severe pressure. Therefore, delivering a message of unity is extremely important,” she said.

Indicating that Türkiye is a “strategically important partner,” Kallas also drew attention to its role in defense and regional stability, alongside issues such as migration.

Kallas continued: “When we look beyond the Middle East to the Caucasus, we see that Türkiye plays a very important role. That is why it is important to hold these talks and evaluate what we can do together.”

Arguing that Europe does not need a joint army but rather needs to strengthen the European pillar within NATO, the EU foreign policy chief stated that Europe also has much to learn from Ukraine regarding new capabilities.

Reiterating that Türkiye holds a “highly significant position” within NATO, Kallas expressed that the EU and Türkiye must also address the Cyprus issue.