Connect with us

Diplomacy

Constructing connectivity: A decade of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global South

Published

on

Yingshi Gao, CGTN Journalist

It has been ten years since China initiated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This September, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway in Indonesia opened to traffic, drawing a barrage of international media spotlight and a fresh wave of skepticism from the West. Many outlets in the Western media sphere have cast a dubious eye on the economic viability of this railway, igniting the discourse around the purported ‘debt trap’ diplomacy often associated with the BRI. Echoes of neo-colonialism, too, resonate through the hallways of global dialogue, painting China’s vast infrastructural endeavor in shades of imperial ambition.

Both statistical data and local leaders have rebuffed this portrayal. Take the example of sub-Saharan Africa; in 2022, the debt-to-GDP ratio in this region stood at approximately 56.3%, whereas globally, it was 247%.

In 2018, former Liberia Public Works Minister W. Gyude Moore penned an article and commented, “The language of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ resonates more in Western countries, especially the United States, and is rooted in anxiety about China’s rise as a global power rather than in the reality of Africa.” In 2022, a study from the Centre on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University also suggested that private sector maneuvering rather than Chinese scheming is more likely to induce a wave of defaults.

Another popular narrative describes China as using ‘untransparent’ debt strategically to aid ‘authoritarian states.’ Some argue that “Chinese aid poses a challenge to conditional aid, thus weakening democracy promotion.” Professor Andreas Freytag at the University of Jena, Germany, did research on this issue in 2022. His research discovered that Chinese aid correlates with a neutral or positive influence on the endorsement of democracy. Moreover, individuals displaying favorable sentiments towards China appear more inclined to cherish democratic values. On the other hand, the US’s favorable views do not consistently influence democratic support.

Compared to debt, the more urgent problem faced by the Global South is the inability to provide sufficient public goods, hindering faster development in these countries. In Africa’s energy sector, building a reliable electric system has been one of the significant challenges for decades. Access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa was only 47% in 2022, forcing locals to buy their own electric generators, increasing production costs, and generating more pollution.

This is something that Cao Fengze, a Chinese opinion leader and engineer, noticed. When he first arrived in Zambia, participating in the building of a water dam, he tried to buy an air fryer. He found the price of the air fryer to be much higher than expected. Cheaper air fryers were also available (usually less than 200 RMB), but everyone advised him not to buy one since the electrical power system in Zambia was highly unstable, and having multiple power outages on a daily basis was very normal. After a few ups and downs in voltage, lower-quality appliances would burn out quickly. I interviewed him about his fieldwork. From his perspective, establishing a local industrial system is only possible with a stable energy supply, and a gravity dam represents the most cost-effective power scheme for Zambia. Once constructed, a gravity dam requires less maintenance and still has a long lifespan. In his words, “If I embed a coin in the dam, the next person to see the coin may be from many centuries later.”

The lack of enough public goods also greatly impacts Zambia’s agricultural sector. For instance, the price variances between Zambia and its potential market, East Africa, are significant. Crops such as maize and soybeans can be sold at higher prices in Nairobi and Kampala. In June 2022, maize prices in Nairobi crossed $500/Mt, while the price in Lusaka was just over $200/Mt. However, farmers in Zambia are not able to benefit from these potential profits due to inefficiencies in cross-border markets and transport logistics. This forms a negative feedback loop: constrained by poverty, Global South nations often find themselves unable to invest in building and maintaining interconnecting highways. Without these crucial transport links, they remain trapped and mired in poverty, unable to unleash their economic potential.

But how to break that loop? In the eyes of the Chinese, the answer is not foreign food aid but vast investment in public goods to build a system that can generate blood for itself.

That is also why China has focused on building electric and transportation facilities among the BRI participating countries.

To tackle the power deficit, China funded and helped to build the Kafue Gorge Lower hydropower station, the largest power project undertaken by Zambia since its independence. Five new Chinese-built generators in this dam added 750 megawatts to the country’s national grid, adding nearly a third of this country’s electric capacity. Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema also participated in the commissioning ceremony and praised that both countries completed the project in ‘an ingenious way.’

Chinese infrastructure projects are more than just building roads and railways but aim to establish a systematic base for future development.

Building water dams, for example, has helped local workers learn new skills through participating in the construction work. The local government has also benefited from working closely with China in managing big projects, aligning different interests, and ensuring that everything runs smoothly.

It’s like fine-tuning a well-oiled machine. This isn’t just about making sure that trade keeps flowing but also about growing skill sets and laying down a foundation for the future.

Despite these advantages, the Belt and Road Initiative still has room for improvement. For instance, local communities affected by the projects have called for equal compensation. Moreover, there have been calls for enhanced transparency and adherence to stricter labor practices. Addressing these concerns will make the BRI a more robust and mutually beneficial initiative.

Diplomacy

US drafts Ukraine plan with Nord Stream restart and sanctions relief

Published

on

Draft proposals by the US administration to end the war in Ukraine envisage establishing a demilitarised line in the Donbass region, easing sanctions against Moscow, and offering a comprehensive investment package to Kyiv.

According to a report by the British magazine The Economist, citing Ukrainian officials, Washington is working on a broad framework comprising both economic and political points to persuade the parties to reach a settlement.

Under the draft plan reported by the publication, Russia is offered the opportunity to conclude trade agreements with the US, an easing of sanctions, and the normalisation of political relations.

Ukraine, in exchange for relinquishing its goal of NATO membership, is promised direct foreign investment and European Union accession.

The report notes that Ukrainian officials do not possess complete visibility over every detail of the final text on the table, but are closely familiar with its overarching framework.

Nord Stream pipeline and natural gas shipments on the table

The Economist reported that the package designed to persuade the leadership in Moscow also includes items such as the resumption of Russian natural gas sales to the European market and the reactivation of the Nord Stream pipeline.

The magazine also points out that decisions regarding the operation of a pipeline located on European territory do not fall directly under US jurisdiction.

Ukrainian negotiators, meanwhile, are concerned that the Washington delegation may lock in commercial agreements in line with its own economic interests before the fighting formally stops.

Speaking to the magazine, a Ukrainian official summed up the American side’s approach with the words: ‘Why wait and waste time? Time is money.’

Diplomatic contacts intensify at leadership level

Stating that it is ready for talks, the Russian government announced that an agreement had been reached in recent contacts with Washington to launch a trilateral negotiation process that would also include Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said: ‘The objective of these negotiations will be to address the issue of ensuring the security of Ukraine and Russia once peace agreements are reached.’

As part of these diplomatic efforts, US President Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, met Russian leader Putin on 21 October at the Konstantinovsky Palace in St. Petersburg.

Speaking during the portion of the meeting open to the media, Witkoff noted that he had brought documents outlining a pathway to peace and asked Putin to examine these texts.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the president would evaluate the American proposals.

Noting that concrete ground for a ceasefire had emerged during the St. Petersburg meeting, Witkoff expressed hope for the start of trilateral contacts between Russia, the US, and Ukraine to address technical matters.

Putin thanked Trump for his interest in peace efforts and recounted that the US president had specifically emphasized during their recent telephone calls that the war must end as soon as possible.

Framework prepared in Oslo carried to Moscow

Immediately before his visit to St. Petersburg, Witkoff had attended talks held on 20 October in Oslo, the capital of Norway.

Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner joined the meeting remotely due to illness, which was attended by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store.

According to information provided by Stubb, the parties at the Oslo meeting clarified key security and economic elements that the American envoy would present to Moscow. Air defence systems, energy infrastructure, and partial ceasefire measures were also discussed.

Commenting after the talks in St. Petersburg, Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov argued that the newly presented approaches did not contain many elements useful for a resolution.

Noting that Witkoff informed Putin about the contacts in Oslo and relayed fresh nuances in the positions of European leaders and the Kyiv government, Ushakov stated that the meeting was thorough and frank, adding that the conflict is ‘moving toward an end.’

Continue Reading

Diplomacy

South Korea pulls part of embassy staff from Ukraine amid POW dispute

Published

on

The South Korean government has decided to withdraw part of its embassy staff from Ukraine.

According to the Yonhap news agency, Foreign Ministry spokesman Park Doo-sun cited the Kyiv administration’s failure to take “positive steps” in the dispute that began with the leak of information concerning the handover of North Korean prisoners of war as the justification for the move.

The spokesman also listed the ongoing threat of air strikes, which complicates the safety of diplomats, among the reasons.

Following the withdrawal of part of the personnel, essential diplomatic contacts will continue under the leadership of the charge d’affaires ad interim to Ukraine. All consular staff tasked with protecting South Korean citizens will remain in Ukraine.

Prior to this move, the Seoul administration decided on 8 October to withdraw its ambassador. The Foreign Ministry stated at the time that it was ready to continue consultations with Kyiv to resolve the emerging issues constructively.

Tensions between the two countries began with a speech delivered by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Zelenskyy announced that two captured soldiers from the North Korean army had been handed over to South Korea.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, meanwhile, accused Kyiv of breaching a confidentiality agreement.

Lee said the disclosure of this information endangered the prisoners’ families and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Seoul expects a public apology

Dmytro Lytvyn, an adviser to the Ukrainian president, denied the existence of a confidentiality agreement.

The South Korean Foreign Ministry summoned Ukrainian Charge d’Affaires Andriy Veshkin on 28 September and issued a note of protest against Lytvyn’s remarks.

President Lee Jae-myung warned in a statement on 2 October that they would take additional measures against Kyiv if Ukrainian authorities did not acknowledge the agreement and make a public apology. Lee stated that Ukraine itself had initially requested that the transfer of the prisoners be kept confidential.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi said the dispute stemmed from differing interpretations of the confidentiality regime.

Tykhyi noted that Seoul, based on its constitution which recognises the entire Korean Peninsula as its own territory, requested that the prisoners be handed over “like its own citizens”.

Describing the handover as a “gesture of goodwill”, Tykhyi stated that they were conducting closed-door negotiations to resolve differences of opinion.

Ambassador Park Ki-chang returned to Seoul on 10 October. According to a report by The Korea Times newspaper citing the ministry, recalling the ambassador served as a diplomatic protest against the leak of information regarding the prisoners.

The newspaper wrote that South Korea had last taken a similar step in 2008 by withdrawing its ambassador to Japan.

Moscow warned foreign diplomats

On 3 October, the Russian Foreign Ministry reiterated its warning to foreign nationals, including diplomatic mission staff, against remaining in Ukraine.

The ministry recalled its advice to leave Kyiv, citing ongoing strikes against military targets.

The ministry noted that those who failed to heed the warnings would bear responsibility for the potential consequences.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in a statement on 24 September that they had no information regarding Kyiv handing over two North Korean prisoners of war to Seoul.

Peskov, noting that prisoner matters fall under the authority of the Defence Ministry and intelligence services, said, “Contacts through the special services are continuing.”

Continue Reading

Diplomacy

Ex-BND head Hanning tied to former Mossad chief amid spy inquiry

Published

on

August Hanning, who led Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) between 1998 and 2005, was arrested on 6 October on allegations that he obtained roughly 2,000 classified agency documents and used them during contacts with intelligence officers from a foreign state.

Accused of high treason and espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence agency, the former spy chief is alleged to have procured the documents from former BND employee Manfred D.

Prosecutors stated that the leaked records included internal briefing notes presented to senior German officials, though the Berlin government has not yet publicly disclosed which country received the classified data.

According to an exclusive report by Jake Green for The Cradle, seized email exchanges revealed extensive ties between the arrested Hanning and former Mossad director Danny Yatom.

The correspondence shows that the two former intelligence directors built an ongoing network of contacts following their public service, combining commercial ventures, efforts to secure political influence, and intelligence links.

This dynamic has triggered debate that using personal connections and official access for private gain has left Germany’s intelligence apparatus vulnerable.

Intelligence notes for 10,000 euros and campaign proposals

According to the reviewed emails, Hanning told Yatom in a 2018 message that he could prepare an “overall assessment based on information obtained from senior German officials and intelligence agencies” concerning an unidentified candidate.

The former BND head committed to completing the report by 13 July in exchange for 10,000 euros.

Contacts between the two men subsequently expanded to cover domestic political processes in Germany. Ahead of the September 2021 federal election, Yatom asked Hanning to approach leading candidates.

Describing CIY Global as a “political campaign company”, the former Mossad chief noted that he aimed to introduce its capabilities to German politicians, and he mentioned his intention in the same exchange to transfer documents concerning a cybersecurity firm.

Cybersecurity partnership and surveillance operations across Europe

The partnership between Yatom and Hanning reached beyond political lobbying initiatives into the cybersecurity sector.

Hanning reportedly served as a consultant for World Health Energy Holdings, a cybersecurity company linked to Yatom.

Firms of this type, established or managed by former intelligence personnel, provide commercial platforms on the international market for Israeli-origin surveillance, cyber intelligence, and political influence capabilities.

The operational presence of private Israeli-based surveillance technologies across Europe has recently entered judicial records through scandals in Poland, Spain, and Greece.

Polish prosecutors announced on 12 October that data collected under the previous government via Pegasus spyware against political opponents had been transferred out of the country, adding that manufacturer NSO Group maintained access to the technical infrastructure.

In Spain, the 2022 CatalanGate investigation established that at least 65 people, including politicians, lawyers, and civil society representatives, were targeted using Pegasus or Candiru software, with Citizen Lab researchers publishing strong evidence linking the operation to Spanish authorities.

In Greece, the surveillance operation targeting journalist Thanasis Koukakis and Member of the European Parliament Nikos Androulakis was determined to have used Predator software, linked to Intellexa, a company founded by former Israeli intelligence officer Tal Dilian.

In the German espionage investigation, the traffic between Hanning and Yatom involving paid reporting, contacts with electoral candidates, and commercial partnerships does not yet provide conclusive legal evidence regarding the final destination of the roughly 2,000 classified documents.

Nevertheless, the disclosed correspondence gives German investigators a concrete line of inquiry to assess whether classified state secrets reached commercial networks tied to Israeli intelligence.

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey