The statements of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis targeting Turkiye in the US Congress broke the calm that has been going on for two years. While Turkiye reacted with the highest pitch, the Eastern Mediterranean islands, which Greece had armed against the agreements, came to the fore again.

The drilling tension between Turkiye and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, which peaked in the summer of 2020, left its place to exploration negotiations with the intervention of Germany. Turkiye had withdrawn its seismic research vessels in the Eastern Mediterranean as a gesture of goodwill. Both countries turned a blind eye to the statements directed to their own internal public opinion and took a constructive attitude. At least until Mitsotakis’ speech at the US Congress…Addressing the US Congress in a period when Turkey declared that Sweden and Finland would veto their NATO membership as long as they continue to support the PKK/PYD, and NATO members reacted to this, Mitsotakis blamed Turkey for the division in Cyprus and demanded that the sale of F-16s to Turkey be stopped. While the Congress gave Mitsotakis a standing ovation for minutes, US President Joe Biden gave a strong message of support to Mitsotakis.

The response: A troop landing exercise on the island

President Tayyip Erdoğan said, “There is no Mitsotakis for me anymore,” and he brought up the Eastern Aegean islands in the Ephesus 2022 exercise, based on the scenario of “military landing on an island” held in Seferihisar, just 1.5 kilometers from the Turkish coasts, opposite the island of Samos: “We invite Greece, as it was a century ago, to stay away from moves that will result in regret and to come to its senses. Behave yourself. Turkey will not refrain from using the rights granted to itself by international agreements regarding the armament of the islands.”

The possibility of a hot conflict between the two countries over the islands is very low. However, the Aegean Sea is a gangrene problem between Turkiye and Greece. So, which are the islands that are the subject of discussion, what are the arguments of the parties and the possible moves that can come with the legal basis on which they are based?

The process of passing the islands to Greece

The eastern Aegean islands were occupied by Greece during the First Balkan War. At the end of the war, which resulted in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, as per the London Protocol signed in 1913, the Ottomans gave up their rights in Crete, and it was decreed that Austria-Hungary, England, France, Russia, Italy and Germany would decide the future of the Eastern Aegean islands (Tashos, Samothrace, Limnos, Bozbaba, Lesbos, Chios, Ipsara, Samos and Ahikeria). The decision taken by six states in 1914 that the islands would remain under Greek sovereignty was also approved by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty.

The Dodecanese Islands (Batnoz, Lipsi, İleriye, Kelemez, Kos, Incirli, Istanbulya, Ileki, Herke, Kerpe, Çoban, Sömbeki, Rhodes and Meis), which make up the rest of the Eastern Aegean Islands, were occupied by Italy in 1912 during the Tripoli War. Italy, which accepted that it would withdraw from the islands with the Ushi Agreement, continued to stay on the islands, using the First World War as an excuse. Italy, which was on the losing side in the Second World War, transferred these islands to Greece with the Paris Peace Treaty signed with the allied countries in 1947.

Disarmament by treaties

Six states authorized by the London Protocol for the eastern Aegean islands made provisions that the islands ceded to Greece in 1914 would not be used for military purposes. Article 12 of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty states that this decision was approved exactly. Accordingly, Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ahikeria islands are listed by name, and the islands of Thassos, Bozbaba and Ipsara are transferred to Greece, with reference to the 1914 decision, provided that they are not used for military purposes. “In order to ensure lasting peace, the Greek Government undertakes to observe the following measures in Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ahikeria (Nicara) Islands. In addition, Article 13 of Lausanne stipulates that no naval bases will be established and no fortifications will be made on the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ahikeria: undertakes to comply with the following measures. According to this; first, no naval bases will be established on these islands, no fortifications will be made, secondly, it will be forbidden for Greek military planes to fly over the lands of the Anatolian coast, and on the other hand, Turkish military planes will not be allowed to fly over these islands. Thirdly, the Greek military forces on these islands will not be more than the number of regular soldiers who have been called up for military service and can be trained on-site, and the gendarmerie and police forces will remain in proportion to the gendarmerie and police forces in the whole Greek country.”

The Dodecanese, consisting of 14 islands, were ceded from Italy to Greece with the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, saying that they would be demilitarized and will remain so.

Greek theses and facts

Despite this, Greece began to disregard the above-mentioned international agreements by openly arming the Eastern Aegean islands towards the 1960s and after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation. Greece bases these violations on the following legal arguments:

Claim 1: With the signing of the Montreux Straits Convention, the 1923 Lausanne Straits Convention was repealed. Thus, the right to armament granted to the Turkish Straits in Montreux also applies to the Greek-dominated islands of Lemnos and Samothrace.

Fact: The Straits Convention of 1923 is a natural extension of the Treaty of Lausanne. Greece is trying to take advantage of the absence of a clear provision as to whether only the revised articles of the 1923 Straits Convention or all of them were repealed with the entry into force of the 1936 Montreux Convention. However, while the additional protocol of the Montreux Convention has a clear provision that allows Turkiye to engage in military activities in the Turkish Straits, the same does not apply to the Greek islands.

Claim 2: Article 13 of the Treaty of Lausanne forbade only “establishment of naval bases” and “fortifications” in Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ahikeria Islands. This provision does not prevent Greece from arming these islands.

Fact: The term “disarmament” is not explicitly used in Article 13, but when read together with the reference to the decision taken by the six states of 1914, it is seen that there is an obstacle to arming. In addition to prohibiting the establishment of bases and fortifications, Article 13 also includes the provision that “Greek military forces on these islands will not exceed the number of regular soldiers who have been called up for military service and can be trained on site, and similarly the gendarmerie and police forces will also remain in proportion to the gendarmerie and police forces in the whole Greek country.”

Claim 3: Turkiye is not a party to the Paris Peace Agreement, which left the Twelve Candidates under Greek sovereignty. Therefore, it cannot appeal on the grounds that Greece violated the disarmament provision in this agreement.

Fact: Turkiye is not a signatory to the Paris Peace Treaty, but it is clear that the disarmament clause was added because of Turkiye’s security concerns. For this reason, even if it is not a party, it is Turkiye’s most natural right to demand that the parties comply with the provisions of the agreement, as a country whose security interests are directly affected by the violations.

Not finding its legal arguments sufficient, Greece took the step in 1993 to prevent the illegal military deployment on the said islands from being brought to the international judiciary. Accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on this date, Athens made reservations on the mandatory jurisdiction regarding matters arising from military measures.

Allied yet offensive…

In addition, Greece has two separate arguments, one on the grounds that it is an ally with Turkiye and the other on the grounds that Turkiye is an aggressor. According to the first, both countries have established an alliance relationship by being members of NATO, and this new situation has removed the reason for the existence of the provisions on the disarmament of the islands. The second one is based on the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, the Aegean Army established independently of NATO, and the TGNA decision that the extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 miles would be considered a reason for war. According to Greece, all this shows that Turkiye is an “aggressive state” and Greece also has the right of self-defense, that is, the disarmament provisions have come to an end.

Greece keeps weapons and soldiers in seven of the nine islands (Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Ipsara and Ahikeria), in violation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, with claims and arguments that are far from the truth. Again, it is clear that the Greek army has fortifications in Batnoz, Ileriye, Kelemez, Kos, Ileki, Kerpe, Symi, Rhodes and Meis, which are supposed to be unarmed as per the Paris Agreement.

Turkiye, which has been against Greece’s arming of the islands from the very beginning, is making diplomatic attempts to resolve the issue before the United Nations and NATO. Turkiye is not expected to intervene in the islands unless there are conditions that will compel Turkiye to use force, that is, unless a military step is taken against Turkiye from the islands in question. However, it is still important for Turkiye to convey the legal evidence that will strengthen its hand to the international public.

Greece’s assurance

Although it has agreed with the USA and France to purchase weapons and ships that will strengthen its naval and air defense, it is clear that Greece does not have a manpower and military superiority over Turkiye today. The problem for Ankara is the regional and extra-regional alliances against Turkiye rather than the military balance. As a result of the “Muslim Brotherhood” line that has been followed for many years, Turkiye, which has opened up with Mediterranean countries such as Syria and Egypt, and regional countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has realized its loneliness in the Mediterranean and started to take diplomatic steps to compensate for this situation, but there remain many more avenues for collaborations to be developed with the aforementioned countries.

It is also a known fact that Greece trusts the Atlantic, especially the USA and France, rather than the regional alliances it has established against Turkiye. At this point, it seems that Greece will be positioned as NATO’s “outpost” in the region.

The most obvious indication of this was that Greece was quickly equipped with US bases. From Alexandroupoli to Suda, the United States continues to stockpile weapons in Greece. Former Greek Prime Minister, Syriza Party Chairman, Alexis Tsipras, criticizes this new situation as follows: “Greece not only abandons its fixed foreign policy dogma, but also becomes a docile and loyal ally of the West, which at the end of the day becomes a pawn on the chessboard of the third powers.”

What can Turkiye do?

According to some commentators around the government, the United States is trying to keep Turkiye in line. Turkiye is not the direct target of the build-up to Greece. The USA is giving the message that Turkiye is “replaceable”. However, according to President Erdogan, the target of the US buildup on the border is Turkiye. So, how can Turkiye eliminate both the steps taken by Greece in the Eastern Aegean with the assurance of the Atlantic and the threats directed against it through Greece?

It is a fact that the greatest guarantee of peace is deterrence. The first element of deterrence is undoubtedly military power. Greece is trying to balance its power with Turkiye with its military expenditures far above its economic capacity. Turkiye is compelled to take steps that will not allow this gap to close. At this point, it was seen in the F-35 crisis that the indigenization projects of the defense industry were of critical importance.

The second element of deterrence, as important as the first, is to build regional-extraregional alliances based on common interests. Taking more determined diplomatic steps for Egypt and Syria in the Eastern Mediterranean has now become an irresistible necessity. Turkiye should break the circle of containment with the countries of the region, with economic agreements based on equity and social and cultural projects that take care of common interests.

Today, for the status of the eastern Aegean islands, it would not be in Turkiye’s interest to bring up the military option unless there is a direct attack against it. However, any position to be gained in the Eastern Mediterranean will weaken the hand of Greece in the Eastern Aegean as well. The maritime jurisdiction delimitation agreement with Libya needs to be brought to the agenda quickly with Egypt. On the other hand, natural gas exploration works, which have been suspended for two years due to reconnaissance talks with Greece, should be restarted. Of course, not dragging the TRNC, which is the biggest trump card in the Eastern Mediterranean, into the unresolved processes of the United Nations and taking concrete steps towards the recognition of the TRNC as an independent state will also strengthen Turkiye’s hand and deterrence.