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Perspectives within Chinese academia on the expansion of the SCO

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During its July summit, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) expanded its membership to nine with the formal accession of Iran. This pivotal development has further amplified the organization’s regional and global significance. The current member states are: China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Belarus and Mongolia currently hold observer status, whereas Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, the Maldives, Myanmar, Qatar, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates participate as dialogue partners. Iran’s integration into the SCO, coupled with the geopolitical dynamics engendered by the Russia-Ukraine war, has catalyzed diverse debates and divergent viewpoints within Chinese academic and political circles regarding the organization’s trajectory. The salient themes of these discourses can be delineated as follows:

  1. The Russia-Ukraine War

A broad consensus exists within the Chinese academic milieu that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine signifies the fourth major systemic paradigm shift in the international arena, succeeding the profound legacies of the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War. Within this framework, it is underscored that Russia has positioned itself not merely against Ukraine, but broadly against the West. Scholars emphasize that while China cannot be expected to passively spectate Russia’s enfeeblement on the global stage, this precarious situation necessitates an astute and calibrated assessment.

In this context, two primary perspectives emerge:

Russia’s Attenuation as a Global Power: According to this view, Russia’s efficacy as a global power is inherently constrained, and it faces formidable challenges on the ground. It is posited that even if Russia achieves its strategic objectives through this war, it will be incapable of reclaiming the robust standing it commanded prior to the conflict. Russia’s intervention has consequently thrust China into a precarious diplomatic posture, compelling it to navigate arduous strategic decisions.

The Expansionist Policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Conversely, an alternative perspective contends that the fundamental catalyst of the war is not Russian aggression, but rather NATO’s relentless expansionism. From this vantage point, Russia was effectively coerced into war by these very policies. Furthermore, considering the United States’ mounting pressures upon China, Russia’s intervention inadvertently fortifies China’s own defensive strategic posture.

  1. Europe’s Perception of the SCO’s Expansion vis-à-vis NATO Dynamics:

    An Evaluation from the Chinese Academic Perspective

The enlargement of the SCO and its correlative dynamic with NATO constitute a salient locus of debate within the nexus of international relations and security policy. Particularly within Chinese academic circles, this discourse is contoured by two distinct paradigms regarding Europe’s perception of the interplay between these two organizations:

The Severe Constraints on the European Union’s (EU) Autonomous Decision-Making Capacity: This school of thought postulates that the EU is fundamentally incapable of sovereign decision-making on the international stage. This assertion is corroborated by the EU’s adherence to US foreign policy—imposing sanctions on Russia despite contradicting its own vital interests—its de facto partisanship in the Russia-Ukraine war, and its unwavering anti-Russian persistence despite enduring colossal economic attrition. The spectacle of an EU galvanizing around NATO—notwithstanding French President Emmanuel Macron’s prior diagnosis of NATO’s “brain death”—underscores the profound limitations of the bloc’s strategic autonomy. Consequently, from this analytical standpoint, expending diplomatic capital to sway the EU is deemed an exercise in strategic futility.

The Enhancement of the EU’s Autonomous Capacity: In stark contrast, a dissenting perspective argues that the categorical dismissal of the EU’s sovereign decision-making capabilities is inherently flawed. The EU’s paramount reliance on the US resides in the defense sector; thus, the bloc’s concerted efforts to forge an indigenous defense industry in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war possess the potential to substantially mitigate this dependency. Proponents of this view maintain that a militarily emancipated EU would be poised to chart an independent course, rather than obsequiously tailing US foreign policy. They posit that the Ukraine-Russia conflict has provided the existential impetus for the EU to cultivate a robust defense sector—a prerequisite for future strategic autonomy. By ostensibly conforming to anti-Russian sanctions and absorbing severe economic penalties, the EU is tactically buying time to execute its own sovereign agenda without provoking American ire. In the longue durée, this trajectory is forecasted to contravene US interests while converging favorably with those of the SCO. Scholars advocating this view contend that the EU is currently projecting an unprecedented facade of unity.

  1. The Perception of the SCO’s Expansion in Central Asia and Its Ramifications for Sino-US Dynamics

In recent years, the escalating friction between China and the United States in the global arena has profoundly impacted the foreign policy calibrations and strategic imperatives of Central Asian nations. Within this milieu, the expansion of the SCO and its reverberations across the region are the subjects of rigorous academic scrutiny.

The imposition of punitive tariffs on Chinese goods during the Trump administration, compounded by diplomatic and military maneuvers concerning Taiwan, propelled Sino-US relations to an unprecedented crescendo of tension. This friction has invariably impelled Central Asian states to recalibrate their foreign policy paradigms, specifically regarding energy matrices and regional security architecture.

In their pursuit of emancipation from the prevailing influence of Russia—traditionally perceived as the regional hegemon—these nations strive to amplify their foreign policy elasticity by diversifying the export markets for their energy resources. Consequently, Central Asian states seek to fortify their sovereign decision-making capacities by exporting energy directly to China, and to the West via Türkiye, thereby circumventing reliance on Russian infrastructure. In this strategic calculus, bilateral relations with China are of paramount importance; the recent summit convened by China in the city of Xi’an is widely interpreted as a testament to this deepening strategic symbiosis.

Nevertheless, China’s mounting hostilities with the US and its perceptibly pro-Russian posture amidst the Russia-Ukraine war have fomented palpable apprehension, most notably in nations such as Kazakhstan. Iran’s induction into the SCO exacerbates these anxieties, engendering profound uncertainties regarding the future architecture of regional power balances.

Inherently risk-averse regarding regional and global crises, Central Asian republics tend to maintain a calculated distance from the state actors instigating such volatilities. Consequently, for China to sustain its regional footprint, it is imperative that it comprehensively acknowledges these apprehensions and formulates policies designed to assuage them. Such an approach is indispensable not only for the preservation of regional stability but also for the long-term viability of China’s strategic imperatives in Central Asia.

  1. An Evaluation of India’s Position within the SCO and Sino-Indian Dynamics

The positioning of India within the SCO has evolved into a focal point of intense deliberation in recent years within international relations literature, and unequivocally among Chinese scholars. The diplomatic posture adopted by India, which acceded to the SCO concurrently with Pakistan in 2017, constitutes a critical determinant influencing regional dynamics, most acutely concerning Sino-Indian relations.

Chinese experts have largely reached a consensus that India has not fully integrated into the SCO and fails to comport itself as a committed, full-fledged member. This behavioral pattern is particularly striking given India’s historically robust ties with Russia. Certain analysts posit that India initially joined the SCO at Russia’s behest; however, capitalizing on the wane of Russian regional influence post-Ukraine invasion, New Delhi is increasingly pivoting towards forging closer strategic alignments with the United States.

In the context of bilateral relations, Beijing’s conviction that it harbors no fundamental diplomatic disputes with New Delhi serves as the bedrock of engagement between these two Asian behemoths. Conversely, India’s maneuvering within the SCO, and notably its “one earth, one family, one future” paradigm promulgated during the G-20 summit, draws incisive criticism from the Chinese intelligentsia. While there is a concession that this paradigm ostensibly aligns with China’s vision of a “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind,” Chinese experts highlight that the root cause of the friction between the East and West squarely lies in the provocative machinations of the United States in the region.

In conclusion, India’s stratagems within the SCO and their cascading effects upon Sino-Indian relations are of paramount significance to regional equilibrium and international geopolitics. In this regard, the future trajectory of relations between these two powers emerges as an indispensable vector that will undeniably architect both regional and global dynamics.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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