In an extensive broadcast on the Harici digital platform’s Strategic Compass programme, prominent Turkish international relations scholar Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal and investigative journalist Alptekin Dursunoğlu, editor-in-chief of the specialized regional outlet Yakin Doğu Haber, delivered a comprehensive operational assessment of escalating geopolitical turbulence across the Middle East.

The dialogue dissected the severe institutional, political, and strategic crises currently paralyzing the Tel Aviv and Washington administrations, the profound doctrinal evolution in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s defence apparatus, and the operational collapse of the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen.

Setting the analytical framework, Prof. Dr. Ünal noted that regional stability remains held hostage by political leaderships in Washington and Tel Aviv whose military ambitions diverge sharply from institutional reality. Ünal asserted that US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are functioning under immense domestic and international vulnerability, observing that the wider West Asian arena has been left swaying under the command of two unpredictable figures whose room for operational manoeuvre has contracted severely following domestic political defeats.

Turning directly to the internal institutional turmoil inside the Israeli security and defence establishment, Dursunoğlu detailed the unprecedented breakdown in the civil-military chain of command that surfaced in the Israeli press following the national elections. Specifically addressing the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Eyal Zamir, Dursunoğlu underscored that the military top tier actively resisted prime ministerial instructions designed to embroil the country in an existential conflict.

“Before the Israeli elections, Netanyahu made a serious demand for war,” Dursunoğlu stated, detailing the internal Israeli deliberations. “However, the Chief of General Staff, Eyal Zamir, did not heed this. We learned from the Israeli press after the elections that outright insubordination had effectively taken place. It was noted with irony that in the Middle East’s supposedly sole democracy, the military commander was subordinate to the political will, yet refused to listen to that political will. This is likely an unprecedented development in the short history of that regime.”

Dursunoğlu observed that this refusal followed a direct appeal by the domestic political opposition, known as the Change Bloc under the leadership of Gadi Eisenkot, who had cautioned the general staff against acting as a political instrument. Dursunoğlu explained: “Prior to that, the Change Bloc warned the Chief of General Staff directly. It was anticipated that Netanyahu would attempt to sway the elections in his own favour by launching a war against Iran, which prompted the warning not to enter such an adventure.”

Addressing the persistent rumours that the US administration might launch an assault using massive conventional munitions, Dursunoğlu dismissed the strategic utility of deploying ordnance such as the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast. “Your own military experts state that this bomb detonates prior to impact to devastate wide open areas,” he noted. “That was why it was dropped in Afghanistan, to eliminate dispersed headquarters across broad surface terrain without targeting each facility individually. But your own assessments state that the Iranian facility is carved deep into granite, under hundreds of metres of mountain rock. What is the Mother of All Bombs supposed to do against that? It is widely recognized that even tactical nuclear strikes could not affect it.”

“What objective will you achieve in a short strike that you failed to secure in 40 days?”

Scrutinizing the strategic logic of Tel Aviv and Washington threatening an intense, three-day air blitz against Iranian sovereign territory, Dursunoğlu questioned the credibility of the entire premise when compared to earlier operational outcomes.

“There is an unavoidable military reality to confront,” Dursunoğlu stressed. “What objective will you achieve in an intense, short-duration strike that you failed to achieve during the 40-day war? Moreover, the Iranian side is explicitly warning that the Iran of today is fundamentally different from the past. Tehran states clearly that while you may possess the capability to initiate hostilities, you will not be the party that determines when a ceasefire takes place.”

Dursunoğlu pointed out that Washington’s quiet diplomatic manoeuvres contradict its public posturing. He highlighted that despite aggressive posturing from cabinet hardliners, substantive communications to Tehran had taken a noticeably conciliatory posture through alternative channels.

“If the United States is serious about these existential military threats, why is Vice President JD Vance sending a letter directly to Mohsen Rezaee?” Dursunoğlu asked. “Why are the hawks like Trump himself, Hegseth, or Rubio sidelined in this instance, while Vance sends a letter to Mohsen Rezaee characterized by a completely softened, polite tone proposing dialogue? Iran’s answer has been resolute: seven explicit conditions have been placed on the table. Tehran is demanding concrete implementation before any meaningful talks can proceed, stating frankly that it possesses zero trust in American commitments.”

Dursunoğlu emphasized that institutional rationality within both the US and Israeli armed forces acts as an impediment to reckless unilateral strikes. “Both regimes contain institutional architectures, professional armed forces, intelligence agencies, that are not required to sacrifice sovereign national interests purely for the immediate political survival of individual leaders,” Dursunoğlu argued. “Military analysts and security figures inside Israel are openly voicing this apprehension: if the US posture recedes following the shifts in Congress, how can Israel sustain an isolated conflict against Iran?”

“Iran has lifted the 2,000-kilometre missile limit”

Examining Iran’s revised deterrence architecture, Dursunoğlu revealed that the parameters governing Iranian retaliatory measures have expanded dramatically, both technologically and geographically. He underscored that Tehran’s strategic calculations no longer adhere to previous voluntary self-restraints.

“Iran has formally stated that if an attack occurs, there will no longer be any geographical boundaries,” Dursunoğlu remarked. “This stance is not confined to the immediate theatre. Iran has lifted the 2,000-kilometre missile limit that had previously governed its strategic arsenal. Historically, when the late leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei was questioned on this, he confirmed that while the armed forces possessed the technical capability to exceed that range, he had restrained it specifically to avoid handing European capitals and Netanyahu an excuse to construct an Iranian threat narrative.”

Dursunoğlu stated that this self-imposed doctrine is now defunct: “Today, that limit has been discarded entirely. Mojtaba Khamenei, the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Mohsen Rezaee have all affirmed that geographical limitations no longer apply. This implies directly that US facilities across Europe and broader regional perimeters are within scope. If Iranian energy infrastructure is struck, the vulnerability extends outward. While the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could theoretically be reversed via maritime agreements, a sustained strike against Iranian energy networks could trigger the absolute flattening of primary export terminals and processing facilities across the Gulf, including Fujairah and Yanbu.”

Dursunoğlu argued that the operational assumptions under which Western strategists operated have been completely invalidated by Iranian technological demonstrations. “The entire narrative that Iran lacked advanced signal processing, satellite data links, and long-range operational precision has collapsed,” Dursunoğlu asserted. “Iran demonstrated these sophisticated capabilities in full measure, neutralizing the element of surprise that the adversaries relied upon earlier in the conflict.”

“All options are on the table, including the ground invasion of Gulf monarchies”

Expanding on the systemic consequences of an unconstrained regional conflagration, Prof. Dr. Ünal and Dursunoğlu explored the absolute vulnerability of the Arabian Peninsula, where political geography itself faces radical transformation if open hostilities commence.

“Should a wide-scale regional confrontation break out, the traditional American phrase that all options are on the table will apply in reverse,” Dursunoğlu declared. “At that juncture, the ground invasion of Kuwait is on the table, Bahrain is on the table, the Emirates are on the table, and the Saudi state will face unprecedented devastation from both the north and the south. When Iran states that it will dictate the operational scope and duration of the war, this encompasses the reality of ground manoeuvres that could dissolve the current political map of the Gulf.”

Prof. Dr. Ünal contextualized this vulnerability by analysing the asymmetric demographics and geography of the Gulf states. Ünal pointed out that significant Shiite populations across Kuwait, eastern Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain remain acutely disenfranchised, creating vast internal faultlines should regional conflict erupt. In Bahrain specifically, where an estimated 70% of the indigenous population is Shiite, systemic political repression by the ruling monarchy has established an exceptionally volatile internal environment. Furthermore, Ünal emphasized that Saudi Arabia’s principal oil extraction assets reside squarely within its historically marginalized Eastern Province, meaning that any systemic internal or external military destabilization would instantly paralyze the kingdom’s economic foundation.

Addressing the military dynamics in Yemen, Dursunoğlu and Ünal observed that the Saudi state apparatus has become thoroughly mired in a strategic quagmire against the Ansarullah movement. Ünal underscored that the Ansarullah forces have executed precision strikes deep into Saudi territory, consistently targeting critical infrastructure belonging to the state oil firm Aramco in Yanbu and elsewhere, alongside regional administrative hubs and major international airports.

Dursunoğlu detailed the extreme disparity in air defence effectiveness between different theatres, pointing out that Western partners have failed to provide the Gulf monarchies with an impervious operational umbrella: “Consider a goal in a football match to represent territory. Israel’s territorial footprint is protected by multiple layered air defence umbrellas deployed in extreme density, yet even that barrier was repeatedly penetrated during recent engagements. Saudi Arabia’s landmass is vastly larger, and no state on earth possesses the defensive inventory to establish comparable multi-tier coverage across such a huge geographical scale. Consequently, Yemeni missiles and drones easily penetrate Saudi airspace and strike designated strategic targets at will.”

Dursunoğlu underlined the total failure of the Saudi ground intervention: “When the campaign was initiated in July with an equipped mercenary proxy force of 70,000 intended to march onto Sanaa, the expectation was a swift victory. Today, Ansarullah is not retreating; their units are steadily advancing towards the gates of Aden. Riyadh cannot safeguard its own critical infrastructure, its domestic proxy forces are collapsing across southern Yemen, and its historical border areas adjacent to northern Yemen face persistent strategic exposure.”

“Netanyahu is politically finished, while Washington braces for a lame-duck presidency”

Assessing the executive dynamics in Washington and Tel Aviv, Dursunoğlu identified deep systemic exhaustion and the prospect of cascading political crises that threaten the immediate survival of both administrations.

“In Washington, the drive toward accountability has targeted figures like Pete Hegseth,” Dursunoğlu stated, detailing the mounting pressure exerted by congressional Democrats. “The political opposition is demanding his removal, creating an acute dilemma for the Trump administration. If Hegseth is sacrificed, the evidentiary trail leads directly upward to executive orders issued by Trump himself. While there are suggestions that Israel could serve as a convenient scapegoat for failures in West Asia, sacrificing key officials will only accelerate moves toward congressional impeachment once the balance of power solidifies in January.”

In Israel, Dursunoğlu outlined an equally fragile matrix confronting the Likud establishment. With Gadi Eisenkot tasked with exploring coalition options, the domestic balance rests on razor-thin parliamentary mathematics. “Eisenkot faces the difficult task of cobbling together a 61-seat majority through arrangements with either Haredi factions or outside confidence from Arab lists, both of which provoke fierce resistance within the Zionist political spectrum,” Dursunoğlu explained. “The Haredi parties, representing Ashkenazi United Torah Judaism and Sephardic Shas, remain fixated entirely on preserving broad military draft exemptions for their communities. If Eisenkot provides credible assurances on this front, a viable alternative coalition can emerge. Alternatively, the defection of merely three to four Likud lawmakers would decisively break Netanyahu’s grip on the Knesset.”

Dursunoğlu characterized Netanyahu’s persistent war agitation as a desperate strategy of personal preservation: “Netanyahu is the actor with the most existential requirement for active war, precisely because the collapse of military momentum leaves him immediately exposed to electoral annihilation and legal reckoning. Yet the Israeli military apparatus is exhausted. The army has run out of operational manpower, which is precisely why the bitter domestic fight over drafting the ultra-Orthodox has escalated so violently. The Israeli Chief of Staff himself admitted on multiple occasions in internal assessments that the military structure was raising red flags over systemic institutional collapse under the weight of prolonged multi-front warfare.”

Addressing the friction between the US and Israeli leaderships, Dursunoğlu highlighted reporting from Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth concerning explosive arguments between Trump and Netanyahu over direct military commitments. “Reporting indicates that violent shouting matches, described literally as emerging from hell, have characterized recent exchanges between Trump and Netanyahu,” Dursunoğlu noted. “Netanyahu continues to plead for a direct, collaborative American offensive against Iranian sovereign territory, but Trump recognizes the prohibitive domestic and military price tag and refuses to commit forces to an unwinnable strategic morass.”

Prof. Dr. Ünal concluded the discussion by noting that the traditional pro-Israel consensus in the US capital is fracturing irreparably under the weight of Netanyahu’s international isolation. “Netanyahu has become an absolute object of hatred globally, severely complicating the lobbying efforts of pro-Israel organizations across Western capitals,” Ünal observed. “With generational political shifts evidenced in US metropolitan hubs like New York, where substantial portions of the Jewish electorate are backing progressive, anti-war candidates, future administrations in Washington will inevitably tilt toward restrictive policies and potential sanctions against Israeli unilateralism. The era when Tel Aviv could dictate unconditional US military interventions across the Middle East has definitively closed.”

Following the conclusion of elections in both the United States and Israel, the political landscape across the Middle East faces fresh uncertainty as regional actors reassess the balance of power surrounding Iran.

In an in-depth interview broadcast on the Harici YouTube channel, host Mehmet Kıvanç discussed the regional fallout, electoral dynamics, and military contingencies with Oral Toğa, a researcher at the Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM). Toğa provided a comprehensive assessment of how domestic economic pressures and foreign policy entanglements reshaped voting behaviour, the strategic predicaments facing both Washington and Tel Aviv, and the operational calculations unfolding in Tehran amid the threat of renewed conflict.

Kıvanç opened the discussion by observing that the long-anticipated elections in both countries had concluded, leaving the region at an analytical crossroads. Addressing the shifting political currents in the US, Kıvanç highlighted that within the Democratic Party, figures critical of the ongoing genocide in Gaza and those questioning unconditional support for Israel had gained visible momentum, with even figures like Kamala Harris expressing reservations regarding war with Iran. In response, Toğa noted that while microeconomic concerns such as fuel prices and inflation historically drive voting behaviour, they often serve as catalysts prompting the electorate to question broader foreign policy commitments.

“Standing by Israel has now become a political cost”

Reflecting on the domestic drivers behind the US vote, Toğa emphasised that economic friction inevitably pushes voters to scrutinise governance from a structural perspective. “For decades, there have been analyses concerning the impact of kitchen table issues on the ballot box,” Toğa stated, recalling former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel’s famous aphorism regarding economic discontent. “Certainly, we can say that petrol prices and inflation influenced these election results for Americans. But when these micro issues, matters directly affecting the public, begin to bite, the people start questioning macro matters. They ask: Why are we experiencing this?”

Toğa observed that a broad consensus exists among political analysts regarding the electoral repercussions of foreign entanglements. “All experts agree that Middle Eastern developments, alongside the domestic economic situation, exerted a direct influence on the election and extracted a political cost from Trump,” Toğa said. “Standing by Israel has now become a political cost. This debate is even occurring within domestic politics in Greece today, where people ask why they are taking a position alongside a country committing genocide while everyone else is stepping back. Aligning with Israel is becoming a distinct political liability.”

According to Toğa, this dynamic directly clashed with the core promises made to the American electorate. “Trump, who pledged an America First policy, ran a campaign whose service to American interests remained ambiguous for two years, generating direct and indirect consequences for the American public and raising serious questions,” Toğa remarked. “While he promised to be a president who avoids and ends wars, we arrived at a point governed by continuous conflict, war, and fragile ceasefires since last year. All these elements produced the outcome of the US elections.”

Addressing Kıvanç’s question regarding whether traditional pro-Israel lobbies like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) are suffering an enduring erosion of power, Toğa argued that the information environment has fundamentally transformed. He pointed to the emergence of independent digital platforms and social media channels scrutinising political donations, revisiting historical foreign policy decisions, and questioning narratives that were previously dismissed as conspiracy theories.

“Netanyahu and his contemporaries are only now realising that we no longer live in the world of the 1990s,” Toğa said. “Prior to the rise of social media, holding specific broadcast channels granted you a monopoly. You could make someone famous overnight or destroy someone prominent just as quickly. Controlling the press made it simple to market your own narratives. Today, however, people are watching a genocide in high-definition quality. They could not conceal what occurred in Minab despite significant efforts, and it continually returned as an uncomfortable question before the president. People also question incidents such as strikes hitting weddings.”

Toğa explained that past precedents continue to weigh heavily on public trust. “There is historical baggage,” he said. “Why did the Iraq War begin in 2003? It was claimed there were chemical weapons. Later, numerous books and memoirs by senior bureaucrats revealed this was untrue and argued that it served Israeli interests, openly assigning blame to Israel for these engagements. The accumulation of this baggage, combined with social media’s rapid dissemination of information, has made it impossible to monopolise narratives. If one platform loses credibility, an alternative emerges immediately, and information keeps flowing. This constitutes the greatest challenge for the current Israeli government and represents the primary factor weakening its influence in the US.”

“The security climate after October 7 ties the hands of the Israeli left”

Turning to the Israeli elections, Kıvanç noted that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition lost 10 seats rather than suffering an outright collapse, while Arab parties surged from 10 to 19 seats. Meanwhile, the opposition camp led by Gadi Eisenkot viewed its own performance as a failure despite Netanyahu’s vulnerabilities. Kıvanç asked whether the conflict with Iran had consolidated Israeli society behind a more aggressive security posture.

Toğa responded that Israeli political consciousness remains anchored to the trauma of the October 7 attacks. “Israelis cannot move past October 7,” Toğa stated. “Whatever occurs, the ultimate card played in Israel returns to October 7. Consequently, the security climate after October 7 ties the hands of the Israeli left regarding the genocide, the assaults in Lebanon, Iran, and Yemen, and actions concerning West Bank settlers. The political right directly challenges the left by pointing to what the Palestinians they defended did. Netanyahu captured a substantial security tailwind, entered into what he termed a seven-front war, and framed his campaign around the narrative that Netanyahu never surrenders, manipulating this security environment to emerge with the leading bloc despite dropping 10 seats.”

Toğa drew an operational distinction between public sentiment regarding Gaza and attitudes toward Tehran. “Opinion polls show the Israeli public is deeply divided over Gaza because of reserve soldier casualties and the question of why they are dying,” he explained. “Yet that division does not exist regarding Iran. The Israeli public is far more unified in viewing Iran as an existential threat. The narrative of unfinished business with Iran was central to the election campaign, reinforced by Trump’s open endorsements from abroad. Eisenkot was repeatedly accused of being soft on this front, forcing him into a defensive posture where he emphasised his military credentials and the personal loss of his son and nephew.”

When asked about Eisenkot’s prospects of forming a governing coalition through either external Arab party support or a national unity government, and whether Eisenkot would pursue regime change in Tehran, Toğa underscored that Israeli institutional strategy transcends individual leadership.

“Altering and breaking the political will in Iran is an established state policy for Israel, rather than merely changing the regime,” Toğa stated. “They perceive a genuine threat from Iran. One must not forget the evacuation of northern communities following October 7 due to Hezbollah’s posture, the constant threat posed by allied proxy forces prior to October 7, Iran’s rapidly developing ballistic missile capabilities, and its proximity to nuclear status. A nuclear Iran would fundamentally alter the security doctrines of Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the Gulf states, creating a domino effect that Israel desperately seeks to avoid. Furthermore, Israelis have no way of predicting which capabilities Iran will transfer to which actor, as demonstrated by the advanced missiles and drones supplied to Hezbollah, Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces.”

Toğa warned against misinterpreting Eisenkot’s political standing or doctrine. “People should not view Eisenkot as an inherently peaceful figure,” Toğa observed. “He is a former military commander who formulated the Dahiya doctrine, which explicitly outlined the systematic targeting of civilian and urban infrastructure in Beirut’s Dahiya district. His argument is simply that military operations must be directed where they yield tangible results. Regarding government formation, relying on ultra-Orthodox parties brings severe constraints, while partnering with or relying on Arab parties alienates factions that refuse to appear alongside them. A minority government would be exceedingly fragile. While a 28-day mandate with a potential 14-day extension is underway, if the task eventually falls back to Netanyahu and fails, a return to elections appears the more probable trajectory.”

“The primary objective is turning Iran into a failed state”

Addressing the transition period before the newly elected US Congress convenes in January, Kıvanç pointed to media speculation and remarks by figures such as Tucker Carlson regarding potential nuclear contingencies or strikes targeting Iranian facilities. Asked whether the threshold for a nuclear strike was approaching, Toğa offered a cautious assessment, indicating that while talking about nuclear strikes breaks long-standing taboos, it remains an unlikely primary course of action.

“The nuclear scenario is not something I place in my top five contingencies,” Toğa stated. “If it were ever considered, it would be under conditions of extreme operational desperation or as a punitive demonstration to enforce surrender, perhaps targeting unpopulated desert expanses near Natanz or the Qazvin Mountains rather than launching a strike on Tehran that would kill 15 to 20 million people. However, that is not the primary objective. The primary objective is turning Iran into a failed state by destroying its conventional capabilities, civil infrastructure, and administrative systems, leaving it permanently unstable and incapable of projecting regional power, much like Iraq after 1991 where the state was crippled under sanctions despite Saddam remaining in place.”

Asked to detail the practical operational contingencies currently being considered, Toğa pointed toward targeted amphibious and covert operations designed to enforce diplomatic capitulation.

“Amphibious landings are not a scenario to be excluded, as military preparations point in that direction,” Toğa explained. “This does not mean an American army marching to Tehran. Instead, we could see special forces deployed to specific zones to conduct sabotage against targets inaccessible to air strikes, alongside operations to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz to break Iran’s political will. The objective would be a limited occupation in strategic economic corridors like Hormozgan or Chabahar, essentially telling Tehran that forces will remain until an agreement is signed.”

Toğa noted that Iran’s internal economic vulnerabilities make it susceptible to external strangulation. “Iran’s economy is currently in an exceptionally severe condition,” he said. “Public sector salaries remain unpaid across numerous sectors, with parliament recently debating unpaid wages for healthcare personnel, while retirees staged major protests in mid-October. Reports indicate instances where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struggled with payrolls, necessitating financial transfers from Iraq via the Popular Mobilization Forces. If an adversary destroys water distribution networks and vital civilian infrastructure, Iran could be left with a structural burden requiring 15 to 20 years to overcome, compounded by continuous secondary sanctions.”

When Kıvanç asked whether a sustained war of attrition was viable or if Washington sought a rapid resolution, Toğa clarified the strategic utility of such operations. “Even a punitive strike-and-withdraw operation generates identical long-term instability,” Toğa said. “To craft a victory narrative, Trump could leverage amphibious control over strategic islands or ports like Bandar Abbas to force Iran into signing an agreement that concedes total transparency on the nuclear file and broader demands. However, such devastation ensures prolonged internal crisis because sanctions would remain intact, precisely as occurred in Iraq. This reality explains the intense diplomatic engagement from regional capitals like Pakistan, Türkiye, and the Gulf, including the discussions surrounding the Mecca alliance and talks in Tehran aimed at preventing a catastrophic regional escalation.”

“Tehran is actively preparing for direct war”

Evaluating Iran’s internal readiness, Kıvanç asked about the military and political stance of the leadership in Tehran given the severe socioeconomic pressures. Toğa confirmed that Iranian military planners have been operating on a war footing for an extended period, particularly following the strike on Iran’s diplomatic mission in Damascus.

“Tehran is actively preparing for direct war,” Toğa said. “The Iranian military expected war throughout 2024. However, Israel’s targeted decapitation campaign against senior commanders has begun to disrupt the decision-making apparatus. The commanders who were killed were the very architects who doctored Iranian defence doctrines, authored the contingency plans, and managed defensive preparations. Iran possesses ready-made plans for the initial days of a conflict, but sustaining operations beyond that point is complicated by emerging political friction within the establishment.”

Toğa highlighted internal disputes over key appointments, pointing to the polarising profile of Mohsen Rezaee. “Mohsen Rezaee was never the natural first choice for such roles,” Toğa noted. “He is a highly controversial and often sensationalist figure in Iranian public life. In times of crisis, domestic political divisions can lead factions to accuse one another of treason over the slightest misstep as groups jockey for influence in the future hierarchy. What Iran needs most right now is the unchallenged authority of an Ali Khamenei who can strike the table and unify the political structure.”

When asked if the current Supreme Leader could still exercise that unifying power or if Mojtaba Khamenei held equivalent influence, Toğa drew a stark contrast between their political profiles. “Mojtaba Khamenei does not currently possess that level of overarching authority,” Toğa explained. “Mojtaba is a remarkably influential figure who exercises substantial control within the IRGC and played a vital role in establishing its intelligence apparatus. But he is not Ali Khamenei. Ali Khamenei experienced the revolution firsthand, survived an assassination attempt, served as president during the Iran-Iraq War, and led the country for over three decades, which explains why he consistently sought to keep Iran out of direct war. Mojtaba, though trained at the office of the Supreme Leader over the last 20 years, has not yet demonstrated that independent political weight publicly. That authority cannot easily be consolidated before the conflict concludes.”

Toğa detailed how the Iranian state is restructuring its internal procedures to withstand systemic pressure. “Parliament has amended its internal regulations to permit online sessions and convene in alternative locations during wartime,” he said. “Iran is banking entirely on strategic endurance and resistance. Through civilian mobilisation initiatives like the Jan Feda campaigns, authorities are training diverse civic groups in urban combat and first aid to ensure ground stability. Institutionally, they have instituted redundancy mechanisms up to four leadership tiers should senior officials be assassinated. Furthermore, they are refining the mosaic defence concept, integrating the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters with the general staff to eliminate bureaucratic multi-headedness and endure enemy strikes without capitulating.”

“Iran will expand the conflict horizontally”

Regarding the trajectory of a potential new military escalation, Kıvanç asked how far Tehran could push its asymmetric response given that conflict cannot continue indefinitely. Toğa asserted that Iran’s operational doctrine relies on horizontal escalation rather than absorbing blows passively.

“Iran will expand the conflict horizontally,” Toğa stated. “If its civilian infrastructure is targeted, it will target Israeli infrastructure in return. Unlike Iran’s dispersed assets, which were decentralised after studying the 1991 Gulf War, Israel’s infrastructure is far more centralised. US military bases across Saudi Arabia and the Gulf will inevitably become targets. Tehran’s target set could expand to include facilities in Azerbaijan, Crete, and European installations, as hinted by recent statements. It could even extend to activating sleeper cells across Europe and globally, as recently witnessed in the UK.”

When Kıvanç asked whether this implied that Tehran would deploy all available leverage, Toğa emphasised the existential nature of the confrontation for the Iranian leadership. “From the Iranian perspective, this is an existential struggle for national survival,” Toğa said. “They are fighting to prevent the country from collapsing into a fragmented, perpetual war zone like Libya. Regardless of whether an Iranian citizen supports the Islamic Republic, there is a fundamental desire for safe schooling, operational businesses, and stable livelihoods. This civic and patriotic consciousness exists across both reformist and conservative factions, even if political reconciliation between them remains elusive.”

Toğa noted that the administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian was engineered partly to solidify the internal front ahead of potential conflict, citing the appointment of the first Sunni governor to Sistan and Baluchestan and security operations targeting militant camps in Iraq. However, turning to the prospects for mutual diplomatic concessions, Toğa observed that internal rigidity hampers progress.

“A written mutual understanding could provide breathing space, but maximalist demands surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the domestic drive to inflict a political cost on Trump obstruct a breakthrough,” Toğa stated. “Trump has already paid an electoral cost, meaning he has little left to lose during his remaining window in office to construct a victory narrative. While diplomatic channels facilitated by Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia remain vital, Iran’s maximalist positioning regarding Hormuz complicates matters. Neither Washington nor Tel Aviv is willing to leave the Strait under its current status or allow Iran to emerge from this crisis with its regional deterrence intact for the next 20 years. If Tehran makes concessions on Hormuz and offers nuclear transparency, diplomatic de-escalation remains viable.”

In a concluding query, Kıvanç asked whether an increasingly cornered Iran might conduct a nuclear test in international waters, such as the Indian Ocean, to demonstrate a working deterrent. Toğa assessed that intelligence assessments currently discount an operational weaponised capability, though desperate measures cannot be entirely ruled out.

“Available information suggests Iran has not reached that operational stage,” Toğa said. “If US and Israeli intelligence possessed definitive evidence of a completed nuclear warhead, their operational posture would differ significantly. Reports indicate that while Iran mastered uranium enrichment, it remained bottlenecked at the weaponisation stage, specifically miniaturising a warhead to fit ballistic missile delivery systems before the current war began. Nevertheless, strategic capability remains closely guarded. Iran has operated like a chess player, gradually escalating its demonstrations from rudimentary strikes in True Promise 1 to advanced missiles in True Promise 2. If the country faces absolute existential collapse and possesses such a capability, exercising that ultimate card cannot be dismissed.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his call for a unity government in a speech delivered on Tuesday, 10 November, following the swearing-in ceremony of the new Knesset.

Opposing the prospect of forming a government with the backing of parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, Netanyahu accused the lawmakers of those factions of “supporting terrorism” and “seeking the destruction of the Jewish state”.

According to a report by The Times of Israel, Netanyahu’s remarks drew sharp backlash from the opposition.

Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar Party and tasked with forming the government, cancelled a scheduled meeting with Likud representatives.

Netanyahu’s efforts since the election campaign to delegitimise the Arab parties target the possibility of Eisenkot forming an administration with their support.

In the parliamentary arithmetic, Netanyahu’s bloc remains at 53 seats, whereas the parties recommending Eisenkot for the premiership hold a combined total of 67 seats.

Objections by Jewish opposition parties to collaborating with Arab parties, however, complicate the translation of that numerical majority into a government.

Netanyahu opened his address by turning to Iran, claiming that Tehran is once again seeking to advance its nuclear programme.

“The only way to permanently eliminate this existential threat is to bring down the regime of the ayatollahs,” Netanyahu said.

Citing security risks as the justification for establishing a national unity government, Netanyahu assessed: “We must set aside all other considerations and form a national unity government. Only a government of this kind can handle challenges of this scale.”

Netanyahu devoted the bulk of his speech to the prospect of opposition parties cooperating with Arab lawmakers.

Refusing to distinguish between Ra’am and the Joint List, Netanyahu asserted that both political movements aim to bring about the downfall of the Jewish state.

On this subject, Netanyahu said: “They differ only over what kind of Palestinian state will be built on the ruins of the Jewish state: an Islamic state on the Muslim Brotherhood model, like Hamas in Gaza, or a nationalist Palestinian state on the Fatah model? That is the entire difference between them.”

Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas had previously stated on multiple occasions that Netanyahu held negotiations with him in 2021 with the aim of forming a government.

Netanyahu’s attempt at the time yielded no result, and Ra’am subsequently joined the Bennett-Lapid coalition government.

Netanyahu also opposed Eisenkot’s efforts to engage ultra-Orthodox parties, addressing Haredi lawmakers and arguing that Israel’s Jewish identity is under threat.

Urging Haredi representatives not to trust the pledges made by the Eisenkot bloc, Netanyahu said: “They will make you a mountain of promises. But as soon as a government led by the left is formed, all those promises will evaporate. They will have a guarantee from the Arab parties and do whatever they want.”

Netanyahu reiterated his commitment to establish a legal framework for the status of yeshiva students and to pass a military conscription law through consensus with rabbis.

The United Torah Judaism party has expressed anger at the Netanyahu administration over its failure to implement legislation exempting religious school students from mandatory military service.

During the process of recommending a candidate to the President for forming the government, the party did not put forward any name.

The Shas party, by contrast, continues to maintain its place within the Netanyahu bloc.

The principle of mandatory national service for all, advocated by Eisenkot, remains one of the primary obstacles to any potential partnership with United Torah Judaism.

During Netanyahu’s address to parliament, protests erupted from the opposition benches regarding his advisers’ connections to Qatar and the failure to establish a state commission of inquiry into the attacks of 7 October 2023.

Former prime minister Naftali Bennett, leader of the Together Party, asked: “What about the state commission of inquiry? Why do you not declare Qatar an enemy state? What about your Qatari consultants?”

As Democrats Party leader Yair Golan and members of his party walked out of the chamber, lawmaker Gilad Kariv asked: “How much money did you take from Qatar?”

For many years, Netanyahu followed a policy that facilitated the transfer of financial funds from Qatar to the Hamas administration in Gaza.

Several close advisers working within the Prime Minister’s Office are under investigation over allegations that they obtained financial gains in exchange for safeguarding Doha’s interests.

It had been reported that Jonatan Urich, a longtime adviser to Netanyahu, admitted in a police statement to receiving hundreds of thousands of shekels for Qatar-linked activities, and that this work continued after 7 October.

Urich continues to work on Netanyahu’s team.

In his speech, Netanyahu revived allegations of foreign interference in election processes, demanding the lifting of restrictions placed on the investigation file.

Police inquiries are known to have yielded limited evidence regarding the allegations in question, with judicial authorities having indicated that the outcome would not change even if the claims were confirmed.

Following the speech, Eisenkot stated on his X account that Netanyahu had exploited an official ceremony for political ends.

Eisenkot said in his statement: “I sat and listened to the outgoing prime minister’s disconnected, divisive, hateful, and disgraceful speech. I became even more convinced that he is unfit to remain in office for a single minute longer.”

Reaffirming his goal of forming a “national emergency government”, Eisenkot stressed that Netanyahu’s administration had polarised the country and jeopardised its security.

The Joint List described the parliamentary speech as “inciting and racist”, announcing that it would work toward removing Netanyahu from office.

The party stated that it remains committed to representing in parliament the will of more than 500,000 citizens who supported it at the ballot box.

Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas told Channel 12 television that he was astonished by Netanyahu’s use of an official state ceremony to “lie, incite, and defame Arab parties”.

“We are law-abiding Israeli citizens. We do not want to establish an Islamic state or an Arab state,” Abbas said.

Abbas added: “We support peace and ending the conflict through a two-state solution. We condemn terrorism; we too are victims of terrorism.”