OPINION
Could tensions in Kosovo lead to war?
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Hasan ÜnalTensions in Kosovo are never-ending. The root of the problem is the refusal of the majority Serbian population in Kosovo to submit to the rule of the Kosovo state and government in the territory stretching from the north side of Mitrovica, divided by the Ibar river, towards Serbia. After NATO’s air campaign against Serbia in 1999, some of the Serbs living in Kosovo fled to the northern part of Mitrovica and settled there when the Serbian government withdrew in June. There was already a Serb-dominated population in that area. Some of the Serbs who fled from other areas feared that they might be next in line due to the previous policies of oppression and massacres against Albanians. Others fled out of fear of being attacked simply because they were Serbs. The UN Security Council-mandated administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR, made up of NATO forces, including the United States, did not take effective action in time to prevent the region from becoming independent.
The civil society efforts to split Mitrovica, which has the richest mineral deposits in northern Kosovo, almost in two, with the river Ibar as the border, and to bring the area stretching north towards Serbia under the control of the Kosovo administration, predominantly Albanian, over time, did not yield much result. There have been frequent tensions between Serbs who want to establish a kind of ‘parallel’ administration there with the support of Serbia and Kosovan government forces trying to bring the region under Kosovo’s sovereignty. This time it started when Serbs in the region boycotted the general local elections in Kosovo. Serbs did that since they do not consider them part of Kosovo. In fact, they think that the whole of Kosovo is a province that was forcibly taken away from them and should belong to Serbia. On the other hand, it is very important for the Kosovo government not to create a ‘parallel’ administration in this region. After Serbia abolished Kosovo’s autonomy in the 1990s, contrary to the spirit of the Yugoslav constitution, and directly annexed the region to Belgrade, constituting ninety percent of the population, Albanians established a ‘parallel administration’, started to run their own affairs despite the difficulties, and boycotted all elections, especially in Serbia, on the grounds that Kosovo was not Serbia.
Former Yugoslavia: Six Founding Republics and Two Fully Autonomous Regions
Kosovo was not an ordinary province/state of Serbia, as it is portrayed in the Western media and occasionally in Turkey. After the withdrawal of the Nazi troops in 1944, learning from the experience of Royal Yugoslavia, Tito established a socialist federation based on six founding republics (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia) and five nationalities (Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Croats and Slovenes). In this way, he thought he had solved the ethnic problems; however, the tensions that erupted in Kosovo in the 1950s due to the policies pursued by the Serbian interior minister and the problems that arose since the Bosnian identity was not recognized showed that this issue was not yet resolved.
As a result, Tito amended the constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974 as if it were being rewritten. In addition to the six founding republics, Kosovo, where Albanians constituted ninety percent, and Vojvodina in the north, where Hungarians constituted a strong minority (around 46%) were turned into fully autonomous regions and Bosnian national identity was recognized. There was little constitutional and administrative difference between the fully autonomous regions and the republics. For example, both regions had their own constitutions, their own parliaments, their own governments and their own internal administration (including police and judiciary). They also had the constitutional right to conclude and implement economic, commercial, educational, training and exchange agreements with other states, and the Kosovo administration, for example, exercised this right in 1975 and 1976 through agreements with the World Bank and the former East German Republic.
On the other hand, the constitution of Yugoslavia, while referring to the six republics and the two fully autonomous regions, counted them as ‘the six constitutional units that constitute Yugoslavia’, which implies that there are no hierarchical differences between them, and already in Yugoslavia’s main constitutional institutions (e.g. the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, the Presidential Council of Yugoslavia, whose importance increased after Tito’s death), the founding republics and the fully autonomous regions are on an equal footing. However, there was still the strange constitutional problem that republics theoretically had the right to declare independence, while fully autonomous regions did not. Indeed, in the events that erupted in Kosovo after Tito’s death, the people of Kosovo initially fought to become a founding republic. The problem became complicated following escalating tensions and clashes all over Yugoslavia; Kosovo’s autonomy was abolished by Milošević and his clique in 1989-1990 in violation of the constitution of Yugoslavia; and after increasing tensions and the forced closure of the Kosovo Parliament, the MPs were forced to declare an independent state called the Republic of Kosovo. The process of becoming an independent state, which seemed very difficult at the beginning, was followed by the disintegration of Yugoslavia in bloody conflicts and the massacres and genocides led by Milošević and his Bosnian cohorts Karadžić/Mladić, and the failure of Serbia to take steps to reduce tensions in Kosovo despite the Dayton Accords. For example, Serbia’s refusal to form a new and smaller Yugoslavia by transforming the Republic of Montenegro into a trilateral entity (Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro), and its insistence on creating an almost racist administration in Kosovo made things even more complicated and paved the way for the chain of events leading to NATO’s intervention. Meanwhile, the dissolution of Yugoslavia took place largely according to the constitution of the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Vojvodina. Six republics became independent, while Kosovo, after Serbia was forced to withdraw from the region, gradually became independent in 2008, recognized by more than a hundred states, but not (yet) a member of the UN due to Russia’s veto.
Is a New Balkan War Imminent?
For these reasons, Albanians do not want to allow a ‘parallel’ administration to emerge north of Mitrovica. On the other hand, from time to time, Serbian governments, like the current Vucic administration, raise this issue as if they can take back Kosovo and then backtrack. Vucic himself did the same after the previous car license plate crisis and will probably backtrack after the municipal crisis subsides. The truth of the matter is that the return/return of Kosovo, whose population is more than ninety percent Albanian, to Serbian sovereignty would upset the status quo in the Balkans like a tectonic earthquake, but such a possibility is almost non-existent.
In a multipolar world, the media, which often perceives Serbia’s domestic political outbursts as Russia on one side and the West/NATO on the other, may think that Moscow is provoking the Belgrade authorities based on the criticism of NATO’s actions in the Balkans in the previous years; but such criticism does not mean open arms and ammunition aid, nor can it be interpreted as Russia encouraging Serbia to start a war. After all, Russia cannot provide military aid to Serbia these days, even if it wanted to, because the states surrounding the country blocked Lavrov’s official visit to Serbia last year by closing their airspace to the plane carrying the Russian foreign minister, let alone allowing aid to pass through. After that crisis over license plates was overcome, Vucic made statements that they did not intend to take steps together with Russia.
But would NATO drive the Albanians against Serbia? This is also very unlikely, because then, in any case, the Republika Srpska (Republica Srpska) that makes up Bosnia-Herzegovina might try to secede, Croatian forces and Croatia and Bosniaks might mobilize against the Serbs, and the fragmented structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina might be broken. On the other hand, if the Albanians become too strong, it could disturb Greece and even Macedonia, since Greece, acting as a natural ally of the Serbs, would not want the Albanians, who are natural allies of Turkey, to become stronger. If the Albanians, who make up more than a third of its population, gain power and ground, it would also make Macedonia vulnerable. In short, the scenario of NATO having Serbia beaten by the Albanians is not very plausible, if not impossible. It is also important to keep in mind that the US and the EU want to integrate Serbia into NATO and the EU rather than exclude it. In short, until Serbia recognizes Kosovo within its current borders, there will continue to be increasing and decreasing reports of tensions and street protests in the region, but the dynamics that would turn this into a chessboard between Russia and the West do not exist, at least for now. Turkey’s attempts to de-escalate crises are always appropriate, but it is important to be aware that there will be no definite results. In addition, it is absolutely beneficial to work intensively on alternative solutions even for partial results.
Li Yunqi, Journalist
CGTN Radio
“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?
Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.
But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.
In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.
These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.
This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.
The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.
The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.
This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.
The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.
Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.
OPINION
Türkiye’s “soft severance of diplomatic relations” with Israel has limited impact on the Middle East
Published
4 days agoon
18/11/2024By
Ma XiaolinOn November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.
Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.
Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.
Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.
Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.
However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.
Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.
Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.
Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.
In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.
After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”
It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.
The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.
Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.
With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.
Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.
Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.
Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.
Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.
Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.
Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.
Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.
These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.
Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.
In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.
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