On September 10 and 11, it took place in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, the 1st World Congress against Fascism, Neo Fascism and Similar Expressions. The country that suffered an attempted coup d’état during the days after the presidential elections were held, on July 28, experienced situations in those days that indicated the emergence of a type of fascism or neo-fascism that has raised alarm bells to such point that the government and the social bases have decided to organize and receive thousands social activists from all over the world to debate and above all to create an international defense front against fascism and its various manifestations.

In this context, we interviewed Claudio Katz, an Argentine economist and human rights activist. Author of numerous texts interpreting contemporary capitalism and the global economic crisis. Kats actively participates in continental forums challenging free trade, foreign debt and militarization. He received honorable mentions from the Libertador Prize for Critical Thought for his books The Future of Socialism (2004) and The Dilemmas of the Left in Latin America (2008).

Venezuelan Political Scientist Micaela Ovelar and Claudio Katz

How is Argentina facing the danger of fascism?

Well, in my case, I am part of the delegation that has come from Argentina to participate in this important Anti-Fascist Congress, and it is particularly shocking for those of us who came from Buenos Aires, because last week a congress of the far right was held in Argentina, in which Javier Milei was present, Santiago Abascal (Spain) was present, José Antonio Kast (Chile) was present, and all the leaders of the most right-wing current in Latin America were present.

And the impact is strong, because here in Venezuela we are in the antithesis of what I saw in the media in Buenos Aires last week. They have an agenda, and we have the opposite agenda, totally opposite. First of all, we have an anti-fascist agenda, and they have different types of approaches to fascism. Approaches in the sense of an acceptance of fascist processes in different countries, facilitating different types of violence, facilitating actions of terrorist groups.

For example, the attempted assassination of former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, which was motivated by the hate speech and violence transmitted by the networks of these groups. The extreme right there in Buenos Aires was making an apology for Israel’s massacre in Gaza. The extreme right defends the barbarism that is being seen in Gaza at the moment, that indescribable scene of bombings, of murder of children, of destruction of hospitals.

And the extreme right claims all that. We here, in Venezuela, are denouncing the genocide against the Palestinian people, supporting the Palestinian people, carrying out a campaign similar to that carried out against apartheid in South Africa, supporting the great movement of indignation of the global intifada against the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians. That is to say, no matter how you look at it, we have different agendas. They are with the militarization of Europe, they are for the continuity of the war in Ukraine. We seek to shore up forms of pacification, a form of mediation, a way to end this NATO presence, moving missiles throughout the old continent.

And they, the extreme right, have a program of reactionary authoritarianism. That is the modality in which they approach forms of dangerous neo-fascism, semi-fascism, proto-fascism. Trump, for example, intends to exercise total control of all powers, dissolve any autonomy of the Judicial Branch, the Legislative Branch, control the press, control the security services, the same program of violation of the Constitution that Milei has in Argentina.

In fact, they seek to change National Constitutions without making constitutional reforms. In fact, imposing a new authoritarian political regime and using the enormous power of social networks that have become how they develop their campaigns. Trump, Bolsonaro, Milei seeks to transform their economic power into political power, and with that power they want to sustain their hate speeches through social networks. They have exercised a totally uncontrolled level of verbal violence through network X.

And in this we are also on the opposite path. We want regulation of social networks and not turn that universe into an arena managed at the discretion of hegemonic powers. In that sense, we have achieved an important goal: the freedom of Julian Assange, someone who has effectively exercised freedom of the press. That is situated in our field, the field of democracy, the field of freedom.

How is fascism expressed in other parts of the world?

Well, Javier Milei, the Argentine president, explicitly says that social equality is an aberration. We think that social equality, social justice, is a right to achieve. Milei wants the rich not to be taxed. We want to reduce the inequality gap with taxes on large fortunes.

They want to return to the old reactionary nationalism and deify a glorious past of each of their countries. “Make America great,” says Trump; “Return to the Victorian era,” say the promoters of Brexit; “Rebuild Hispanic dominance in Latin America”, say the Spanish against the rights of the native peoples. They want to restore the “Day of the Race.” They essentially seek the subjugation of the people and seek oppression of the hardest hit sectors throughout the era of neoliberalism.
They told the poor workers: “You are to blame for what happens to you for not competing, for not working enough, for not being efficient”. “You are unemployed because you are not looking for a job.” Now, that neoliberal discourse has lost force. And now the new right, the extreme right, comes and says: “No, you are poor, because the fault lies with the one below you, not the one above you, it is not the one who exploits you, not the one who oppresses you, not the capitalist who is enriched by your effort and your work. It is the fault of the one below you.”

And who are the immigrants? the Mexicans, the Arabs, the Africans in Europe, the helpless in Latin America. Against them “punitivism”, “Hard hand” Bukele in El Salvador and Milei or Bullrich in Argentina.

Can you tell us what you see in Venezuela that is a threat to the United States?

What I have seen in Venezuela is a spirit of resistance, the decision to resist, the decision to stand firm in the face of imperial subjugation. In Venezuela, oil is at stake. That’s the main thing. What imperialism wants is oil. To them, whether there are electoral minutes or if there are not minutes at all, that type of thing, it matters very little to them.

They want to do in Venezuela what they did in Iraq, what they did in Libya, demolish governments with which they have tensions and devastate a country. What for? To appropriate the oil. That’s what Trump said with all the letters, with sincerity Trump said: “We should have become owners of Venezuelan oil.” That’s what they want.

So, there is a permanent double standard of the media. They say that Venezuela is the only country where there are problems in the electoral systems. But where are Bukele’s minutes? He says he won by 70%. What is the verification? In the United States there is an electoral college that does not necessarily grant victory to the candidate who has obtained many votes. And did anyone consider that democracy is violated there? in a country where you have to raise funds to be a candidate. That’s called plutocracy. Only those who have money can be a candidate, if you don’t have money, nothing, not a word in the media.

In France, Macron lost the parliamentary elections. He has to cohabitate with whoever wins the elections and he did not respect that popular will. In Spain there is a monarchy. And is that monarchy going to teach us Latin American countries lessons about democracy and republic? The constituency voting system in Great Britain, in France, distorts the proportionality of the votes. Any questions? Nothing.

Then you must go to the background of the problems. Imperialism wants to subjugate Venezuela, it wants to subdue Latin America to develop a dispute with China, regaining full control of its so-called “backyard”. And well, here there is resistance, here there is fight, here there is battle.

It is the same battle that took place in Bolivia and the right was defeated, the one that led to the defeat of Bolsonaro’s coup, the one that prevented Le Pen’s victory in France. Well, and that’s the way to go. And that is why it is a pleasure to be here in Venezuela, in this Congress, which I am sure will mark a before and after.

What did you think of this First World Meeting against fascism?

It is a beginning of a greater articulation of the popular movements of our region to stop the right-wing wave, to stop the fascist wave and to fight for our ideal, for the ideal of many of us who are here. Because the ideal of the right, the agenda of the right, is capitalism. And that is why they speak so badly about socialism. And well, they weren’t wrong about that. Their enemy is socialism, because socialism is the project of equality, the project of democracy, the project of justice.

And I would tell you more: our socialist project is infinitely less utopian than the idealization of the market and the imaginary of capitalist prosperity that Milei, Trump, Le Pen, Meloni and all the extreme right in the world have. United we will win!

Dr. Matti Pesu, former researcher of Finland Defense Ministry answered our questions: “The risk of escalation into a full-scale war between NATO and Russia remains low.”

Matti Pesu is a Senior Research Fellow in the Finnish foreign policy, Northern European security, and NATO research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). From May 2022 to April 2023, he led a research project analyzing Finland’s nascent NATO policy and the country’s evolving role in Euro-Atlantic security.

He has published extensively on Finnish foreign, security, and defence policy, defence cooperation, Baltic Sea security, and Euro-Atlantic security.

Dr. Matti Pesu answered journalist Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions on Russia-Ukraine war and the position of the Baltic states.

Strengthening NATO’s eastern flank has become a key agenda item for the Alliance, especially after Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. Finally, the US decision to deploy hypersonic missiles in Germany on a long-term basis has provoked retaliation from Moscow. What do you think about the latest risks of escalation?

The risk of escalation into a full-scale war between NATO and Russia remains low, as neither party desires military conflict. The US decision to deploy a new weapon system is a measured response to Russia’s previous deployment of medium-range missiles in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, bolstering deterrence and reassuring allies about the U.S. commitment to their security.   

As is well known, the danger for NATO is that the destabilisation of the Suwalki corridor could cut off all theBaltic states from Poland, which is NATO’s only route toLithuania, Latvia and Estonia. What is your comment on the allegations that Moscow will invade Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland from Ukraine? Indeed, no serious comments about it from Putin or his cabinet.

Russia has in fact avoided actions that would significantly increase the risk of a direct military conflict with NATO. However, should Ukraine collapse, it could serve as a potential springboard for Russian aggression against neighboring NATO allies. This scenario would deteriorate regional security, which is one of the reasons why the Baltic states and Poland are such strong supporters of Ukraine.

In recent months, Russia has stepped up military cooperation with Belarus and started joint nuclear exercises. How realistic are the risks of a “nuclear war” in this context?

The risk of nuclear war remains very low. However, Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Belarus is part of its strategy to intimidate and dissuade Ukraine’s Western supporters from providing more robust military assistance.

Finland has given up its long term non-aligned position by joining NATO. Do you think this will deter Russia from any actions against Finland given the fact that experts discuss NATO will not sacrifice the rest of Western Europe for small Baltic countries?

Throughout the history of NATO, experts and policymakers have debated the reliability of US and allied security guarantees, which is an inherent aspect of “extended deterrence.” Despite these discussions, the US and otherNATO allies are consistently demonstrating their commitment to collective defense. They regularly conduct exercises in Finland, develop executable operational plans to defend the country, and signal their willingness to pre-position military equipment on Finnish soil. These actions strongly indicate the allies‘ dedication to mutual defense.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has accused the Baltic countries of launching a “campaign of lies” against Hungary. He emphasized that the decision regarding security checks does not compromise Hungary’s stringent security measures. To address these allegations, State Secretary for Security Policy Péter Sztáray provided firsthand information to the embassies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, saying “hoping to end the misinformation campaign“. What does Finland think about Hungary’s position? How is the relations after Hungary’s approval of NATO bid of Finlands membership developing recently?

The relationship between Hungary and the majority of its EU and NATO partners has recently hit rock bottom. Also Finnish politicians have been highly critical of Hungary’s recent actions, including Prime Minister Orban’s trip to Moscow and the decision to grant visas to Russians. Hungary’s obstructionist stance on Finland’s and particularly Sweden’sNATO membership has outraged many Finns. It is difficult to see what Hungary gained from its actions apart from a tarnished reputation.

What is your response to the discussions assuming that to stay in dialogue with Russia is a safer way than making it an enemy?

From the end of the Second World War until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, maintaining dialogue with Moscow was a fundamental aspect of Finnish foreign policy. The intensity of this dialogue varied over time. However, due to recent Russian aggression, there is now little to discuss, as Finnish and broader Western views on the war in Ukraine and European security diverge significantly withMoscow’s position. This situation is a direct consequence of Russia’s own counterproductive actions. For a frontline nation like Finland, it is a matter of existential interest that Russia’s aggression fails and that the West remains united in condemning such actions.

After Finland’s participation to NATO mainly with the support from Türkiye, what has changed in Helsinki-Ankara relations up to now?

The intensity of Finnish-Turkish diplomacy increased significantly during Finland’s NATO membership process, leading to the formation of working groups on issues such as terrorism. However, to my knowledge, these working groups have not been very active and have not attracted significant public attention recently. Unsurprisingly, the intensity of the bilateral relationship has decreased. There is a prevailing sentiment in Finland that Türkiye’s instrumentalization of Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership processes for its own purposes jeopardized the national security of both countries. That said, it is also recognized that Finland andTürkiye – both having significant land forces – may share considerable interests within the alliance.  

What are Finland’s main foreign policy and security agenda now?

The current agenda focuses on establishing Finland within NATO and ensuring its integration into NATO’s planning, command structure, and force structure. Helsinki is also intensifying its relationships with key allies such as the US, UK, Norway, and Sweden. Additionally, supporting Ukraine remains a high priority.

Nele Loorents, former Representative of Estonian Defense Ministry to Estonian Embassy in Washington, spoke to Harici: “We really believe in collective defense and Article 5. But at the same time, we understand that in the worst-case scenario, there is this timely factor. So, we really want to be prepared to fight back from the first day ourselves.”

Nele Loorents joined the International Center for Defence and Security (ICDS) as research fellow in December 2023. Prior joining the ICDS she had a long-term career as a civil servant at the Estonian Ministry of Defence. Since 2000 she pertained to the fields of Defence Investments, as well as Defence Policy and Planning.

Nele Loorents answered journalist Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions Esntonia’s defense policy and the Russia-Ukraine war.

You’re working for the defense ministry for 23 years now and you know you remember the period just post-Soviet and now. Can you briefly tell me what is the summary of the transformation you witnessed all these years in defense policy of Estonia? And you can also talk about the Baltics because you have similar experience with neighbors.

I think what is really important from our perspective is that when we gained our independence, it was immediately crucial for us to completely cut off from the Russian legacy. So, we completely started from scratch with everything. We restructured our defense to be more applicable to the western militaries.

Obviously, from the first day, we had a strong determination to join both NATO and the EU as we understood that for a small nation like Estonia, and also other Baltic states, it was essential and existential to gain membership in larger organizations. That’s why we worked heavily in the first years of our independence to be applicable to join NATO and the EU. We were very conservative in all our actions.

We tried to follow all the requirements and rules set by different organizations as we requested to join them. Economically, the first years of our independence weren’t the easiest, especially due to the fact that we started from scratch. But at the same time, we had a great opportunity to put into leadership a younger generation who just maybe came from universities and already had a western mentality.

So, it helped us a lot that we didn’t have to change the existing system, but we were allowed to build up our society in a way that we thought would be most beneficial for our future and long-term independence effort.

For Central European countries and beyond that, European countries having borders with Russia act as a type of buffer zone metaphorically. How does this make you feel personally as a defense advisor for many years? And how does it impact your policies?

What do you mean by buffer zone?

Now, Ukraine, by Russia’s claim, is in this position because Russia told Ukraine not to come close to NATO and the EU. Ukraine didn’t listen to that because it’s a sovereign country, decided to make its own decision. And now that’s the situation. It’s just being in a buffer zone between Russia and the Europe. It’s like you have the fear and you want to be brave at the same time and you don’t know the result.

I am not sure if it’s the right word to call this Eastern flank a buffer zone. But anyway, Russia has always been our neighbor. And we haven’t had any kind of positive feeling about Russia’s ambitions towards politics or overall their historically claimed regions.

Every now and then, Russian politicians say something about how they see the Baltic states still being historically part of the big Russian empire. And there has always been interest to keep the Baltic states in Russia’s sphere of influence. So that has always been the case.

We never thought there would be any change in Russia’s attitude towards us. And we have developed our defense in a way that we are independently prepared to defend our country. It has been very visible throughout the years how much Estonia, for example, has been investing in defense overall.

Estonia has invested more than two percent in defense since 2015, which is exactly the NATO criteria. But this was the year after Crimea happened. So, we immediately started to react to the situation in very relevant terms.

And it really increased during the Prime Minister Kallas term.

Yes. And now, during the past two and a half years since Ukraine’s full-scale invasion, we have made several decisions to raise our defense budget even more. Right now, the level is 3.2%. There is a commitment by the government to spend more than three percent at least for the next four years. And I think what is even more important is what you are doing with that money.

How do you distribute this money?

In our case, we are spending almost half of the defense budget on procurement and developing new capabilities, which is, I think, in NATO terms probably the highest percentage of all.

Which are the main countries you are procuring defense items from?

Oh, there are a lot of different partners. If we speak about bigger capabilities like medium and long-range fires, then obviously from the U.S. we are procuring HIMARS systems, from Germany the IRIS-T systems. There are quite many partners all over Europe to procure ammunition.

Estonia is one of the biggest procurers of ammunition at this point in Europe, which might seem surprising considering how small we are. But as I said, we really want to be prepared and we really believe in collective defense and Article 5. But at the same time, we understand that in the worst-case scenario, there is this timely factor.

So basically, any kind of reinforcement by Allied forces takes some time. So, we really want to be prepared to fight back from the first day ourselves. That’s why we are investing a lot in possible conflicts, if they happen in our region.

We are investing a lot into our territorial defense. We have also raised our wartime readiness quite significantly during the last year. I think it’s one-fourth, so it’s right now about 40,000 reserves on wartime readiness.

Lots of exercises ongoing, lots of SNAP taxes ongoing. There is a lot of effort put into this overall societal approach to increase the resilience of society. So, there is quite a significant effort actually ongoing currently in order to be prepared if something would happen in our region.

How many percent of your population is Russian? My question would be how they would react to a possible conflict with Russia because it’s their origin, as in all other countries you have Russians. And how do you manage this policy? They’re Estonian citizens but they’re Russian, so do they participate in exercises.  Do you have a public questionnaire, like what is the reaction of Russian-origin citizens to the tensions?

I think we currently have about 30 percent of ethnic Russians. Many of those have been very well integrated into Estonian society already, so that’s not a relevant question for the majority of ethnic Russians. But obviously, we have some regions where there is still some pro-Russian mentality.

Yes, like the northeastern part of Estonia, we have this part where the majority of the population is Russian. What has been surprising from our part is, or from the governmental parties, that in the past two years we have made quite many different steps in order to decrease this possible Russian hybrid influence on our ethnic Russian population. We have removed some of the old monuments which were reminders of the Russian and Soviet times and where some people still went to celebrate special days.

And it seems or it was visible that the reaction by the population or Russian ethnic population was less than actually expected. It was expected to be much more restless, but there was very little. Obviously, we can speculate about the reasons for that. But I guess one of the reasons is that especially the younger generation understands that if they are really trying or following this Moscow approach, then they might be influenced by that. They might be the ones who are actually in Ukraine fighting, or their opportunities in Europe to study or work or engage more in that way will be limited or totally cut off.

So, I think the younger generation is more inclined towards the West and trying to disconnect more from this Russian political approach. And I think the older generation is just getting to an age where their voice is maybe not so heard anymore. So that’s probably one of the things.

Going back to the previous question, I would ask you about the distribution of your budget and you talked about having several different sources. So, Türkiye is one of them. I think you were working with Baykar about UAVs. So, can you tell us the level of your cooperation, your procurement, because Baykar was very effective in Ukraine, providing UAVs to the Zelensky government and it was praised for their support. What’s your level of relations with Baykar?

Because I am not exactly an official in procurement at this point, I really don’t know how close the relations with different enterprises are at this point. But I know that in our Ministry of Defense and also our procurement organization, there are really close relations with all NATO allies. And Türkiye most certainly is one of those countries where we try to find more opportunities for further cooperation.

I think what is pretty important also about the Estonian population distribution is currently the level of Ukrainian refugees, because we have more than five percent of our population as refugees from Ukraine. I guess this is really visible also if you walk on the streets and go to the shops and schools and so on, that there is quite a lot of work Estonia is also currently doing in order to integrate those people into our society, because we really don’t know how this terrible situation in Ukraine is.

I want to talk about Suwalki Gap. For Baltic countries, for you, for Lithuania, and Latvia too, that’s a critical issue. Near Kaliningrad, Politico magazine called Suwalki as the most dangerous place on earth. Russian officials are not really mentioning Suwalki. Except once Lukashenko of Belarus hinted something about Suwalki Gap. But from Russia, I don’t hear anything. Why, for Baltic countries, is it at the top of the agenda?

I would say that for Estonia, maybe this Suwalki problem has always been a little bit less relevant than in the case of Lithuania and Poland because it’s really like their borderline. And obviously, the Suwalki problem or this challenge includes also this Belarusian contribution. It means that really then Russia has to leverage Belarusian cooperation or leverage their sources.

So, there are maybe some questions about that also. But during the past two years, there have been significant changes, I would say, in this problem because NATO has made quite significant decisions, but as well they’re having national developments which address this problem. I would bring out just a couple of those which are, I think, very important in order to mitigate this challenge.

First of all, it’s a question about Allied presence. In Madrid, it was decided that NATO will increase in all the needed states, the level of presence up to that brigade. And now, already, there has been a decision made that there will be a brigade in Lithuania, there will be a brigade in Latvia, and obviously, more presence means that there is more power in order to react immediately. So, you don’t have to reinforce as many land forces through the Suwalki gap as you had needed in case you have just battle groups. So that’s the first thing.

The second thing that was decided was to set up this new NATO command structure in all the Baltic states and to decrease the command structure level to the level of divisional size of command structure HQ. Which means that basically, you don’t have to have all the forces in place from the first day, but you have in place a working command structure which is able to reinforce all the needed forces in case of crisis. And the third thing, which I would say is maybe the most crucial thing, is the joining of Finland and Sweden to NATO. Because this basically closes the Baltic Sea to be like an internal NATO sea more or less.

And it enables us to move very quickly with air and navy assets if there would be some kind of NATO’s navy and air assets to Baltic regions if needed. So even if there would be some kind of leap in moving land forces through the Suwalki gap, you can close this gap with other assets like air force, navy, and that probably lessens…

So, I think these are like three most important things decided. And the fourth thing, which is related directly to the NATO element, is the new regional plans. And although the plans themselves are restricted and we don’t have the full visibility of what has been decided in there, I am quite certain that it has played through the scenario also of Suwalki gap.

And there are really these structures in place in order to act in case of Suwalki gap, this kind of closeness would happen. So, these are like four things in NATO terms. But also, as I said, there is this national approach and Estonia is currently investing a lot into our own defense.

We are investing heavily in longer-range fires; missiles and rockets. And the aim is actually to keep the adversary out of our country, not to give him the opportunity to cross the border at all. So, I think this is also a really important aspect if we speak about Suwalki gap challenge as a general.

You also have an unratified border agreement with Russia, yes? Can you talk about that?

There is not really much to tell. There are some details which we still haven’t been able to kind of sign. But I think what is important is that last year Estonia and all other Baltic states have made a lot of effort into securing the borderline. So, we are really fencing our borderline with Russia. We are building the bunkers on the borderline in order to be also prepared in any case scenarios. And I think this is really what is important.

So, the paperwork doesn’t matter. The borderline is there anyway. It’s not ratified, but we implement it. We still implement and there is a clear understanding of where the borderline is.

Other than Suwalki and the border issue, what do you think Estonia has as a risk or danger?

Well, Russia is obviously a danger. Or may threaten Russia. There is no dispute about that. And in Estonia’s case, obviously the landline with Russia is much shorter than in other Baltic states because we have this lake Peipus on the borderline. Well, Finland is like in the north and there is a big sea in between. But I think the eastern border having this big lake in between gives us more visibility of how the troops are moving. So, there are just like a couple of places where actually Russians can cross the borderline, like on land terms. And it’s from our perspective, obviously gives us the opportunity to control those spots more than it would be to have the landline throughout our borders. I guess, that’s quite an important aspect also.

And what do you think former Primer Minister Kaja Kallas will change in the European Union, like foreign policy direction or these measurements, precautions? Because you have all of these threats and you have the experience of Russia. For Estonia, I think this is a very important role internationally. What do you think she’s going to bring?

I really think, this is my personal opinion, that there won’t be really a big change, of course, in the European Union due to that. Because Kaja Kallas and her kind of approach has been very clear and visible throughout the past years when she has been the Prime Minister. And in the international sphere, I think her judgment of the situation has been very highly valued.

So, I really think that she has to change the course of the European Union in any way because there have been many Estonian initiatives in the European Union already, which are on the way to be implemented in many ways.