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Türkiye’s BRICS bid discussed at Shanghai University

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On 24 September, the Institute of Global Studies of Shanghai University organised a workshop on ‘Türkiye’s Re-Asia Initiative’.

Moderated by Prof. Guo Changgang, Director of the Centre for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University, the workshop discussed China and Türkiye’s foreign policies, the rising global South, the BRICS agenda and Türkiye’s membership bid.

Opening the event, Prof. Guo Changgang said: “As Ankara is applying to join BRICS, it is a good time to talk about Türkiye’s Asia policy,” highlighting the Re-Asia Initiative.

“Türkiye’s efforts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and participate in ASEAN show that Türkiye has adopted a ‘pendulum’ position between the West and the East,” said Prof. Dr. Gürol Baba of Ankara Social Sciences University. Gürol Baba said Türkiye’s move to join BRICS will make it a more ‘visible’ actor in the region: “Türkiye is an active middle power. It should cooperate with like-minded powers. For example, Türkiye is a founding member of the MIKTA group. BRICS is also a place where Türkiye can find like-minded countries. Baba said Türkiye wanted to keep East and West together in its foreign policy.

Prof Zou Zhigiang of Fudan University said: ‘Türkiye is changing its Asia policy. This is because an Asia that is economically and technologically confident, competitive and rising in every sense cannot be ignored. Türkiye is currently seeking to increase its engagement in the region. President Erdoğan attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in 2022 for the first time as a NATO country. It has also been confirmed that Türkiye has applied to join BRICS,” he said. Prof Zou summed up why Türkiye attaches such importance to Asia in 4 points:

  1. Accumulated frustration with the West and the European Union. It is now clear that Türkiye’s EU membership will not happen in the near future.

  2. Türkiye is seeking strategic autonomy. It wants to be a central power in the world and pursue a balanced policy. It wants to be a centre between East and West and not give up its NATO membership.

  3. The growing global influence and attractiveness of the SCO and BRICS.

  4. Türkiye’s domestic economy faces challenges. New economic markets and capital inflows are vital for Türkiye.

Prof Zhou Shixin of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies commented on China’s Asia policy:

“China is seen by the US as the biggest threat, so it is blocked and ostracised by the US and some of its allies. China-US relations are one of the most important factors driving the regional power shift and order transition in the Asia-Pacific. China is expanding its presence and increasing its influence in the Asia-Pacific. China is acting as a modern and sovereign country, making great efforts to defend its territorial integrity and sovereign independence and to achieve national reunification. China also seeks peaceful and equal coexistence and interaction with the US, but does not seek to coerce the US. China seeks to strengthen security and economic relations with more regional countries on the basis of the principles of ‘friendship, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness’. China seeks to manage and resolve territorial disputes with its neighbours primarily through bilateral diplomatic consultations and negotiations”.

Commenting on Türkiye’s Asia Re-entry Initiative, Prof. Zhou said that Ankara has demonstrated its willingness to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy based on the Strategic Depth Doctrine and made the following suggestions: “Türkiye can focus more on Southeast Asia rather than South Asia and Northeast Asia, Türkiye can interact with Asia-Pacific countries as a sovereign country, not as a NATO member, even with Japan and South Korea. Türkiye could promote more economic cooperation rather than security cooperation, Türkiye could apply to join the ASEAN Regional Forum as an Asian country, and Türkiye could negotiate more free trade agreements with Asia-Pacific countries beyond South Korea (1 May 2013), Malaysia (1 August 2015) and Singapore (1 October 2017) before joining the EU. As a result, China is willing to help Türkiye further coordinate with some regional countries.”

Prof Zhou Yiqi of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies spoke about China’s Middle East policy:

“There are four major parties in the Middle East: Arab countries, Israel, Iran and Türkiye. China has strengthened its relations with most of the major powers there. However, Türkiye remains the only party that has not yet signed a partnership agreement with China. Diplomatic relations between the two: Strategic Cooperation Relations. Although relations between China and Israel are rather poor, there is still a relationship of innovative partnership. In addition, China has successfully negotiated the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. China’s partnership between these two countries has become a bridge that brings them together.

The traditional stereotype is that China is only interested in economic issues and is a free rider on security in the region. However, after its mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its efforts to bring peace to Gaza, China has become an active player in Middle East security issues. However, this still differs from US efforts to use the alliance as a bargaining chip. China has always been quite fair in the Middle East, which has earned it trust. But it is also on the side of justice, for example on the Palestinian issue.”

Commenting on Türkiye’s Re-Asia Initiative, Prof. Zhou Yiqi said: “I think it is important for Türkiye to improve its relations with China, because China-Türkiye relations are even weaker than China-Israel relations. China is looking for stability in the face of apparent uncertainty. But I don’t understand why the foreign minister went back to Türkiye and suddenly raised taxes on electric cars imported from China. Such issues have become a hot topic on Chinese social media and this is definitely not positive for people-to-people understanding,” he said.

Dr Selçuk Aydın of Boğaziçi University commented on Türkiye’s relations with Asia:

“The origins of modern Türkiye go back to the early 19th century. The biggest event of that period was the abolition of the Janissaries. In other words, while the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a transformation, this process was expressed with a ‘new’ term. If we look back to the 1920s, there were again discussions about ‘New Türkiye’. When Erdoğan came to power, all the news was about ‘New Türkiye’. In fact, Asia is nothing new for Türkiye; it already has historical, cultural and religious links. I think Dr Serdar has been working on Uighur and Xinjiang issues. Historically, this region has been very connected and interacted with Türkiye.

Secondly, Türkiye’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative is a great initiative. There is a mystery in Türkiye about China and in China about Türkiye. How is Türkiye perceived? For China, the concept of Türkiye is probably limited to NATO. Then there is the Xinjiang issue. There are two important issues that hinder Türkiye’s cooperation with China.

The first step we need to discuss is Türkiye’s dissatisfaction with what the US is forcing it to do in the Middle East. Especially the Syria incident. That was a turning point in diplomacy. Another example is the FETO case. Gulen had a close relationship with the US and there was a coup attempt. After this incident, Türkiye’s diplomatic direction changed. After the Arab Spring, Türkiye realised that the US did not support liberal movements in the Middle East, but only focused on its own interests. Subsequently, Türkiye became more involved in Middle Eastern affairs, for example by mobilising its military abroad in Syria, Azerbaijan and elsewhere.

We need to analyse Türkiye’s foreign policy from these perspectives. First, history, which is also intertwined with religion. The Ottoman Empire was the centre of the Caliphate. The second is the racial dimension, which also bears traces of the late Ottoman Empire. Turkish consulates are therefore the main pillar of Turkish foreign policy. The third pillar of Turkish policy is the promotion of a non-Western approach. This is related to the foundations of modern Türkiye and is very anti-colonialist. At the same time, Türkiye is geographically close to Western countries and has historically cooperated with them.

Türkiye’s neighbours are often in civil war or conflict. So Türkiye has to look to Asia, because China has incredible lessons to teach in that region. China may be the only superpower that wants peace in the Middle East.”

Commenting on Türkiye-China relations, Dr Serdar Yurtçiçek said:

“Professor Yiqi mentioned that there are four important powers in the Middle East (Türkiye, Arabia, Iran and Israel) and although China has very good relations with three of them, it has not been able to improve its relations with Türkiye. The reason for this is the Uighur issue, as Selçuk mentioned earlier. Since 2016, I have been living in China and researching Türkiye’s China policy. During this time, I have met many Chinese academics and politicians. The conclusion I have drawn from my experience and research is that the most important issue between Türkiye and China is the Uyghur issue, and unless this issue is resolved, all other areas of cooperation cannot be built in a relationship of mutual trust. Last year, former ambassador Emin Önen said: ‘There is mutual understanding on 99 points in Türkiye-China relations, but let’s not agree on one point. This should not hinder the development of bilateral relations’. Prof. Yang Chen said that China wants to improve its relations with Türkiye, but this point is as important as the other 99 points and the two countries should keep their mutual promises. That point is the Uighur issue. And it is clear that Turkish academics and politicians do not understand how important the Xinjiang issue is for China and that it is a non-negotiable issue in terms of national sovereignty.

After the Second World War, Turkish-Chinese relations developed largely within the foreign policy boundaries drawn by the United States. In particular, the fight against China in the Korean Civil War and Türkiye’s eventual accession to NATO led to Uighur figures such as Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra defecting to Türkiye, making Türkiye a centre for anti-China Uighur separatist organisations. Even diplomatic relations between Türkiye and China only started after the US established diplomatic relations with China.

The situation was no different before the Second World War. Türkiye prioritised its friendship with the Soviets in its foreign policy and was wary of taking any steps that might anger the Soviets. For example, in 1944, Türkiye and the Republic of China almost signed a treaty of friendship, but Türkiye cancelled the treaty at the last minute so as not to anger the Soviets. This was because Türkiye had serious problems with the Soviets, especially the issue of the Straits Convention. The situation was similar in China. Xinjiang was largely under Soviet control. According to a Turkish diplomat, if a Chinese official wanted to go to Xinjiang, he first had to get permission from the Soviet consul in Kashgar.

Today, for the first time, there is a possibility of strategic relations between China and Türkiye without the shadow of a third country. Türkiye’s application for BRICS membership should be seen in this context.”

ASIA

Economists cut China growth forecasts to 4.8 per cent

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Chinese economists have cut their forecasts for the country’s gross domestic product in 2024 in the latest quarterly Nikkei and Nikkei Quick News survey, underlining the pressure on authorities struggling to revive growth.

The average forecast of 28 local experts on China’s economy points to annual GDP growth slowing to 4.8 per cent, down from 4.9 per cent in the previous survey in July. Some of the economists submitted or updated their responses after Chinese authorities last week cut interest rates, supported the property market and pumped billions of dollars into the stock market, sending shares soaring. For those who responded before the stimulus began, the Nikkei asked whether they wanted to change their forecasts.

Of the 25 economists who made full-year growth forecasts in the previous quarterly survey, 16 cut their outlooks, while nine held their expectations steady. The overall range of growth forecasts shifted downwards from 4.8 to 5.3 percent to 4.5 to 5.0 percent. The average forecast for the July-September quarter is 4.6 percent, a further deceleration from the 4.7 percent growth recorded in the April-June period and weaker than the 4.9 percent expansion in the third quarter of last year. The quarter-on-quarter growth forecast for the third quarter, which better reflects the momentum of the economy, is 1.1% in seasonally adjusted terms, slightly higher than the 0.7% growth recorded in the second quarter.

Analysts warned of significant headwinds. KGI Asia’s Ken Chen cut his annual growth forecast to 4.9% from 5.3%, taking into account recent weaker-than-expected data ranging from industrial production and investment to retail and property sales. The current economic growth trend is still down, mainly due to the bottoming out of the property cycle and downward pressure from external demand,’ he said, suggesting that stimulus may not be enough to achieve the government’s annual GDP target of ‘around 5%’.

Despite policy efforts to lower mortgage rates and reduce the cost of buying, the housing sector remains a major drag. When economists were asked to pick the top three risks from a list of nine, the “sluggish housing market” topped the list, cited by 17 out of 20. This was followed by ‘weak consumer confidence’ and ‘no or inadequate policy’.

Hui Shan, chief China economist at Goldman Sachs, cut his forecast from 4.9% to 4.7%, saying that previous policy measures to stimulate the property market “may not be as effective”.

Tetsuji Sano, chief Asia economist at Sumitomo Mitsui DS Asset Management, said: ‘Consumer demand is likely to fall across the board as the population continues to age and the pension system is underdeveloped.

Property accounts for about 70% of Chinese household assets. This means that the fall in house prices has a direct negative wealth effect, reducing consumer confidence and fuelling deflation concerns.

There are clear risks that deflationary pressures could become entrenched,’ said Alex Muscatelli, Chief Economics Officer at Fitch Ratings. He noted that the GDP deflator, which reflects general price changes in the economy, has fallen on an annualised basis for five consecutive quarters, while prices of basic goods and services have remained flat.

China is heavily reliant on manufacturing and exports, especially as it has struggled to improve sentiment since the COVID-19 outbreak, but momentum in this sector is also starting to wane. Industrial production growth slowed to 4.5% y/y in August from 5.1% y/y in July.

This comes at a time of heightened trade protectionism, with the US, the European Union and Canada imposing additional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Similarly, Indonesia has reimposed tariffs on goods such as textile imports, particularly from China, which came into effect in August.

Arjen van Dijkhuizen, senior economist at ABN AMRO Bank, noted that trade divergence has helped mitigate the impact of tariffs to some extent and that exports remain the key driver of China’s growth. ‘However, China’s supply-side strategy is contributing to escalating trade frictions, with the US, EU and others protecting strategic sectors from China’s [oversupply],’ he said.

Ongoing external and internal uncertainties appear to be behind the stimulus measures, which involve numerous central government agencies, including the People’s Bank of China.

It is rare for the PBOC to announce both a [reserve requirement ratio] cut and an interest rate cut at the same time, signalling the urgency policymakers feel to provide support,’ said Jing Liu, chief economist for Greater China at HSBC.

Jian Chang, chief China economist at Barclays, agreed. Recent developments signal that the Chinese leadership is taking a more proactive approach to tackling its most pressing structural problems. However, both bank economists left their annual forecasts unchanged at 4.9 per cent and 4.8 per cent respectively.

Looking beyond this year, the economists expect a gradual slowdown to 4.5 per cent in 2025 and 4.2 per cent in 2026, reflecting a long-term structural slowdown.

“The crisis in the housing sector, the associated loss of housing wealth and the need for households to repair their balance sheets, as well as uncertain income and job prospects in an uncertain economic environment, are hampering domestic consumption,” said Sophie Altermatt, economist at Julius Baer.

Wei Yao, chief Asia and China economist at Societe Generale, said ‘the current state of the economy calls for more radical measures’ and stressed the need for ‘restructuring of real estate and local government debt rather than further interest rate cuts to end the deflationary spiral’.

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Journalists in prison: We were in the same cell with IS members

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Afghan journalists, who had the experience of being imprisoned, say that they were imprisoned in the same cells as Islamic State (IS) also known as Daesh members. A local journalist in the north of the country who was recently arrested and tortured by the Taliban said: “No professional has been humiliated to this extent,” referring to the journalism professionalism.

Afghan journalists have reported hundreds of cases of torture, arbitrary arrests and increased censorship in the past three years.

They say they are often arrested for covering attacks by opposition groups or writing about discrimination against women. Some of them have announced that they were imprisoned in the same cell with members of the Daesh group.

“My colleagues and I no longer want to continue this profession. New restrictions are announced every day. If we cover attacks or issues related to women, we face phone threats, subpoenas or arrests,” a journalist who was recently arrested and beaten told a foreign media.

At the time of Taliban takeover in 2021, Afghanistan had 8,400 media workers, 1,700 of whom were women. But according to media sources, now only 5100 journalists are working, of which 560 are women.

Taliban asks journalists to respect Islamic values, the country’s national interests while reporting.

One of the officials of organizations supporting journalists, who wished to be recognized by his pine name, Samullah, said “since the Taliban returned to power, we have recorded about 450 cases of violations of journalists’ rights, including arrests, threats, physical violence and torture.”

However, Hayatullah Mohajer Farahi, the Deputy Minister of Information and Culture, said that the media is allowed to operate in Afghanistan, but asked that they should respect “Islamic values, the country’s national interests, and its culture and traditions.”

Last month, new rules were applied to the media’s political talk shows. According to the editor-in-chief of media outlets, based on the new decision of the Taliban, the guests must be selected from the approved list of this group, the topics must be approved in close coordination, and criticism of the regime is prohibited. These programs should not be played live until the recordings are checked and “weaknesses” are removed. An employee of Afghanistan’s state radio and television said that women are no longer allowed to work as reporters.

In Helmand province, it is forbidden to broadcast women’s voices on TV and radio. Also, monitoring of journalists in social networks continues and media continue to operate through self-censorship.

The implementation of new law introduced by the Taliban ministry for the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice, has also added to the worries of journalists. This law prohibits taking pictures of living creatures and also prohibits women from speaking in public.

Taliban arrests key Daesh members responsible for recent attack that kills many

Taliban said that they have captured key members of the Daesh terrorist group, including a citizen from Tajikistan — they were responsible for recent deadly attacks across Afghanistan.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that the Taliban’s special forces arrested key members of Daesh claimed that a Kabul suicide bombing that left six people dead last month.

Though, he didn’t specify the arrested number of Daesh members, but said that the Daesh suicide bomber “infiltrated Afghanistan from a training camp in Pakistan.” He also claimed that other members of Daesh were arrested in a series of raids but said all of them recently returned from there (camp in Pakistan.)

Mujahid said that the Daesh group “have established new operational bases and training camps” in Pakistan, saying “from these new bases, they continue to orchestrate attacks, both within Afghanistan and in other countries.”

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China breaks record in corruption crackdown on top cadres

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China’s high-level anti-corruption drive continues.

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), China’s top political discipline and anti-corruption body, has reportedly placed a senior inspector under investigation.

According to the South China Morning Post, discipline chief Li Gang is under surveillance as part of the investigation. Li was appointed by the CCDI to the Central Organisation Department, the Communist Party’s top human resources office.

The CCDI announced on Monday that Li was under ‘disciplinary review and surveillance investigation’ for ‘suspected serious violations of discipline and law’.

In the past two weeks, three other senior officials have been placed under investigation on similar charges.

They are Cao Xingxin, deputy general manager of state-owned telecoms giant China Unicom, Sun Yuning, deputy director of the General Administration of Customs, and Du Yubo, former vice-minister of education.

According to a count by the South China Morning Post, 44 senior cadres were placed under investigation in the first nine months of this year, up from 34 in the same period last year.

The CCDI said 45 senior officials were investigated last year. This is the highest number since Xi launched his sweeping anti-corruption campaign in 2013, in which he vowed to go after both ‘tigers’ and ‘flies’ – powerful leaders and lower-level bureaucrats.

Two more were added to the 2023 total in June, when the Politburo announced that former defence ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe had also been placed under investigation last year.

All the detained Tigers belonged to a pool of what the CCDI calls ‘centrally directed cadres’, officials with the rank of vice-minister or above.

A smaller number held slightly lower ranks but occupied key positions in critical sectors.

Li, 59, a vice-minister, is the highest-ranking disciplinary chief to be dismissed this year after Long Fei, the disciplinary chief of the state-owned China Southern Power Grid.

Long was placed under investigation in February and expelled from the Party in August for serious violations of Party discipline and laws.

Addressing the CCDI’s general assembly in January, Xi urged the top discipline watchdog to ‘regularly weed out rotten apples’ as the fight against corruption remained ‘serious and complex’ after more than a decade.

Xi said the CCDI should ‘resolutely prevent and crack down on wrongdoing’ to strengthen the building of its discipline inspection and supervision team and become a ‘model of self-reform’.

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