Opinion
Could tensions in Kosovo lead to war?
Tensions in Kosovo are never-ending. The root of the problem is the refusal of the majority Serbian population in Kosovo to submit to the rule of the Kosovo state and government in the territory stretching from the north side of Mitrovica, divided by the Ibar river, towards Serbia. After NATO’s air campaign against Serbia in 1999, some of the Serbs living in Kosovo fled to the northern part of Mitrovica and settled there when the Serbian government withdrew in June. There was already a Serb-dominated population in that area. Some of the Serbs who fled from other areas feared that they might be next in line due to the previous policies of oppression and massacres against Albanians. Others fled out of fear of being attacked simply because they were Serbs. The UN Security Council-mandated administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR, made up of NATO forces, including the United States, did not take effective action in time to prevent the region from becoming independent.
The civil society efforts to split Mitrovica, which has the richest mineral deposits in northern Kosovo, almost in two, with the river Ibar as the border, and to bring the area stretching north towards Serbia under the control of the Kosovo administration, predominantly Albanian, over time, did not yield much result. There have been frequent tensions between Serbs who want to establish a kind of ‘parallel’ administration there with the support of Serbia and Kosovan government forces trying to bring the region under Kosovo’s sovereignty. This time it started when Serbs in the region boycotted the general local elections in Kosovo. Serbs did that since they do not consider them part of Kosovo. In fact, they think that the whole of Kosovo is a province that was forcibly taken away from them and should belong to Serbia. On the other hand, it is very important for the Kosovo government not to create a ‘parallel’ administration in this region. After Serbia abolished Kosovo’s autonomy in the 1990s, contrary to the spirit of the Yugoslav constitution, and directly annexed the region to Belgrade, constituting ninety percent of the population, Albanians established a ‘parallel administration’, started to run their own affairs despite the difficulties, and boycotted all elections, especially in Serbia, on the grounds that Kosovo was not Serbia.
Former Yugoslavia: Six Founding Republics and Two Fully Autonomous Regions
Kosovo was not an ordinary province/state of Serbia, as it is portrayed in the Western media and occasionally in Turkey. After the withdrawal of the Nazi troops in 1944, learning from the experience of Royal Yugoslavia, Tito established a socialist federation based on six founding republics (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia) and five nationalities (Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Croats and Slovenes). In this way, he thought he had solved the ethnic problems; however, the tensions that erupted in Kosovo in the 1950s due to the policies pursued by the Serbian interior minister and the problems that arose since the Bosnian identity was not recognized showed that this issue was not yet resolved.
As a result, Tito amended the constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974 as if it were being rewritten. In addition to the six founding republics, Kosovo, where Albanians constituted ninety percent, and Vojvodina in the north, where Hungarians constituted a strong minority (around 46%) were turned into fully autonomous regions and Bosnian national identity was recognized. There was little constitutional and administrative difference between the fully autonomous regions and the republics. For example, both regions had their own constitutions, their own parliaments, their own governments and their own internal administration (including police and judiciary). They also had the constitutional right to conclude and implement economic, commercial, educational, training and exchange agreements with other states, and the Kosovo administration, for example, exercised this right in 1975 and 1976 through agreements with the World Bank and the former East German Republic.
On the other hand, the constitution of Yugoslavia, while referring to the six republics and the two fully autonomous regions, counted them as ‘the six constitutional units that constitute Yugoslavia’, which implies that there are no hierarchical differences between them, and already in Yugoslavia’s main constitutional institutions (e.g. the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, the Presidential Council of Yugoslavia, whose importance increased after Tito’s death), the founding republics and the fully autonomous regions are on an equal footing. However, there was still the strange constitutional problem that republics theoretically had the right to declare independence, while fully autonomous regions did not. Indeed, in the events that erupted in Kosovo after Tito’s death, the people of Kosovo initially fought to become a founding republic. The problem became complicated following escalating tensions and clashes all over Yugoslavia; Kosovo’s autonomy was abolished by Milošević and his clique in 1989-1990 in violation of the constitution of Yugoslavia; and after increasing tensions and the forced closure of the Kosovo Parliament, the MPs were forced to declare an independent state called the Republic of Kosovo. The process of becoming an independent state, which seemed very difficult at the beginning, was followed by the disintegration of Yugoslavia in bloody conflicts and the massacres and genocides led by Milošević and his Bosnian cohorts Karadžić/Mladić, and the failure of Serbia to take steps to reduce tensions in Kosovo despite the Dayton Accords. For example, Serbia’s refusal to form a new and smaller Yugoslavia by transforming the Republic of Montenegro into a trilateral entity (Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro), and its insistence on creating an almost racist administration in Kosovo made things even more complicated and paved the way for the chain of events leading to NATO’s intervention. Meanwhile, the dissolution of Yugoslavia took place largely according to the constitution of the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Vojvodina. Six republics became independent, while Kosovo, after Serbia was forced to withdraw from the region, gradually became independent in 2008, recognized by more than a hundred states, but not (yet) a member of the UN due to Russia’s veto.
Is a New Balkan War Imminent?
For these reasons, Albanians do not want to allow a ‘parallel’ administration to emerge north of Mitrovica. On the other hand, from time to time, Serbian governments, like the current Vucic administration, raise this issue as if they can take back Kosovo and then backtrack. Vucic himself did the same after the previous car license plate crisis and will probably backtrack after the municipal crisis subsides. The truth of the matter is that the return/return of Kosovo, whose population is more than ninety percent Albanian, to Serbian sovereignty would upset the status quo in the Balkans like a tectonic earthquake, but such a possibility is almost non-existent.
In a multipolar world, the media, which often perceives Serbia’s domestic political outbursts as Russia on one side and the West/NATO on the other, may think that Moscow is provoking the Belgrade authorities based on the criticism of NATO’s actions in the Balkans in the previous years; but such criticism does not mean open arms and ammunition aid, nor can it be interpreted as Russia encouraging Serbia to start a war. After all, Russia cannot provide military aid to Serbia these days, even if it wanted to, because the states surrounding the country blocked Lavrov’s official visit to Serbia last year by closing their airspace to the plane carrying the Russian foreign minister, let alone allowing aid to pass through. After that crisis over license plates was overcome, Vucic made statements that they did not intend to take steps together with Russia.
But would NATO drive the Albanians against Serbia? This is also very unlikely, because then, in any case, the Republika Srpska (Republica Srpska) that makes up Bosnia-Herzegovina might try to secede, Croatian forces and Croatia and Bosniaks might mobilize against the Serbs, and the fragmented structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina might be broken. On the other hand, if the Albanians become too strong, it could disturb Greece and even Macedonia, since Greece, acting as a natural ally of the Serbs, would not want the Albanians, who are natural allies of Turkey, to become stronger. If the Albanians, who make up more than a third of its population, gain power and ground, it would also make Macedonia vulnerable. In short, the scenario of NATO having Serbia beaten by the Albanians is not very plausible, if not impossible. It is also important to keep in mind that the US and the EU want to integrate Serbia into NATO and the EU rather than exclude it. In short, until Serbia recognizes Kosovo within its current borders, there will continue to be increasing and decreasing reports of tensions and street protests in the region, but the dynamics that would turn this into a chessboard between Russia and the West do not exist, at least for now. Turkey’s attempts to de-escalate crises are always appropriate, but it is important to be aware that there will be no definite results. In addition, it is absolutely beneficial to work intensively on alternative solutions even for partial results.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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