Europe
German historians condemn draft law on post-war expulsions
Historians in Germany are criticising the federal government’s policy regarding Eastern Germans who were “resettled” after the Second World War.
According to a statement issued by the Association of German Historians (VHD), the new draft law concerning the Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation Foundation—tabled in the Bundestag in mid-August—reduces the complex events of the post-Second World War “resettlement” process to “German suffering”. It ignores the necessary historical context, namely the war of annihilation waged by Germany in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and thereby creates a “self-referential national narrative” hitherto developed primarily by expellee associations.
Historians point out that this situation jeopardises reconciliation efforts, particularly with Poland and the Czech Republic.
Because this change of focus directly affects the permanent exhibition maintained by the foundation at the Documentation Centre for Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation in a central district of Berlin, it will generate a broad public impact.
This development goes hand in hand with the revival of Berlin’s former “Germanness” policy towards minorities in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Post-war German migration exhibition: where is Nazi Germany?
According to German Foreign Policy, the starting point of the recent debates surrounding the Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation Foundation was the permanent exhibition at the Documentation Centre for Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation, which is operated by the foundation and opened at the Deutschlandhaus in Berlin in 2021.
Spanning two floors, the exhibition chronicles the resettlement of the German-speaking population from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The exhibition thus addresses historical events within a two-part context.
As the historian Felix Ackermann, who teaches at the Distance-Learning University of Hagen, described by way of example, the first floor presents “the pre-history of ethnic nationalism and state-enforced migration”, particularly in the context of various cases of flight, expulsion, and resettlement in 20th-century Europe.
Building on this content, the second floor focuses on the post-war resettlement of Germans.
However, this core element of the permanent exhibition is preceded by a very brief overview of the war in which Nazi Germany occupied significant parts of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
This aspect is of vital importance because without this knowledge, the complexity of the “resettlement” process cannot be evaluated in its proper context and adequately understood.
The Polish border issue
The overall structure of the permanent exhibition is widely described as a “compromise” reached between right-leaning expellee associations and the Scientific Advisory Board of the Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation Foundation.
This board also includes historians, particularly from Poland and the Czech Republic.
This compromise had hitherto been maintained by the director of the Documentation Centre, the historian Gundula Bavendamm.
However, in mid-2024, expellee associations effectively abandoned this compromise and launched a fierce attack.
For instance, in a letter sent to Bavendamm by Bernd Fabritius (CSU), then president of the Federation of Expellees (BdV), it was stated that the connection between the resettlement process and Germany’s war of annihilation had to be severed, as this “confused context with causality”.
Fabritius also argued that the Federal Republic of Germany’s 1990 recognition of Poland’s national borders should not legally be characterised as a “cession” of the former eastern territories of the German Empire.
This statement recalls that the border treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland merely “confirmed” the border between the two states, described it as “inviolable”, and renounced all “territorial claims”.
The treaty contains no unconditional recognition definitively describing the border as “inviolable”. As Fabritius’s statement implies, this situation could give rise to potential loopholes.
CDU/CSU influence in German expellee associations
The offensive launched by the expellee associations gained momentum following the change of government last year.
Initially, despite the unanimous objections of the Academic Advisory Board, this led to Documentation Centre director Bavendamm’s contract not being renewed in November 2025 and the post being advertised.
Close observers noted that not only the expellee associations played a role in this process, but also the Group of Expellees, Repatriates, and German Minorities within the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, which is closely linked to them.
The leader of this group, Klaus-Peter Willsch (CDU), is a member of the board of trustees of the Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation Foundation.
Similarly, Stephan Mayer, deputy chairman of the Expellees Group who took over the BdV presidency from Fabritius, is also a member of this board.
The person they sought to appoint as director of the Documentation Centre to replace Bavendamm was Sven Oole.
Critics had noted that Oole had “no managerial experience in German museums” and had produced no “academic publications” on the subject, but that “as the long-time managing director of the ‘Group of Displaced Persons’, he knew the group’s historical-political goals like the back of his hand”.
Oole’s candidacy failed due to threats from the Scientific Advisory Board that it would resign en masse if he were elected.
In the end, Roland Borchers was selected, but it is said that no one knows “where he intends to lead the foundation”.
Attempts to define Germans as a community based on descent
However, the substance of Borchers’s work is likely to be severely curtailed by the new law on the Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation Foundation, which was adopted by the federal government in July and submitted to the Bundestag in mid-August.
The Association of German Historians (VHD) directed sharp criticism at this legislation in late May. This criticism stems partly from the fact that Bernd Fabritius, in his role as Federal Government Commissioner for Matters Related to Ethnic German Resettlers and National Minorities, will in future hold an additional seat on the foundation’s board of directors.
According to the VHD’s statement, this will effectively give the BdV “a government-backed majority position on the foundation’s supervisory board”.
In its statement, the VHD explicitly warns against “bad examples of a state-directed remembrance policy”.
Furthermore, the statement contends that the new law focuses the foundation’s work to a certain degree on “German suffering” and replaces “the historical context of flight and expulsion with a self-referential national narrative”.
This situation further exacerbates “existing threats to reconciliation efforts, particularly with the Federal Republic’s Eastern European neighbours, especially Poland and the Czech Republic”.
Finally, the statement notes that, diverging from the openness of recent years, the law “once again defines Germans as a community based on descent”.
No immigration to Germany—except for “ethnic Germans”!
The historian Felix Ackermann also recently addressed the broader political context.
According to Ackermann, the new law aims not only to strip the resettlement process of its historical context and confine commemorative activities to a narrow national framework.
In addition, the federal government is moving the Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation Foundation from the purview of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media to the remit of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.
Christoph de Vries, Parliamentary State Secretary at this ministry and deputy chairman of the Expellees Group within the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, is also pushing for “the opening of new immigration channels for ethnic kin”.
Indeed, while politicians such as de Vries advocate strict restrictions on immigration, the Federal Ministry of the Interior seeks to revise immigration regulations for members of German-speaking minorities in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
This revision would allow even German speakers born after 31 December 1992 to obtain German citizenship.
As Ackermann noted, this dual focus on the concept of “Germanness” makes it possible to describe the expulsion regions, just as during the Konrad Adenauer era, as the whole of the “German East”.
The fact that the “responsibility to preserve the history of the German East” now falls once again to the Federal Ministry of the Interior—which, as is well known, is responsible for domestic and not foreign affairs—seems to Ackermann “like a bad joke”; yet, Ackermann says, in reality this situation “brings terrible consequences.”
Europe
Most EU citizens reject fast-track Ukraine accession, poll finds
An opinion survey conducted across the European Union has revealed that 53% of bloc citizens oppose admitting Ukraine to the EU through an accelerated process in the coming years.
According to the study carried out by the Bertelsmann Foundation, 47% of EU residents support the idea of fast-track membership.
The most pronounced opposition to rapid accession was recorded in Romania at 60%, followed by Germany at 59%, and France and Poland at 57% each.
The lowest resistance to Ukraine’s accelerated membership was found in Sweden at 31%. This figure stood at 37% in Spain and Portugal, and remained at 43% in the Netherlands.
Domestic support for the process remains exceptionally high; 83% of the public in Ukraine want to join the bloc as soon as possible.
Europeans differ over defence contributions and strategic benefits
The survey also examined perceptions regarding the defence of the continent. Some 58% of Ukrainians believe that their “resistance against Russia’s military campaign protects the entire continent and the EU as a whole.”
In contrast, 29% of bloc citizens share the view that the EU and its member states contribute more to defending the union than Ukraine does.
While 23% of participants view the efforts of both sides as equal, the share of those who consider Ukraine to be the bloc’s “primary protector” remains at 16%.
The study also indicates that low expectations concerning the tangible benefits Ukraine would provide to the bloc contribute to the limited support for its membership.
Only 14% of surveyed Europeans believe that this accession will make the EU stronger and more influential on a global scale. Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents who anticipate that Ukraine’s entry will increase the bloc’s resilience was measured at 11%.
Timetable debate persists in the negotiation process
Ukraine applied for membership immediately after Russia’s military intervention and gained candidate status in 2022.
The accession process encompasses a 33-chapter reform package organised under six clusters, which aims to guarantee democratic and economic standards.
Formal accession talks began in June 2024. The negotiation process, which had long been blocked by Hungary, made progress after Peter Magyar took office as the country’s prime minister.
Magyar also succeeded in having the term “accelerated accession” for Ukraine removed from EU texts.
Magyar argued that a contrary approach would send the wrong message to Western Balkan nations, such as Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, which have worked towards membership for years.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called for the membership process to be completed by 2027, stating that this would provide a fundamental security guarantee for both Ukraine and Europe.
On the other hand, circles within the bloc that oppose rushing the process insist on the complete fulfilment of all conditions, including anti-corruption measures.
Meanwhile, the EU Ambassador to Ukraine, Katarina Mathernova, points to 2030 as a likely accession date.
For membership to take place following the completion of negotiations, all 27 EU member states must grant unanimous approval.
So far, only the first of the six chapter clusters, covering fundamental values and principles such as the rule of law, human rights, and the judiciary, has been opened for Ukraine.
Europe
NATO unveils 32-nation defence strategy to counter adversaries
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Alexus Grynkewich has unveiled a new defence strategy aimed at rendering any attack against an alliance member entirely futile.
Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum, Grynkewich said the concept, titled the “Theory of War”, is designed to prevent hostile elements from infiltrating NATO territory and waging conflict there.
Arguing that they aim to reassure the one billion people living within the alliance’s borders, Grynkewich maintained that they also wish to send a message to adversaries such as Russia that NATO is prepared for a potential invasion.
“If we are attacked, we are ready to fight even tonight,” Grynkewich said.
Three-stage defence plan enters into force
Approved by all 32 alliance members, the plan combines land forces and conventional weapons systems with advanced technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles, counter-drone systems, and artificial intelligence.
Lessons drawn from ground and air combat in Ukraine, as well as current conflicts in the Middle East, play a decisive role in shaping the strategy.
According to Grynkewich, the new defence doctrine rests on three fundamental phases that form the core of NATO’s approach:
The first pillar of the plan, the “block” phase, focuses on preventing hostile forces from seizing allied territory.
In this context, NATO ground components will engage directly with attacking units, restrict their manoeuvrability, and neutralise forces attempting to breach alliance borders.
Should the assault continue, the second phase (“blunt”) will come into play, deploying autonomous systems requiring minimal human intervention alongside advanced sensor networks to slow the momentum of the attack and wear down advancing forces.
These systems will detect threats in real time, combining capabilities across different operational domains to halt the adversary’s advance.
The final stage, the “break” phase, will target not the attacking units directly, but the operational warfighting system that sustains them.
Command centres, supply chains, and logistics routes will be struck using long-range precision strike systems and sensor networks, eliminating the adversary’s ability to sustain military operations.
“Enemy commanders will not be able to direct their troops, their supply lines will be severed, and their logistics vehicles will be destroyed,” Grynkewich said.
Strategy aims to defend borders rather than gain territory
Noting that NATO has no intention of acquiring territory and that the strategy is entirely defence-oriented, Grynkewich said, “We have no plan, intention, or ambition beyond protecting our citizens and our territory.”
Stating that he considers the likelihood of a direct attack on alliance territory to be low, the commander nevertheless stated that they would respond without hesitation to any attempt targeting allies.
Addressing questions regarding US commitment to the alliance, Grynkewich recalled that Washington reaffirmed its adherence to Article 5 at the NATO summit in July.
Article 5, which forms the cornerstone of NATO’s collective defence principle, stipulates that an armed attack against one ally is considered an attack against all members.
Europe
Germany detains two Turkish suspects over Polish Starlink arson
Polish authorities have announced that German police detained two Turkish citizens suspected of setting fire to a Starlink station near Warsaw last month.
Tomasz Siemoniak, Poland’s minister coordinating the special services, told a news conference in Warsaw on Monday that Poland has requested the suspects’ extradition and has “no doubt” that Russian secret services were behind the arson attack.
“It should also be noted that Russian intelligence agencies are increasingly turning to people linked to the criminal underworld,” Siemoniak said at the press conference.
In a post on X, Prime Minister Donald Tusk described the incident as another “act of hybrid warfare” and said those responsible for the sabotage would be brought to justice in Poland.
Interior Minister Marcin Kierwinski said the two Turkish citizens would be charged in Poland with carrying out an act of sabotage on the orders of a foreign intelligence agency.
Power supply equipment at a Starlink ground station serving Eastern Europe, including Poland and Ukraine, caught fire on the night of 23 September.
The incident did not cause a major disruption to internet service. The blaze, however, completely destroyed the station’s electrical system and backup generator.
Poland, a key transit route for Western aid to Ukraine, has faced a series of suspicious incidents recently.
Numerous cyberattacks have targeted public utilities, including water and energy infrastructure as well as hospitals.
In addition, damage to a railway line between Warsaw and the Ukrainian border was attributed by officials to Russian sabotage.
In late July, a Russian missile also landed in Poland.
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