Opinion
Once again, the dead end we’re on
As soon as the Hezbollah operation, which was launched by Israel with a great psychological operation, ended in failure, the jihadist terrorist organizations that have been hiding in the Idlib region of Syria for years suddenly sprang into action. It was reported that the advance of HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) and its affiliates, which has caused a serious stir among political Islamist groups in Turkey, had taken control of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, and was heading south towards Hama, only to be stopped there for the time being by the Syrian army.
The Turkish media and political Islamists, who at the beginning of the Israeli attack on Hezbollah (17-18 September) had headlined “Hezbollah is finished, Israel has done a great job” after Israel blew up the pagers and radios used by the organization and killed its leadership, including Hassan Nasrullah, were hinting at a new Syrian operation centered on Idlib. So, Hezbollah was finished, and it was only a matter of time before Israel crushed Lebanon. From both Lebanon and the Golan, it would quickly cross into Syria and pounce on the forces they called the Assad ‘regime’. There was another detail to this scenario. The jihadist terrorist organizations led by HTS, which were based in Idlib on our border, would also mobilize from the north and finish off Syria.
Even an opening was planned on the basis of this scenario. Since Israel would unleash the PKK/PYD forces in Syria on us on the way to our border, we had to embrace the ‘Kurds’ by making an opening to them first. In this way, we would take the ‘Kurds’, in fact the PKK/PYD, away from Israel. Of course, in return, we would have to change our constitution into a federal one and form a confederation with these ‘Kurds’, which was not such a big deal. After all, wasn’t the state of the Republic of Turkey wrongly founded on national-unitary principles? In other words, while Israel was trying to establish a federal or autonomous Kurdistan in the Middle East, we were going to establish this project ourselves and applaud it as a success.
Your mind/brain is burnt, isn’t it? Yes, this was indeed the great opening that was unimaginable. If we put aside the words of the opening and focus on the Syrian issue again, the answer to the words ‘Israel will come from the south towards our borders and threaten us with the PKK/PYD’, which was actually used as a justification for the opening, was clear. If Israel was going to come from the south and try to establish a Kurdistan by threatening Turkey together with the PKK/PYD, we should have fought against this project by normalizing our relations with Syria, which was against this project, instead of doing what Israel wanted to do, which was to establish a Kurdistan.
That was the way of reason. There would have been no point in proposing a series of crazy opening projects, as if to say to Israel ‘don’t bother, we are ready to create Kurdistan and we are preparing its infrastructure’; but all these discussions have now changed their content. Although the capture of Aleppo by the HTS and the continuation of its attacks southwards towards Damascus seem to have delighted a significant part of the media, which thinks that a victory has been achieved, it seems certain that when this party ends and the facts start to emerge, we will start talking about other things.
Possible outcomes
Let us first ask the question: Can Russia and Iran leave Syria completely alone? From Russia’s point of view, the answer to this question is clearly ‘no’, because for Russia Syria is its most solid military base in the Middle East. This has been the case since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Syria participated in that war (Yom Kippur War) together with Egypt, but later, when Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat made a compromise with the U.S. and Israel and turned to a policy of reclaiming the territories lost to Israel in 1967 in a peace treaty, Cairo’s military relations with the Soviet Union were almost nil. And Syria, under Hafez al-Assad, became the Soviet Union’s biggest military ally from the mid-1970s.
From those years until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Moscow provided Damascus with an abundant supply of advanced air defense weapons, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, and conventional weapons. Military ties between Moscow and Damascus continued, albeit at a slower pace, under Yeltsin, who ruled the Russian Federation from the collapse of the Soviet Union until the early 2000s, when Putin took over the Kremlin. By the time of the dirty war launched by the US and its allies (2011), military relations between Moscow and Damascus seemed to have reached a strategic level again, and this level was more or less maintained throughout the war.
Abandoning Syria is not an option for Russia. Such a situation would mean a serious loss of prestige for Russia, which is waging a de facto war against the collective West in Ukraine, and it would have to dismantle its military bases in Syria. Given that its relations with the Greek Cypriots and Greece have become hostile, Russia would have great difficulty even sailing ships in the eastern Mediterranean.
Iran cannot leave Syria either. Iran cannot support Hezbollah in Lebanon if it leaves Syria completely to political Islamist and PKK/PYD groups. In fact, the strategic relations between Tehran and Damascus began with the establishment of an anti-imperialist, anti-American and anti-Israeli regime after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. When the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, believing that the Iranian armed forces had lost considerable power during the revolution, declared war on Iran, all Arab states except Syria sided with Saddam Hussein, while Hafez al-Assad established close relations with the Iranian government.
These relations, which gradually turned into strategic military cooperation, continued uninterrupted and Syria played the role of a strategic bridge between Iran and Hezbollah for years… In fact, it can be said that one of the main reasons for attacking Syria was to break this link, and the 2011 dirty war was aimed at breaking this anti-Israeli bloc. Today, if Iran leaves Syria alone, it will also leave Hezbollah alone. It cannot do this because in such a case Iran, which has created outposts against Israel by taking advantage of the strategic mistakes made by the U.S. since the invasion of Iraq, could be quickly dismantled from these points and confined to its own borders, and in such a case there should be no doubt that efforts to destroy the Iranian regime from within will be accelerated.
What kind of a Syria?
Military support from Russia and Iran may be slow and limited, but it is certain that at some point these two states will take action against the jihadist terrorist groups in Syria. What they will do at that point is an important question mark. Because if we see the current HTS attacks, as Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan put it, as the result of the internal dynamics and the refusal of the Assad regime, which we always see as guilty and responsible, to listen to the just and legitimate demands of the people (! ), which erupted as a result of the Assad regime’s refusal to listen to the just and legitimate demands of the people (!) – this is what Fidan said after his meeting with his Iranian colleague – what are we going to do if Russia, Iran, and Syria gain the military upper hand on the ground against these groups? Especially after the publications of the pro-government media, which give Syrian cities number plates…
Moreover, if our policy, which has nothing to do with our national interests and which we are pursuing only to harm Assad, succeeds and HTS manages to hold the areas it controls, including Aleppo, this will lead to the emergence of two Terrorist Territories on our southern borders. One controlled by HTS and its affiliates and the other by the PKK/PYD region east of the Euphrates… Have we thought how this would benefit Turkey? Or if Assad fulfils the instructions we are now giving in a patronizing way – to take Syria out of its national-unitary structure and turn it into a federation – and if federated/autonomous parts such as the HTS region and the PKK/PYD region with their own military power are formed within this country, what benefit will this bring to Turkey?
On the other hand, we know from the refugees and terrorist organizations we face that this policy has placed an enormous burden and strategic cost on our country. None of this existed before 2011. With the current policy, it is quite possible to fall out with Russia, Iran and even China. Arab countries may also oppose us and demand that we leave Arab lands immediately. Could this damage our relations with Egypt, for example, which is very sensitive to all these radical Islamist organizations? Can we destroy the Astana platform with our own hands and convince our partners there – Russia and Iran – that we have nothing to do with all these events?
On the other hand, are we aware that by contributing to such a mess in Syria, we are destroying Trump’s option to withdraw from Syria? And that we are playing into the hands of Israel and the U.S. deep state, which is determined to create a Kurdistan… In my opinion, our foreign policy has returned to the factory settings of 2011 and things are not going to go well. I hope I am wrong.
Opinion
Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France
The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.
In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.
Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.
Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.
The shadow of 17 October 1961
It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.
Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.
This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.
To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?
Looters on the streets, where are the police?
Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.
While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.
It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.
To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?
The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.
A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges
The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.
The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.
The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.
These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.
The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.
In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.
An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands
Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.
Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.
To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.
Opinion
What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?
By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.
The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.
There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.
For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.
Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.
Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.
There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.
For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.
Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?
Let us give another example from the Turkic world.
On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?
We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?
Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.
In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?
In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?
Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?
How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?
Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?
How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?
Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?
These questions can certainly be multiplied.
Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.
Opinion
The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East
In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.
In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.
Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.
Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.
A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East
On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.
These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.
If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.
Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.
Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.
For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.
The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again
The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.
Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.
The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.
Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.
Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.
Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.
Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.
In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.
In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.
Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.
A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.
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