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‘Russian agents’ controversy in Azerbaijan: Why are former ministers under fire?

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Erkin Öncan — Journalist

While not currently a major topic in the Turkish press, a debate concerning alleged “Russian agents” has been ongoing in Azerbaijan for some time. Media outlets close to the government, in particular, have been discussing a supposed group of “Russian agents.” It is even claimed that this “agent group” was the primary reason for the closure of the “Russian House,” which was officially shut down due to “lack of legal registration.”

Notably, this group allegedly includes high-ranking figures such as former Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov; Ramiz Makhdiyev, a close associate of Haydar Aliyev known as the “grey cardinal”; former Head of National Security Eldar Makhmudov; former Minister of Culture Abulfas Garayev; and former Minister of Youth and Sports Azad Rahimov. [Note: Grey Cardinal is a term used for people who have great power and influence behind the scenes, but are not very visible in public].

What happened?

Earlier this month, the pro-government Azerbaijani news agency Qafqazinfo reported that “a network serving Moscow’s interests has been identified in the country” and that “the activities of Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian House) in Baku have been suspended.”

Other pro-government media outlets quickly disseminated the news, asserting that the individuals in question received instructions from Russian intelligence and attempted to influence socio-political processes in Azerbaijan through a network of agents.

Although Qafqazinfo presented the news with the caveat, “However, the information reaching Qafqazinfo leaves no doubt that such a structure really exists,” there has been no official statement confirming the launch of any investigation into the matter.

Another press organization, however, reported the veracity of the “spy group” allegations with these statements:

“The fact that these people are no longer on duty does not mean that the relations have disappeared. There are still those who go to the representative of Russian intelligence and receive instructions, send false messages to our society, and try to create division.”

Political scientist Natig Miri, speaking to Crossmedia.az, claimed that Russia’s “spy network” strategy is not unique to Azerbaijan but is employed in “almost all embassies and consulates”:

Natig Miri said, “However, it is not limited to political elites. There are also such people among the leaders of non-governmental organizations, media outlets and political scientists. In a sense, they are trying to ‘wash Russia’s hands’. In Azerbaijan, it is imperative to identify, expose and remove such persons from their positions in the government and society.”

“The man who writes has no mind”

The accused individuals have vehemently denied the allegations. Mammadyarov responded to the claims by stating, “Some people have a stomach ache. The man who writes has no mouth.” Mammadyarov further questioned, “I was educated in Ukraine, Russia and the US. Does this mean that they should call me an agent of these countries?”

The crash of AZAL’s Embraer 190 aircraft on December 25 near Aktau, Kazakhstan, during a Baku-Grozni flight, reignited tensions between the two countries.

Azerbaijani officials had confirmed the claim that the plane was attacked by the Russian “Pantsir-S” air defense system in the incident, which resulted in the deaths of 38 people. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev for the incident, it highlighted how relations, which have fluctuated in the post-Soviet period, could escalate into open tension.

Due to historical ties and geopolitical dynamics, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia is constantly evolving, sometimes strained but difficult to sever completely. Relations between the two countries are founded on pragmatism and a balance of interests.

However, two significant issues distinguish Azerbaijan, a former Soviet country, from its peers: Russia’s position in the Karabakh Crisis and relations with Israel.

In certain respects, the same alignment found in every former Soviet country also applies to Azerbaijan. A significant portion of the nationalist and liberal sectors in Azerbaijan, similar to Georgia and Ukraine, are inclined to shed the Soviet past and establish closer ties with the West. This makes it easier for these forces to align with Western-backed political groups.

On the other hand, the Karabakh crisis, which has persisted since the 1990s and was “recently” resolved in Azerbaijan’s favor, has resulted in a prolonged Russian military presence in the region. Although the Azerbaijani government has not voiced any serious objections to Russia’s political and military presence, this presence has consistently been a source of unease for the government’s electoral base, namely the nationalist/conservative segments of the country.

In other words, regarding Russian relations, the Azerbaijani government has consistently allowed its electorate and affiliated media outlets to express sentiments that it cannot officially voice due to its current balancing strategy. This serves the dual purpose of appeasing domestic politics and sending an unofficial message. This dichotomy is often observable in Turkey’s foreign policy as well.

Relations with Israel

Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel, or rather, Israel’s interest in Azerbaijan, is naturally linked to Azerbaijan’s geographical location in the South Caucasus, its proximity to Russia and Iran, and its oil reserves.

The fact that Azerbaijan represents, to put it mildly, “an alternative” to Russia and Iran in the region is a well-known fact, even if it is not often explicitly stated.

However, this relationship does not entirely sever Baku’s dependence on Russia, even though it irritates Moscow and Tehran. In the first six months of 2024, the volume of trade between the two countries more than doubled, increasing 2.5 times to exceed $8.3 billion.

Azerbaijan’s share in foreign trade volume with Russia in 2024 is 10.1%, its share in exports is 4.4%, its share in exports of non-oil/gas products is 34.6%, and its share in imports is 17.2%.

While the media discussed “Russian agents” in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev, on February 11, approved an agreement signed in late 2024 to expand the North-South corridor linking Iran and Russia through Azerbaijan. The 2024 bilateral agreement provides for the modernization of road and rail infrastructure to accommodate growing trade volumes.

In another meeting held three days ago in the Iranian capital, Tehran, Azerbaijani, Russian, and Iranian officials reportedly agreed on a plan to construct the Rasht-Astara railway on Iranian territory.

Russian companies remain active in Azerbaijan’s energy and infrastructure projects, while Baku provides Moscow with a transit corridor for the transportation of gas and oil. Simultaneously, however, Azerbaijan aims to reduce its dependence on Russia by developing alternative routes through projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.

From the perspective of both Russia and Azerbaijan, the current relationship is characterized by a partnership of interests. Considering the figures, it can be inferred that the discussions regarding “Russian influence” in Azerbaijan are primarily directed at domestic public opinion rather than Russia for the time being, and that the “Russian agent” accusations against senior officials reflect internal political calculations.

DIPLOMACY

US proposes controversial ‘colonial’-style agreement to Ukraine

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The US is pushing to control all future major infrastructure and mining investments in Ukraine, veto the role of Kyiv’s other allies, and undermine its goal of European Union membership.

According to a draft document obtained by Bloomberg, the Donald Trump administration is demanding the “right of first refusal” on investments in all infrastructure and natural resource projects under a revised partnership agreement with Ukraine.

If accepted, the partnership agreement would give the US enormous power to control investments in projects in Ukraine such as highways and railways, ports, mines, oil and natural gas, and the extraction of critical minerals.

The agreement would give the US first claim on profits transferred to a special reconstruction investment fund controlled by Washington.

The most crucial point of the document is that the US considers the “material and financial benefits” it has provided to Ukraine since the beginning of the war as a contribution to this fund.

In effect, this means the Trump administration would force Ukraine to pay the cost of all US military and economic support provided since the start of the war before Kyiv receives any income from the partnership fund.

According to the draft document, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) will control the investment fund by nominating three of the five board members and holding a “golden share” giving it special voting rights to block certain decisions. Ukraine will appoint the other two members and will be prevented from interfering in the fund’s daily management.

The Kyiv government will be required to deposit 50% of the earnings from all new natural resource and infrastructure projects into the fund. The draft states that the US will be entitled to all profits until its investment is recouped, plus a 4% annual return.

Ukraine will be obliged to submit all projects to the fund for review “at the earliest possible time,” and the DFC will gain board membership or oversight rights in all funded programs.

Kyiv will also be prohibited from offering rejected projects to other parties on “materially better” terms for at least one year.

Furthermore, according to the draft, the US government will have the right to purchase Ukraine’s metals, minerals, and oil and gas on commercial terms before other parties, regardless of whether the fund finances the project.

The agreement, which has no time limit, also prohibits Kyiv from selling critical minerals to countries that are “strategic rivals” of the US.

The US presented a revised agreement to officials in Kyiv last weekend after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s plans to sign an earlier deal fell through following a tense discussion with Trump in the Oval Office last month.

The White House said last week that the administration has moved beyond the previously negotiated agreement covering critical minerals in Ukraine.

Negotiations between the two sides are ongoing, and the final draft may include revisions to the terms. A person familiar with the matter told Bloomberg that Ukraine would respond to the US document with its own changes this week.

Speaking to reporters in Paris on Thursday, where he traveled to attend a summit with European leaders, Zelenskyy said the full agreement proposed by the US requires “detailed study” and that the terms are constantly changing during negotiations.

While it is too early to say an agreement has been reached, he said, “We support cooperation with the US, we do not want to send a single signal that could cause the US to stop helping Ukraine.”

In response to a request for comment, a US Treasury Department spokesperson stated that the US remains committed to the swift finalization of the agreement and securing a lasting peace for Ukraine.

National Security Council spokesperson James Hewitt said, “The minerals agreement offers Ukraine the opportunity to establish a lasting economic relationship with the US, which is the foundation for long-term security and peace. This agreement will strengthen relations between the two countries and benefit both sides.”

Ukraine gained EU candidate status in 2022 and is set to begin accession talks for full membership, which could take years to complete. This situation is likely to become more complicated if the US gains effective control over investment decisions covering large areas of the Ukrainian economy.

Ukraine had previously stated that an agreement with the US should not conflict with its association agreement with the EU. It had also previously rejected the US demand that Washington’s past support for Ukraine be included as a contribution to the joint fund.

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DIPLOMACY

EU to continue funding Türkiye despite İmamoğlu concerns, Politico reports

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Protests following the detention and arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu seem to have put Europe in a difficult position.

In an assessment published in Politico titled “EU faces a billion-euro dilemma in Türkiye crisis,” politicians and officials cited say that regardless of what happens on the streets of Istanbul, Ankara is too important an ally to alienate.

The report states, “The European Union will continue to transfer billions of euros to Türkiye despite President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s extensive crackdowns on political opponents.”

Recalling that European officials warned their southern neighbor to “uphold democratic values” following Ekrem İmamoğlu’s arrest, Politico writes, “But Türkiye’s strategic importance means the bloc will likely look the other way. Erdoğan knows this too.”

Dimitar Bechev, a lecturer at Oxford University, says, “Whatever the Turkish leader does, the EU will have to follow suit.”

Two European officials, speaking to Politico on condition of anonymity, said that Türkiye’s EU candidate status requires it to protect democratic values and that Brussels would respond to violations. Although one of them stated, “We are following the developing situation in Türkiye with great concern” and “Recent developments contradict the logic of EU membership,” they also acknowledge that given Türkiye’s importance in migration, trade, energy, and defense matters, any reaction from the EU is unlikely to disrupt relations between Brussels and Ankara.

Pointing out that although Türkiye’s EU membership negotiations have stalled over the past decade, the country still receives billions of euros in accession funds, Politico notes, “Ankara has also received about 9 billion euros in aid to host refugees from the Middle East and is in line to receive large sums to support European defense industries.”

Highlighting that Türkiye, which has become a major hub for oil and gas exports, has a trade flow with the EU exceeding 200 billion euros annually, the publication writes, “Türkiye has also played a key role in controlling access to the Black Sea and enforcing sanctions against Moscow since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Recently, its potential significant contribution to a possible peacekeeping mission in Ukraine has been discussed.”

Bechev says, “The status quo before İmamoğlu’s arrest was comfortable for the EU because there was enough democracy,” and suggests that recent developments are not dire enough to change this.

According to the “Readiness 2030” plan presented by EU leaders last week, Türkiye, as an EU candidate country, has the potential to access 800 billion euros worth of joint procurements from funds designed to increase the bloc’s defense spending.

However, Greece and Cyprus, both long in conflict with Türkiye, are pushing for restrictions. Diplomats speaking to Politico said they intend to enact a clause requiring the defense move to occur “without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States.”

Arguing that Athens and Nicosia, which were in the process of normalizing relations with Ankara before the recent crisis, now have to perform a “delicate balancing act,” Politico quotes a senior Greek official admitting that “even Athens cannot go too far.”

The Greek official involved says, “Of course, we will support a firm stance condemning the current developments in Türkiye, but without being provocative. The defense industry remains a major gap for Europe, which paves the way for this policy of trade-offs that we see happening.”

Even Cypriot MEP Michalis Hadjipantela, calling for “targeted sanctions” by stating “Effective pressure from the EU is essential,” also said that “sanctions should be targeted and linked to progress on the above issues to prevent further alienation of the country.”

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DIPLOMACY

Fidan and Rubio discuss Syria, Gaza, and defense in US meeting

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Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan and his accompanying delegation began a two-day visit to the US.

During the visit, Fidan met with US Senator Marco Rubio. According to a statement attributed to US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce, the two discussed cooperation on key issues in security and trade.

Rubio requested Turkey’s support for peace in Ukraine and the South Caucasus, while appreciating Ankara’s leadership in the “Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.”

According to the spokesperson, the American senator reiterated the need for close cooperation to support a “stable, unified, and peaceful Syria,” stating they do not want Syria to be “either a base for international terrorism or a pathway for Iran’s destabilizing activities.”

Rubio also highlighted recent progress in bilateral trade and encouraged an even greater economic partnership moving forward.

Finally, the Senator expressed concerns regarding the recent arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu in Turkey and the subsequent protests.

Turkey has not made an official statement: AA reported based on ‘foreign ministry sources’

According to Turkish Foreign Ministry sources cited by AA, Fidan and Rubio emphasized the “importance of engaging with the Syrian government” during their meeting on Tuesday.

The sources stated, “Both sides emphasized the importance of engaging with the Syrian government and expressed their determination regarding the stabilization of Syria and the fight against terrorism.”

According to the sources speaking to AA, Fidan and Rubio discussed a range of regional and bilateral issues, including the need for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, deemed essential for “regional peace.”

The sources also mentioned that the issues discussed in the phone call between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Donald Trump on March 16 were followed up on during the meeting.

The two sides also discussed preparations for upcoming presidential-level visits and expressed their determination to remove obstacles to defense cooperation.

The report added, “Both sides clearly expressed their political will to remove obstacles to cooperation in the defense industry. Technical meetings will be held to resolve existing issues.”

The two sides also discussed efforts to achieve a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, with Turkey expressing support for recent US efforts in this direction.

The talks also covered the ongoing peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability for the entire Balkan region.

Is Hamas on the table?

Meanwhile, Trump, during a White House meeting with a group of US Ambassadors confirmed by the Senate, referred to Turkey and Erdogan as a “good country, a good leader.”

The new US Ambassador to Ankara, Thomas Barack, was also present at the meeting. Barack, known as a close friend of Trump and a real estate magnate, thanked the President for appointing him to Turkey, “one of the ancient civilizations.”

In an article penned by Murat Yetkin in Yetkin Report, it is alleged that Trump might engage in bargaining over Hamas and Gaza in exchange for steps such as lifting CAATSA sanctions against Turkey.

Yetkin relays that CHP leader Ozgur Ozel, in a statement on March 18, referred to the Trump-Erdogan phone call, criticizing the lack of mention of Gaza and Israel, and accused Erdogan of “selling out the Palestinian cause for Trump.”

Recalling that Trump’s special representative Steve Witkoff told Tucker Carlson in an interview that they expect “good news” from Turkey, Yetkin underscores that Witkoff also stated elsewhere in the interview, “A terrorist organization cannot run Gaza; this is unacceptable for Israel. But their disarmament is possible. Then they can stay for a while longer and even get involved in politics.”

Yetkin asks, “Is Trump supporting Erdogan because of a plan to disarm the PKK and Hamas together?” while also noting that the Secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, Hussein al-Sheikh, met with Foreign Minister Fidan in Ankara on March 19, before Fidan flew to the US.

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