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Syria’s turmoil reflected on India

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On Sunday 8 December, the decades-long rule of Bashar al-Assad and his family in Syria ended. There is now a great deal of uncertainty in Syria. Although the Assad regime has fallen and it is known that Assad and his family have been granted asylum in Russia, it is not yet clear what kind of transition will take place. A mixed group of opposition groups led by HTS is expected to form the next government in Damascus, but there is also the possibility of a power struggle within these groups, in which case there is a risk that the political transition may not be smooth or peaceful.

One might wonder why India and Syria, some 4,000 kilometers apart, are relevant, but the opposition’s overthrow of Delhi’s long-time friend Bashar al-Assad is likely to reverberate far beyond the Middle East and affect India in unexpected ways. This is because the two countries have a long-standing friendship based on historical and cultural ties that has developed over the years, especially during Assad’s tenure. During the civil war that erupted in 2011, New Delhi took a stance in favor of resolving the conflict through a militarized, inclusive, and Syrian-led political process. Its embassy in Damascus has been and remains active. The new Syria, where the political equations may change, has the potential to affect India’s relations with Damascus, which are currently on a very slippery, chaotic, and uncertain ground, and beyond that, the dynamics of the Middle East.

India has two major investments in the Syrian oil sector: A 2004 agreement between ONGC Videsh and IPR International for oil and gas exploration, and another joint investment by India’s ONGC and China’s CNPC to acquire a 37 per cent stake in a Canadian company operating in Syria. New Delhi has also for some time sought to invest heavily in the construction of an India-Gulf-Suez Canal-Mediterranean-Levant-Europe corridor that includes Syria. And India’s close relationship with Damascus could give New Delhi the opportunity to strengthen its ties with other Middle Eastern countries more broadly… For India, maintaining stable relations with Syria and other key players in the Middle East is also vital to counter Pakistan’s rhetoric in these Muslim-majority countries…

In a statement issued on Monday 9 December, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said: “We are monitoring the situation in Syria in the light of ongoing developments. We stress that all parties should work to preserve the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Syria. We support a peaceful and inclusive Syrian-led political process that respects the interests and aspirations of all segments of Syrian society. Our Embassy in Damascus remains in touch with the Indian community for their safety and security.” On 7 December, Delhi had also warned its citizens against travelling to Syria, with Delhi’s immediate concern being the safety of its citizens in the country. According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, there are about 90 Indians in Syria and as of yesterday (11 December) it had evacuated 75 Indian nationals, including forty-four pilgrims from Jammu and Kashmir.

Well, India clearly has no plan B for a post-Assad Syria. First, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad has been India’s partner for years AND his fall from power and the uncertainty that follows is deeply worrying for India’s political and economic interests in the region. Over the past 13 years, as Syria has been torn apart by a brutal civil war and Bashar al-Assad has been isolated by many global powers for his actions, only a handful of countries have continued to work with Assad. While providing millions of dollars in humanitarian aid to the Syrian government under the name of Operation Friend to Türkiye and Syria, the Delhi government has maintained high-level contacts. The Syrian foreign minister visited India in 2023, and senior Indian diplomats also travelled to Syria. India refused to support sanctions against the Assad regime at the UN and called for an easing of sanctions during the Kovid pandemic, citing humanitarian concerns. It also argued for non-intervention by foreign powers in the Syrian civil war.

So, what was the reason for all this? Let us go from the general to the specific:

First, there is the historical context.

India and Syria have historically enjoyed friendly relations, with regular bilateral exchanges at the highest level since the establishment of diplomatic relations. Both countries have worked together for decades. Both countries were founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. And New Delhi’s foreign policy since 1947 has generally been pro-Arab. Prime ministers such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Syria and developed close ties with its leaders. This meant that India had a personal stake in working with Syria. For example, when the Syrian civil war began in 2011, India provided $240 million for the development of the Tishreen power plant. So, this historical background with Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez al-Assad ensured that the relationship continued.

What India really wanted was stability.

Unfortunately, as is well known, the Syrian civil war started as part of the Arab Spring movement; countries across the Arab world witnessed massive popular protests calling for the overthrow of dictatorships and new democratic governments, but in some countries, such as Libya, things went terribly wrong. While Western powers supported the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, the country descended into civil war instead of becoming a stable democracy. New Delhi also wanted to ensure that Syria did not follow the same path, because India has important interests in the Middle East, from energy resources to economic investment and political relations with Middle Eastern countries, and there are around 9 million Indians living in the region. Therefore, when war broke out in Syria, New Delhi was motivated by a desire to reduce external pressure on Assad: it refused to support sanctions against Syria at the United Nations, condemned the violence perpetrated by both Assad and the rebel forces, and advocated non-intervention by foreign powers in Syria. All this was appreciated by the Assad government.

The terror dimension brought the Indian and Assad governments together.

While Delhi’s stance was appreciated by the Assad government, Bashar al-Assad, in an interview with an Indian television channel in 2017, expressed his concern over India’s confrontation with terrorism and compared the situation with Syria: “I think our independence dates back to the same period in the 1940s. Our geographies may be different, the reasons behind the terrorism that both countries face may be different. But at its core, terrorism is one and the ideologies we both face are similar. In India, terrorism is used for political purposes, and the situation in Syria is no different. It is an extremely dangerous phenomenon.”

In 2014, when ISIL was rapidly taking over large parts of Syria and establishing its own government, leading to foreign intervention, the rise of ISIL also posed a threat to India because it had tried to organize attacks there. And the Delhi government announced its support for Russia’s military offensive to destroy ISIL. Now India fears that the Russian- and Iranian-backed overthrow of Assad could embolden militants beyond the region and give a boost to anti-India militant groups operating in South Asia and Kashmir.

Now comes the crucial part: Kashmir…

Interestingly, Syria has supported India’s position on Kashmir. It has stated that Kashmir is an internal matter for India to deal with. This position of the Assad government makes Damascus a useful partner for New Delhi, as Pakistan often turns to the Islamic world for support on Kashmir. So, while Delhi supports Damascus on many international issues, including the Palestinian cause and Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights, Syria supports India’s position on Kashmir, arguing that it is an internal matter for India to resolve and that New Delhi has the right to resolve it as it sees fit. In the most recent example, while the rest of the Muslim world strongly condemned India’s decision to revoke Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomy by abrogating Article 370 in 2019, Syria described it as India’s internal affair; Riad Abbas, Syria’s ambassador to India at the time, said: “Every government has the right to do what it wants on its territory to protect its people. We will always stand by India in any action.”

Well, isn’t there an ’emotional’ dimension? Investments…

Delhi will now also be concerned about the fate of its investments in Syria, particularly in the oil sector. Seeking to capitalize on Syria’s geostrategic location, New Delhi has been investing in Syria’s infrastructure and development for decades. We have already mentioned that it has two major investments in Syria’s oil sector and has provided a $240 million loan for the Tishreen thermal power plant project. ONGC Videsh has a 60 per cent stake in Block 24 in northern Syria, covering the Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor regions; for oil and gas exploration activities, ONGC Videsh acquired the exploration, development, and production license with IPR International in May 2004, and later ONGC India and CNPC China jointly acquired a 37 per cent stake in a Canadian company operating in Syria. Delhi has already struggled to operate in Syria due to US and EU sanctions on Syria, and the fragile situation in post-Assad Syria will make it even more difficult for these investments to become operational.

In addition, bilateral trade between the two countries will decline from more than $100 million between 2020 and 2023 to $80 million in 2024. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s Study in India programme, which has also supported capacity building for Syrian youth, offered 1,500 places for Syrian students in undergraduate, postgraduate and PhD programmes in four phases from 2017 to 2018.

Concluding remarks

India’s engagement with Syria is part of its broader strategy to increase its presence and influence in the Middle East AND operates on the logic of a quid pro quo policy of favor for favor or reciprocity. In particular, in return for Damascus’s support on issues such as Kashmir, Delhi – in addition to providing substantial development and humanitarian assistance – supports “Syria’s legitimate right to retake the occupied Golan Heights”. Israel captured the rocky Golan Heights in the Levant from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War… During a visit to Syria in 2011, then Indian President Pratibha Patil said: “India has consistently supported all Arab causes. I would also like to reiterate our dedicated support for Syria’s legitimate right to the Golan Heights and its early and full return to Syria.”

It was a rarity in the Muslim world that Syria under Assad was a staunch supporter of Delhi on Kashmir. BUT now that a new page has been turned in Syria, it is a matter of great interest, especially for India, whether this give and take, the quid pro quo, will continue. There is no doubt that New Delhi is and will continue to monitor the situation closely. And it is now taking a cautious approach to the rapidly changing events in the region, especially the complex atmosphere of a new Syria. What Damascus’s stance will be on Kashmir and where India now stands on Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights are issues that can be revisited. India’s key strategic partners are Russia and Iran, whose influence and position in the region has been severely weakened by the fall of Assad, which has significantly altered the geopolitical dynamics of the region. What should work in Delhi’s favor is that it is seen as a neutral actor in its Syria policy, something that is working for India now, as even militant non-state actors generally have no problems with India and see it as neutral.

And I have saved another crucial bonus for last:

Delhi’s concerns about the new Syrian situation have another dimension, the Turkish dimension.

While Iran and Russia were Assad’s main supporters, Western actors like the U.S were anti-Assad. And Türkiye, as an actor that has always carried the Syrian issue on its back, and never compromised on its principled stance, has been one of the major game-changing powers supporting the Syrian opposition. India was neutral – it is not in the habit of getting involved in situations that do not directly concern or affect it. New Delhi avoided taking sides in the developments in Syria, BUT in a sense, it was a ‘passive’ supporter of Assad. Now, the fall of Assad means that Delhi has lost a friend in the Muslim world.

With the vacuum of support created by Iran’s preoccupation with its own conflicts in Gaza, Hezbollah’s in Lebanon, Russia’s in Ukraine, the fall of Assad and the subsequent – perhaps short-term – possible decline of Russian and Iranian influence in Syria AND Türkiye’s support for the opposition that toppled Assad, Türkiye is on the winning side of history… Thus, reading the current situation in this way, India’s current Syria scenario is based on the assumption that Delhi’s future interaction with Damascus could be shaped by a new dynamic with Türkiye at the helm. In other words, in the event of the formation of a new Turkish-backed regime – which India sees as highly likely – it is believed that a post-Assad Syria might support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, with the idea that it might not take Delhi’s side on India-Pakistan issues. In other words, when it comes to Türkiye, India, which unfortunately does most of its political reading through the prism of Kashmir and Pakistan, has no reservations about the current Syrian ‘Türkiye Inside’ scenario… BUT I should also mention that they are giving a lot of attention and importance to the fact that President Erdoğan did not mention Kashmir in his recent UN speech…

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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