Opinion
Syria’s turmoil reflected on India
On Sunday 8 December, the decades-long rule of Bashar al-Assad and his family in Syria ended. There is now a great deal of uncertainty in Syria. Although the Assad regime has fallen and it is known that Assad and his family have been granted asylum in Russia, it is not yet clear what kind of transition will take place. A mixed group of opposition groups led by HTS is expected to form the next government in Damascus, but there is also the possibility of a power struggle within these groups, in which case there is a risk that the political transition may not be smooth or peaceful.
One might wonder why India and Syria, some 4,000 kilometers apart, are relevant, but the opposition’s overthrow of Delhi’s long-time friend Bashar al-Assad is likely to reverberate far beyond the Middle East and affect India in unexpected ways. This is because the two countries have a long-standing friendship based on historical and cultural ties that has developed over the years, especially during Assad’s tenure. During the civil war that erupted in 2011, New Delhi took a stance in favor of resolving the conflict through a militarized, inclusive, and Syrian-led political process. Its embassy in Damascus has been and remains active. The new Syria, where the political equations may change, has the potential to affect India’s relations with Damascus, which are currently on a very slippery, chaotic, and uncertain ground, and beyond that, the dynamics of the Middle East.
India has two major investments in the Syrian oil sector: A 2004 agreement between ONGC Videsh and IPR International for oil and gas exploration, and another joint investment by India’s ONGC and China’s CNPC to acquire a 37 per cent stake in a Canadian company operating in Syria. New Delhi has also for some time sought to invest heavily in the construction of an India-Gulf-Suez Canal-Mediterranean-Levant-Europe corridor that includes Syria. And India’s close relationship with Damascus could give New Delhi the opportunity to strengthen its ties with other Middle Eastern countries more broadly… For India, maintaining stable relations with Syria and other key players in the Middle East is also vital to counter Pakistan’s rhetoric in these Muslim-majority countries…
In a statement issued on Monday 9 December, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said: “We are monitoring the situation in Syria in the light of ongoing developments. We stress that all parties should work to preserve the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Syria. We support a peaceful and inclusive Syrian-led political process that respects the interests and aspirations of all segments of Syrian society. Our Embassy in Damascus remains in touch with the Indian community for their safety and security.” On 7 December, Delhi had also warned its citizens against travelling to Syria, with Delhi’s immediate concern being the safety of its citizens in the country. According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, there are about 90 Indians in Syria and as of yesterday (11 December) it had evacuated 75 Indian nationals, including forty-four pilgrims from Jammu and Kashmir.
Well, India clearly has no plan B for a post-Assad Syria. First, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad has been India’s partner for years AND his fall from power and the uncertainty that follows is deeply worrying for India’s political and economic interests in the region. Over the past 13 years, as Syria has been torn apart by a brutal civil war and Bashar al-Assad has been isolated by many global powers for his actions, only a handful of countries have continued to work with Assad. While providing millions of dollars in humanitarian aid to the Syrian government under the name of Operation Friend to Türkiye and Syria, the Delhi government has maintained high-level contacts. The Syrian foreign minister visited India in 2023, and senior Indian diplomats also travelled to Syria. India refused to support sanctions against the Assad regime at the UN and called for an easing of sanctions during the Kovid pandemic, citing humanitarian concerns. It also argued for non-intervention by foreign powers in the Syrian civil war.
So, what was the reason for all this? Let us go from the general to the specific:
First, there is the historical context.
India and Syria have historically enjoyed friendly relations, with regular bilateral exchanges at the highest level since the establishment of diplomatic relations. Both countries have worked together for decades. Both countries were founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. And New Delhi’s foreign policy since 1947 has generally been pro-Arab. Prime ministers such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Syria and developed close ties with its leaders. This meant that India had a personal stake in working with Syria. For example, when the Syrian civil war began in 2011, India provided $240 million for the development of the Tishreen power plant. So, this historical background with Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez al-Assad ensured that the relationship continued.
What India really wanted was stability.
Unfortunately, as is well known, the Syrian civil war started as part of the Arab Spring movement; countries across the Arab world witnessed massive popular protests calling for the overthrow of dictatorships and new democratic governments, but in some countries, such as Libya, things went terribly wrong. While Western powers supported the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, the country descended into civil war instead of becoming a stable democracy. New Delhi also wanted to ensure that Syria did not follow the same path, because India has important interests in the Middle East, from energy resources to economic investment and political relations with Middle Eastern countries, and there are around 9 million Indians living in the region. Therefore, when war broke out in Syria, New Delhi was motivated by a desire to reduce external pressure on Assad: it refused to support sanctions against Syria at the United Nations, condemned the violence perpetrated by both Assad and the rebel forces, and advocated non-intervention by foreign powers in Syria. All this was appreciated by the Assad government.
The terror dimension brought the Indian and Assad governments together.
While Delhi’s stance was appreciated by the Assad government, Bashar al-Assad, in an interview with an Indian television channel in 2017, expressed his concern over India’s confrontation with terrorism and compared the situation with Syria: “I think our independence dates back to the same period in the 1940s. Our geographies may be different, the reasons behind the terrorism that both countries face may be different. But at its core, terrorism is one and the ideologies we both face are similar. In India, terrorism is used for political purposes, and the situation in Syria is no different. It is an extremely dangerous phenomenon.”
In 2014, when ISIL was rapidly taking over large parts of Syria and establishing its own government, leading to foreign intervention, the rise of ISIL also posed a threat to India because it had tried to organize attacks there. And the Delhi government announced its support for Russia’s military offensive to destroy ISIL. Now India fears that the Russian- and Iranian-backed overthrow of Assad could embolden militants beyond the region and give a boost to anti-India militant groups operating in South Asia and Kashmir.
Now comes the crucial part: Kashmir…
Interestingly, Syria has supported India’s position on Kashmir. It has stated that Kashmir is an internal matter for India to deal with. This position of the Assad government makes Damascus a useful partner for New Delhi, as Pakistan often turns to the Islamic world for support on Kashmir. So, while Delhi supports Damascus on many international issues, including the Palestinian cause and Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights, Syria supports India’s position on Kashmir, arguing that it is an internal matter for India to resolve and that New Delhi has the right to resolve it as it sees fit. In the most recent example, while the rest of the Muslim world strongly condemned India’s decision to revoke Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomy by abrogating Article 370 in 2019, Syria described it as India’s internal affair; Riad Abbas, Syria’s ambassador to India at the time, said: “Every government has the right to do what it wants on its territory to protect its people. We will always stand by India in any action.”
Well, isn’t there an ’emotional’ dimension? Investments…
Delhi will now also be concerned about the fate of its investments in Syria, particularly in the oil sector. Seeking to capitalize on Syria’s geostrategic location, New Delhi has been investing in Syria’s infrastructure and development for decades. We have already mentioned that it has two major investments in Syria’s oil sector and has provided a $240 million loan for the Tishreen thermal power plant project. ONGC Videsh has a 60 per cent stake in Block 24 in northern Syria, covering the Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor regions; for oil and gas exploration activities, ONGC Videsh acquired the exploration, development, and production license with IPR International in May 2004, and later ONGC India and CNPC China jointly acquired a 37 per cent stake in a Canadian company operating in Syria. Delhi has already struggled to operate in Syria due to US and EU sanctions on Syria, and the fragile situation in post-Assad Syria will make it even more difficult for these investments to become operational.
In addition, bilateral trade between the two countries will decline from more than $100 million between 2020 and 2023 to $80 million in 2024. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s Study in India programme, which has also supported capacity building for Syrian youth, offered 1,500 places for Syrian students in undergraduate, postgraduate and PhD programmes in four phases from 2017 to 2018.
Concluding remarks
India’s engagement with Syria is part of its broader strategy to increase its presence and influence in the Middle East AND operates on the logic of a quid pro quo policy of favor for favor or reciprocity. In particular, in return for Damascus’s support on issues such as Kashmir, Delhi – in addition to providing substantial development and humanitarian assistance – supports “Syria’s legitimate right to retake the occupied Golan Heights”. Israel captured the rocky Golan Heights in the Levant from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War… During a visit to Syria in 2011, then Indian President Pratibha Patil said: “India has consistently supported all Arab causes. I would also like to reiterate our dedicated support for Syria’s legitimate right to the Golan Heights and its early and full return to Syria.”
It was a rarity in the Muslim world that Syria under Assad was a staunch supporter of Delhi on Kashmir. BUT now that a new page has been turned in Syria, it is a matter of great interest, especially for India, whether this give and take, the quid pro quo, will continue. There is no doubt that New Delhi is and will continue to monitor the situation closely. And it is now taking a cautious approach to the rapidly changing events in the region, especially the complex atmosphere of a new Syria. What Damascus’s stance will be on Kashmir and where India now stands on Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights are issues that can be revisited. India’s key strategic partners are Russia and Iran, whose influence and position in the region has been severely weakened by the fall of Assad, which has significantly altered the geopolitical dynamics of the region. What should work in Delhi’s favor is that it is seen as a neutral actor in its Syria policy, something that is working for India now, as even militant non-state actors generally have no problems with India and see it as neutral.
And I have saved another crucial bonus for last:
Delhi’s concerns about the new Syrian situation have another dimension, the Turkish dimension.
While Iran and Russia were Assad’s main supporters, Western actors like the U.S were anti-Assad. And Türkiye, as an actor that has always carried the Syrian issue on its back, and never compromised on its principled stance, has been one of the major game-changing powers supporting the Syrian opposition. India was neutral – it is not in the habit of getting involved in situations that do not directly concern or affect it. New Delhi avoided taking sides in the developments in Syria, BUT in a sense, it was a ‘passive’ supporter of Assad. Now, the fall of Assad means that Delhi has lost a friend in the Muslim world.
With the vacuum of support created by Iran’s preoccupation with its own conflicts in Gaza, Hezbollah’s in Lebanon, Russia’s in Ukraine, the fall of Assad and the subsequent – perhaps short-term – possible decline of Russian and Iranian influence in Syria AND Türkiye’s support for the opposition that toppled Assad, Türkiye is on the winning side of history… Thus, reading the current situation in this way, India’s current Syria scenario is based on the assumption that Delhi’s future interaction with Damascus could be shaped by a new dynamic with Türkiye at the helm. In other words, in the event of the formation of a new Turkish-backed regime – which India sees as highly likely – it is believed that a post-Assad Syria might support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, with the idea that it might not take Delhi’s side on India-Pakistan issues. In other words, when it comes to Türkiye, India, which unfortunately does most of its political reading through the prism of Kashmir and Pakistan, has no reservations about the current Syrian ‘Türkiye Inside’ scenario… BUT I should also mention that they are giving a lot of attention and importance to the fact that President Erdoğan did not mention Kashmir in his recent UN speech…
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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