Opinion
The Tragedy of a Nation: Bashar’s Glory Days and the Road to Ruin
On December 9th, Russia officially announced that it had granted asylum to Syria’s former president Bashar al-Assad and his family. On the same day, the Syrian embassy in Russia lowered the tricolor two-star flag of the “Arab Republic of Syria,” which had flown for over half a century, and raised the opposition’s tricolor three-star flag. Thus, Russia became the first major power to seamlessly transition its allegiance to the Syrian opposition government. Simultaneously, another long-time Syrian ally, Iran, also publicly announced its recognition of the new Damascus regime. The “strategic allies” Russia and Iran, who had been supporting Bashar in his campaigns, pivoted overnight to embrace their former adversaries. Such cold pragmatism—turning a blind eye to old allies’ tears while joining the smiles of new ones—is both baffling and unsettling.
However, reality is as cruel as it is straightforward. Politics is heartless, and the pursuit and defense of national interests are naked and unrelenting. When Bashar’s regime became a liability and an unreliable partner, its abandonment became inevitable. With Russia and Iran increasingly preoccupied with their own troubles, dropping Bashar and switching sides amounted to damage control and a last-minute effort to stop their losses.
The sudden collapse of Bashar’s regime surprised all parties, even those with the most advanced intelligence and information networks. Otherwise, how can one explain Israel’s sweeping bombardment of Syrian military targets and its occupation of more territory, or the United States’ large-scale bombing campaigns against remaining ISIS strongholds in Syria? These actions indicate that neither Israel nor the West anticipated such a swift and thorough collapse of Bashar’s regime. Moreover, they did not expect the opposition forces, particularly the “Liberation of Syria” alliance, which pose an even greater threat to Israel and the West, to seize Syria’s heartland so easily and control all the country’s war machinery.
Deeply analyzing the rapid and disastrous defeat of Bashar’s regime holds significant value. It offers lessons for authoritarian governments regarding governance and decision-making, and it provides insights for all nations on how to maintain diplomatic alliances and ensure their viability under certain conditions.
The primary reason for this historic upheaval in Syria lies within Bashar’s regime itself—or, more broadly, the Assad family, which controlled Syria for over 50 years, and the elite circles surrounding it. The key conclusion is that, despite being trapped in the vortex of war, the regime failed to adapt to the circumstances, make decisions about war and peace, or reconcile national integration efforts. Instead, it relied excessively on external forces to safeguard its sovereignty and regime. Ultimately, this dependence turned the regime into a mere cog in foreign war machines. Once it became dysfunctional, abandonment and replacement were inevitable.
The rise and fall of Syria reflect the broader modern history of war and peace in the Middle East, serving as a microcosm and a living museum of this turbulent process. Since 1948, driven by the ideals of Arab nationalism, Syria actively joined efforts to oppose the partition of Palestine, setting itself on a long-term collision course with Israel and enduring hostility with the West. This path ultimately led Syria to align with the Soviet Union, later binding itself tightly to Russia and Iran in its struggle for survival and development.
The Assad family, belonging to the Alawite sect—a minority within the Shia branch of Islam—long faced suppression, discrimination, and marginalization. During the French colonial period, Alawite men had little choice but to join the military to make a living. This adversity inadvertently enabled the Alawite sect to grow into a dominant force in the Syrian military. It played a central role in overthrowing the Faisal monarchy and became a pillar of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. In the end, the Alawites turned the tide and emerged as the ruling family holding Syria’s destiny in their hands.
In 1967, Syria, whose intelligence chief had been turned by Moscow, was misled by the Soviet Union and false intelligence suggesting that “Israel would launch an attack.” Alongside Egypt, Syria eagerly prepared for war, which prompted Israel, under immense pressure, to launch a preemptive strike. With its singular strength, Israel defeated Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, capturing Palestine’s Gaza Strip (occupied by Egypt), the West Bank and East Jerusalem (controlled by Jordan’s Hashemite Kingdom), as well as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria. This war reinforced Syria’s image as a victim of aggression and occupation, solidified its role as a frontline state, and strengthened the Assad family’s legitimacy in ruling over a majority Sunni Muslim population.
On October 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt coordinated a large-scale surprise attack known as the “Ramadan War,” the largest blitzkrieg since World War II. Syria nearly recaptured the Golan Heights and put Israel on the brink of collapse. However, with U.S. support, Israel ultimately turned the tide, reclaiming the Golan Heights. Yet, this war shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility, elevating Syrian President Hafez al-Assad as a contemporary Arab hero alongside Egyptian President Sadat, both becoming new icons of Arab nationalism.
However, on October 7, 2023, Hamas (the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement) launched a surprise attack on Israel on the fiftieth anniversary of the Ramadan War. Ironically, this event ultimately led to the collapse of the Syrian government and the total downfall of the Assad family’s rule, as though history was playing a massive joke. Yet Syria’s current tragedy can be traced back to the misguided path it took after the Ramadan War.
The “victory” of the Ramadan War gave Sadat the political capital and historical opportunity to change course and withdraw from the Palestinian conflict. Egypt had already paid a devastating price—100,000 casualties, hundreds of billions of dollars in losses, and nearly 40 years of lost focus on peace and development. Sadat proactively sought reconciliation with Israel and, through the Camp David Accords, recovered the entire Sinai Peninsula at the cost of abandoning its Arab allies Syria, Jordan, and Palestine.
Feeling “betrayed” by Egypt, Syria aligned itself with Libya and Iraq, raising the banner of Arab nationalism and becoming a stronghold of the Arab resistance movement. Assad, Gaddafi, and Saddam Hussein naturally emerged as the “three strongmen” of the Arab world. They supported and cultivated anti-Israel resistance forces while simultaneously competing for leadership within the Arab world.
However, Assad’s Syria had inherent weaknesses, which made achieving peace through war or independent resistance unattainable—a tragic role that continues into Bashar’s era today. Syria’s limited territory, small population, and complex ethnic dynamics left the majority Sunni Muslim population under the rule of Alawite elites pursuing secularization. Meanwhile, Israel held onto the Golan Heights, a critical strategic area just 60 kilometers from Damascus, which further exacerbated Assad’s precarious position.
This left the Assad regime in a difficult and divided state: internally, it relied on the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party’s “one nation, one party, one leader” ideology, maintaining authoritarian rule under the banner of resisting Israeli occupation; externally, it avoided military confrontation with Israel to prevent further devastation, sustaining a “cold peace” for half a century that allowed for slow national development under relative stability.
Driven by competition with Iraq’s Ba’ath Party for legitimacy and leadership of Arab nationalism—and by the Alawite elites’ fear of the Sunni majority—Assad decisively sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1979-1988), turning his back on the broader Arab community. In February 1982, inspired by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revival triggered by Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood staged an armed uprising in Hama, seeking to overthrow Syria’s “infidel regime.” The rebellion was brutally crushed. This historical event laid the groundwork for Hama’s support during the 2011 Arab Spring and the Syrian war, where local populations either cooperated with or passively watched rebel forces launch massive offensives against the government.
After the 1982 Lebanon War, the Assad regime, which had already lost the Golan Heights and viewed Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence, was unable to directly confront Israel. Instead, it entrusted the national responsibility of reclaiming lost territory to Hezbollah, which had been recently cultivated and armed by Iran. This opened the door for Iran’s westward expansion into the Arab heartland and gradually integrated Syria into the so-called “Shia Crescent.” To some extent, this represented the Assad regime betting Syria’s national destiny and its own rule on a third party rather than following Egypt’s example by courageously seeking peace with Israel to focus on development and improving democracy, livelihoods, and civil rights.
After the 1991 Gulf War, the Middle East entered a promising decade of peace. Saddam Hussein’s army—consisting of over a million elite troops—was crushed by a United Nations-authorized, U.S.-led coalition after attempting to use the occupation and annexation of Kuwait to force Israel’s withdrawal. U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched “Ramadan War” and subsequently worked with Russia (as the successor to the Soviet Union), the United Nations, the European Union, and Spain to initiate the Madrid Peace Process. For the first time, Israel—accustomed to tackling its enemies one by one—was brought under the same roof with its Arab adversaries, including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan (along with Palestinian representatives), to negotiate “land for peace.”
Unexpectedly, Assad faced a second and third Arab betrayal. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan—who had originally pledged to confront Israel alongside Syria—separately negotiated agreements with Israel. The PLO secretly signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, establishing transitional Palestinian autonomy, while Jordan normalized relations with Israel in 1994. From that point on, Assad viewed the Palestinian and Jordanian leadership as strangers, even enemies, cutting off all relations.
Assad’s original heir was not Bashar but his eldest son Basil, born in 1962. However, at a time when Assad was growing old and Basil’s personal reputation was on the rise, Basil, who was destined to inherit the regime, died in a mysterious car accident in 1994—an event that rewrote Syrian history. Bashar, who had originally planned to become an ophthalmologist, was immediately recalled to Syria. He swiftly joined the military, rose through the ranks, and was groomed as the successor, ensuring the continuation of the Assad dynasty.
Had Assad lived longer, Bashar might have inherited a legacy of peace and chosen a different path. If his elder brother Basil had not died, Bashar might have become a highly respected international doctor, perhaps even a Nobel laureate in medicine. Unfortunately, while members of royal families can sometimes choose their own future, others cannot—a stark contrast between Eastern and Western cultural traditions.
At the end of 1999, negotiations over the Golan Heights were close to an agreement but collapsed entirely due to an unintended turn of events that rewrote Middle Eastern history and Syria’s fate. In late 1999, Jordan’s King Hussein II passed away. Known for his remarkable emotional intelligence and extensive diplomatic ties, his funeral in Amman attracted an overwhelming number of world leaders and dignitaries.
Perhaps due to a softening heart as he approached the end of his life, pressure from the situation, or simply an inexplicable lapse in judgment, Assad, despite his frail health, broke tradition and personally attended the funeral of King Hussein. Following the Amman funeral, Israel suddenly announced the suspension of Golan Heights negotiations. The Israeli parliament passed a resolution requiring any policy concerning the future of the Golan Heights to receive two-thirds approval from the Knesset, followed by a national referendum.
Years later, reports emerged that Mossad—the formidable Israeli intelligence agency—had secretly swapped a temporary toilet Assad used at the Amman funeral. Subsequent analysis of Assad’s urine confirmed he was in the late stages of cancer and had little time left. Israel’s Security Cabinet feared that Bashar, then only in his early 30s, would be unable to secure his hold on power. If the Golan Heights were returned and Damascus fell into the hands of Arab nationalists or pro-Iranian forces, Israel would effectively be placing a noose around its own neck. Thus, the near-complete peace talks were permanently frozen.
Six months later, Assad passed away. The Israeli government, despite being an adversarial and warring nation, publicly expressed condolences to the Syrian people, government, and Assad’s family, describing him as a keeper of peace who honored his commitments. Bashar al-Assad assumed power as expected and consolidated his regime. However, he permanently lost the best opportunity to peacefully reclaim the Golan Heights. Instead, he found himself forced to bind Syria to the dual vehicles of the “Shia Crescent” and the “frontline state,” eventually becoming the hub of the “Axis of Resistance,” suffering exploitation from all sides. In this sense, Bashar’s Syria resembles the Western Roman Empire in its dying days, collapsing under the final onslaught of northern barbarians, or the Eastern Roman Empire, which, after a thousand years of survival amid wars and sieges, was finally sent to its grave by the Ottoman Empire following its occupation and division during the Fourth Crusade.
Bashar never aspired to be Syria’s angel or reform hero. After assuming power in 2000, he immediately sought reform, relaxed restrictions, and temporarily ushered in a vibrant and praiseworthy “Damascus Spring.” However, as the trends of liberalization and democratization began to threaten political transformation, Bashar, under immense pressure from powerful conservative forces and entrenched elites—and lacking the strength and political wisdom to persevere—abruptly shut the door to reform after just two years. This marked a lost opportunity to sever ties with history, with Iran, and the Shia Crescent, while reclaiming the Golan Heights through separate negotiations. Bashar dared not take such risks, fearing the same fate as Sadat, who pursued peace for land but paid with his life.
In 2005, the assassination of Saudi-backed Lebanese Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri implicated Syrian intelligence and Hezbollah, highlighting the brutal sectarian conflicts in the Islamic Middle East and the struggle over Lebanon. This event triggered the “Beirut Spring” or “Cedar Revolution,” forcing Syria to end its 30-year military presence in Lebanon and further affirming Lebanon’s independence.
The 2011 Arab Spring erupted following Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution,” which brought down several authoritarian Arab governments across the Mediterranean’s northwest coast. Its ripple effect eventually reached Syria on the eastern coast. The brutal handling of student protests in the southern town of Daraa sparked a broader uprising, with unrest spreading to traditional anti-Alawite strongholds like Hama. Bashar, facing his first major test after a decade in power, responded poorly. Instead of apologizing and addressing corruption and mismanagement, he blamed the West for orchestrating a “color revolution” and shut the door to dialogue. This fueled widespread dissatisfaction, plunging the country into chaos.
At a critical moment, Saudi King Abdullah called Bashar, offering $20 billion to create jobs, stabilize the economy, and maintain regime stability—on the condition that Damascus sever its strategic ties with Iran and the Shia Crescent. However, Bashar viewed Saudi Arabia’s proposed antidote as a poison pill, recognizing that his Alawite minority regime depended on the Shia family for survival. Additionally, reclaiming the Golan Heights required the support of Iran and Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia’s outstretched olive branch was rejected, leading it to mobilize the Arab League and align with Western nations to intervene in Syria under the pretext of protecting civilians and human rights. This opened the curtain on the Syrian Civil War, with external funding and support for opposition forces.
At the brink of regime collapse, Russia—engaged in a geopolitical contest with the U.S. and NATO over Ukraine—intervened. To divert pressure and protect its last remaining Soviet-era sphere of influence in the Middle East, especially its Mediterranean naval base in Syria, Russia coordinated with China to veto Arab League and Western-sponsored resolutions in the UN Security Council, thwarting attempts to replicate Libya’s regime-change scenario. Under the guise of counter-terrorism, with tens of thousands of Shia militia and Hezbollah fighters crossing borders to support the regime, Bashar’s government regained most of its lost territory and major population centers. A ceasefire agreement was signed with the opposition in March 2020, stabilizing the situation for the first time in a decade. However, this left the country divided, with lingering roots of civil war and fragmentation.
Bashar understood the importance of eliminating opposition, yet Syria lacks the strength to uproot rebels protected by Turkey in the northwest and Kurdish forces supported by the U.S. in the northeast and east. Russia and Iran are also unwilling to bear the massive costs of direct confrontation with Turkey or the U.S. to fulfill Bashar’s ambitions for reunification. They have repeatedly urged Bashar to settle for stability and form a coalition government through negotiations—an offer he has rejected. Fundamentally, Syria remains a bargaining chip for Russia and Iran’s geopolitical interests. What matters to them is securing their core national interests, not who controls Damascus. Otherwise, how can one explain why Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias abandoned Bashar in his final hour?
Bashar was originally a “laissez-faire” figure. Despite not being religious, his visit to the Lingyin Temple during the Asian Games in Hangzhou turned him into an internet sensation, sparking controversy and unfounded speculation. Perhaps now, as an exiled leader, Bashar can finally let go of the burdens he has carried for 24 years—burdens too heavy for him to bear. He may return to being an ordinary person or even resume his old career in medicine. But Syria, having been placed on the operating table for half a century, remains carved up and bleeding. Who will save it from this torment?
Overthrowing Bashar’s regime and dismantling the remnants of the Ba’ath Party might not end Syria’s decades of bloodshed but could instead mark the beginning of new conflicts and suffering—much like the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime 20 years ago.
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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Europe1 week agoEuropean intelligence chiefs divide over risk of Russian attack
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Diplomacy1 week agoEast-West Forum in Istanbul to debate multipolarity and global order
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Middle East1 week agoSharaa says 7 October must not shape Israel policy on Syria
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America1 week agoRepublican support for Trump’s war with Iran drops sharply in polls
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Middle East1 week agoPalestinian factions confront legitimacy crisis at Istanbul talks
