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Terrorism in Post-Revolutionary Iran and Its Ongoing Fight

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Seyyed Mohammd Javad Hasheminejad, Iranian terrorism analyst

Since the very beginning of the Islamic Revolution, acts of terror have frequently occurred in Iran, deeply affecting its people and becoming an inseparable part of the country’s collective experience. Statistics frequently cited in Iran’s political discourse, and reiterated by state officials, indicate that by the early 2010s, more than 17,000 Iranians had fallen victim to terrorist attacks. These victims were targeted by over 30 different terrorist groups, with the majority of these attacks occurring during the tumultuous 1980s. Among the most notorious of these groups are the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), and Takfiri groups such as Jundallah, Jaish ul-Adl, Al-Qaeda and ISIS responsible for the assassination of Iranians from all walks of life. These terrorist acts were carried out through various brutal methods, including indiscriminate shootings, bombings, torture, minelaying, suicide attack and other heinous means.

Since the onset of the Islamic Revolution, the overall frequency and scale of terrorist acts in Iran have shown a general downward trend, which can largely be attributed to various measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, alongside international efforts. Enhanced diplomacy, improved and more effective security measures, and decisive actions by the Iranian government have played a critical role in this reduction. For instance, in recent years, Iran has bombarded the headquarters of separatist terrorist groups in the northwest of the country. Furthermore, agreements signed between Tehran and Baghdad led to the relocation of these groups from border areas, significantly reducing terrorist activity in the region.

However, this downward trend has varied over the decades. The 1980s marked the peak of terrorist activities against the country, but in the 1990s and early 2000s, there was a notable decline in such acts, accompanied by a decrease in the number of terror victims. This reduction can be partly attributed to the government’s foreign policy during that time, which prioritized confidence-building and strengthening relations with Western countries. The administration adopted a cultural discourse and a policy of de-escalation, which played a key role in reducing terrorist activities. However, the early 2000s witnessed the emergence of Jundallah terrorist group in southeastern Iran. This group’s operations significantly increased the scale of terrorist activities during that decade, targeting both military personnel and ordinary citizens in and Sistan and Baluchistan province. By the 2010s, the situation began to change once again, with the dynamics of terrorism in Iran evolving under different circumstances.

As previously mentioned, by the early 2010s, Iran had recorded over 17,000 victims of terrorism. While the scale and frequency of terrorist incidents are no longer comparable to the intense wave of attacks during the 1980s, a crucial question arises: what about the period between the early 2010s and 2024? Over this 14-year span, what terrorist acts have occurred, and do we not need a more thorough examination of this time frame? This interval, often overlooked in discussions of Iran’s history of terrorism, warrants closer scrutiny to ensure that all incidents and victims are accounted for in the broader narrative.

The 2010s were marked by significant regional developments that reshaped the landscape of terrorism and gave rise to the emergence and activity of Takfiri terrorist groups. During this decade, Iran played a pivotal role on the international stage, particularly in Syria and Iraq, where it actively fought against Takfiri and terrorist groups, most notably ISIS. In these battles, Iran dealt significant blows to these groups while also suffering considerable losses, including the deaths of numerous military personnel and advisors. As part of a retaliatory effort, the tragic January 3 suicide attack at the Martyrs’ Cemetery in Kerman by ISIS occurred, claiming the lives of nearly 100 Iranians, injuring several hundred more, and marking one of the deadliest terror attacks in Iran’s contemporary history.

Other notable incidents affecting Iranian citizens in the 2010s include ISIS’s attack on the Iranian Parliament, two separate assaults on the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz by ISIS, the attack on the military parade in Ahvaz by the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA), the assassination of nuclear scientists by Israeli regime, and numerous terrorist operations in southeastern Iran by Jaish ul-Adl and other takfiri terrorist groups, particularly in Sistan and Baluchistan province and so on.

The 2020s have brought new dimensions to the evolving nature of terrorism in Iran. An analysis of recent reports on terrorist incidents sheds light on these changes. The most recent report, Iran’s 2023-2024 annual report on terrorism, contains several notable findings. First, dozens of terrorist acts attributed to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) were recorded in cities across the country. These acts primarily involved setting fire to public banners and posters, as well as throwing Molotov cocktails at various locations, including religious sites and administrative buildings. The MEK has publicly claimed responsibility for these actions, providing photographic evidence of each incident on their official websites. In addition, there were two instances of cyber-attacks for which the perpetrators officialy assumed responsibility; one by a hacktivist group called Predatory Sparrow, linked to the Israeli regime on Iranian gas stations, and one by the MEK on the Iranian Parliament’s website and Khaneh Mellat News Agency. While these acts did not result in casualties, they represent an update in the methods employed by terrorist groups, including cyberattacks and acts of sabotage targeting critical infrastructure, highlighting the changing dynamics of terrorism in the modern era.

The second key finding is the shifting geographic distribution of terrorist activities. While recent years have seen a significant decline in such incidents in the western and northwestern regions of the country, southeastern Iran, particularly Sistan and Baluchistan province, has emerged as a new hotspot for terrorist operations. Out of the 50 recorded terrorist attacks nationwide in 2023, nearly half—22 incidents—occurred in Sistan and Baluchistan province, underscoring the shifting focus of these violent acts.

These events have significantly increased the number of victims since the early 2010s, highlighting the need to update the official count of Iran’s terror victims, which currently stands at 17,000. This urgency was underscored in a recent press briefing by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, who explicitly stated the necessity of revising the country’s list of terror victims. It was also announced that a newly updated list of terror victims would be unveiled in the near future. Habilian, a human rights NGO representing Iranian victims of terrorism and Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will jointly hold the ceremony for unveiling the updated list of terror victims.

Currently, some leaders of terrorist groups have been apprehended and brought to justice in Iran. For example, the leaders of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA), responsible for numerous bombings in Khuzestan province, and the Kingdom Assembly of Iran (Tondar), behind deadly explosions at a large religious gathering in Shiraz, have faced legal proceedings. Similarly, the leader of Jundallah, implicated in armed robbery, bombing operations, and armed attacks on Iranian police and civilians, has also been tried. However, many other groups continue to operate with impunity, particularly in Western countries, including Europe and the United States. Groups like the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) openly maintain offices and plan operations against Iran, shielded by the protection of these nations. While Iran has conducted court sessions to address the MEK’s terrorist activities domestically, these efforts are far from sufficient. Coordinated international action is urgently needed to bring these groups to justice and ensure accountability on a global scale.

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Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France

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The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.

In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.

Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.

Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.

The shadow of 17 October 1961

It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.

Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.

This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.

To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?

Looters on the streets, where are the police?

Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.

While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.

It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.

To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?

The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.

A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges

The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.

The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.

The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.

These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.

The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.

In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.

An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands

Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.

Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.

To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.

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What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?

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By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.

The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.

There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.

For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.

Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.

Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.

There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.

For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.

Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?

Let us give another example from the Turkic world.

On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?

We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?

Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.

In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?

In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?

Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?

How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?

Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?

How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?

Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?

These questions can certainly be multiplied.

Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.

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The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East

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In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.

In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.

Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.

Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.

A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East

On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.

These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.

If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.

Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.

Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.

For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.

The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again

The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.

Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.

The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.

Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.

Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.

Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.

Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.

In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.

In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.

Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.

A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.

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