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The Syrian Regime Change Further Alters the Middle East Landscape

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On December 18, just ten days after the fall of Syria’s capital and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the opposition, which had not yet firmly seized power, gained preliminary recognition and acceptance from all adversaries. This rare “political favor” is dazzling and even somewhat difficult to comprehend. Not to mention that Russia and Iran, which were still directly confronting opposition forces ten days ago, suddenly reversed their stance and reconciled with their long-standing enemies. Even the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, which had previously designated the main opposition force, the “Liberation of Syria” Front, as a terrorist organization, reversed their policies, selectively forgot their long-standing crimes, and quickly engaged with them face-to-face. They are now prepared to collectively promote the construction of a “New Syria” under the framework of UN Resolution 2254.

If the new round of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has lasted for more than a year, has profoundly reshaped the Middle East landscape, then “Syria War 2.0,” as the “black swan event” of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, will further accelerate this transformation.

The latest round of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict erupted on October 7 last year, triggering the “Sixth Middle East War.” This war is a genuine hybrid war, encompassing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s “Seven-line Combat,” as well as what I define as the “Eighth Front,” which is Israel’s civil and military confrontation with the United Nations.

I support the term “Sixth Middle East War” because, in terms of its duration, scope, participating forces, casualties, material losses, and impact on global security and stability, this war qualifies as a large-scale regional war, fundamentally different from the five Middle East wars between 1948 and 1982.

The first five Middle East wars began with the partition of Palestine in 1948. At that time, World War II had just ended, and the Cold War structure had yet to form. The United States and the Soviet Union, which had rapidly ascended to superpower status by leading the world in defeating the fascist Axis powers, sought to use the Palestine issue to expel the three traditional hegemons – the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire, and the French Republic – from the Middle East, thereby establishing a new regional order and power structure.

Meanwhile, the number of newly independent Arab states emerging from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire was limited and lacked unity. As a result, Palestine was forcibly partitioned and handed over to the Jewish people as compensation for Europe’s long-standing persecution and massacres against them. The establishment of Israel constituted a great injustice to the Arab nations and the indigenous Palestinians because, for nearly two thousand years, Jews had not been the dominant indigenous population of Palestine. However, under the auspices of the United Nations, the great powers imposed the “State of Israel” on the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, whom we are familiar with today.

In 1956, the Suez Canal War broke out, and the United States and the Soviet Union jointly thwarted the joint invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel. This further weakened the declining British Empire’s control over the Eastern Mediterranean region, particularly the Suez Canal. Subsequently, the 1967 “Six-Day War,” the 1973 “Yom Kippur War,” and the 1982 “Lebanon War” were all proxy wars between the US and the Soviet Union for dominance in the Middle East. Arab countries either followed the Soviet Union in an attempt to recover lost territory or stood by as spectators, pursuing self-preservation. However, Israel was, without a doubt, the “Middle Eastern orphan.”

The historical context and factions involved in the “Sixth Middle East War” have undergone a complete and transformative shift. More than 40 years after the end of the Cold War, Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, has seen its strength significantly weakened by focusing on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield. Meanwhile, the United States, as in the previous three Middle East wars, spares no effort in supporting and defending Israel. The vast majority of Arab countries remain on the sidelines, avoiding entanglement in this new war centered around Israel. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE even assisted in defending Israel during Iran’s airstrike in April.

In the “Sixth Middle East War,” Israel’s primary opponent is no longer a coalition of Arab nations but the “Axis of Resistance,” which bears a far stronger pan-Islamist hue than pan-Arab nationalism. The Pahlavi dynasty of Iran, which stayed out of the first five Middle East wars, has long since passed. The Islamic Republic, which came to power through the 1979 revolution, has long engaged in proxy and shadow wars with Israel, driven by its dual motivations of Islamic revolutionary ideology and the ambition to become a Middle Eastern superpower. However, through Israel’s bombing of Iranian diplomatic facilities in Syria and the assassination of Hamas leaders in Tehran, Iran was forced into the open and directly involved.

Since 1973, Syria had maintained a cold peace with Israel and lacked the capacity to confront Israel alone. Moreover, after 13 years of civil war, Syria was fragmented and could only passively serve as the battleground for the Israel-Iran confrontation. Two state actors, Iran and Syria, along with four non-state actors – Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq – collectively assumed the main role in resisting Israel, forming what is known as the “Axis of Resistance.”

At the same time, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France continued to defend Israel by imposing sanctions and containing Iran and Syria. Through limited military operations, they targeted and restrained the Houthis in Yemen and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, carefully avoiding escalation and expansion of the conflict, especially to prevent being dragged into this century-defining war in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, peripheral actors such as the “Liberation of Syria” alliance and the “Syrian National Front” supported by Turkey seized the opportunity in the later stages, becoming involved in this new Middle Eastern war, which initially had little to do with them. They easily reaped significant benefits, unexpectedly toppling the Bashar al-Assad regime.

The “Sixth Middle East War” unfolded in three major phases. The first phase lasted for a full year until September, with Gaza as the primary battlefield, where Israel focused on the “southern campaign” against Palestine. The second phase, lasting from September to the end of November, saw Israel shift focus to the “northern campaign” against Lebanon, targeting the leadership and forces of Hezbollah, destroying its infrastructure, and cutting off its strategic route to Iran through Syria.

The third phase, from late November to December 9, saw Israel reach a ceasefire with Hezbollah while completely destroying its land routes to and from Syria. Simultaneously, Israel carried out heavy bombardment of Syria’s northwestern military frontlines, causing the already weakened and demoralized Syrian army to collapse. This cleared the path for the mixed opposition forces, which had been planning an offensive for six months, allowing them to accelerate the disintegration of the Damascus regime.

The “Sixth Middle East War” led to the collapse of the Assad regime, surprising all parties involved. Perhaps Israel only intended to use opposition forces to further reduce the Damascus regime’s control and weaken the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance.” The opposition forces did not anticipate their adversary’s vulnerability, nor did they expect that Russia and Iran, which were supporting Assad, would be so depleted. Alternatively, it is possible that through Turkey and the framework of the “Astana Process,” the three parties had already negotiated a deal, ultimately collaborating to bring an end to the Assad regime.

The sudden collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime took both the United States and Israel by surprise. As a result, the U.S. deployed heavy weaponry, including B-52 strategic bombers, to launch intense airstrikes against the remaining forces and controlled areas of ISIS. Meanwhile, Israel exerted maximum effort to completely destroy Syria’s defense forces, which it had tolerated for decades, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the new regime. Israel also expanded its illegal occupation of the Golan Heights, advancing closer to Damascus to deepen its defensive buffer zone.

The reason is simple – the “Liberation of Syria” alliance originated from Al-Qaeda, with its ideology rooted in “Jihadist Salafism.” The U.S. and Israel are seen as its natural strategic and ultimate enemies, regarded as the “forces of evil” and the “new crusaders” that must be completely eradicated. Compared to the Assad regime, which sought to reclaim occupied territories, and the Iranian Islamic government, which aimed to expand its geopolitical influence through Middle Eastern issues, the answer to who poses the most dangerous and deadly threat is evident.

The “Sixth Middle East War” has triggered a chain reaction, leading to a “Syrian Civil War 2.0.” This has resulted in the unexpected victory of Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, the global enemy, marking a shocking and ironic twist. However, the strange aspect of this new Middle Eastern war is that the new rulers, who captured Damascus and declared it an “Islamic victory,” openly announced that they would not consider Israel an enemy. They expressed no intention to initiate new conflicts but instead showed willingness to establish normal relations with all parties, focusing on stability, development, and improving livelihoods – as if demons had transformed into angels overnight.

The “Sixth Middle East War” appears to be nearing its end and may conclude with Hamas releasing hostages and reaching a long-term ceasefire with Israel. The “Shia Crescent” is already crippled, the “Axis of Resistance” is in full retreat, and the Damascus regime has shifted allegiance. With Trump, a staunch supporter of Israel, about to take office, media attention on the Middle East will shift from Gaza, the starting point of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to Damascus. The world will scrutinize whether the new regime can stabilize its base, quickly reconcile with the international community, including its former strategic adversaries – the U.S., the West, and Israel – and establish an inclusive transitional government under UN Security Council Resolution 2254. The goal will be to restart the constitutional amendment process and eventually build a new Syria where multiple ethnic groups and sects coexist, balancing the interests of all parties.

In theory, the transformation of a Syria that has been “torn apart” does not depend entirely, or even primarily, on the will of the new rulers in Damascus. Rather, it hinges on the bargaining between the United States, Turkey, Russia, Iran, Israel, and even the Gulf Arab states, which had been previously sidelined from the Syrian chessboard but are now reengaging. This reflects the historical reality that small countries cannot independently determine their own futures. It is an inevitable result of great power competition in the Middle East and a fundamental obstacle to the systematic resolution of Middle Eastern issues.

The apparent winners of the “Sixth Middle East War” are Israel and Turkey, as they have expanded their influence and control over Syria. However, this also heightens competition and friction between the two, adding a new layer of Israeli-Turkish rivalry to the traditional Israel-Arab and Israel-Iran conflicts. In the long run, this will inevitably increase the financial and resource burdens on both countries, potentially turning their regional expansion policies into a new quagmire.

The apparent losers of the “Sixth Middle East War” are Russia and Iran, as they have lost a key Middle Eastern hub where they had long exerted independent influence and deep control. For Russia, this reveals its limitations in opening a second front and highlights its declining influence as a global power. At least in the Middle East, Russia is now reduced to the role of an ordinary player, struggling to maintain a military base presence.

For Iran, the loss exposes the fatal weakness that its geopolitical ambitions far exceed its national strength. Losing the western flank of the “Shia Crescent” after over 40 years of effort, as well as the weakening of the “Axis of Resistance,” forces Iran to contract its sphere of influence back to the Tigris-Euphrates region. This severely undermines Iran’s ambitions to reconnect the Syrian corridor and extend its reach to the Eastern Mediterranean.

However, for Russia, losing Syria may not be a crippling blow. It merely represents the loss of a once-premier geopolitical and diplomatic stronghold. Russia can instead focus on the Ukraine war to preserve existing gains and seek some form of balance with the United States. Russia may even shift its diplomatic and strategic priorities toward Eurasia and the Global South to expand its influence and construct a new world order.

For Iran, the dual blow to its leadership of both the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance” not only constitutes a severe military and diplomatic failure but also risks domestic political fallout. Reformists and moderates may hold conservatives and hardliners accountable, further fueling public anger and dissatisfaction. This presents an unprecedented challenge to the long-standing rationality of Iran’s foreign and strategic policies.

In this sense, the ripple effects of the “Sixth Middle East War” will extend beyond Syria. They could destabilize Iran’s political system, pushing it to a difficult crossroads: should Iran continue its decades-long Islamic revolutionary policy of denying Israel’s legitimacy as a sovereign state, or should it gradually adjust its national strategy and dilute its revolutionary ideology? By adopting a more pragmatic stance, Iran could engage with the Middle East peace process, improve the overall geopolitical climate, and ultimately push Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. This could lead to comprehensive regional peace, reconciliation, and cooperation, paving the way for mutual stability, development, and prosperity.

For Palestine, especially for radical forces like Hamas, the third major catastrophe, which has lasted over a year, has inflicted severe damage on the Palestinian people. Whether they can seize the opportunity presented by the Beijing reconciliation and sincerely unite under the unified leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will be crucial. Through genuine negotiations, Palestinians could reclaim Gaza, the West Bank, and share East Jerusalem. This represents the second historical window for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1993 Oslo Accords and serves as a critical moment and strategic opportunity for the survival of the Palestinian nation.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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