Asia
2026 Asia outlook: A year of critical elections and high-stakes summits
For Asia, 2025 was a year marked by significant trade disruptions due to US tariffs, conflicts in South and Southeast Asia, changes in government in South Korea and Japan, and China conducting trade negotiations with Trump.
In 2026, Asia faces a year filled with numerous elections, political turbulence, and diplomatic summits. Nikkei Asia has compiled the prominent developments for the region:
JANUARY
Verdict on Abe assassination in Japan
A Japanese district court will announce its verdict regarding the 2022 assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on January 21. This case brought the activities of the Unification Church, a religious group with strong ties to conservative politicians including Abe, into the spotlight. The 45-year-old murder suspect, Tetsuya Yamagami, and his family suffered financial hardship due to his mother’s substantial donations to this organization.
Myanmar elections
Following the first phase conducted in 102 districts on December 28, the Myanmar junta’s Union Election Commission will hold the second phase of general elections in 100 districts on January 11. The third phase is expected to take place on January 25. The elections are proceeding even though the country remains embroiled in civil war and faces political uncertainty. Regional countries are concerned about suspicious voter lists within a strict party system dominated by military allies.
Vietnam Communist Party congress
Members of the Communist Party of Vietnam will gather in Hanoi from across the country to hold the party’s largest meeting. The gathering will also see the selection of the country’s top leaders for the next five years. The party congress is being held during a critical period in which Vietnam is implementing its most comprehensive reforms in forty years. The new leaders will play a key role in determining whether the country can achieve its ambitious goals, including annual economic growth of at least 10% starting from 2026.
FEBRUARY
Bangladesh elections and referendum
On February 12, Bangladesh will hold its first elections since the removal of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, along with a referendum on a reform package known as the July Charter. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is seen as the favorite, gaining momentum with the return of its de facto leader, Tarique Rahman, from London. The Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami is expected to take second place. The National Citizens’ Party, founded by students who led the 2024 uprising, is trailing in the polls. Nationalist-Islamist parties are gaining strength in Bangladesh.
Thailand elections
In the general elections to be held on February 8, Thais will vote for 500 members of the lower house. While 400 of the total will be elected from constituencies across the country, the remaining 100 seats will be distributed based on the total number of votes received by each party. The Election Commission will certify all members of parliament over approximately one month before parliament convenes in April to select the new prime minister.
Laos elections
Laotians will head to the polls on February 22 to elect representatives for the National Assembly and Provincial People’s Councils ahead of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party congress. University of Tokyo professor Toshiro Nishizawa predicts that the leadership transition at the congress will lead to technocrats taking a greater role in steering the economy.
MARCH
Nepal elections
On March 5, Nepal will hold its first parliamentary elections since protesters—dubbed “Gen Z” by the West—toppled the elected government of then-Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli following violent protests that spread nationwide in September, claiming 76 lives. When candidate registration closed at the end of November, over 100 political parties, including the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and Maoist Centre, had announced their candidacies.
China National People’s Congress
China will hold its annual National People’s Congress, where Communist Party leaders will review and approve the country’s economic plan for the next five years. The plan was discussed at the party’s significant fourth plenary session in October and focuses heavily on technological innovation and self-sufficiency as the world’s second-largest economy enters a prolonged superpower rivalry with the US.
APRIL
Potential Trump visit to China
US President Donald Trump stated he plans to visit China in April and potentially launch a series of summit meetings with his rival Xi Jinping that could reshape relations between the two countries. The two leaders finalized a trade truce and reduced tensions regarding tariffs and rare earth elements when they met in South Korea at the end of October, though many issues remain unresolved.
China Auto Show
China’s most important auto show will open in Beijing on April 24, showcasing the latest vehicle technologies. The rapid rise of Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers has brought the global industry to a turning point. According to the organizer’s website, the Auto China fair will span 380,000 square meters and host over 1,000 exhibitors.
MAY
Shangri-La Dialogue
The Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s largest defense conference, will be held once again against the backdrop of US-China rivalry. While high-level military officials and security analysts are expected to attend the annual conference, it remains a matter of curiosity whether the defense ministers of the world’s two largest economies will participate.
JUNE
FIFA World Cup
On June 11, the FIFA World Cup will commence with host countries Mexico and South Africa facing off in Mexico City. In the tournament, which is also co-hosted by the US and Canada, Asia-Pacific nations Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Uzbekistan will compete to win the iconic gold trophy, though none are considered favorites. The final match will be played on July 19 in New Jersey.
South Korea local elections
South Koreans will elect mayors and other municipal administrators nationwide in local elections traditionally viewed as a report card for the ruling party’s first term. The elections will occur as President Lee Jae Myung completes his first year in office. The most watched seat will be the mayoralty of Seoul, where one-fifth of the population resides. Fundamental issues such as housing and job creation appear set to dominate the pre-election debate agenda.
“Summer Davos” in Dalian
The World Economic Forum will hold its annual summer meeting from June 23–25 in the northeastern Chinese city of Dalian. The conference will bring together academics, politicians, executives, and others to discuss current global issues.
JULY
NATO Summit in Ankara
Following the historic NATO summit held in The Hague in 2025, where allies pledged to dedicate 5% of their gross domestic product to defense by 2035, the transatlantic defense pact is holding its annual meeting in Ankara, strategically located near Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. This marks the second time Turkey has hosted the summit, following the meeting in 2004.
AUGUST
Start of New J. League calendar
After 32 seasons, Japan remains set to change its football J. League calendar to an European-style autumn-spring season. To ensure a smooth transition, a mini-league will be held between February and May before the August–May season begins. The goal is to better align the calendar with global transfer windows to increase player values, reduce the number of matches played during the country’s grueling summer months, and synchronize better with continental competitions.
SEPTEMBER
Semicon Taiwan
One of the year’s most important technology and chip industry events begins on September 2 in Taipei. Last year’s event broke records with over 100,000 visitors and more than 1,000 exhibitors. Semicon regularly attracts the industry’s biggest names, and executives from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Nvidia, and Infineon have featured as speakers in the past.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit
The China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization will hold its annual summit in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. This meeting of the group, which includes other Central Asian countries as well as Russia, India, Pakistan, and Iran, is expected to focus on security.
OCTOBER
International Maritime Organization net zero discussions
The International Maritime Organization’s Net Zero Framework was not adopted at the October 2025 meeting due to joint opposition from the US, despite being tentatively accepted by IMO members earlier in the year. Instead, it was decided to postpone the vote on the framework, which consists of a global fuel standard and a pricing mechanism for maritime transport emissions, by one year. The sector accounts for approximately 2% of global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions.
NOVEMBER
ASEAN Summit in the Philippines
Ambassadors and leaders will gather in the Philippines for the ASEAN Summit, one of the most important summits for Asia. All eyes are on Manila as the group’s new chair. Manila’s tenure will determine the bloc’s resilience in the face of deepening geopolitical fractures and economic challenges.
APEC meeting, Shenzhen
China will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ meeting in Shenzhen on November 18 and 19. By setting the meeting’s theme as “Building an Asia-Pacific Community for Shared Prosperity,” China is displaying a stance contrary to the escalating tensions with the US, Japan, Taiwan, and other countries.
UN Climate Conference, Türkiye
The United Nations’ annual climate talks will be held in the Turkish city of Antalya, but Australia will chair the negotiations following a compromise on hosting duties between Ankara and Canberra. After the 2025 conference in Brazil failed to reach an agreement on a roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels due to opposition from oil-producing nations, the focus will be on whether progress can be made this time. The issue of trade, which India and China helped turn into a climate problem in Brazil, will again be on the agenda.
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Laos exit least developed country status
Five years after the United Nations decision, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Laos are preparing to exit Least Developed Country status on November 24. This will be a turning point in the economic development of these countries. However, exiting this category means the loss of certain advantages, including trade privileges, and there have even been debates in Bangladesh about whether to delay exiting this status. Dhaka is currently attempting to sign trade agreements to make the transition smooth.
Taiwan local elections
Voters in Taiwan will cast ballots for mayors, city council members, and other officials on November 28. As Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te’s Democratic Progressive Party battles the main opposition Kuomintang and its new leader Cheng Li-wun, the local elections will be a closely watched indicator of general political momentum.
DECEMBER
New Zealand elections
New Zealand will hold elections following the dissolution of the current parliament or the expiration of its term, with the deadline for voting set for December 19. The National Party, the dominant member of the ruling coalition, and the opposition Labour Party, which suffered a defeat in the previous elections in 2023, are currently running neck and neck in the polls.
G20 Summit
The G20 summit will be held over two days starting December 14 at Trump’s golf resort in Miami. The leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will also attend this event, which will form a significant diplomatic platform for Asia’s major powers—China, India, and Japan—upon the invitation of the US president.
Asia
China outpaces India in race for Russian crude oil supplies
China has accelerated its crude oil purchases from Russia to replace oil shipments originating from the Middle East.
According to a Reuters report based on data from energy analytics firm Kpler, China is outpacing India in the Russian oil market.
India’s crude imports from Russia’s European ports fell by approximately 30% in August.
Beijing’s increased purchases could curb India’s exports of refined petroleum products and consequently trigger a diesel and gasoline shortage across Asia.
While China previously favoured ESPO blend crude shipped from Russia’s Asian ports, the share of its purchases from Russia’s European ports, consisting primarily of the Urals grade, has climbed to 31%.
Russian crude imports by India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, dropped to 1.87 million barrels per day in August. This volume remained well below the 2.79 million barrels per day recorded in July.
Under this scenario, which poses a risk to the Asian region, India stands as the region’s largest exporter of diesel and gasoline.
However, the country’s total crude imports in August were recorded at 4.17 million barrels per day. This figure marked the lowest level since the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East.
If the tightening raw material supply prevents Indian refineries from maintaining processing throughput, a severe deficit in refined products could emerge across the Asian market starting in September.
The Times of India previously reported that India’s Russian crude imports reached their highest share since 2022 in July.
During that period, Russia supplied more than half of India’s total crude imports of just over 5 million barrels per day, delivering 2.8 million barrels per day.
At the end of July, the Russian government extended its temporary export ban on gasoline, diesel, and other fuel types until 31 January 2027.
Under the restrictions that took effect on 1 August, direct exports of diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils by refiners will be exempted starting 1 September.
Bloomberg reported in June that Russian Urals crude was being sold in India at a $3.90 discount per barrel against international benchmarks after a hiatus of more than two months.
Urals crude traded at a discount again on 29 May for the first time since mid-March.
According to The Times of India, however, this discount on Russian Urals crude had almost entirely evaporated by early August.
Asia
Japan sharpens defense posture while strengthening Turkish ties
In an extensive interview on the Harici YouTube channel hosted by journalist Elif Ilhamoglu, Asia-Pacific research specialist and journalist Mehmet Asil Gonultas provided a comprehensive analysis of East Asia’s shifting geopolitical landscape.
Focusing on the newly released 2026 Japanese Defence White Paper, Tokyo’s military posture, foreign policy recalibrations under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and expanding bilateral ties with Turkiye, Gonultas detailed how systemic anxieties regarding China, Russia, and North Korea are reshaping the region.
“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats”
Addressing the release of Japan’s updated national security strategy document, Gonultas noted that the nearly 600-page publication represents the longest and most assertive security outline produced by Tokyo to date. He underscored that the tone toward regional competitors has hardened markedly compared to previous editions.
“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats in this year’s document,” Gonultas said. “Regarding Russia, the text explicitly characterizes its military presence on the contested Kuril Islands as an occupation, particularly following the recent visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to one of the islands. North Korea is evaluated through the operational lens of the Russia-Ukraine war, where Pyongyang is actively refining its military capabilities, deploying personnel, utilizing drones, and gaining battle-tested experience in an active combat zone.”
Gonultas explained that the characterization of Beijing as a deteriorating security risk reflects a trajectory that has intensified steadily over recent years. “While China has been identified as a primary security concern since at least 2022, the rhetorical severity increases with every iteration. This year’s assessment is the heaviest yet, directly mirroring the firm posture of the state,” he stated.
Contrasting the current administration with former leadership, Gonultas remarked, “Former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba advocated a relatively moderate approach, maintaining that Japan and China must find ways to coexist peacefully given their geographic reality. However, Prime Minister Takaichi adopted an uncompromising stance toward Beijing even prior to assuming office.”
He noted that Beijing’s actions have reinforced Tokyo’s apprehensions: “Beijing continuously provides justification for this stance. During recent missile testings, Beijing claimed to have informed Japan in advance, but Tokyo clarified that notice was provided merely 30 minutes prior to launch, emphasizing that no formal permission was granted. Furthermore, Chinese naval vessels regularly test boundaries in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and a Chinese warship recently targeted a Japanese fighter jet with a guidance laser. The white paper explicitly argues that China’s actual military expenditures significantly exceed its publicly declared defense budget.”
Following the publication of the document, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense swiftly issued formal condemnations, accusing Tokyo of fanning regional tensions and reverting to historic militarism. “China reacted directly by asserting that this document reflects rising Japanese militarism,” Gonultas said. “In response, Tokyo points to China’s rapid rearmament, its inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking Japanese territory, its maritime incursions, and its anti-aircraft capabilities targeting Japanese military aviation.”
“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons”
Turning to the structural and military capabilities outlined in the white paper, Gonultas clarified that Tokyo is prioritizing high-technology defense systems and diplomatic-economic integration rather than unconventional deterrence.
“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons,” Gonultas emphasized, addressing recent media speculation surrounding defense policy debates. “While domestic discussions on nuclear deterrence surfaced during the era of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, implementing such a policy remains politically impossible. Regardless of a ruling party’s parliamentary majority, strong internal factions vehemently oppose the concept. When Abe tentatively raised the question of nuclear deterrence after leaving office, then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida immediately rejected the notion. Kishida, who remains an influential parliamentary figure, reaffirmed only recently that Japan must unconditionally oppose nuclear armament.”
Clarifying recent remarks made by Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi regarding the public taboo surrounding nuclear debates, Gonultas observed, “The prohibition against discussing nuclear weapons is not a formal statutory ban, but rather a deeply ingrained societal consensus. The public remains firmly opposed to even raising the topic. Defense Minister Koizumi, whose personal popularity has risen significantly among right-wing factions since taking office, uses this rhetoric largely as a political signaling strategy to consolidate his base as he positions himself for a future prime ministerial run.”
Gonultas outlined Tokyo’s actual defense investments, highlighting unmanned systems and domestic defense manufacturing. “Japan’s primary technological focus centers on advanced drone infrastructure,” he stated. “Furthermore, Japan has revised its historical restrictions on arms exports. While the constitution was previously interpreted to ban the export of lethal weaponry—limiting sales strictly to search-and-rescue or non-lethal equipment—legislative shifts now permit defensive exports, provided they are directed toward allied nations that are not actively engaged in armed conflict.”
“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China”
Evaluating Tokyo’s strategic dependence on Washington, Gonultas emphasized that Japan’s defense planners view the US alliance as indispensable for national survival.
“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China’s sheer scale,” Gonultas stated. “This fundamental reality forces Japanese policymakers to maintain flawless relations with Washington at all costs. Recently, when a US serviceman was implicated in an assault incident on Okinawa Island, Defense Minister Koizumi explicitly declined to criticize the US military, drawing sharp domestic backlash. Yet, this reflects Tokyo’s overriding priority: retaining the US strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.”
“Both the Japanese government and the general public harbour deep anxieties regarding Chinese intentions, particularly concerning a potential military move against Taiwan,” Gonultas continued. “Should China blockade or seize Taiwan, Japan’s vital maritime trade routes would be compromised at Beijing’s discretion. Aside from the United States, no regional power possesses the capacity to offer meaningful deterrence.”
Gonultas added that this strategic anxiety has intensified under the current US administration. “Japanese planners are operating under immense pressure to keep US President Donald Trump fully committed to regional security, even as Washington signals potential adjustments to its military posture, including reductions in joint exercises with South Korea,” he noted. “To build a broader network of deterrence, Tokyo is actively cultivating overlapping bilateral and trilateral security partnerships with Australia, the Philippines, India, and South Korea, aiming to anchor US power within the region.”
“Constitutional limits restrict Japanese forces to purely defensive operations”
Addressing whether growing regional friction could lead to direct military confrontations, Gonultas pointed to the legal constraints governing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.
“The likelihood of Japan initiating or engaging in direct offensive conflict remains minimal,” Gonultas stated. “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution explicitly renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of offensive war potential. All military assets held by Japan are structured strictly for self-defense, meaning operational force can only be applied after Japanese territory sustains an explicit attack.”
“When Prime Minister Takaichi previously stated that Japan would protect Taiwan in the event of an invasion, any operational support would realistically be limited to logistics, non-combatant evacuation operations, and naval resupply missions for US forces, rather than direct front-line engagement,” Gonultas explained. “Although Takaichi favors constitutional revision, the Japanese public remains overwhelmingly pacifist and deeply attached to Article 9, driven by demographic aging, historical memory, and a profound fear of military escalation.”
“Turkiye is viewed as a reliable and capable defense partner”
Highlighting expanding diplomatic and industrial engagement between Ankara and Tokyo, Gonultas noted that defense procurement and technological cooperation have gained significant momentum.
“Following high-level diplomatic engagements, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s official visit to Tokyo and subsequent defense agreements signed at the SAHA EXPO defense exhibition, bilateral security cooperation has entered a concrete phase,” Gonultas said. “Japan is actively seeking to acquire drone technology. Importantly, Tokyo does not merely wish to purchase off-the-shelf equipment; it seeks technology transfers and co-production frameworks to understand manufacturing methodologies. Ankara has demonstrated a positive reception to these discussions.”
“Turkiye is viewed in Tokyo as a reliable, highly capable defense actor and a non-aggressive diplomatic mediator,” Gonultas added. “With negative public perception toward Israel reaching 80% in Japan, Tokyo has deliberately diversified its defense partnerships away from Tel Aviv, placing increased value on its historical alliance with Turkiye.”
Gonultas further observed that diplomatic coordination extends into Central Asia. “Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Eri Arfia, who is of Uyghur origin and fluent in Turkish, visited Istanbul and met with representatives of the Organization of Turkic States, expressing Japan’s interest in securing observer status,” Gonultas explained. “Tokyo views Turkiye as a vital bridge to Middle Eastern energy stability and Central Asian critical mineral supply chains.”
“Takaichi’s public approval ratings have dropped toward 50%”
Analysing domestic political dynamics, Gonultas reported that Prime Minister Takaichi faces mounting economic pressures that threaten her initial political momentum.
“While Prime Minister Takaichi entered office with approval ratings approaching 70%, recent surveys show public support dropping toward 50%, with some independent polls placing approval near 40%,” Gonultas stated. “The primary driver behind this decline is economic dissatisfaction. Despite state interventions to stabilize the yen around 170 per US dollar following energy price surges caused by the Iran conflict, living costs remain elevated.”
“Voters supported Takaichi expecting structural economic revitalization, but the administration has heavily prioritized ideological and administrative initiatives—such as designating Osaka as a secondary capital alongside its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, enacting national flag protection laws, and tightening permanent residency requirements for foreign workers,” Gonultas explained. “Although the government plans to cut consumption taxes on food items from 8% to 1%, prominent figures within her own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including former Prime Minister Ishiba and veteran leader Taro Aso, have publicly questioned the fiscal viability of these plans.”
Concurrently, economic authorities face severe macroeconomic challenges following joint currency interventions by the US and Japan. “While joint interventions successfully halted the chaotic depreciation of the yen beyond the 170 threshold, Japanese government bond yields recently hit 30-year highs of approximately 3%,” Gonultas noted. “To offset inflationary pressures on households, the government has facilitated a 5% average wage increase—the highest in recent decades—while coordinating with Washington to maintain exchange rate stability.”
Concluding his evaluation of Tokyo’s regional policy, Gonultas noted that despite broader regional instability, Japan continues to maintain active diplomatic communication with Tehran to safeguard energy transit through the Strait of Hormuz. “Tokyo maintains functional diplomatic channels with both Washington and Tehran, leveraging its neutral diplomatic standing to support regional maritime stability and energy security,” Gonultas concluded.
Asia
Pakistan top court orders Imran Khan moved from prison to hospital
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that former Prime Minister Imran Khan must be transferred from prison to a hospital.
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) announced on Tuesday that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had ordered the transfer of former Prime Minister Imran Khan from prison to a hospital. The ruling meets a long-standing demand from his party and family, who have voiced concerns over his health.
The 73-year-old cricketer-turned-politician has been imprisoned since August 2023, following convictions in a series of cases that he maintains were politically motivated after his removal from office in 2022.
His sons had repeatedly raised concerns over the past year regarding his deteriorating health, while his lawyers stated that he had suffered significant vision loss in his right eye during his time in detention.
PTI spokesman Zulfikar Bukhari said: “This is a welcome decision. We wish this had happened earlier so that his eye and overall health would not have deteriorated this much.”
Bukhari added: “He should remain in the hospital until all doctors are satisfied.”
Khan’s spokesman Naeem Haider Panjutha stated on X that the court had directed Khan to be moved to Shifa International Hospital within 48 hours and to remain there until 16 September.
Since being ousted from power in a no-confidence vote, Khan has faced numerous legal proceedings, including cases involving state gifts and unlawful marriage. While some convictions have been suspended or overturned, appeals against others remain pending. Khan denies the charges against him.
In February, leading figures from the global cricket community, including prominent names from across the border in India, expressed “deep concerns” over Khan’s prison conditions and demanded improved treatment for him.
PTI came to power in 2018 and retains a broad support base across key provinces. However, the party was stripped of its electoral symbol ahead of the 2024 elections, forcing its candidates to contest the polls as independents.
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