Opinion
A Capital Outflow
A record level of capital outflow that equals 1.47 trillion rubles has taken place to the bank accounts outside Russia, in a time period between June and August, according to the Central Bank of Russia. For a comparison, the capital outflow had been recorded as 57 billion rubles in the same time period of 2021 (third quarter), which is 26 times less. For another comparison: the budget revenues for the year 2022 were recorded as 25.02 trillion rubles. This means that roughly 6 percent of all budget revenues of the nation were scooped out of the country by the bourgeoisie, only in the third quarter of the last year. Only then we can add the 543.4 billion and 550.7 billion rubles that are also scooped away in the first and the second quarters, by the “patriotic” bourgeoisie (despite all “sanctions”), who have managed to take out more than 10 percent of the national budget revenues in the last three quarters.
And the outflow did not stop after the third quarter. The Central Bank of Russia has estimated in early December that the Russian citizens had roughly 4.19 trillion rubles (or 66.65 billion USD at that time) in foreign bank accounts, as of November 1st. Also, according to the data released by the Central Bank of Russia on February 13th, the total assets of Russian citizens in foreign bank accounts have summed up to a total of 94.3 billion USD (or about 7 trillion Rubles, that is almost 30 percent of the national budget revenue of 2022). This means that the deposits in foreign bank have more than tripled over the last year. This alone is an enormous capital outflow, and it is just the tip of the iceberg. These data only shows the outflow that the Central Bank has allowed. The account deposits of Russian citizens in foreign banks had reached 0.5 billion USD in January 2022, which have risen to 4.3 billion USD in February. Almost all these transactions have taken place between February 24th and 28th. The outflow has lost its momentum between March and May, since the Central Bank of Russia had imposed harsh restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. And as soon as the banks have relaxed some these restrictions, the outflow spiked again, reaching 48.9 billion USD in the second half of the year, or making up to the 77 percent of the total annual outflow. Even this can be considered as a very modest estimate, since it is not possible to get information from the countries where the outflow has occurred to after the sanctions.
Moreover, the total capital outflow is not only these 70-100 billion USD in foreign banks. The Central Bank had estimated last July, that the total capital outflow in 2022 would be 243 billion USD. This is a record in the last 10 years, with second happening in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea, being 152 billion USD. The total capital outflow between 2012 and 2021 is around 576.5 billion USD. Capital that equals half of that in the previous 10 years, was scooped away in just one year.
Of course, this amount includes that of the foreign companies which sold their assets in Russia or, stakes that Russian companies hold in foreign countries. So, the capital outflow is often not done by carrying huge stacks of cash across the border. But it is done by shifting enormous sums to offshore companies, and that is pretty much like carrying huge bags of cash.
So, this enormous capital outflow can take place in every means and there are not much obstacles to doing this. According to the Head of the Russian Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina, who has spoken around the end of the year, saying “This is not a matter of concern for us in the current situation. We do not consider it necessary to take any special measures in this connection. “, and adding that “As confidence in macroeconomic stability, price stability strengthens, these funds will return to the Russian banking system, to rubles.”
I get goosebumps as soon as I hear “macroeconomic stability”
Another important statement from the Central Bank was that “import substitutions have been reduced to the cost of standard of living”. So, almost 400 billion USD in assets have been frozen in western banks, there has been a capital outflows close to 250 billion USD this year, but it is import substitutions were lowered to the cost of standard of living. And this statement was made right after the announcement by the US government that American companies would be 152 billion USD of subsidies in microchip production.
One of the most prominent economists in Russia Mikhail Khazin, posted an article on Telegram that “he had initially written for a media outlet, but he did not manage to get it published”, in which Glazyev immediately posted. He claimed that the Russian “fiscal bloc” (the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank) were still represented by the liberal elite, who still wanted Russia to remain in the “necessary liberal” international community. He says, they must meet the basic requirements of the “Washington Consensus” to achieve this. Two of these requirements would be: “Prohibiting all Ruble investments and motivating further capital outflow”. And the second would be maintaining the liquidity of the global dollarization over the nation’s own interests”. Khazin explains the recent capital outflow that broke records in the first three quarters of 2022, with these theses.
And the relationship between economics and politics gets even more evident at this point, while Khazin considers this stance of the “fiscal bloc” as high treason.
Taxation Of The Grand Bourgeoisie
Putin’s speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in early September was of great programmatic importance. I have evaluated his speech under “9 crucial points” back then. And on the eighth point, I stated:
“The Kremlin keeps stressing that they have used and will continue to use ‘the market mechanisms and instruments’ to seize the ‘excess profit’ of the grand bourgeoisie. This could shows that the grand bourgeoisie has not succeeded in its lobbying efforts together with the ‘fiscal bloc”.
In his speech, Putin has described these market instruments as follows:
“These will be market instruments that are known by all: it can either be customs clearance or recovery of the excess profit in some other ways”.
The target of these words was neither the petty bourgeoisie that emerged after the crisis, nor the new middle bourgeoisie that has now started to flourish after the disqualification of the Navalniyite middle bourgeoisie after February 24th. They too, managed to accumulate an “excessive profit”, and are still accumulating, but the real target was the grand bourgeoisie, which were mainly active in the fields of telecommunications, mining industries and finances, and clearly reeked of a dangerous threat (even if Putin had given a guarantee of “private property” at the same time).
Despite Putin’s programmatic speech, the aforementioned issue has not come up for a long time. Finally, on February 15th, around four and a half months after the announcement of the program, the Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Sazanov has announced that “started working” on two resolutions on this agenda: A voluntary payment, or a kind of involuntary taxation.
Why did it take so long or why did this even come up in the end? The answer to the first question is: We would not expect the grand bourgeoisie to not resist the taxation of excess profit, imposed by the Kremlin. Moreover, the economic situation was relatively stable from the beginning of September and until December when sanctions on crude oil exports were imposed, so back then the first shock was absorbed, and the nation has turned from the brink of total collapse. This may be an exaggerated rhetoric, but definitely not a false one. The Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov has clearly stated that “the economy is at risk of collapse” on December 27th when in describing the situation in March, and that he “thinks that the economy is about to go completely out of control”. Meanwhile Belousov has addressed the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Central Bank of Russia when crediting those who managed to reverse this doomsday scenario, but did not mention anything about the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the resistance by the grand bourgeoisie must have gained more momentum in such atmosphere of a relative satisfaction.
And the answer to the second question is: The “fiscal bloc” had to stop further hindering this program, since the problem of financing the government budget, which is caused by a massive decline in the natural gas and oil revenues due to sanctions and the sabotage of Nord Stream 2 pipeline, keeps threatening to destroy the Russian economy.
The Finance Minister Siluanov spoke only two days after Sazanov and stated that he expects “industry giants” to make a “voluntary contribution” of 300 billion rubles to the government budget in return for their excessive profits in 2021 and 2022. Such funds would not cover the expected budget deficit since the budget deficit in 2023 is the expected to be around 2.9 trillion rubles (which is 2 percent of the GDP), and can reach 5 trillion rubles due to the large decrease in oil and gas revenues that occurred as a result of the sanctions. We can understand that the Ministry has alleviated the taxes on grand bourgeoisie to an enormous scale, and has reduced it to around 10 percent of the expected budget deficit even with the most optimistic estimations. But even this was not enough, so the minister tried to make it a “voluntary action”. Moreover, the ministry must have negotiated with some these “industry giants” and tried to get their consent, that is because according to Siluanov: “These industry giants are ready to share some of their profit, with the state”. And on top of that, Siluanov also announced the good news that oil and gas companies would not be charged an additional tax over their profits over these past years.
There seems to be a mismatch between the words of the minister and his deputy; While the deputy minister speaks of two resolutions, there is only one solution according to the minister. While his deputy also points out the hard way, the minister states that there is already an understanding with the grand bourgeoisie on this issue.
However the grand bourgeoisie does not seem convinced these days. Head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Aleksandr Shokhin, has made it clear that voluntary action would not work out. But this was not as if “there could not be a thing called voluntary tax, we should force it properly”, but rather something like “there cannot be a tax on excess profits, since things like private property and the free market are untouchable, we should instead reduce taxes so that the free market can invest even freer and the concept of big government is nonsense anyways” etc.
An Involuntary Volunteerism
On the exact same day that Siluanov has made the voluntary tax announcement, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov was asked about this issue at a press briefing. Peskov noted that talks are still ongoing, while similar practices are very common all over the world, and that the government is in a constant contact with representatives of large businesses on this issue, while adding: “The key word is voluntary, but, of course, the interaction between the country’s leadership and business, and the government and the business sector, is a two-way street. Therefore, of course, it is necessary that both sides, although we are all on the same side nonetheless, were clearly aware of the realities that we live in today and the needs the country has”.
That was regarded as a very diplomatic response, and although it did not imply a direct challenge to the grand bourgeoisie, which he had comforted with his message of cooperation, the warning or some may even say the threat, was clear enough. The Kremlin as it is the rational thought, has no doubt that the grand bourgeoisie will not show any voluntary willingness, therefore the formula of involuntary volunteerism must have seemed more practical. The force may bare more fruits, and with the threat of enforcing it, some giant industries may volunteer to contribute and receive a reward in the form of a state decoration, but the division of labor between those who can afford it and those who cannot is such that the Kremlin will not hesitate to introduce some new ways of encouraging volunteerism, in order to overcome the foolishness (that word can be used conditionally), of the “fiscal bloc”.
However, the “fiscal bloc” will not hesitate to look for ways to minimize the profit losses of the grand bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact, the first major move came on the exact same day, from the bloc’s one significant part, the Central Bank. Not only did the Central Bank back the Ministry’s volunteerism plan, it also proposed to cancel the debts of these companies to the government banks in return for the “voluntary contributions” of this class, that totals 300 billion Rubles (according to the report of Banksta, one of the closest affiliated outlets of the grand bourgeoisie).
This is a marvelous bribery! Let us first cancel all short, medium and long term loans, then you can “donate” us, and let us call this volunteering.
The central bank’s call for peace was quick to earn Deripaska’s approval. The owner of RUSAL wrote: “This would be a balanced decision, if not the ideal”.
The “conflicting alliance” continues, as the existence of this alliance does not stop the conflict. The Kremlin will continue its involuntary volunteerism imposition, but it can accept to cancel some of the long-term loans, while it could be a little bit difficult to cancel medium-term loans, and it will surely reject to cancel short-term loans. While it is certain that the problem cannot be solved with such negotiations, while the Kremlin will continue to go for the grand bourgeoisie to finance the government budget, the fiscal bloc will continue its efforts to fend it off, as oil and gas revenues fall rock bottom.
***
There have been two new developments confirming what I have claimed, after I have written them. So, it impossible to end this article without mentioning about them briefly.
First, Putin’s programmatic speech on February 22nd, included the announcement that they would not back down on taxation, despite the pressures from the bourgeoisie and the “fiscal bloc” (he openly admitted “things are tough”). Despite the insistence and the determination of the “fiscal bloc”, the cancellation of long-term loans was largely off the agenda after this speech.
The second is the statements made by Alexander Shokhin, the same day that of Putin’s speech. Shokhin said, they had reached an agreement with the government for a one-time “windfall tax”. The fact that this is defined as a tax, and not as a voluntary contribution, clearly shows the Kremlin’s dedication. And for Shohin, there is only one question that remains: That is how to estimate these “excess profits”.
Opinion
Macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric UAV attacks in Russia
Today, the nature of asymmetric threats is undergoing a profound transformation, with their focus shifting increasingly toward economic centers. By mid-2026, the nature of asymmetric warfare within the borders of the Russian Federation entered a qualitatively new and critical phase.
An analysis of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes carried out in July 2026 reveals a deliberate shift in targeting. Moving beyond military installations and fuel-energy infrastructure, these attacks directly targeted civilian logistics networks and critical nodes of the macroeconomic infrastructure.
The primary objective of this strategic shift is to deplete the country’s internal resources, induce insurmountable disruptions in supply chains, and exert intense psychological pressure on the civilian population.
Large-scale, coordinated strikes on the distribution centers of Wildberries—Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and part of the RVB joint venture (formed by the 2024 merger of Wildberries and Russ)—became the symbol of this new phase of home-front vulnerability. The geographic scope of these attacks, spanning an unprecedented area from the Northwestern Federal District to Southern Russia and Crimea, exposed critical gaps in national industrial risk insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation sparked severe legal disputes between platform economy giants and small businesses, compelling immediate intervention from both corporate executives and senior state officials.
Tracing the multi-layered consequences of the kinetic impacts resulting from these July attacks on the state’s digital and physical economy will shape the new architecture of civilian sector security.
The zenith of the logistical terror waged by Ukraine was recorded on the night of July 24, 2026, marking the most technically complex UAV attack inflicted on Russian Federation territory since the beginning of the year. According to data from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, domestic air defense systems detected and destroyed 571 fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs that night.
Two points have become exceptionally critical here: saturating radar fields and the military “swarm” effect. In short, this event is the clearest indication that the enemy has transitioned to a tactic of overwhelming radar systems. At the same time, the “swarm” effect generated across a vast geographic expanse aims to rapidly deplete the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems and expose air defense positions deep behind the front lines.
The breadth of the targeted geography attests to the unprecedented scale of the operation. UAVs were neutralized over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Vladimir regions, as well as over Moscow, Krasnodar, the Republic of Crimea, and the waters of the Azov and Black Seas.
Such a dense dispersion of targets across a vast territory points to an attempt to paralyze transportation and logistics arteries within Russia’s European landmass.
In parallel with the mass deployment of UAVs, missile strikes were also conducted against civilian industrial enterprises. During the same period, a missile attack on a local enterprise in the Fileyka district of Kirov resulted in outright catastrophe, leaving 6 people dead and 32 employees injured with varying degrees of severity.
Following the incident, Regional Governor Aleksandr Sokolov stated that the situation required not only the evacuation of the wounded, but also large-scale interventions such as restoring water and power supplies and auditing the security of neighboring settlements. This combined approach—employing inexpensive kamikaze drones to degrade air defenses followed immediately by missile strikes on unprotected industrial zones—presents an entirely new threat paradigm for the civilian economy.
Systematic and sequential attacks directed at the facilities of a single commercial entity completely eliminate the possibility of coincidence. The strategic, macroeconomic, and psychological factors turning civilian commercial warehouses into critical vulnerabilities for an entire state rest upon four pillars:
- Role as the central circulatory system of domestic trade: Wildberries plays a critical role in the architecture of the modern Russian economy, connecting millions of consumers with tens of thousands of SMEs. Damage to distribution centers severe supply chains, triggering localized shortages of essential consumer goods and regional inflationary spikes. The primary goal is to destabilize the domestic market and create an artificial supply vacuum.
- Immense facility footprints and defense complexity: Spanning hundreds of thousands of square meters across the nation, these hangars constitute massive targets with high radar contrast. Unlike military bases, these commercial warehouses cannot possess their own air defense systems; placing every such facility under an air defense umbrella is physically impossible without compromising frontline systems.
- Social and psychological impact: In the eyes of the public, logistics centers symbolize daily economic stability. Black plumes of smoke visible from miles away, massive fires, and civilian casualties represent a hybrid terror tactic designed to transport an atmosphere of fear deep into peaceful cities and shake the internal socio-political climate.
- Magnified radius of economic impact: Inventory consumed by flames in these warehouses generally consists of stock purchased by merchants on credit. The destruction of commodity inventories holds the potential to cause mass vendor bankruptcies, bank loan defaults, and cascading layoffs across small businesses.
The events of July 2026 mark an irreversible shift in the threat landscape facing Russian commerce and macroeconomics. Attacks directed at Wildberries hubs in regions such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Tambov exposed the utter vulnerability of civilian logistics infrastructure.
Deploying relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, the enemy is capable of inflicting tens of billions of rubles in direct damage, paralyzing the supply of essential goods, and triggering an acute social crisis in which hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs face the threat of bankruptcy. According to Russian experts, the total cost of a single fire—similar to the Kotovsk incident on July 18—can range between 50 and 100 billion Rubles ($630 million – $1.2 billion USD).
Despite its massive capital reserves, corporate business was caught unprepared for military threats. The medium-term survival of the e-commerce economy depends on the state and the private sector uniting to engineer unprecedented systemic solutions. Establishing compensation funds and introducing mandatory risk-distribution mechanisms are critical steps that must be taken.
Logistics hubs will remain open targets unless a “state program for subsidized reinsurance of military risks” is established for the critical nodes of the civilian economy. In the future, it will not suffice for large enterprises merely to pour capital into the physical protection of infrastructure; they must also deeply decentralize their logistics networks to prevent the concentration of goods and capital at single points of failure.
Opinion
Egypt Under Fire: What Does the Damietta Strike Mean for Global Energy Markets?
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
For the first time since successive waves of escalation between Washington and Tehran began in recent months, an Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility has become a direct target.
In the early hours of Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at least one drone struck the floating storage unit Energos Winter, owned and operated by a U.S. company and sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, while it was moored at the Mediterranean port of Damietta. The impact ignited a fire that spread to a neighboring LNG carrier, GasLog Salem. Egyptian authorities confirmed that the blaze was brought under control without any reported casualties, while no group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.

A Broader Context That Cannot Be Ignored
The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It came only hours after the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted joint strikes with Saudi forces targeting armed factions in Iraq accused of launching drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Tehran responded by warning against a “miscalculation,” at a time when the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions of an earlier round of escalation that erupted on 8 July, when U.S. forces carried out strikes inside Iranian territory following an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with attacks targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.
Against this tense backdrop, Damietta appears to represent yet another link in the chain of regional escalation—but an exceptional one. For decades, Egypt has sought to keep itself removed from direct military polarization in the region, unlike several Gulf states that have increasingly become arenas of open confrontation.
At the same time, this interpretation does not entirely rule out the possibility of an indirect Israeli role, driven by hostility toward Egypt’s growing diplomatic influence in the Palestinian and Gaza files. Cairo has remained committed to advancing the two-state solution and to implementing the second and third phases of the peace roadmap agreed upon following the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit last October. The Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has sought to obstruct these efforts. Netanyahu, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, is widely accused of bearing responsibility for committing genocide that, according to Palestinian authorities, have resulted in the deaths of approximately 73,000 Palestinian civilians since 7 October 2023.
Why Egypt?
Over the past two years, Egypt has steadily strengthened its position as a regional hub for liquefying and re-exporting natural gas. This growing role has been supported by its two LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, in addition to a network of pipelines linking the country with Israel and Cyprus.
This infrastructure—unmatched elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of combined liquefaction capacity and direct access to European and global markets—has transformed Damietta and Idku into critical gateways for Eastern Mediterranean gas, including increasing volumes of Israeli/Stolen Palestinian natural gas liquefied and re-exported through Egyptian facilities.
According to local reports, the Energos Winter alone was supplying approximately 450 million cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt’s national grid and was preparing to receive four additional cargoes during August.
This expanding role gives any attack on Egypt’s gas infrastructure significance far beyond the immediate incident itself. It threatens not only Egypt’s domestic energy supplies but also a supply chain upon which Europe has increasingly relied as part of its strategy to diversify away from Russian natural gas.
Who Was Behind the Attack? Open Scenarios
At the time of writing, no organization had officially claimed responsibility, leaving several possible interpretations.
The first scenario cautions against prematurely attributing responsibility to Iran or its regional allies. It argues that the ambiguity surrounding the incident—and the absence of any claim of responsibility—may itself be deliberate, allowing whichever actor carried out the attack to undermine Egyptian stability without incurring immediate political costs.
This possibility includes actors competing over Eastern Mediterranean energy routes, as well as local or transnational groups pursuing agendas unrelated to the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Egyptian officials themselves have adopted a notably cautious approach. Egypt’s Minister of Information warned against “rushing to accuse any party,” while a former official suggested that “certain actors are seeking to drag Egypt into the conflict,” implying that the attack may have been designed precisely to draw Cairo into a confrontation it has consistently sought to avoid.
A second scenario, Israeli Involvement or the Involvement of Israel’s Allies
This, in itself, remains a serious hypothesis that is reportedly being discussed in undisclosed investigative circles. The prevailing analyses, supported by pro-Israeli and pro-American narratives, have largely centered on suspicions directed at Iran or Iran-aligned actors within the context of the ongoing conflict, rather than at Tel Aviv. This is partly because Israel maintains an energy partnership with Egypt, making any attack on an Egyptian export terminal potentially detrimental to its own natural gas interests.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis—like all others—must ultimately be assessed in light of the findings of the official investigations, which are still underway. It is worth recalling, however, that repeated warnings have been voiced regarding the visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, as such visits have often been followed by heightened regional instability, as was argued after developments last December. According to this line of analysis, Netanyahu seeks to prolong the conflict with Iran in order to strengthen his domestic political position, secure his continuation in office, and advance Israel’s long-term strategic objective of neutralizing Iran and carrying out “Greater Israel.”
Within this framework, some analysts argue that there are broader efforts to weaken both Egypt and Türkey. They cite remarks attributed to a former Mossad operative during appearances on Israeli television, alleging that such a strategy would also serve to divert international attention away from the Gaza file and the question of Palestinian statehood—an issue on which Egypt has intensified its diplomatic efforts in recent days. According to this interpretation, creating indirect pressure on Egypt—the region’s most stable and secure state—could be viewed as a means of drawing Cairo into a wider regional confrontation.
A third scenario links the incident directly to the broader U.S.-Iran escalation. According to the article, The New York Times, citing two Iranian sources, reported that the attack may have been intended as a signal that global shipping and energy supplies could face deeper disruptions should Tehran or its allies choose to escalate further. The sources, however, did not identify the perpetrators or specify the launch point of the drone.
The Messages Behind the Attack
Regardless of who carried out the operation, the choice of target sends several important signals. An attack on what the article describes as the first American-owned energy asset on Egyptian soil would convey a message to Washington that not only its military installations in the Gulf, but also its economic footprint across the region, has become increasingly vulnerable.
For Egypt, which has consistently pursued a policy of strategic restraint and regional neutrality, the incident serves as a reminder that its geographic position—adjacent to some of the world’s most important energy and maritime corridors—no longer guarantees insulation from the conflicts unfolding around it.
For global markets, the attack suggests that the geographic scope of potential disruption is expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf into the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing insurance premiums for shipping and critical energy infrastructure in a region long regarded as comparatively secure.
Egypt’s Official Response
The Egyptian government handled the incident with considerable caution and procedural professionalism, treating it primarily as a crisis-management operation rather than a political event.
The Cabinet confirmed that the fire had been caused by a drone attack without attributing responsibility to any specific party, emphasizing that investigations were continuing “to take all necessary measures to safeguard Egypt’s interests and national security.”
Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly described the response as a test of the state’s crisis-management capabilities, praising emergency teams for successfully moving the burning vessels away from the port, thereby preventing what could have become a far larger disaster.
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the incident publicly for the first time during a telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. During the call, he confirmed that the competent authorities were conducting a comprehensive investigation, warned of the dangers posed by the escalating regional situation, and stressed the importance of cooperation between Egypt and the international community to contain the crisis while adhering to peaceful solutions.
This measured diplomatic approach—avoiding direct accusations while emphasizing de-escalation—reflects Cairo’s determination not to be drawn into a broader regional confrontation despite having come under direct attack on its own territory.
Several Gulf states also expressed their full solidarity with Egypt and voiced support for its efforts to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.
The Impact on Global Energy Markets
The Damietta incident occurred at a time when global energy markets were already under considerable strain. Brent crude had been hovering around US$90 per barrel following the escalation of 8 July, while the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark for natural gas had climbed above US$700 per 1,000 cubic meters for the first time since March.
Any additional disruption affecting an Egyptian LNG export terminal risks reinforcing this upward trend. Europe has increasingly relied on Egyptian liquefied natural gas as part of its broader strategy to diversify supplies away from Russian pipeline gas. Consequently, even a temporary interruption to Egypt’s export infrastructure could heighten market concerns over supply security.
The incident also adds to the geopolitical risk premium already factored into insurance costs for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Higher perceived risks could translate into increased shipping and insurance costs for LNG carriers throughout the region, even if subsequent investigations conclude that the attack was an isolated event unlikely to be repeated.
What Should Be Done to Prevent Similar Incidents?
First, Egypt should further strengthen its short-range air defense capabilities and counter-drone systems around strategic energy installations along its Mediterranean coastline. This includes deploying advanced early-warning radar networks and cost-effective interception systems capable of neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles before they reach critical infrastructure.
Second, broader regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms should be expanded among Egypt and neighboring states—including Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye—in recognition of the increasingly interconnected nature of Eastern Mediterranean gas infrastructure and the shared strategic importance of safeguarding regional energy corridors.
Third, given that the targeted floating storage unit is owned by a U.S. company, Washington should contribute to financing and modernizing the protection of such critical infrastructure rather than limiting its response to statements indicating that it is merely “monitoring the situation,” as the article characterizes the U.S. reaction.
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—reducing the broader cycle of regional escalation between Washington and Tehran remains the only sustainable guarantee against similar incidents in the future. Any purely technical or localized security measures can mitigate immediate risks but cannot eliminate them so long as the underlying geopolitical drivers of confrontation remain unresolved.
Conclusion
The Damietta incident serves as a stark reminder that geographic neutrality alone is no longer sufficient to shield a country that has become a pivotal node in the global energy network.
References:
1- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro
4- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/ships-drone-strike-egypt.html
Opinion
Rising populist parties in Europe and liberalism
Leon Trotsky, one of the foremost leaders of the October Revolution, defined fascism as the totalitarian organization of society by monopoly capital. Magnates of large-scale monopoly capital are acutely aware that their profits cannot be safeguarded in the absence of authoritarian political power. Thus, fascism finds its bedrock of support among capitalist forces, the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital circles, and major landowners. We are all too familiar with the calamities fascism wrought upon the world in the era preceding the Second World War.
The post–World War II era is often commemorated as the golden age of capitalism—a period characterized by robust growth rates and low unemployment. Real wages climbed, social rights expanded, demands for a welfare state remained vibrant, and the pursuit of a social state yielded tangible results. This era ultimately met its demise in the 1970s, undone by shifts in the regime of accumulation and structural economic crises.
Today, across Europe, political parties that could virtually be characterized as the direct successors to pre-WWII fascist movements are consolidating their electoral gains. Germany, France, and Italy serve as quintessential examples. These parties weaponize poverty, unemployment, and anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Middle Eastern sentiments, while capitalizing on the incompetence of traditional center-right and center-left parties and taking a deeply Eurosceptic, critical stance toward the European Union. They employ caustic rhetoric against the political elites who have dominated governance for decades. Receiving endorsement from both US President Trump and Russian leader Putin, they draw substantial support simultaneously from working-class constituencies—traditionally the bedrock of the left—and from grand capital circles. While monopoly capital quietly pats these populist movements on the back, it simultaneously winks at liberal-democratic and increasingly indistinguishable social-democratic parties that champion unbridled capitalism and aggressive liberalism. Beyond France and Germany, examples abound from Italy to the United Kingdom…
The interests of grand capital, which back populist regimes and advocate authoritarian governance, also champion localization. For the erosion of the national, the public, and the collective—alongside the attenuation of the central state and the elevation of the local—works decisively to the advantage of big capital.
Why?
Because of this:
Under liberalism, the state does not regulate the market; rather, the market regulates, directs, and subdues both the state and society. In a liberal order, the state is expected to act on behalf of capital and in favor of the market—intervening in politics, society, and the law, and enacting statutory frameworks strictly to this end. The state is tasked with engineering legal and institutional arrangements for the market’s account and benefit. Society is reduced to a market-society, wherein the citizen is reimagined as a consumer, a client, and an entrepreneur. Since competition is elevated as the supreme imperative, citizens themselves must become entrepreneurial and competitive—a posture the state actively promotes and incentivizes.
According to liberals, the state bears no obligation to shield its citizens from the pitiless mechanics of the market or the ferocity of unchecked capitalism. On the contrary, the state demands and encourages that citizens establish themselves as entrepreneurial actors within the market arena. Consequently, the state aligns itself with capital, operating at its beck and call. Hence, liberalism harbors an innate preference for unorganized, non-unionized, cheap labor. Wages are suppressed; agricultural subsidies are gutted to a minimum; and strikes are banned on the flimsiest of pretexts.
Because liberalism insists that the state be sculpted, organized, and driven according to market demands—allowing the market to command and direct the state—the liberal vision of the nexus between politics and economics, as well as politics and law, is deeply fractured. In their worldview, law must operate exclusively to the advantage of capital, acting as the vigilant sentinel for the inviolability of property rights. It must dismantle every obstacle standing in the way of free trade, unbridled competition, and the free market, while swiftly and severely penalizing any force that dares to impede them. To conform to the expectations and demands of capital: this is the primary imperative required of the law.
In sum, through its championing of identity politics, its reduction of the citizen to a mere client, and its liquidation of the state’s social character in order to place public power at the disposal of capital, liberalism stands fundamentally opposed to the social, the public, and the national. This is a truth that must be firmly impressed upon left-liberals, nationalist-liberals, and conservative-liberals alike.
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Middle East2 weeks agoPentagon faces severe budget crunch as Middle East operational costs drain key military funds
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Diplomacy2 weeks agoWorld Bank warns US-Iran conflict could slash global growth to 1.3% as inflation looms
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Middle East2 weeks agoOil passes $90 as tanker attacks halt Hormuz shipping
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Europe2 weeks agoGermany accelerates African energy diplomatic push to secure natural gas and green hydrogen
