Opinion
Lone Wolf in Power: Can Shigeru Ishiba Lead Japan Out of the Quagmire?
Niu Jiarui
Research Assistant, Department of History, Shanghai University
On September 27, 2024, the result of the presidential election of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) saw Shigeru Ishiba triumph over the frontrunners, including the favored candidate, Sanae Takaichi, securing the majority of votes in the second round to become the 28th President of the LDP. Under Japan’s parliamentary system, the leader of the ruling party is invariably the Prime Minister. Consequently, on October 1, following the resignation of the Kishida Cabinet, Ishiba was elected by the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors in a joint session, garnering over 50% of the votes, thus officially assuming the role of the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan.
Who is Shigeru Ishiba? Once labeled by the media as a ‘pro-China’ figure, claiming that ‘China poses zero threat to Japan,’ Ishiba has long been known within the LDP as a ‘lone wolf,’ often at odds with various factions within the party, yet he managed a stunning reversal in the polls. Recently, during his campaign, he proposed the establishment of an Asian version of NATO, demanding equal status with the United States, demonstrating a hawkish stance. The question remains whether Ishiba’s leadership will bring new changes to Japanese politics and how it will affect Japan’s relations with China and the United States.
Will his tenure be groundbreaking or ephemeral? The coordination and protection of forces within and outside the party are key.
Ishiba’s election is seen as a result of the machinations of power brokers and factional politics within the LDP. In 2008, Ishiba’s first attempt at running for the LDP presidency ended in defeat by former Prime Minister Taro Aso. In the 2012, 2018, and 2020 elections, he faced similar failures, largely due to his poor relations within the party, often clashing with sitting prime ministers and causing political divisions, leading to his repeated losses in intra-party elections.
In this year’s election, Ishiba won the presidency with a narrow margin of 215 to Takaichi’s 194. Two factors contributed to this outcome: firstly, Takaichi’s radical policies raised concerns among conservative members within the LDP, and secondly, several key ‘kingmakers,’ such as former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, former LDP President Fumio Kishida, and former Prime Minister Taro Aso, all endorsed candidates in the second round. After the initial round, except for Aso’s faction, most of the previously undecided factional votes flowed towards Ishiba. This shift was not only due to Ishiba’s political promises to regain the trust of his peers but also a calculated move by factional leaders to test the waters with a potentially reformist figure within the party. Despite the claim of a faction-free election, the reality is that the election was still influenced by factional politics, and Ishiba’s victory may be a trial by the factions to see if he can lead the LDP out of its current doldrums and restore public confidence. The factions remain cautiously optimistic.
On October 1st, the list of cabinet members was also announced, reflecting the compromises and concessions made by the politically weak Ishiba to various forces.
Japanese politics is essentially about interpersonal relationships, emphasizing the exchange of power and the balance of factional power. Maintaining harmony within the party requires a delicate balance of power and relationships among factions. The new cabinet lineup, which includes one member from the Kishida faction (Kochikai), two from the Aso faction (Wakate Kyokai), one from the Motegi faction (Heisei Kenkyukai), one from the Ishiba faction (Suigetsu-kai), two from the old Nishimura faction, one from the old Hayashi faction, one member from the Komeito, and 11 unaffiliated members, demonstrates a balance between experience and fresh blood, factional equilibrium, cross-factional cooperation, gender and age diversity. This reflects Ishiba’s effort to seek balance in the new cabinet.
Although Ishiba has been cautious and conservative in his actions to avoid conflicts with various parties, his position as Prime Minister remains precarious.
Recently, Ishiba has been accused of potential financial misconduct within his faction, the Suigetsu-kai, involving unaccounted-for political funds. Based on public opinion, such revelations at this time are likely to be recognized as the result of threats or hints from within the party or external forces, signaling to Ishiba to stay within his bounds.
Regardless, the new Prime Minister is immediately facing the risk of a political scandal, which could adversely affect the LDP’s upcoming House of Representatives election. Initially, the Ishiba Cabinet’s approval rating was only 51%, the lowest since 2001. It remains to be seen whether this support rate can be maintained above 50%. Whether the unstable governance can be put on the right track depends on various factors. Given the fragile position of the Ishiba administration, his policies and political direction may be determined by the party’s leadership. How Ishiba balances various forces and successfully fulfills his role as Prime Minister remains to be seen.
A Quest for Equivalence with the United States? Ishiba’s Grand Strategy May Be Difficult to Realize
Japan has long sought military self-defense and strategic protection.
Since the 1951 signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan has maintained a high degree of unity with the United States in military strategy. Alongside the external cooperation formed by the U.S. military presence and Japan’s strategic use of land, Japan has established an internal strategy to expand the scope and responsibilities of its Self-Defense Forces, while also seeking to amend the Constitution’s Article 9, which renounces war. These have long been consistent political goals of the LDP and other conservative parties.
Since the 21st century, leaders such as Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Fukuda Yasuo, and Shinzo Abe have prioritized military strength as part of their policy platforms, actively promoting the revision of defense guidelines and constitutional reform. Ishiba has also taken a hawkish stance in the field of military security, advocating for the establishment of an ‘Asian version of NATO’ during his campaign and emphasizing the importance of a basic national security law and strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance.
What is Asian version of NATO? As the name suggests, it aims to establish a military organization or alliance in Asia, similar to NATO in Europe, involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and other Asia-Pacific countries, with rights and obligations of mutual military cooperation . Ishiba argued, ‘Today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Asia… Asia lacks a collective self-defense system like NATO, and thus has no mutual defense obligations, making it prone to war… the establishment of Asian version of NATO is indispensable.’ He emphasized that geopolitical tensions are the principal rationale behind this proposal. Concurrently, Shigeru Ishiba underscores the notion that ‘Japan is a sovereign and independent nation,’ perceiving the current Japan-U.S. relationship as inherently ‘asymmetrical.’ The advocacy for an Asian version of NATO, rooted in the discourse of regional threats, aims to augment Japan’s military standing in East Asia. It seeks to establish a dialogue mechanism of equal standing between Japan and the U.S. and extend Japan’s military strategic reach into North America, thereby augmenting Japan’s strategic influence on the global stage.
However, the reality is that there are many obstacles to the establishment of the Asian version of NATO. Due to the different relationships with China and the cultural and institutional differences between Asian countries and Europe, the NATO model is difficult to replicate in Asia.
Firstly, ASEAN countries oppose it. The Jakarta Post, as the official newspaper of Indonesia, stated that ASEAN is not interested in Japan’s ‘Asian NATO’ proposal, as this alliance is seen as an affront, as participating in such a military alliance would only escalate regional tensions. ASEAN emphasizes the establishment of a multilateral framework centered on economic benefits, which is inconsistent with Japan’s focus on military competition in East Asia, revealing Japan’s intentions for military strength in the Asian NATO proposal.
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar also clearly expressed India’s negative response. He emphasized that India has a unique historical background and diplomatic strategy and does not intend to become part of any military alliance, nor will it follow the practices of other countries. This statement sends a direct and clear message to the new Japanese Prime Minister that India seeks autonomy and independence in security and strategic cooperation and is unwilling to participate in the construction of a regional military group similar to NATO.
At the same time, the pursuit of an equal position with the United States in Asian NATO will inevitably face opposition from the United States. The concept of an Asian NATO with Japan advocating for ‘leadership under the United States and Japan’ and ‘parity with the U.S. in military terms’ is fraught with challenges, and Ishiba also stated that ‘elevating the Japan-U.S. alliance to the level of the U.S.-U.K. alliance is my mission.’ U.S. officials responsible for East Asian and Pacific affairs stated that Ishiba’s proposal to ‘establish a more formal institution’ is not yet ripe, and the United States prefers to optimize the existing cooperation framework rather than seek the creation of a new closed military alliance.
Therefore, they all have issued a warning to Ishiba, greatly extinguishing the flames of Ishiba’s Asian NATO ambitions, and the United States and ASEAN’s refusal to Japan’s proposed regional military alliance makes the strategic blueprint of Asian NATO difficult to implement.
Is Ishiba a ‘pro-China faction’ within the LDP? Ishiba’s stance on China after taking office still requires cautious observation.
Before becoming Prime Minister, Ishiba showed a ‘pro-China’ signal during his time in governance. As a Christian who empathizes with the weak, Ishiba demonstrated a rare stance on China-Japanese historical issues, acknowledging that ‘Japan should reflect on and apologize for the war,’ stating that both Chinese and Japanese people were victims of that war. Compared to the Japanese right-wing politicians who always beautify historical facts and refuse to admit the aggression of war, Ishiba’s stance within the LDP is quite pro-China, and he has long been considered by the Japanese media as a member of the ‘pro-China faction’ within the party. On the issue of China, Ishiba has emphasized that China is not a threat to Japan and has recently stressed the importance of dialogue and exchange to continuously advance strategic reciprocal relations with China.
However, as the leader of Japan, will Ishiba adhere to the political stance of his youth after taking office? On the one hand, Ishiba’s repeated appearances in the election have focused on achieving ‘Asian NATO’ as his governing goal. The establishment of a military alliance inevitably requires creating an imaginary enemy—is it China or North Korea? In this case, will China-Japanese relations deteriorate due to Japan’s military extremism? On the other hand, his demand to station U.S. troops in Guam and establish a security dialogue with the United States on an equal footing has been clearly rejected by the United States. ‘The strategy of competing with the United States’ must be implemented, does this mean that Japan’s strategy will shift, and through strengthening cooperation with China, will it achieve its cunning goals?
Japan’s security has always relied on external support. And Japan, which has long maintained a unified front with the United States, if seeking external parity with the United States, must rely on the interests and strategic support of opposing forces to maintain a close but independent alliance distance. However, in reality, Japan cannot achieve such ambitions at present. As mentioned above, the domestic situation in Japan is unstable, and the external strategy is blocked. Ishiba’s goal of Asian NATO is difficult to achieve breakthrough progress in his three-year term. Looking at the domestic situation, such as the LDP’s financial reform, the upcoming House of Representatives election, the disaster relief in Noto, and the adjustment of the economic market deflation… Japan’s domestic political ruins are in urgent need of repair, leaving Ishiba’s cabinet with little room to develop overseas forces. Therefore, on the external stance, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not loudly proclaimed the strategic shift of Japan after the prime minister’s change, and Japanese Foreign Minister Iwao Tsukuda also stated that Asian NATO should be ‘carefully considered.’
Ishiba’s softened diplomatic stance after taking office shows such a conservative handling logic: Japan’s comprehensive alliance relationship with the United States will not change, and Japan’s consistent strategy towards China will not change because of the promotion of security system expansion. Domestic affairs are prioritized over foreign affairs, and the opportunity-based security competition under the threat of the region will be temporarily shelved, with continuous planning and covert operations in the future. Faced with the situation in the East, Japan’s current statements are more conservative, avoiding focal disputes with China and the United States, while focusing on the adjustment of domestic affairs and easing diplomatic pressure. Especially for China-Japanese relations, it is also stated that ‘although there are various unresolved issues,’ there is a desire to build a constructive and stable relationship through strengthened dialogue. Therefore, whether the Japan-U.S. relationship will enter an ‘adrift’ era, or whether the hawkish stance will be implemented to the end, maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance’s security network against China and North Korea, we cannot generalize.
Ishiba’s policy declaration behind shows Japan’s sensitivity to changes in the East Asian geopolitical landscape and the country’s anxiety about Japan’s progress, which is a struggle against the current. Under the competition of China and the United States, the Ishiba cabinet chooses diplomatic compromise, prioritizing domestic affairs, which is the consideration of Ishiba’s timing and also the inevitable result of Japan’s political environment. In such diplomatic deployment, Japan-U.S. relations and Japan-China relations will not change significantly in the future, and the direction of Japan will have to wait and see Ishiba’s future governance performance.
Opinion
What Did the Trilateral Summit in China Reveal?
The trilateral summit between US President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, held on November 19, 2026, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit hosted by China, not only overshadowed the APEC gathering itself but also dominated the global agenda. It is worth recalling that APEC economies account for more than 60 percent of global GDP and half of the world’s merchandise trade.
Some have compared the summit to the Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945), which brought together the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union toward the end of World War II. But this is a deeply flawed comparison. The world is no longer the same, and neither is the United States. Moreover, Britain, which had a seat at the table back then, is absent today. This time, a very powerful China is at the table. Russia now occupies the seat once held by the Soviet Union. The Yalta Conference took place as a major war over the division of the world was drawing to a close. The summit in China, by contrast, was held at a time when the shift toward multipolarity is increasingly evident. The Yalta Conference produced significant consequences in terms of dividing up the world. This summit, however, produced no tangible results whatsoever.
Nor could it have.
Why?
Because it is extremely rare for summits of this kind to produce major results. Leaders attend such meetings to size up their counterparts and rivals, project an image to the world and demonstrate their importance to their domestic audiences. This is true of bilateral and trilateral summits, just as it is of NATO, UN and EU summits.
This time was no different.
The three major powers attending the summit pledged to one another and to the world that they would remain in communication. They also demonstrated that they could come together whenever they wished. That was all.
No progress was made toward resolving either their mutual disagreements or broader global problems. These are countries with different expectations, priorities, interests, scales of power and perceptions of threats. At the summit, the United States found itself alone at the table, while China and Russia were the more comfortable parties.
But there is more.
If we examine the positions of the three leaders individually, US President Trump emerges as a leader who has lost his majorities in both chambers of Congress and become what Americans call a “lame duck.” He has also failed to achieve what he had hoped for against Iran, while the politician he supported in Israel failed to win the election. The United States is a country marked by deep social, cultural and class divisions. Its productive capacity is far below what it once was. Inevitably, this situation is reflected in its politics, foreign policy and military.
Xi, the leader of the host country, China, was in the strongest position of the three. His country continues to make economic advances, and he knows that time is on China’s side. China trades with the vast majority of the 193 UN member states and runs a trade surplus with 106 countries. Known as the world’s factory, China continues to deliver strong performance in economic growth, production, trade, exports and investment. It is also rapidly deploying its soft power resources and public diplomacy tools. China is increasingly prominent in rankings of the world’s largest companies, banks and universities, as well as in the number of patents, electric vehicle production and artificial intelligence research.
The other leader at the summit, Vladimir Putin, has managed to keep Russia’s economy afloat despite the war in Ukraine, contrary to the expectations, wishes and predictions of Western observers. The share of the US dollar and euro in Russian exports has fallen from 85 percent in 2021 to just 9 percent today. Despite the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries over the war in Ukraine, the Russian economy has grown by more than 10 percent over the past three years. Russia has replaced the West with the East in its foreign trade. Indeed, the Asia-Pacific region’s share of Russia’s foreign trade has risen from 25 percent in 2014 to 53 percent today. Its free trade agreement with Indonesia will enter into force in early 2027. Russia is also continuing negotiations with India on a free trade agreement.
EUROPE’S DISMAL STATE
The summit of the three major powers in China was also revealing in another respect: it exposed the predicament Europe has fallen into. Europeans, who are neither consulted nor even mentioned when it comes to resolving major global or regional problems, should be well aware of the position they now find themselves in, as well as the European Union’s ineffectiveness and diminished standing.
Indeed, one of the three leaders attending the summit, Vladimir Putin, drew attention to this situation at a conference held as part of APEC. He stressed that Europe, having drastically reduced its energy imports from Russia, was now facing energy shortages and losing its competitiveness.
It is worth recalling that, in its efforts to minimize energy imports from Russia, Europe turned to liquefied natural gas (LNG). It invested in wind energy, sought to expand its bioenergy and nuclear capacity, and turned to solar power. It called on citizens to conserve energy, urging them to turn down their thermostats by one degree and make greater use of heat pumps. None of these measures solved Europe’s problems.
In short, the trilateral summit in China produced no concrete results. But it once again demonstrated the influential and decisive positions that the three countries occupy in world affairs.
Opinion
The Chinese Approach Behind the Trilateral Summit: It May Pay to Get Familiar with It Sooner Rather Than Later
The most important significance of this China-Russia-U.S. trilateral summit lies not in how many specific issues it has resolved, but in the fact that the meeting itself is a landmark event.
Looking back at international diplomacy over the past several decades, neither the G8 nor the G20 has ever seen a formal dialogue of this kind, with the leaders of China, Russia and the United States taking part directly in a meeting centered on their trilateral relationship.
Russia was once a member of the G8, but within that framework it always struggled to escape its structural differences with the other Western members. Much of the time, it had to contend with pressure from them. As for the G20, although the leaders of China, Russia and the United States have all attended its meetings, the three countries have never come together in this way.
This time is different. Three countries with the world’s most consequential military capabilities, nuclear arsenals and economic influence are beginning to explore a new way of communicating directly with one another.
For this reason, the value of the meeting should not be judged by how many specific disputes it has resolved. Complex international problems cannot be settled in a single meeting. What truly matters is that it has shown the world that the three major powers are willing to seek solutions together. Even if differences remain on specific issues, the three countries have at least established a platform in which they can discuss, coordinate and seek common ground.
Conversely, the fact that the summit directly addressed specific issues, including issuing an explicit warning to the International Criminal Court, also shows that this was not a diplomatic performance with merely symbolic significance. What is at stake is whether the major powers can reach some form of common position on concrete international affairs, and whether that position can have a practical impact.
The Agendas Behind the Reactions
There has been no shortage of opposition to the summit. But a closer look reveals that many of the criticisms have less to do with whether the meeting can bring benefits to the international community than with the political positions and interests of those making them.
In the United States, some media outlets with Democratic Party leanings seem to have one overriding objective: criticizing Trump. Whatever he does can be portrayed as political grandstanding, a diplomatic concession to Putin, or a betrayal of America’s traditional allies.
For some neoliberals who self-styled as global citizens, the future of the world seems to have only one acceptable form: the one that conforms to their own ideals. They are not genuinely concerned with how countries can find common ground amid conflicts of real-world interests. Still less are they willing to acknowledge that the international order might evolve in a direction different from the one they have imagined.
Europe’s reaction, meanwhile, stems largely from anxiety over Ukraine’s future and its reluctance to see Putin return to the center of international diplomacy.
But there is a fundamental reversal of perspective here. Russia is facing the entire NATO bloc, whose member states have continued to provide Ukraine with economic support, weapons and technological assistance. Despite the scale of this external backing, Russia has still managed to gain the upper hand on the battlefield. This in itself says a great deal about Russia’s strength and its standing in the international system.
Russia is certainly no longer the Soviet Union, but its power has never been something that can be measured simply by GDP. Although its economy is considerably smaller than those of the United States and China, the war has demonstrated its economic resilience. Russia also remains one of the world’s most important military and nuclear powers, a force that no international security arrangement can afford to ignore. The fact that the United States and Europe have been unable to defeat Russia has already proved the point. There is simply no need for Putin to gain a personal diplomatic platform to demonstrate Russia’s importance.
As for Ukraine’s future, it will inevitably be the product of coordination among the major powers and itself. European countries are, of course, free to continue supporting Ukraine. But if they believe that sustained assistance alone will enable them to determine the outcome of the war entirely on their own terms, they are probably indulging in an illusion. Ukraine’s sovereignty and security interests deserve respect, but that does not mean its future can be discussed without regard to the actual balance of power.
It is particularly worth noting that the summit has once again affirmed a basic fact: a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers is something all sides are determined to avoid. Nuclear deterrence is not simply conventional military power magnified. It fundamentally changes the risk structure of great-power conflict. It requires all sides to maintain their red lines amid competition and keep communication open despite their differences.
Those who subscribe to the Thucydides Trap may have the intellectual capacity to search old texts for supposed historical patterns, but they may lack a sufficiently sharp intuition for what nuclear weapons really mean in the modern world. Mechanically applying the power transitions of ancient city-states to competition among today’s major powers, or simply predicting that a rising power and an established power are bound to go to war, shows little real understanding of the distinctive conditions of contemporary international relations. Hopefully, this summit will prompt them to think again: less noise from historical analogies divorced from reality, and more understanding of the strategic environment in which we actually live.
In Asia, Japan’s reaction appears to have been particularly strong.
Japan fears being left out, but the source of its anxiety lies in its own actions. Japan is a defeated country of WW2, and its postwar international standing and security arrangements are rooted in a distinctive historical context. Today, it wants to continue relying on the United States for security guarantees while seeking greater autonomy within the U.S.-led order. It wants to profit from U.S.-China competition, yet repeatedly provokes China and Russia on regional security issues. At the same time, there are already people in Japan openly discussing the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.
This contradiction—wanting both to remain dependent and to break free, seeking to profit from great-power rivalry while trying to reshape the regional security landscape—is drawing Japan into an increasingly complicated position.
If Japan is worried about being excluded from a new forum for great-power dialogue, it should first look to its own policy choices for the explanation. A country that repeatedly takes the initiative in creating tensions with its neighbors can hardly expect other major powers to put its concerns first when discussing regional security.
Another aspect worth noting is the way the three countries have approached the issues in the Middle East.
The Middle East is one of the most important geopolitical flashpoints in the world today, and the decision to start with energy issues is a particularly astute move. Energy is fundamental to the functioning of the global economy, and all three countries have direct interests in this area. Energy security, stable supplies and regional conditions offer common ground for discussion, while also providing a way to address broader questions of regional conflict, maritime security and the international political order. This does not mean that the three countries must adopt identical positions on the political stances about the region. Nor does it mean that the three major powers intend to decide the future of the Middle East among themselves. Rather, the starting point is to identify areas where their interests intersect and where common ground can be found.
This also shows that the trilateral summit is by no means a Yalta-style division of the world.
The Yalta Conference represented an arrangement of the postwar world by major powers on the basis of the balance of power created by military victory and occupation. What this summit represents is something different: three countries with enormous international influence seeking to identify areas for joint action despite their differing interests and positions.
These are two fundamentally different logics of international relations.
Why China Does Not Behave Like a Traditional Great Power
Outside China, many people still seem unable to understand one question: now that China is a major military and economic power, why does it not behave like the great powers of the past?
Why is China not in a hurry to carve out spheres of influence? Why is it not keen to use a military presence to control other regions, or to impose its own political system and values on other countries?
The answer lies in China’s own political and intellectual traditions.
The Chinese concepts of wangdao (rule through moral authority) and tianxia (all under heaven), together with the internationalist ideals rooted in communist thought, all form part of the way China understands international relations. China emphasizes resolving differences through consultation and reconciling the interests of different parties, rather than simply using power to divide countries into opposing camps. Something of this approach can even be seen in China’s domestic political system.
Take China’s legislative process, for example. It is not plainly a matter of holding a vote and passing a bill with a simple majority or a two-thirds majority. Before legislation is introduced, extensive research is conducted and opinions are solicited. During the legislative process, proposals are discussed and revised repeatedly. Before a formal vote, efforts are made to build the broadest possible consensus. The aim is not merely to get a bill passed, but to ensure that the final text wins the approval of as many deputies to the National People’s Congress as possible.
This does not mean that China’s legislative system is free of disagreement, or that every law receives unanimous approval. But it does reflect a political approach different from one based on competition for a majority: the aim is to resolve differences as far as possible before a vote, rather than treating the vote itself as the only means of resolving them.
The trilateral summit reflects a similar way of thinking. Its main objective is not to demand that countries choose sides, but to seek common ground. Rather than first dividing countries into camps and then discussing possible cooperation, the idea is to start with issues of shared concern and look for areas where progress can be made together.
Of course, China’s geopolitical thinking is also grounded in a very deep reservoir of historical experience.
Over the course of thousands of years, China’s territory gradually expanded to the geographical limits within which it was relatively feasible to exercise effective control. In a sense, it reached the limits of what it could readily govern. The dynasties of China’s past were not without ambitions for further expansion, nor did they never attempt to project power over greater distances. But China’s historical experience repeatedly demonstrated that expansion beyond a country’s actual capacity for governance and logistical support could become a heavy burden. Administering frontier regions, conducting long-distance military campaigns and waging sustained wars abroad all consume enormous national resources. Once those costs exceed what a country can bear, they can accelerate the accumulation of internal tensions and even set the country on the path to decline.
Dreaming of carving up the world is easy. But turning that dream into reality requires the ability to project power on a scale commensurate with those ambitions. And the ability to project power can itself generate further impulses to expand: maintaining existing control requires more resources; protecting established interests brings additional security commitments; and preventing a decline in influence can lead to an ever-widening scope of intervention. This logic can easily spiral out of control, turning the dream of expansion into a nightmare of national over-extension.
The rise and fall of the European powers since the Age of Exploration offer repeated evidence of this. The Chinese have, of course, taken notes.
I do not believe China’s geopolitical thinking can be explained entirely in terms of realist calculations. As noted above, it has much deeper historical, political and intellectual roots. But perhaps, at this stage, a realist perspective is the most useful way for others to understand China’s position.
China does not lack the ability to participate in international affairs, nor does it lack the resolve to defend its own interests. The key point is that China does not believe that expanding its influence must entail establishing spheres of influence, or that international affairs can only be resolved through competition for power among the major countries.
From Trilateral Consensus to Regional Consultation
Of course, emphasizing consultation among the major powers does not mean that three countries can make decisions on behalf of the rest of the world.
On the contrary, when the three countries seek to coordinate their efforts on specific regional issues, China can be expected to insist that the countries concerned be involved in the consultations. The three powers may reach a consensus on broad principles concerning issues of shared concern, but they should not impose any regional arrangements on that consensus alone. The sovereignty, interests and wishes of the countries in the region must still be respected.
China has already facilitated a number of rounds of diplomatic talks in the Middle East. The results have varied, but these efforts have brought about some tangible changes. The restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China, is one notable example. The significance of such diplomatic efforts is not that China decides the region’s future on behalf of the countries involved (nor could it ensure peace once for all) , but that it provides an opportunity for countries that once found it difficult to communicate to return to the negotiating table.
In this sense, what China hopes to promote is not a club in which three major powers jointly manage the world, but a model of international relations built on coordination among major powers, with regional countries taking part in the process and consensus gradually expanded through consultation.
One final point, from a realist perspective. There is a popular expression in China that refers to China, Russia and the United States as the “top three” among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
This is, of course, not an official diplomatic term, but it reflects an intuitive understanding of the current balance of power in the world. Britain and France still hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council, but their overall national strength and international influence have changed considerably from what they were in the era of colonial empires.
In a sense, the international standing of Britain and France is a legacy of the colonial era. The traditional geopolitical thinking of the United States and Russia, meanwhile, is a combination of the logic of global expansion pursued by colonial powers and the superpower rivalry that took shape after World War II. China’s rise has brought a different kind of international relations practice into the picture.
China cannot change the long-established thinking of the United States, Russia and other countries overnight. But perhaps, in the future, the international community will gradually become accustomed to China’s approach to consultation and see it play a role in an increasing number of international affairs.
Some have questioned whether this kind of trilateral summit can happen again. I would argue that the question is not so complicated. Now that such a forum has emerged, and now that it offers the three major powers an opportunity to communicate directly and seek common ground, what future U.S. president, regardless of party affiliation, could easily turn down the opportunity to take part?
Opinion
APEC Summit: How China Uses the Art of “Emotional Value” to Deal with Trump
The 2026 APEC summit in Shenzhen is destined to create a symbolic, yet important, chapter in the contemporary history of diplomacy: Chinese President Xi Jinping, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold a trilateral meeting in-person during the summit, which is described by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as a meeting with “groundbreaking significance.” There are reasons to support to the argument that such a description is not an exaggeration: This is actually the first time in history that the heads of state from the three most powerful countries among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council hold a trilateral meeting.
Among these three countries, there are three noteworthy pairs of dynamics: China and the United States mark the two largest and unparalleled economic superpowers of the world; Russia and the United States mark the largest and unparalleled nuclear military superpowers of the world; and China and Russia, together, are the most powerful challengers to the current West-led neoliberal world order. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that these three countries are the largest factors influencing the security and economic development of the world today, and thus this trilateral meeting, even if it is more symbolic than concrete, is destined to have profound historical significance. An important thing people can expect from this trilateral meeting is whether it can create some sort of long-term and periodic mechanisms of trilateral meetings among the heads of three states. If this meeting can establish such a long-term mechanism, that means that China, Russia, and the United States are interested in, at least symbolically, cooperating together on controlling the intensity of the competitions among them and on solving global conflicts and crisis together.
While I acknowledge that this trilateral meeting has tremendous symbolic significance, however, I do not argue that this trilateral meeting would make much concrete differences to the world order, not anything close to what the Yalta Conference in 1945 did. From the Chinese perspective, the purpose of this meeting is not able seriously construct a new platform to achieve a détente with the U.S., because the Chinese are fully aware that it cannot ever dissuade the U.S. from viewing China as its strategic rival. The purpose of this Xi-Putin-Trump meeting, in my opinion, is for China to use the “emotional value” to buy more time for China in its long-term strategic competition with the U.S.
“Emotional value” is a trendy Chinese internet-originated vocabulary that refers to the ability to provide positive emotional support, comfort, or joy to others in a relationship or social interaction. When you are not able to, or not willing to, offer actual use value (like money or other resources, for example) to someone, you can use “emotional value” to make them feel respected while refrain from actually spending resources on them. Ever since Trump’s first term in 2016 and since the first round of China-US trade war in 2018, the Chinese have been severely bothered by his unpredictable personality, and Chinese officials are often confused about how serious Trump is when he comments on trade issues. Putin’s performance, however, provided a remarkable lesson for the China on how to deal with Trump: During the Russia-Ukraine war, Putin made various comments saying that he was willing to accept Trump as a mediator in this conflict, and there were various cases that Putin spent hours talking with Trump on phone, making Trump emotionally satisfied and felt respected. Meanwhile, however, the Russian army did not halt its operations in the frontier, and Putin’s emotional “massage” for Trump actually gave the Russian army more time to advance its control of territories in the frontier.
From the Chinese perspective, Putin’s success in dealing with Trump is remarkably useful, and the Chinese quickly learned it from him: When Trump visited Beijing in May 2026, the Chinese showed great hospitality to him and his accompanies, including US Secretary of State Marco Rubio who once was sanctioned by China, and media report in China was filled with headlines such as “Rubio was amazed by the architecture of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.” In terms of important political issues, however, there was very little achieved in this visit, and both countries did not even publish a joint communique. Trump’s visit to China in May seemed to be simply a tourist group of old people, and the Chinese did not expect any progress of China-US relations. This touristic visit of Trump, however, was seen as positive by the Chinese, because at least it appeased the unpredictable personality of Trump and Trump did not make trouble for China for at least half of a year until now. Most important, while offering emotional value for Trump in this visit, the Chinese government offered almost nothing it did not wish to offer in terms of concrete national interests of China: For example, China did not compromise on its subsidies for state corporations and AI industries, its currency policy on the yuan, its military exercise in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and its partnership with Russia and Iran. From Chinese point of view, this is a diplomatic victory that prevented Trump from further causing troubles for China for quite a while, without any real costs in terms of national interests.
Therefore, one can understand this incoming trilateral meeting as another event in which China repeat this practice. China is not naïve to expect anything concrete from the U.S. in this meeting for two reasons. First, China is fully aware that the US has a bipartisan consensus viewing China as its major strategic rival, and this will not change in the foreseeable future. Second, after the mid-term election, the Democrats now control the Senate, and thus even if Trump is willing to sign anything with China, these agreements can be easily sabotage by the Democrats soon. Therefore, with such a low expectation, the only thing China expects from Trump now is not making troubles for China in the rest of his term.
China also understands that, with such a huge lose in the mid-term election, Trump and the Republican party must be very anxious about the presidential election in two years, and Trump desperately needs some sort of accomplishments which he can use for domestic propaganda. This APEC meeting can be a great chance for him: The Chinese will show respect for him in terms of protocols, and will likely release some positive but vague signals on trade issues that are not related to China’s core interests, such as agreeing to purchase more American agricultural products. These materials can be used by Trump for his domestic propaganda to continue rally his MAGA supporters, and meanwhile he will likely be silent on China-related issues for a while. With that time earned through offering emotional value, China will be able to get more time to further strengthening itself in military, economy, and high-technology industries, preparing itself for its long-term competition with the U.S. and for China’s own goals, such as the reunification of Taiwan.
It is important to point out that Trump is not the only one receiving this emotional value. China recognizes that its quasi-ally Putin also needs some materials for domestic propaganda too, and thus this trilateral meeting will also be an event in which China tries its best to emphasize Russia’s status still as a global power. Interestingly, in the formal statement released by the Chinese foreign ministry, instead of using the term “China-US-Russia trilateral meetings” as most international media do, the Chinese foreign ministry deliberately uses the word “China-Russia-US trilateral meetings” to offer emotional value to Putin. One can expect China and Russia to release a number of agreements and maybe a joint statement on current issues in order to demonstrate to the world that China is still standing together with Russia in the common struggle against the neoliberal unipolar world, and both countries will likely emphasize again their common goal in constructing a multipolar world, despite the fact that both China and Russia will likely provide remarkable emotional value to Trump in order to keep him calm.
Many people tend to expect changes in international relations to be a fast one marked by various milestones. In reality, however, politics never works that way, and the Chinese are clearly aware of this. China does not attempt to show its ambition in a milestone meeting, and this trilateral summit in APEC is never meant to be another Yalta Conference. Instead, the APEC will be a platform for China to promote two things: First, China will manage its stable relationship with the US, and will buy more time for itself through offering emotional value to Trump while refraining from compromising on any actual national core interests of China; second, China will use this platform to strengthen its partnership with not only its quasi-ally Russia, but also other friendly states in the developing world, in order to move forward to a multipolar world.
The Romans say that “Rome is not built in one day.” In China, more than two thousand years ago, political scholar and strategist Hanfeizi also has a famous quote says “the collapse of a huge dam starts with little holes of the ants.” The Chinese, with thousands years of experiences in politics, are patient enough in terms of their diplomacy, and understands that the erosion of the current US-dominated neoliberal and unipolar world will be a long process. This APEC meeting is not a milestone marking dramatic and sudden changes in international relations, but one of the many small steps for China to buy more time, to strengthen itself militarily and economically, and to deepen its ties with partners all over the world in a common struggle for a multipolar world order which is not dominated by the West.
*Zhang Sheng is currently a PhD candidate in Sociology at Johns Hopkins University and holds a master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University. He is also non-resident researcher at the Center for Asian Studies, Koç University. Zhang’s research interests include, but are not limited to, the evolution and transformation of China’s engagement in the Middle East, Sino-Turkish relations, and Chinese diplomacy and politics from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the present. In addition, Zhang is a research fellow affiliated with several think tanks and research institutes in China and Nepal. Beyond his academic career, he is also a political commentator and columnist, frequently contributing opinion pieces and giving television interviews for various mainstream media outlets in China, Egypt, Russia, and Nepal.
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