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Alaska Summit will not reverse Ukraine’s great defeat

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At midnight on August 15 local time, the much-anticipated U.S.-Russia summit concluded at the Joint Military Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska, with both sides reaching no written agreement and agreeing to continue talks later. Although U.S. President Trump had predicted that the “probability of failure” was only 25%, the summit, despite seemingly yielding limited results, itself became a milestone in easing U.S.-Russia relations, especially as a consensus on follow-up negotiations was reached. Therefore, it is expected to lay the foundation for a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine conflict through territorial exchange. Naturally, it cannot reverse the great defeat of Ukraine and even Europe.

It is reported that the U.S.-Russia summit adopted a “3+3” dialogue model led separately by Trump and Russian President Putin, lasting nearly three hours. After the talks, Trump and Putin held a joint press conference as scheduled and gave high evaluations of the summit in a relatively friendly atmosphere.

Putin emphasized that the talks were “productive, the atmosphere was positive, and the content was very profound and clear.” He described the U.S. and Russia as “close neighbors separated by the ocean” with a “shared historical heritage (referring to Alaska),” who had also fought common enemies. However, he noted that in the four years since the last summit, bilateral relations had “fallen to the lowest point since the Cold War,” which was not in the interests of either country or the world. Both sides needed to shift from confrontation to dialogue.

When talking about the Russia-Ukraine war, Putin praised Trump’s efforts to promote peace, stating that the “Ukraine incident” posed a fundamental threat to Russia, and he looked forward to “ensuring the solution for Ukraine is stable and long-term, eliminating all the original crises, and ensuring that all laws regarding the establishment of a fair and balanced Europe are taken into account.” Putin pledged that “Ukraine’s security must also be guaranteed” and that he would work with the U.S. side to achieve the goal of “paving the way for peace in Ukraine,” hoping Ukraine and European countries would “accept all this constructively, set up no obstacles, and not attempt to undermine the process through provocations and behind-the-scenes plots.”

Trump declared that he had a “productive meeting with Putin. We agreed on many points; I would say most (key points) are agreed upon, with a few big issues not yet fully resolved… so before we reach an agreement, nothing counts yet.”

Trump said he would later brief Ukrainian President Zelensky as well as NATO and European leaders on the content and progress of the summit by phone and emphasized that whether an agreement would be reached ultimately depended on their attitude. Trump also optimistically stated that the points of disagreement still had a “good chance of being achieved.”

At the press conference, Putin suggested holding the next U.S.-Russia summit in Moscow. Trump neither confirmed nor denied, casually saying it was “rather troublesome” for the U.S. side. However, Trump thanked Putin for visiting, gave the negotiation results a “10 out of 10,” and withdrew his previous warning that Russia would face “serious consequences.”

The U.S.-Russia Alaska Summit attracted global attention, not primarily because it could necessarily bring peace to both Russia and Ukraine, but because it broke Western political taboos by initiating the first U.S.-Russia presidential meeting since the outbreak of the war three years ago. Putin, who had been collectively boycotted by most Western countries, expelled from the G7 club, and wanted by the International Criminal Court in Rome due to the Russia-Ukraine war, had now become a guest of honor for the Western leader, the United States. He even received Trump’s extraordinary courtesy of being greeted personally at the plane’s stairway and escorted to the meeting site in the same car. This undoubtedly humiliated America’s European and NATO partners and proved that Trump was indeed a transactional leader who disregarded values, morality, and integrity.

From this perspective, the Alaska summit also created history, as it was not only the first time a Russian leader had visited this territory once sold to the United States but also the first time in ten years that the U.S. had welcomed a Russian president again. Moreover, the Alaska summit was not only the first Trump-Putin meeting since 2019 but also the first U.S.-Russia summit since the Biden-Putin talks in Geneva in May 2021. From the perspective of bilateral relations, the Alaska summit witnessed and promoted further repair and warming of U.S.-Russia relations, as well as consolidated the stability and sustainability of the personal relationship between Trump and Putin.

However, Alaska did not bring a substantive breakthrough in resolving the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Even at the final critical moment, both sides greatly lowered expectations for the summit’s outcome, including not signing any agreement. The reasons are simple: first, the summit was prepared in great haste; second, it concerned Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty. Before the summit, both teams had limited time for full consultations and groundwork, so it was clearly too late to reach a written agreement or inappropriate to form a written document. Therefore, the Alaska summit became a journey of restoring U.S.-Russia bilateral relations and an exploration of peace in Russia and Ukraine.

Before embarking on the Alaska journey, Trump had already clarified the interim task of the summit, promising not to finalize any agreement with Putin but to leave agreements for subsequent U.S.-Russia-Ukraine trilateral talks. He told the media, “If this is a good meeting, we will achieve peace in the near future.” “The second (trilateral) meeting will be very, very important because it will be the meeting where they reach an agreement.”

Trump also bluntly said, “I don’t want to use the word ‘partition,’ but in some sense, it’s not a bad word.” Clearly, Trump acknowledged the reality of Ukrainian land being taken by Russia and had continuously, overtly or covertly, been selling this plan to Ukraine and other Western partners. Trump’s active planning and promotion of the Alaska summit was very likely aimed at demanding Russia agree to a ceasefire, thereby creating conditions for subsequent “land for peace” or “land for security.” In other words, as long as Russia agreed to a full or even partial ceasefire — for example, no longer launching ground offensives to seize more Ukrainian land, or halting large-scale airstrikes against Ukraine’s deep targets — Trump would have the grounds and confidence to persuade or force Ukraine and its European war-hawk partners to accept reality.

The fundamental reason the Alaska summit did not achieve full consensus may also lie in the fact that Russia has not yet achieved its intended land-control goals, such as complete control of the Donbas region. It could also be that Russia still hoped the U.S. and NATO would provide more reliable guarantees for its current territorial claims and long-term security demands, especially ensuring Ukraine would not join NATO.

Although the Alaska summit did not sign any written agreement, it still left Ukraine and most of its European partners unhappy, uneasy, and pessimistic. Because the final outcome of sacrificing Ukraine and Europe’s security interests has already become apparent, signing an agreement is merely a matter of sooner or later, not a question of whether such a compromise will be made.

Before attending the meeting at Trump’s invitation, Russia’s bottom line had already been laid on the table and known to the world. Its core terms were that Ukraine must cede part of its territory and abandon joining NATO. The Trump administration’s demands were also open and transparent: requiring Russia to quickly agree to a ceasefire in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions, but not requiring Russia to withdraw from the Ukrainian lands it already occupied. The “partition” prospect Trump mentioned in his warm-up for the Alaska summit was the best policy annotation of this.

The Times of London recently quoted U.S. National Security Council sources as saying that the U.S. and Russia had discussed possible models for Russia’s long-term occupation of Ukrainian territory, one of which was based on Israel’s occupation model of Palestinian land in the West Bank. In such a scenario, Russia would have military and economic control over the occupied Ukrainian territories and establish its own government there. Although the White House denied this report as fake news, it was clearly not groundless and was in fact the very tragic ending of the Russia-Ukraine conflict that the author had predicted years ago: the “Palestinization” of the Ukraine issue.

In the face of the reality that the United States appears to be mediating fairly but is in fact adopting an appeasement policy toward Russia, and that Europe cannot rid itself of its emotional and power dependence on the U.S., Ukraine and its European partners have lost confidence and courage. Although Zelensky emphasized that “Ukrainians will not give their land to the occupiers,” he is now more eager than ever to participate in a U.S.-Russia summit, and even hopes to hold a U.S.-Russia-Ukraine summit unconditionally.

NATO Secretary-General Rutte, in an interview with ABC on August 10, helplessly stated that Ukraine may eventually have to accept Russia’s de facto control over part of the occupied territories. Such control would be based on “factual” recognition, not “legal” recognition. This was by far the most candid and straightforward statement from a NATO leader regarding a peaceful solution to the Russia-Ukraine war.

On the eve of the Alaska summit, German Chancellor Merz met Zelensky in Berlin. The leaders of Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Finland, as well as European Council President von der Leyen and NATO Secretary-General Rutte, also participated via video link. After the meeting, Merz, on behalf of the European partners, put forward five demands to Trump to ensure Europe’s and Ukraine’s basic security interests: Ukraine must participate in follow-up talks, a ceasefire must precede any peace agreement, territorial claims must be based on the existing frontlines, Ukraine must receive security guarantees, and negotiations with Russia should be based on a “common transatlantic strategy.”

Although the Alaska summit did not reach a milestone agreement, it itself had milestone significance. It not only meant that U.S.-Russia relations had warmed up further, but also that the Russia-Ukraine war was one step closer to a “strategic match point” of U.S.-Russia compromise and Ukraine-Europe concessions. Since Trump and Putin have agreed to continue holding summits, Putin’s suggestion of Moscow as the next venue cannot be ruled out. The next summit may become a decisive closing negotiation, whether limited to the U.S. and Russia, or expanded to include trilateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks, or even quadrilateral talks involving the U.S., Russia, Ukraine, and the EU or NATO.

The future of the Russia-Ukraine war as a “tragic victory for Russia and a tragic defeat for Ukraine” is becoming increasingly clear, as the balance of victory in the war is tilting more visibly toward Russia and approaching its ceasefire conditions: Ukrainian troops withdrawing from the remaining controlled areas of Donbas, giving Russia full control over Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and the Crimean Peninsula. On the 11th, Ukrainian frontline military personnel admitted that Ukrainian troops entrenched in the southwest corner of Donetsk faced the risk of encirclement, and on the 13th, the governor of that region pessimistically stated that Russian forces had fully controlled the Donetsk frontline.

What cannot be obtained on the battlefield is difficult to obtain at the negotiating table; what cannot be gained at the negotiating table can only be fought for on the battlefield. Whether at the negotiating table or on the battlefield, since the U.S. is almost entirely leaning toward Russia, Ukraine and its European partners will be the losers. Perhaps before the next U.S.-Russia summit or multilateral summit is held, Russian forces will already have achieved their established battlefield objectives, and by then, Ukraine and its European partners will be forced to swallow the bitter fruit of ceding land in exchange for peace.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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