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Israel’s reoccupation of Gaza will bury the “Oslo Accords”

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On August 8, under the coercion of far-right forces such as Prime Minister Netanyahu, Israel made a major and historic decision that completely reverses the peace process between Palestine and Israel, announcing that it will fully reoccupy the Gaza Strip, completely eliminate the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), and establish a new civil government. The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office stated that the Israel Defense Forces will be prepared to take over Gaza City while providing humanitarian aid to civilians outside the war zone.

It is reported that the Israeli Security Cabinet approved by majority vote Netanyahu’s strongly advocated “final solution” for Gaza, passing the so-called “Five Principles to End the War,” which include disarming Hamas; returning all Israelis held captive, whether alive or dead; achieving the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip; maintaining Israel’s security control over the Gaza Strip; and establishing a civil government that belongs neither to Hamas nor to the Palestinian National Authority.

This move by Israel is enough to shock and deeply worry world public opinion. When Israel, after ending 20 years of institutionalized garrison in the Gaza Strip, once again imposes full military administration, it is tantamount to declaring the complete death of the “Oslo Accords,” that the Palestinian National Authority recognized by the international community is no longer a peace partner, that the Gaza Strip is no longer “owned and governed by Palestinians,” and that Israel will once again become the overlord of this land.

From a broader and longer-term perspective, this move will weaken Israel’s strategic mutual trust and reconciliation cooperation with its peace partner and the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO, and may reset the reconciliation process between Israel and Arab countries based on the “Abraham Accords,” possibly further worsening Israel’s relations with the international community, and even creating new troubles for the United States, which fully supports Israel, increasing its heavier strategic liabilities.

Reoccupying the Gaza Strip and dominating its future governance is to put the historically turbulent train of the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli peace process into reverse, pushing Israel to repeat the mistakes of history. It will neither help effectively resolve the Gaza war predicament it is deeply mired in, nor help achieve lasting peace and stability, especially the historical reconciliation with Palestine and Arab countries.

Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas carried out the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation and crossed the border to attack Israel, only a year and a half has passed, yet the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has escalated into the “Sixth Middle East War,” with the flames of war extending to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea region, and the Persian Gulf. Israel appears to have achieved military victories over most of its opponents in the “Axis of Resistance,” even hardline adversary Iran, and unexpectedly reaped the “fruit” of the Syrian regime’s collapse. However, it has never managed to conquer the Gaza Strip, which is only 360 square kilometers, has not eliminated Hamas despite the leadership being reportedly “wiped out,” has not eradicated the remnants of Hamas engaged in “ruins guerrilla warfare,” and has not rescued nearly 50 hostages on the brink of death.

Netanyahu and his government, using near-genocidal “scorched-earth tactics” and “starvation tactics,” have created a contemporary, horrific humanitarian disaster that shocks the conscience, challenges the principles of international and humanitarian law and the bottom line of human civilization, humiliates the international community, especially the United Nations composed of 193 sovereign states and two observer states, triggers a global wave of condemnation and anti-Israel sentiment, and revives non-mainstream antisemitic thought in both Eastern and Western societies. In addition, major Western countries that originally adopted indulgent and appeasing policies toward Israel have successively changed their positions—Canada, France, the UK, and Australia are preparing to recognize the State of Palestine, with some countries taking various forms of sanctions and restrictions against Israel. Some developing countries have long since imposed harsher sanctions on Israel, including severing or downgrading diplomatic relations, cooperating with the International Criminal Court in issuing “war crimes” warrants for Netanyahu and other Israeli political and military leaders.

However, Netanyahu, regardless of Israel’s historic political and diplomatic failures, and ignoring opposition from intelligence chiefs, in order to please far-right forces and avoid the collapse of his ruling coalition, as well as to evade legal accountability likely to arise from corruption cases and national security crises, has recklessly led the full reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, expanding the scale and intensity of the war, and increasing Palestinian suffering.

Netanyahu’s latest risky Gaza strategy is actually the result of excessive personal self-interest and an extreme obsession to fight to the end, ignoring that the whole country has fallen into a long war and is fighting on multiple fronts, ignoring the daily casualties at the front line, ignoring the gradual exhaustion of manpower to the point of overturning decades-old national policy to forcibly conscript religious students, ignoring that the entire country’s main trajectory has shifted from peace and development to war and conquest, ignoring the continuous deterioration of the investment climate, the ongoing withdrawal of foreign capital and expatriates, and the constant hemorrhaging of economic development.

Netanyahu’s “scorched-earth tactics” have completely deprived the geographically small Gaza Strip of any security space. Not only are Palestinians losing their lives at the rate of hundreds per day, but the plight of Israeli hostages is also worsening. Especially when combined with the “starvation tactics,” it not only continuously causes a systemic crisis in the basic food and nutrition supply for Palestinians, but also objectively turns surviving Israeli hostages into burial companions.

After Hamas and other organizations recently released the latest hostage status video, the world was shocked, and Israel suffered another heavy blow: Evyatar David, trapped in a confined space, is skin and bones, estimated to have lost half his body weight. Evyatar was even forced to dig his own grave in the reinforced concrete tunnels under Hamas control. Although Hamas’s inhumane acts are certainly condemnable, they show that Netanyahu’s military pressure policy has completely failed—the clearing strategy that nearly flattened Gaza and dug three feet underground cannot completely eliminate Hamas.

It can be said that Hamas, by torturing and starving hostages in extreme retaliation for Israel’s “starvation tactics” and mocking Israel’s “scorched-earth tactics,” has severely provoked Israel’s political nerves and emotions across society. Evyatar’s family accuses Netanyahu’s Gaza policy of failure, and more Israeli citizens, former senior officials, and intelligence chiefs are urging an end to the war to secure the release of hostages. Perhaps the tragic scene of Evyatar being on the verge of starving to death will become a watershed moment in the Gaza war, placing the warlike Israeli right-wing ruling coalition on the fire, and forcing the cornered Netanyahu to take his final gamble—staking his political future, the destiny of Israel, and the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli peace process.

In 1993, the Israeli Labor Party government, suffering from the multiple torments of the long-term occupation of Palestine, reached the “Oslo Accords” with the PLO regarding transitional autonomy. Then Prime Minister Rabin, who had once served as Defense Minister, had always sought to free Israel from the “Gaza nightmare,” because since seizing the Gaza Strip from Egypt in 1967, “peace under Israeli rule” had lasted only 20 years. In 1987, the spark of the “Intifada (uprising)” was ignited in the Gaza Strip, quickly sweeping into a prairie fire and spreading to the broader West Bank.

Rabin himself had also sworn to “break the bones of the Palestinians,” and more Israeli generals cursed Gaza as a “damned strip,” a “hateful hornet’s nest,” because the Israeli army occupied this area during the day, while at night control shifted to various resistance forces. The conflict over the occupied territories, with Gaza as its focus and symbol, plunged Israel into an unprecedented predicament under international law and a whirlpool of world public opinion, while also paying a heavy security and economic price. Today, Netanyahu has forgotten the lessons of history, willingly returning to the old path of the occupier that runs counter to the correct direction of human civilization and history, once again mortgaging Israel’s national image, national development, and international status to the occupation of the Gaza Strip.

On August 7, the Israeli right-wing mouthpiece The Jerusalem Post published an editorial warning Netanyahu to “heed the warning and avoid the Gaza quagmire,” pointing out that fully reoccupying it would worsen the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and give Hamas a propaganda victory, portraying Israel as an occupier and inspiring resistance.

The paper pointed out that historical experience and military analysis show Netanyahu may believe that occupying the Gaza Strip will bring the hostages home and crush Hamas, but this is wishful thinking. The paper quoted famous retired U.S. General David Petraeus, comparing the Gaza ground campaign to “Mogadishu on steroids,” which would lead to rapidly escalating casualties and chaos.

Petraeus, a renowned special warfare expert, U.S. Army general, former commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq, commander of U.S. Central Command, top commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and director of the CIA, was later forced to resign due to an extramarital scandal. Petraeus is far more aware than Netanyahu, who is not from a military background, of the heavy costs and political consequences if the Gaza Strip becomes “Mogadishu-ized.”

In October 1993, U.S. peacekeeping forces stationed in Mogadishu fell into an urban warfare trap while trying to capture aides of warlord Aidid. The U.S. forces killed more than 1,000 fearless militiamen but suffered 19 dead, one captured, and two Black Hawk helicopters destroyed. When televised images reached the U.S. of the captured soldier begging Washington for rescue and Mogadishu mobs dragging the bodies of dead American soldiers through the streets, public opinion pressure skyrocketed, forcing the Clinton administration to announce withdrawal from Somalia four days later.

Today, Evyatar, emaciated and displayed in a Hamas video, is in a situation eerily similar to the U.S. military’s Mogadishu defeat back then. Petraeus’s reminder of this American heartbreak is actually a warning to Netanyahu and his government that if they insist on reoccupying Gaza and causing an even more severe disaster, it could trigger a reversal in America’s one-sided favoritism toward Israel.

The Jerusalem Post also pointed out that fully occupying the Gaza Strip would not ensure Israel’s security; rather, it would trap Israel in the Gaza Strip, in an expensive, endless war with no visible end, making all Israelis bear the consequences, whether reduced income or long-term military service. The paper cited data released by Bank of Israel showing that the war has already caused serious damage to Israel, with all war-related activities—including reserve mobilization, reduced labor force, and disruption of high-tech supply chains—costing more than $600 million per week, about 6% of GDP. By the end of 2025, the cumulative economic burden is expected to reach $5.3 billion to $6.7 billion, close to 10% of GDP.

In 1994, based on the “Oslo Accords,” both sides launched the peace process, starting with “Gaza-Jericho First Autonomy,” later expanding to all Palestinian-populated cities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. After the five-year transitional autonomy ended, the two sides failed to reach a compromise on a series of final status issues, the peace process reversed, Palestine launched the second violent resistance, the “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” and Palestinian-Israeli relations deteriorated rapidly, leading to the demise of the relatively moderate Israeli left-wing camp.

With the rise of Israeli right-wing leader Sharon and the Likud bloc to power, and the Bush administration’s “Axis of Evil” doctrine and anti-terrorism strategy after 9/11, the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was deliberately distorted and deconstructed by Israel and the U.S., demonizing the core relationship of “occupation and anti-occupation” into “terror and anti-terror.” Fatah, the long-term ruling party of Palestine advocating peace, suffered joint suppression by the U.S. and Israel, and its widely recognized political leader Arafat died under Israeli siege. The Palestinian political landscape was thus fundamentally reshaped, with the hardline positions of Hamas and others gradually winning mainstream public opinion.

In 2005, at the critical moment when pro-peace and pro-war forces within Palestine were subtly reversed, the Sharon government unilaterally announced withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, ultimately allowing Hamas to completely gain the upper hand and drive Fatah, which insisted on cooperating with Israel, out of the Gaza Strip, turning this small area into its exclusively controlled “Hamastan.”

In 2006, Hamas, by participating in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, indirectly acknowledged and accepted the “Oslo Accords” and even the “two-state solution,” because whether the Palestinian transitional autonomy government or the legislative body, their establishment and operation were legally based on the “Oslo Accords.” This move was actually a key change in Hamas’s policy toward Israel, but because it did not amend the “Hamas Charter” in time—i.e., did not explicitly and publicly abandon the fundamental position of “eliminating Israel”—its governing legitimacy was not recognized by Israel and the U.S., instead leading to a harsher blockade of the Gaza Strip, creating the “world’s largest open-air prison.”

Since then, as Israeli right-wing forces became more aggressive, continually nibbling away at occupied West Bank territories and intensifying “Judaization” measures in East Jerusalem, it triggered two major Palestinian-Israeli conflicts from 2008 to 2014, i.e., what Israel defines as the “Israel-Hamas wars.” Over the past 20 years, the Netanyahu government has deliberately adopted a “strike but not destroy” approach toward Hamas, intentionally creating two Palestinian power centers, aggravating their geographic, social, political, and governance divisions, and maintaining the enormous and one-sided benefits Israel reaps from long-term occupation.

In 2017, when the U.S. Republican Party returned to power, Hamas seized the opportunity once again, issuing a declaration on May 1 that year accepting the existence of Israel, reaffirming the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and the Gaza Strip and West Bank as its territory, and expressing hope that the Trump administration would promote the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. This was originally another rare window for the Palestinian issue, but it was jointly shut by the unprecedentedly pro-Israel Trump administration and the Israeli right-wing, greedy for immediate interests: the U.S. moved its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, introduced the “Deal of the Century” that sacrificed Palestinian national interests, promoted the “Abraham Accords” that betrayed the Palestinian cause, and encouraged Israel’s far-right forces to further expand illegal settlements.

Hamas’s slow strategic shift and repeated gestures of goodwill abroad were met with humiliation, “warm faces pressed against the cold backsides” of the U.S. and Israel, while domestically facing doubts and challenges from radicals such as the Islamic Jihad Organization and Jihadist Salafists. Thereafter, Hamas returned to hardline and violent policies, becoming involved in multiple large-scale conflicts with Israel, while the “Abraham Accords,” which abandoned the Palestinian cause, created a new reconciliation trend for Israel, paving the way for normalization talks between Saudi Arabia, the new “leader” of the Arab world, and Israel.

Beset by internal and external troubles and despairing about the prospects for peace and reconciliation, at the latest low point and turning moment in the fate of the Palestinian people, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the “Ramadan War” when Israel had suffered heavy losses, and at the last moment before Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the U.S. might cross the key threshold of sacrificing Palestinian interests, Hamas carefully planned and tightly executed the largest-ever single “suicidal” cross-border attack in world military history with 2,000 people at once, attempting through the predictable ruthless retaliation by Israel and the heavy Palestinian casualties to attract the world’s attention and sympathy, push the long-marginalized Palestinian issue back to the center of the world stage, and thereby cause rare mutual fatal injuries and cycles of violence between the two sides, triggering the “Sixth Middle East War,” surpassing all previous Middle East wars in scale and losses.

Strictly speaking, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 did not mean what Israel claimed as the “end of the occupation,” and naturally meant that Hamas retained the right to armed resistance granted by international law. Because the Gaza Strip is part of the occupied Palestinian territory, Hamas claims to represent the interests of all Palestinians and indeed has won the support and recognition of most Palestinians. Because Israel has not returned Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters, has not returned control of Gaza’s external crossings and residents’ freedom of movement, has not ended the collective punishment of Gaza’s 2.3 million people, and has not alleviated the historical suffering of the Palestinian people.

After the “Al-Aqsa Flood” ignited a new round of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, UN Secretary-General Guterres, a former Prime Minister of Portugal, stated: “Hamas’s attack on Israel did not happen without reason.” This statement is entirely from the standpoint of international law, and also represents the mainstream value judgment and main empathy of the international community. Over the past two years, the international attention received by Israel and Palestine has been completely reversed; politically and morally, the Palestinians have achieved victory and honor, and Hamas has realized its strategic vision, even though I personally firmly and consistently oppose resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through violent means.

Therefore, Netanyahu’s scheme to fully reoccupy the Gaza Strip, or the plan to continue besieging the Gaza Strip that may be rejected, are not fundamental solutions to breaking the Gaza deadlock and achieving lasting security for Israel, but are two different strategies for maintaining the illegal occupation, different cost-performance schemes for internal calculations of gains and losses. Has Israel’s de facto occupation and blockade of the Gaza Strip over the past 20 years not ended in failure? Has it not led to the national disaster and national humiliation of the “Israeli 9/11”? Whether full reoccupation or continued blockade, the essence is to maintain the illegal occupation of the Gaza Strip and the entire Palestine, prolong the long suffering of the Palestinian people, and create endless national hatred, family feuds, and cycles of violence—it is the typical act of drinking poison to quench thirst, ladling water onto boiling soup, or extinguishing a fire with fuel. In the end, it is still a dead end.

Lives are of paramount importance, whether Israeli hostages or Palestinian civilians. The most feasible emergency choice is for Israel to immediately and unconditionally cease fire, fully open humanitarian aid to Palestine, in exchange for the early release of Israeli hostages, and then to study and review whether Israel’s war goals of “de-Hamasization, de-militarization, and de-violence” are reasonable and realistic, and whether they can once and for all end Israel’s security predicament and the historical tragedy of the Palestinian people.

Continuing to put faith in iron and blood and the big stick will lead Israel away from the original intentions and vows of independence and statehood, further from the political legacy of compensation for the Jews’ suffering in the Holocaust, and closer to the racism, militarism, and fascism that once persecuted the Jews. The latest cover article of The Economist points out that “a state that ignores the laws of war and feels no shame for illegal acts, without correcting them, not only harms the victims but also harms itself. Israel has a survival interest in achieving justice. Conversely, if it glorifies those who planned famine and ethnic cleansing in Gaza, its politics and society will tilt toward demagoguery and authoritarianism. The young, idealistic state born in May 1948 will cease to exist.”

In any case, the actions of the non-state actor Hamas in killing more than 1,000 Israelis cannot be the reason for the state actor Israel to cause the deaths of more than 60,000 Palestinians. Perhaps Israel’s reoccupation of the Gaza Strip is as irreversible as Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon in 49 BC, but it must never be allowed to repeat the unrestrained annexation of Austria by the Third Reich in 1938.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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Opinion

A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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