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Areas of cooperation in Turkish-Chinese relations: Is it better late than never?

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The fact that global production and the resulting shift in values towards Asia has led all countries in the world to revise their policies towards the region, especially towards China. While the US under former President Barack Obama was defined as an ‘Indo-Pacific’ country, the attitude towards China in national security documents has gradually shifted from cooperation to competition. In line with a policy that the US interpreted as an attempt to mitigate risk and China as an attempt to ‘encircle’, the Washington administration preferred to build alliances with regional actors while raising tariff walls and accelerating the technology war. As a result of this preference, platforms such as AUKUS and QUAD were witnessed, while discussions on NATO’s expansion towards Asia or Asia’s NATO gained momentum.

Europe’s response to the rise of China, which has traditionally been part of the security architecture built by the US, has oscillated between competition and cooperation. While powers such as France, which defends European autonomy, and Hungary, which is on the periphery, have adopted a more cautious approach, Berlin is pointing to competition, provided that economic interests are protected.

The approach of the countries of the Global South to the rise of China has so far been in the opposite direction to that of the US and its allies. Countries that were founded as a result of the struggle against colonialism, that do not want to imitate the development prescriptions of Western countries, that come from different historical backgrounds and have different forms of governance, have seen China as a window of opportunity. China, which is seeking more friends in different parts of the world in the face of US policies of repression, would not only make more generous offers to these countries, but would also give them room to manoeuvre against Washington.

A new phase in China and Turkish-Islamic relations

It can be said that the Middle East and Central Asia are among the regions that are adapting to this reality, which has been described as a multipolar world. In the Middle East, the Sino-Arab Summit, the first of which was held with the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia in 2022, and the Sino-Arab Foreign Ministers’ Forum, the tenth of which was held this year, are seen as symbols of politically institutionalised cooperation, while the expansion of BRICS with the countries of the region sums up the dimensions of the growing economic bond. It is also noteworthy that China has been given the role of “quarterback” in regional conflicts, in line with its growing political prestige and economic weight. Having hosted the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, China’s weight is also felt in the Palestinian issue. While the foreign ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation preferred China as the first address on their Palestine tour, Hamas and Fatah sat down in Beijing for unity negotiations. It is known that the Palestinian factions, which made goodwill statements at the first meeting, decided to continue their meetings in China.

Central Asia retains its special position among the regions where relations with China are deepening. China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (C-C5), which have been meeting at foreign minister level since 2020, met in Xi’an, the starting point of the historic Silk Road, to raise their cooperation to the level of heads of state in 2023. Economics was not the only topic on the agenda at the summit, which heralded investment in the Central Corridor, which runs from China to Europe and includes Turkey. Announcing a $3.8 billion grant to the countries of the region, the Chinese side also stressed that they were a “community of shared destiny” with Central Asia, while the five countries underlined their support for Beijing’s foreign policy narrative.

Is Turkey too late?

Although Ankara has acknowledged China’s growing global influence, especially in regions that are among Turkey’s main areas of interest, the policy development process has been relatively slow. In 2019, Turkey launched a process called the ‘Re-Asia Initiative’ in the region, where China plays a central role, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan explained the need for this policy by saying that ‘the pendulum of history has shifted to Asia’. Moreover, President Erdoğan, like other countries of the Global South, expressed the fact that the international system does not give them enough representation with the words ‘The world is bigger than five’ and did not hesitate to say that multinational platforms are insufficient to solve acute global problems.

Despite the accuracy of Turkey’s observations, which have become globally recognised, it has become clear in the meantime that the steps taken by Ankara do not correspond to an improvement in the institutional order. Turkey’s engagement with the Western world, as opposed to the Middle East and Central Asian countries, as well as its lowered economic expectations and disputes over the Uighur issue, have played a role in such a picture. Former Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu expressed this difference at the end of 2022, stating that the Turkish delegation did not want to go to the Uyghur Autonomous Region, as China had planned. In addition, the fact that most of the Turkish media’s coverage of China consisted of Western-based translations and that Turkey was not sufficiently recognised in China and China in Turkey were among the factors affecting the policy-making process.

Can Minister Fidan forge a new equation?

Like other developing countries around the world, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey still has time to adjust its relations with China to the new realities. In this context, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to China on 3-5 June can be seen as a valuable start in announcing Ankara’s position on issues of interest to China.

In his statement here, Minister Fidan said that Ankara and Beijing overlap on many aspects of international relations, including contentious areas such as Palestine and Ukraine; that Turkey supports China’s constructive relations with Asian and Middle Eastern countries; and that Turkey appreciates China’s role as a mediator, such as in the Saudi and Iranian peace processes.

Perhaps more importantly for China, Minister Fidan said of the arm-wrestling between Washington and Beijing: ‘The fact that the markets established by the dominant powers in the last century are changing hands again under fairer, more competitive market conditions is an outcome that must be accepted. Minister Fidan’s assessments that there is a global transfer of power and that it should be peaceful, as well as his reiteration of respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, were seen as positive factors.

What are the areas of cooperation?

While Minister Fidan’s presentation of Turkey’s position sets the framework for relations in the new era, the main external developments that require cooperation between Ankara and Beijing are the Palestinian and Ukrainian crises, and the risks and opportunities that arise on trade routes.

On the Palestinian issue, Turkey and China, which advocate a ceasefire in the short term and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital based on the 1967 borders in the long term, could play an active role in uniting the Palestinian factions to mature this solution. It is not known whether Turkey and China are coordinated, but it is obvious that they are taking parallel steps in this direction. Indeed, the Hamas delegation that travelled to Beijing for merger negotiations with Fatah had issued a statement to the international press from Istanbul the day before, saying that they wanted to unite under one roof.

Ukraine is also on the list of crises where Turkey and China can play an equation-changing role. Ankara and Beijing, which can simultaneously maintain diplomatic relations with Russia and Ukraine, have converging views on opposing the sanctions policy, representing Russia in peace negotiations and respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries. China, which has been conducting shuttle diplomacy between Moscow, Kiev and European capitals with a 12-point road map, and Turkey, which previously brought the two countries to the brink of peace in Istanbul, could play a mediating role if the warring parties, especially Ukraine, show the will to do so.

The wind blowing in Turkey’s favour on global trade routes also stands out among the dimensions of cooperation in the new period. Indeed, after the Ukraine crisis, the Northern Corridor from China to Europe via Russia lost its popularity, while the Southern Corridor, which includes Iran, became more fragile as a result of geopolitical tensions. On the other hand, the Central Corridor, centred on Turkey, has become more attractive as the Central Asian countries have largely completed infrastructure works and simplified customs procedures. The Caspian Central Corridor, which cuts the distance between China and Europe by 2,000 kilometres compared to the Northern Corridor, will remain on Turkey’s agenda in the new period. In addition, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underlined Turkey’s comparative advantage by expressing the expectation that the Belt and Road Initiative will be harmonised with the Development Road. By stating that the Belt and Road will also provide opportunities for China, Ankara has made clear its position that China should become a partner in global trade rather than an outsider as desired by the West.

The address for cooperation: BRICS, committees, international summit and leaders’ meeting

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s speech during his visit to China, while not as clear as Ankara’s position on hot topics and the listed areas of cooperation, also provides clues as to the platforms that can be used.

Minister Fidan’s statement that he will attend the BRICS meeting in Russia can be seen as a turning point in the institutionalisation of economic relations. BRICS, which came to the fore with President Erdoğan’s statements in 2018, represents 31 per cent of the global economy with the latest participation and includes 6 of the 10 largest oil producers in the world. The fact that BRICS, which is gaining weight every day against the G7, the so-called club of the rich, can respond to some of Turkey’s urgent needs with instruments such as the New Development Bank is one of the facts that Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek cannot ignore. In fact, in a statement he made in 2017, Minister Mehmet Şimşek said, “In order to benefit from the projects they are going to give, you have to be a member. For this reason alone, we are seriously considering becoming a member’.

The ‘intergovernmental working committee’ announced by Minister Fidan during his visit to China is the second notable step in the context of institutionalisation between Ankara and Beijing. The appointment of Mehmet Şimşek, Turkey’s Minister of Treasury and Finance, to head this committee will help achieve results in many areas, such as correcting imbalances in the huge volume of trade, increasing investment in nuclear energy and new technologies, and further activating the Middle Corridor.

While the first meeting of the intergovernmental working committee is expected to be held in the coming months, Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to visit Turkey. Announcing Turkey’s invitation, Foreign Minister Fidan said: “We would like to host Chinese President Xi Jinping in Turkey this year. I have once again conveyed our president’s invitation to our Chinese colleague. Xi’s invitation to visit Turkey may serve to open a new page in terms of regional order as well as bilateral relations.

On the other hand, the Uighur issue may complicate the parties’ engagement, which has been delayed compared to the Middle East and Central Asia. Minister Fidan’s visit added the definition of the cities of Urumqi and Kashgar to the disagreement over terms such as ‘crime, criminal, freedom and separatism’ that has been a problem between Turkey and China for some time. While Minister Fidan defined these two cities as Turkish and Islamic cities during his contacts, this thesis is not accepted by China. According to the White Book published by the Beijing administration, the region is presented as a continuation of ancient Chinese culture, while it is argued that the Uyghurs have separated from the Turks over time.

Although there has been no official or unofficial (through the media) reaction to Minister Fidan’s preference for a different definition from China’s, it would not be surprising if it caused some discomfort.

OPINION

The Houthi War: The “Sixth Middle East War” and the Palestinian Narrative

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At 11:00 p.m. local time on March 20, I boarded Yemen Airways flight IY647, which took off in the rain from Queen Alia International Airport in Amman, the capital of Jordan. Meanwhile, air raid sirens were once again sounding in Israel to the west, as it was reported that the Yemeni Houthi forces had launched missiles at Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city, which were successfully intercepted. More than two hours later, the Boeing aircraft carrying nearly 200 passengers flew at low altitude over the brightly lit Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and landed safely. Our local hosts drove us through long city roads to finally settle at the Shaba Hotel. With Ramadan more than halfway through, this mysterious Arab capital at the frontlines of war was at its liveliest and most bustling time of day. There were no signs of war — perhaps the night had masked the smoke and devastation of the battlefield. On the surface, the infrastructure in Sana’a appeared so outdated that it reminded me of Gaza, Palestine, where I was stationed 25 years ago.

In the early morning of the 21st, the Houthi forces claimed they had launched a “Palestine-2” hypersonic missile at Israel the previous day, successfully striking a military target south of Tel Aviv. It’s truly surprising that the Houthis — often dubbed the “slipper army” — are now capable of producing hypersonic missiles themselves. It’s a testament to the rapid advancement and widespread accessibility of modern technology. What was once exclusive to major world powers no longer holds a monopoly, evoking the sense of “the swallows of yesteryear’s noble halls now nesting among common folk.”

Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree emphasized that this was the second missile attack launched from Yemen on Israeli territory within 24 hours. Observers noted that this was also the Houthis’ first strike on Israeli soil following Israel’s renewed airstrikes and partial ground raids in Gaza — actions that have already caused nearly a thousand Palestinian deaths.

Just prior to the attack on Israel, the Houthis had engaged in a direct confrontation with the U.S. Red Sea fleet — again sparked by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On March 7, the Houthis warned Israel that if humanitarian aid restrictions on Gaza were not lifted within four days, they would resume attacks on ships entering or exiting Israeli ports through the Red Sea. This coincided with the second round of ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas stalling. On the 10th, before the Houthi deadline expired, Israel preemptively announced a cutoff of electricity to Gaza to pressure Hamas. Consequently, the Houthis resumed their Red Sea ship attacks.

The Houthis’ support for Hamas and advocacy for the Palestinian cause naturally angered the U.S., which unconditionally backs Israel. Between March 15 and 19, under orders from President Trump, the U.S. launched its largest recent air assault on Houthi positions via the USS *Harry S. Truman* carrier group in the Red Sea, targeting their radar, air defense, missile, and drone systems. The strikes extended over Sana’a, the Red Sea city of Hodeidah, and the Houthi stronghold in Saada province near the western border. In response, the Houthis launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against U.S. naval targets.

Amid all this, Israel swiftly resumed large-scale air and ground assaults on Gaza, reclaiming the “Netzarim Corridor,” which cuts off north-south traffic within the Gaza Strip. According to U.S. and Israeli media, Israel had informed the U.S. in advance of its plans to reignite conflict in Gaza and received open support from the Trump administration. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the assault was “just the beginning.” With the renewal of conflict, the far-right factions that had exited Israel’s coalition government announced their return. Analysts believe Netanyahu is deliberately reigniting war to hinder the next phase of ceasefire talks, thereby preserving his fragile coalition, prolonging his political life, and avoiding accountability for the severe consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood attack that had previously rocked Israel.

Before Trump returned to power, with Hamas and Hezbollah suffering heavy blows—especially after the unexpected fall of the Damascus regime—the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean underwent significant changes. The year-long “Sixth Middle East War” seemed to be nearing its end, and the focus of both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States, the Arab world, and even the international community shifted toward the multidimensional reconstruction of Gaza. The Houthi forces even temporarily suspended their attacks on Israeli targets in the Red Sea region. However, the failure of the second round of ceasefire negotiations over Gaza and the outbreak of renewed fighting suggest that the “Sixth Middle East War” has not truly ended but has simply moved past an intermission and entered a new phase—with a change in the main battlefield and primary adversaries.

From Israel’s perspective, after more than a year of intense southern offensives, the Israeli military has essentially crushed Hamas. Following two months of focused campaigns in the north, it not only severely weakened Hezbollah but also unexpectedly caused the collapse of the Assad regime, leading to the complete fall of the northwest wing of the “Shiite Crescent.” The key goal of the third phase is to eliminate Hamas’s presence in Gaza entirely, and with the help of the United States, strike hard at the Houthis and Iran, both of whom strongly support Hamas.

From Hamas’s point of view, although it has lost most of its leadership and main combat forces, and the Palestinian people have paid a tremendous price, it has not lost its political foundation or its legitimacy in the struggle. Hamas remains the irreplaceable governing force in Gaza. After the first phase ceasefire, Hamas quickly mobilized thousands of police and security personnel to maintain public order—demonstrating its remaining strength and unwillingness to exit the political and historical stage. It is eager to remain in Gaza under the banners of “legitimate resistance” and the “Palestinian cause,” and participate in the political, security, and economic reconstruction of Gaza in this new era.

From the U.S. perspective, Trump does not want to be permanently tied to Israel’s war chariot. Yet, based on national interests, personal ties, and religious beliefs, he has no choice but to shield and support Netanyahu’s government and Israel. Therefore, Trump introduced the “Clear Gaza” plan to pressure the Palestinians and the Arab world. He has also launched heavy strikes on the Houthis to ease Israel’s burden, while publicly warning and threatening Iran—the so-called “ultimate backer”—in an attempt to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, cool down the Middle East, and ultimately reduce America’s involvement in the region.

From Iran’s perspective, the year-long “Sixth Middle East War” has led to two direct confrontations with Israel, nearly dragging the entire country into full-scale war. It has also seen severe setbacks for the twin geopolitical drivers of the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance.” Iran has suffered a historic political and diplomatic defeat, with more than forty years of investment and influence—especially since the Arab Spring—lost almost overnight. This could undermine the legitimacy of its policies and governance. Over the past few months, Iran has maintained a hardline diplomatic stance—emphasizing support for Palestine and issuing warnings to Israel and the U.S.—which in turn has provoked Israel and the U.S. to “press their advantage” and try to defeat both the “Shiite Crescent” and “Axis of Resistance” through the Gaza war.

From the Houthis’ point of view, since their original goal was to establish an Iranian-style regime, they naturally adopted Iran’s political and diplomatic discourse. That means they must raise the Palestinian banner and align themselves with the Palestinian narrative to overcome the inherent disadvantages of being a Shiite militia. However, the Houthis also possess a level of confidence in their discourse that Iran lacks—because both Palestinians and Yemenis (including the Houthi tribes) are ethnically Arab. For a long time after their uprising began, the Houthis were preoccupied with survival and unable to involve themselves in other causes. Since the outbreak of the Yemeni civil war in 2014 and their rise in power, the Houthis remained focused on fighting the internationally recognized Yemeni government—backed by Saudi Arabia and the “Islamic Ten”—and had no capacity to engage with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Now, with the Houthis gradually controlling one-third of the country’s territory, two-thirds of its population and Red Sea coast, and major cities like Sana’a and Hodeidah—and having developed cruise missiles and drones capable of striking deep into Saudi Arabia and the UAE—their leaders’ vision has clearly expanded. Their ambitions have grown, and their geopolitical appetite is no longer what it used to be. Thus, after Hamas launched the “Al-Aqsa Flood” offensive in October 2023, the Houthis responded with military actions, officially joining the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” opening a new front in the Red Sea outside the Eastern Mediterranean theater—forming the southern battlefield of the ‘Sixth Middle East War.’

From a certain perspective, the Houthi forces—who firmly believe that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”—see their vast desert homeland of Yemen, full of tribes and known for its simple yet tough customs, as a second Afghanistan. With confidence in their military capabilities, they believe that the United States would never dare to send hundreds of thousands of troops for a ground invasion. Instead, the U.S. can only rely on long-range airstrikes, which not only do not harm the Houthis’ survival foundation, but actually serve as a form of publicity—elevating the Houthis in global public opinion as a new bastion of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism. This strengthens their political legitimacy, the perceived justness of their struggle, and the necessity of unifying governance and the state.

Although the Houthi movement rarely publicly links its support for the Palestinian cause, concern for Palestinian suffering, and promotion of the Palestinian narrative directly to its own ideals and ambitions, it can be inferred that such large-scale actions—at the risk of drawing fire and becoming enemies of Israel and the U.S.-led Western allies—are actually intended to force the international community, especially the Arab League, to recognize its effective governance in Yemen. It seeks acknowledgment of its leadership role in Yemen’s political reconstruction and a withdrawal of support for the exiled government. Even if the world does not accept a new Houthi-led regime acting alone, it should at least support a coalition government led by the Houthis—thus ending over a decade of war in Yemen and bringing stability to the Red Sea region.

From this angle, war and peace in Gaza are not just private matters between Palestine and Israel; they are part of the broader political dynamics of the Middle East—and even global politics. Resolving this complex chain of issues is no easy task. But at the very least, achieving a ceasefire in Gaza could deprive surrounding nations and political factions of their excuses and leverage, giving Middle Eastern leaders space to focus on key issues like development, cooperation, and prosperity.

As for the Houthis’ control over much of ancient Yemen—once known as the “Happy Land”—the country remains one of the poorest and most underdeveloped in the world. The Houthi forces have poured significant funds into developing missiles, drones, and various military technologies to “rescue” Palestinians hundreds of kilometers away, while their own people continue to live below the poverty line. This is not a choice any leader with national responsibility should make in terms of priorities. However, for revolutionaries and revolutionary parties, seizing nationwide power and establishing a unified government is likely their most urgent political desire and mission. The Houthi movement and its leaders can hardly resist the immense temptation of political power.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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Is Syria heading towards a federation?

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The news broke like a bombshell in media circles. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the umbrella organization for the PKK/PYD (which is known as the PKK in Syria and has been a primary concern for Türkiye in recent years), reached an agreement with Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the current Syrian President (formerly known as al-Jolani). Starting from the evening of Monday, March 10th, when the news hit agencies, the media erupted with a range of reactions, from claims of the PKK/PYD’s self-dissolution to assertions of Syria’s territorial integrity being secured. Some commentators even suggested this was a rejection of federation, a new setback for Israel, and a significant success for Türkiye. The atmosphere recalled the period following Assad’s departure on December 8, 2024, when there was talk of conquering the neighbouring country, even going so far as to assign license plate numbers to Syrian and other Middle Eastern cities.

What does the agreement entail?

However, the eight-article agreement text does not present a particularly optimistic outlook. In fact, a careful examination reveals that Syria has been (or is being) reshaped into an undeclared federation. The very act of the SDF signing an agreement with the Syrian government implies the construction of a federal structure. On one side stands a state, Syria, and on the other, a structure that perceives itself as a state (or on the path to statehood) and is considered a terrorist organization by Türkiye. In other words, the SDF, with the PYD/PKK at its core, is the entity that has entered into an agreement with the Syrian state. Typically, states engage in agreements with other states or international organizations. The fact that the SDF and the Syrian state have signed an agreement/reconciliation text warrants careful consideration.

The first article of the agreement, stating that “the right to merit-based representation and political participation in Syria, regardless of religious or ethnic origin, is guaranteed,” may initially appear positive. However, when considered alongside the subsequent article, which states that “the Kurdish community is recognized as an integral part of Syria and its constitutional rights are guaranteed,” it becomes evident that this contains serious issues. A federal structure is present, even if unnamed (pending the final Syrian constitution).

If a Kurdish community exists within Syria, and its existence is constitutionally recognized with its rights (the specifics of which will be defined in the constitution) guaranteed, other ethnic and sectarian groups will inevitably make similar demands. For instance, the Alawites, predominantly residing in Syria’s coastal region and recently subjected to horrific massacres by HTS, are likely to present similar demands. The same applies to the Druze community living in territories that Israel occupied and gained control over immediately after Assad left the country on December 8, 2024. In fact, Druze community leaders have repeatedly declared that they cannot live under a radical Islamic regime centered on HTS and would prefer to join Israel if forced to do so. Considering that the southern part of the Druze region, the Golan Heights, was occupied and annexed by Israel in the 1967 war (despite being Syrian territory under international law), the seriousness of their threats becomes clearer. It should be emphasized that Syria is being steered towards a federation that could lead to partition. In such ethnic, religious, and sectarian federations, quotas allocated to these groups, rather than merit, will likely be more influential in matters such as personnel recruitment.

The reference to the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian state, with all its constitutional rights, including citizenship, guaranteed, signifies a significant step towards federation. The existence of a “Kurdish people” and the mention of their constitutional rights imply that the constitution should be drafted on the basis of “peoples.” One of the main articles of the Syrian constitution will likely begin with a sentence such as, “The Syrian state is the common state of Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawites…” or “Syria is the common country of Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawites…”

In this scenario, it can be assumed that Syria will consist of at least four or five autonomous or federated structures. These structures will likely have their own parliaments, internal administrations (including public order forces like police and gendarmerie), judicial systems, and “self-defense forces,” as the PKK prefers to call them. In essence, we can anticipate four or five autonomous/federated units resembling the fragmented and largely independent Kurdish Federal Government of Northern Iraq. It should also be underscored that it is improbable for such a state, formed with a very weak central government in line with Israel’s interests, to possess a substantial army. It would be overly optimistic to believe that in such a federation, named or unnamed, everyone would coexist harmoniously, with different peoples treating each other with utmost respect and avoiding conflicts over power-sharing. The likelihood of such ethnic, religious, and sectarian federal structures, which are inherently fragile, surviving peacefully in a region like the Middle East, where Israel and the US are constantly involved, is extremely low. The possibility of these structures being drawn into disintegration through civil war or territorial conflicts, triggered by external manipulation of internal disputes, should not be underestimated.

The fifth article of the agreement, stating that “the Syrian state shall ensure the return of all displaced refugees to their former places (villages and towns) and guarantee their security,” might initially seem to address the return of refugees who have fled Syria. However, this may not be the case. If this article concerned refugees outside Syria, its inclusion in this agreement would be unnecessary, as such matters fall entirely under the jurisdiction of the Syrian central government. If it referred to refugees from PKK/PYD-controlled areas who were forced to flee their homes due to ethnic cleansing, many of whom are outside the country, this sentence would need to be worded differently. It appears that the “refugees” in question are PKK/PYD groups who have been forced to flee from Turkish-controlled territory, and their return to this territory is being guaranteed by the Syrian state. This could be a precursor to forcing Türkiye out of the territory under its control in the coming years.

Since 2011, Türkiye’s Syria policy has not consistently prioritized national interests. On one hand, Türkiye rightly used force to prevent the PKK/PYD from attaining the status of a puppet autonomous state. On the other hand, Türkiye did everything possible to weaken and ultimately overthrow the Assad regime. Ultimately, the Assad regime was overthrown, and the PKK/PYD has come very close to achieving significant autonomy. The prospects of Syria’s fragmentation and eventual disintegration are not distant.

During the Assad (Baath) regime, as the PKK/PYD faced pressure from Türkiye, they repeatedly approached the Damascus government, stating, ‘Give us autonomy, let us join you and fight together against Türkiye.’ [Assad’s government] said, “You are traitors who cooperate with America. Syria is a nation-state and has a unitary structure. We will not give you or anybody else anything that will disrupt this constitutional structure, we can only enact some regulations for local administrations in the 2012 constitution, and that will apply to all of Syria, not just you.”‘. Ultimately, there is now a Syria that some claim Türkiye conquered, a government described as “our boys,” and the PKK/PYD has signed a treaty with it that includes extensive autonomy. This raises the question: Was this Türkiye’s ultimate objective?

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OPINION

Europe: Transitioning from strategic dependence on the U.S. to strategic self-preservation

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On March 5, French government spokesperson Sophie Primas stated that French President Emmanuel Macron, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer were considering a joint visit to the United States, with the visit expected to be completed “in the short term.” If this plan materializes, it will mark the second time these three European leaders visit the White House within a short period following Donald Trump’s re-election as president. Previously, Macron and Starmer had attempted to persuade Trump in person to value the traditional transatlantic relationship and maintain U.S.-Europe alignment on the Russia-Ukraine war, but with little success. Zelensky’s visit to the White House, however, turned into a diplomatic disaster, with both sides engaging in heated arguments that ended on bad terms. Zelensky’s delegation even left the White House hungry, as they were asked to leave without partaking in the lavish luncheon prepared by their host.

The three White House summits marked another diplomatic “Waterloo” for Europe after its “darkest moment” at the Munich Security Conference. At Munich, European leaders were publicly humiliated by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and were shocked to witness the U.S. engaging in high-level diplomacy with Russia. Despite their dismay, some still held onto illusions. However, after experiencing Trump’s stern lecturing at the White House, European leaders have become much more pragmatic and realistic. Therefore, before seeking another visit to the White House, France and the UK have adjusted their previous stances on the Russia-Ukraine war, now supporting ceasefire negotiations, while Ukraine has obediently stated its willingness to transition from war to peace “under U.S. leadership” and sign a “minerals-for-security” agreement with the U.S.

European leaders are striving to repair the U.S.-Europe relationship, which has been severely fractured by “Trump’s new policies,” in an effort to preserve “peace under American rule.” They aim to ensure continued transatlantic cooperation through three key ties: traditional values, the transatlantic political alliance, and the NATO military alliance, while maintaining a shared destiny, shared interests, and shared moral values. However, Trump 2.0 is likely to bring more sadness, harm, and worries to his European allies. To some extent, European countries have realized that they must adapt to the historical turning point of a “the profound changes unseen in a century.” They must accept the “historical end” of the U.S.-Europe partnership and quickly achieve strategic awakening, gradually breaking free from their strategic dependence on the U.S. while strengthening strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, military self-reliance, and strategic self-preservation.

Europe’s strategic awakening follows an undeniable historical and practical logic. First, no powerful nation remains dominant forever, no absolute center of power is eternal, and no strong ally is unbreakable. This is a lesson from thousands of years of human history, frequently discussed by Western politicians, and confirmed by more than ten shifts in global power centers since the 1500s.

Moreover, under “Trumpism,” the U.S. is irreversibly shifting toward a new era of isolationism, mercantilism, and Monroe Doctrine-style policies, focusing on self-revolution, self-redemption, and making itself “great again.” It has grown weary of acting as the world’s leader, fulfilling international obligations, bearing multilateral responsibilities, and financing global initiatives. The U.S. is even reluctant to continue practicing the evangelical “Messianic” spirit of benevolence and global salvation. Europe must recognize that after a century-long alliance, the U.S. and Europe are now at a crossroads where separation is inevitable. More precisely, the U.S. is actively dismantling the global order and rule-based system it built and sustained for a century—without caring about Europe’s grievances or how it complains tearfully about the break-up.

Europe must now consider how to end its strategic dependence on the U.S. Historically, the U.S. was a “bastard child” of European civilization on the North American continent. However, in the process of breaking away from its colonial “sinful womb,” this “illegitimate offspring” unexpectedly became Europe’s ultimate lifeline and savior. Since its entry into World War I and subsequent victory, the U.S. has fought increasingly stronger wars, achieving an unprecedented level of global hegemony. It has continuously shaped Europe’s fate: without strong American leadership and generous support, Europe could not have swiftly defeated the Axis powers, rapidly recovered from the devastation of two world wars, collapsed the Soviet-led Cold War adversaries, or maintained its dominance in Western education, science, technology, economy, and soft power.

A century of dependence has conditioned Europe into a “fatherly” or “motherly” psychological attachment to the U.S., fostering both admiration and reliance. Despite frequent complaints, disputes, and protests against this overbearing “patriarch,” Europe remains unable to break free. However, the time has come for Europe to awaken from this dependence and embrace strategic independence.

Strategic Autonomy: Europe’s Honor and Dream

Strategic autonomy is not only Europe’s honor and dream, but also one of its primary goals in the pursuit of unity. Historically, Europe has long been unable to act independently due to its internal fragmentation, where numerous feudal states coexisted. Even after the establishment of the Westphalian system, Europe still found itself entangled in two world wars. After World War II, Europe was further drawn into the grand geopolitical game of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Being weak and vulnerable, Europe had to rely on the protection of a strong United States to ensure its security and development.

With the collapse of the Cold War order and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Europe’s dream of unification became increasingly tangible. Through five rounds of EU enlargement, most European countries were brought under the same umbrella. Simultaneously, NATO’s continued eastward expansion pushed Europe’s security frontiers deep into Russia’s traditional strategic heartland.

As the 21st century began, Europe’s strategic environment underwent a dramatic improvement. It not only emerged from the historical shadow of the Soviet threat but also witnessed new developments in the United States—where growth stagnated, and signs of contraction and decline appeared. Thus, strategic autonomy became a new European aspiration, gaining widespread support from nations and citizens alike. However, the U.S. establishment, particularly represented by the Democratic Party, has continued efforts to keep Europe under White House leadership through shared values, traditional alliances, and military partnerships. To achieve this, the U.S. carefully orchestrated the “Ukraine trap,” using Russia as a “scarecrow” to frighten many small European nations, thereby forcing them to remain under the American hegemonic umbrella and continue following Washington’s lead.

Trump’s new policies actually present Europe with a historic opportunity and a strategic window to break free and establish true self-reliance. However, Europe still lacks the necessary strategic confidence and preparedness. It continues to seek leverage from the United States and, in some cases, even prefers to remain under American strategic protection. The inevitable outcome of this approach is that Europe will eventually find itself standing on shaky ground.

Strategic Autonomy: Independent Path Internally, Diplomatic Independence Externally

Strategic autonomy means choosing an independent path domestically and achieving diplomatic independence externally. Europe has historically been the birthplace of modern international relations and diplomacy, serving as both the intellectual foundation and early model for American diplomacy. As a master of geopolitical maneuvering, Europe has long been a dominant player in global affairs.

However, diplomacy must be backed by national power—particularly economic and military strength. This fundamental rule has often left Europe, despite its past glory, with a form of “crippled diplomacy.” With the exception of a few cases such as France, most European countries have historically aligned themselves with U.S. policy, often adhering to White House directives. They have been required to continuously coordinate their policies and even political stances with Washington to ensure transatlantic alignment, thereby creating a synchronized diplomatic chorus.

After the Cold War, the acceleration of global multipolarity provided Europe with greater diplomatic space and maneuverability. European nations, based on their own interests or the collective interests of the EU, have at times pursued diplomatic policies that diverged from or even opposed those of the United States. This growing diplomatic independence, driven by strategic autonomy, has become a concrete manifestation of Europe’s pursuit of unity and strength. However, it has also inevitably become the primary source of conflict, disagreement, and friction between Europe and the U.S.

During Trump’s first term (Trump 1.0), diplomatic disputes between the U.S. and Europe emerged, particularly over issues related to values. However, these differences were quickly mended during Joe Biden’s administration. With Trump’s return to power (Trump 2.0), the transatlantic diplomatic relationship has once again diverged—not only in ideology but also in paradigm. Disputes over trade wars and the Russia-Ukraine conflict have further widened the gap, to the point where Europe and the U.S. are now moving in entirely different directions. Ironically, this divergence will, in turn, reinforce Europe’s diplomatic independence.

Europe’s Greatest Crisis: The Security Dilemma

Europe’s most pressing crisis is its security dilemma—specifically, whether it can establish an independent and powerful military force outside the NATO framework and achieve military self-sufficiency, including the ability to confront its traditional adversary, Russia, on its own.

After the Cold War, Europe embraced NATO, an alliance centered around the United States. The essence of this arrangement was to leverage American military power to neutralize the Soviet threat, prevent Germany’s resurgence, and ultimately avoid another world war.

For more than half a century, the U.S. has maintained a strong military presence in Europe, with numerous bases and a large troop deployment. Washington has also consistently covered over half of NATO’s defense budget, with its military expenditures exceeding 3% of its GDP annually. This long-standing reliance on American security guarantees has not only led Europe to neglect its own military capabilities but has also become an unsustainable burden for the U.S.

With Trump’s Return, NATO’s Easy Days Under U.S. Protection Are Over 

With Trump back in office, NATO can no longer enjoy the luxury of relying on the U.S. security umbrella. The alliance must now assume the primary responsibility for its own defense. During his first term, Trump pressured NATO members to increase their military spending to 2% of GDP. In his second term, he is now demanding it be doubled to 5%, significantly reducing the burden on the U.S.

For Europe, achieving military independence and self-reliance has become an urgent reality. In terms of conventional troop numbers, weaponry, strategic capabilities, and defense industry strength, Europe remains far behind the U.S. in the short term. It may even struggle to counterbalance Russia. As the Trump administration plans to abandon Ukraine, and Europe is forced to prepare for defending Ukraine—or even itself—alone, serious questions arise: How quickly can the EU establish its own military force? Can it rely on the nuclear umbrella provided by the UK and France?

The European “Rearmament” Plan

On March 4, in response to the U.S. cutting off weapons, intelligence support, and possibly even satellite links to Ukraine, the European Union announced a plan to raise approximately €800 billion to “rearm Europe” and establish a secure and resilient defense framework. Under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Germany—after nearly 70 years of pacifism—has doubled its defense budget, surpassing 2% of GDP. The newly elected government coalition, led by Friedrich Merz, is set to propose a bill in the German Parliament next week to establish an extra-budgetary fund of €500 billion under the guise of infrastructure investment, but ultimately aimed at further increasing defense expenditures.

As founding members of NATO and permanent members of the UN Security Council, Britain and France are stepping up as Europe’s natural leaders. While attempting to salvage the crumbling U.S.-Europe geopolitical marriage, they are also actively strategizing Europe’s post-“U.S. withdrawal” defense framework. Discussions include “nuclear sharing” and the potential formation of a European “security force” to support Ukraine.

Observers suggest that the EU and its member states are about to enter an unprecedented period of multilateral and bilateral security negotiations, scrambling to fill the “three-dimensional vacuum” left by the U.S. abandoning its NATO leadership responsibilities—or potentially withdrawing from NATO altogether. This vacuum includes historical disillusionment, present uncertainty, and psychological panic over the future.

Trump 2.0: A Long-Term Shift? 

Theoretically, Trump’s second term could last eight years, and “Trumpism” might persist even longer. In just two months since his return, Trump has already withdrawn from agreements, abandoned allies, and broken diplomatic trust—all with strong momentum that is likely to continue and expand.

This trajectory threatens to overturn the entire post-WWII global security system, international governance framework, and global order. Almost overnight, the United States—once Europe’s unwavering ally and “big brother”—has morphed into a familiar stranger, a tariff war instigator, an ideological adversary, and even a strategic rival.

Meanwhile, Europe is left to navigate an uncertain path alone, and the “Western world” as we know it appears to have fractured into two distinct entities: the U.S. and Europe. The EU was completely unprepared for such a historic and profound transformation in transatlantic relations. European Council President Ursula von der Leyen even described it as a “watershed moment.”

The Inevitable U.S.-Europe Split

The transatlantic relationship is now undergoing systematic dismantling, revision, and restructuring. European leaders are investing enormous efforts in trying to restore the relationship to normalcy. However, the ideological and economic differences between the U.S. and Europe have become so vast that they are likely to drift further apart, potentially reaching the point of no return.

As history has shown, long periods of unity are followed by division, and long periods of division eventually lead to reunification. This historical cycle is playing out once again.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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