Diplomacy
Constructing connectivity: A decade of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global South

Yingshi Gao, CGTN Journalist
It has been ten years since China initiated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This September, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway in Indonesia opened to traffic, drawing a barrage of international media spotlight and a fresh wave of skepticism from the West. Many outlets in the Western media sphere have cast a dubious eye on the economic viability of this railway, igniting the discourse around the purported ‘debt trap’ diplomacy often associated with the BRI. Echoes of neo-colonialism, too, resonate through the hallways of global dialogue, painting China’s vast infrastructural endeavor in shades of imperial ambition.
Both statistical data and local leaders have rebuffed this portrayal. Take the example of sub-Saharan Africa; in 2022, the debt-to-GDP ratio in this region stood at approximately 56.3%, whereas globally, it was 247%.
In 2018, former Liberia Public Works Minister W. Gyude Moore penned an article and commented, “The language of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ resonates more in Western countries, especially the United States, and is rooted in anxiety about China’s rise as a global power rather than in the reality of Africa.” In 2022, a study from the Centre on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University also suggested that private sector maneuvering rather than Chinese scheming is more likely to induce a wave of defaults.
Another popular narrative describes China as using ‘untransparent’ debt strategically to aid ‘authoritarian states.’ Some argue that “Chinese aid poses a challenge to conditional aid, thus weakening democracy promotion.” Professor Andreas Freytag at the University of Jena, Germany, did research on this issue in 2022. His research discovered that Chinese aid correlates with a neutral or positive influence on the endorsement of democracy. Moreover, individuals displaying favorable sentiments towards China appear more inclined to cherish democratic values. On the other hand, the US’s favorable views do not consistently influence democratic support.
Compared to debt, the more urgent problem faced by the Global South is the inability to provide sufficient public goods, hindering faster development in these countries. In Africa’s energy sector, building a reliable electric system has been one of the significant challenges for decades. Access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa was only 47% in 2022, forcing locals to buy their own electric generators, increasing production costs, and generating more pollution.
This is something that Cao Fengze, a Chinese opinion leader and engineer, noticed. When he first arrived in Zambia, participating in the building of a water dam, he tried to buy an air fryer. He found the price of the air fryer to be much higher than expected. Cheaper air fryers were also available (usually less than 200 RMB), but everyone advised him not to buy one since the electrical power system in Zambia was highly unstable, and having multiple power outages on a daily basis was very normal. After a few ups and downs in voltage, lower-quality appliances would burn out quickly. I interviewed him about his fieldwork. From his perspective, establishing a local industrial system is only possible with a stable energy supply, and a gravity dam represents the most cost-effective power scheme for Zambia. Once constructed, a gravity dam requires less maintenance and still has a long lifespan. In his words, “If I embed a coin in the dam, the next person to see the coin may be from many centuries later.”
The lack of enough public goods also greatly impacts Zambia’s agricultural sector. For instance, the price variances between Zambia and its potential market, East Africa, are significant. Crops such as maize and soybeans can be sold at higher prices in Nairobi and Kampala. In June 2022, maize prices in Nairobi crossed $500/Mt, while the price in Lusaka was just over $200/Mt. However, farmers in Zambia are not able to benefit from these potential profits due to inefficiencies in cross-border markets and transport logistics. This forms a negative feedback loop: constrained by poverty, Global South nations often find themselves unable to invest in building and maintaining interconnecting highways. Without these crucial transport links, they remain trapped and mired in poverty, unable to unleash their economic potential.
But how to break that loop? In the eyes of the Chinese, the answer is not foreign food aid but vast investment in public goods to build a system that can generate blood for itself.
That is also why China has focused on building electric and transportation facilities among the BRI participating countries.
To tackle the power deficit, China funded and helped to build the Kafue Gorge Lower hydropower station, the largest power project undertaken by Zambia since its independence. Five new Chinese-built generators in this dam added 750 megawatts to the country’s national grid, adding nearly a third of this country’s electric capacity. Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema also participated in the commissioning ceremony and praised that both countries completed the project in ‘an ingenious way.’
Chinese infrastructure projects are more than just building roads and railways but aim to establish a systematic base for future development.
Building water dams, for example, has helped local workers learn new skills through participating in the construction work. The local government has also benefited from working closely with China in managing big projects, aligning different interests, and ensuring that everything runs smoothly.
It’s like fine-tuning a well-oiled machine. This isn’t just about making sure that trade keeps flowing but also about growing skill sets and laying down a foundation for the future.
Despite these advantages, the Belt and Road Initiative still has room for improvement. For instance, local communities affected by the projects have called for equal compensation. Moreover, there have been calls for enhanced transparency and adherence to stricter labor practices. Addressing these concerns will make the BRI a more robust and mutually beneficial initiative.
Diplomacy
Armenia signals potential complete withdrawal from CSTO

Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan announced that Yerevan might decide to withdraw entirely from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) if member states fail to “demonstrate a clear political stance” regarding Azerbaijan’s actions. Kostanyan emphasized that Armenia is no longer making insinuations but is speaking very openly.
According to the Novosti-Armenia news agency, Kostanyan stated, “Ultimately, if our partners in the CSTO, including the Russian Federation, do not make the political statements that were mentioned several years ago after the aggression against the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, then Armenia will make a final decision.”
The Deputy Minister also underscored that Armenia, as a sovereign state, will determine the right time for its next steps.
Membership was frozen
Relations between Armenia, Russia, and the CSTO deteriorated following the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, after which Yerevan formally requested support from its allies.
Following this process, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan repeatedly criticized the CSTO for not assisting Yerevan.
Pashinyan described the organization as a “bubble alliance,” claiming it was “planning a war” against Armenia alongside Baku.
Last February, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced that Armenia had frozen its participation in the CSTO. By May, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the country would refuse to finance the organization’s activities.
Intelligence report points in the same direction
In January of this year, a public report released by the Armenian Foreign Intelligence Service stated that the country has no intention of returning to full participation in the CSTO in the near future.
The report noted, “We find it highly unlikely that the reasons that led to Armenia suspending its membership will change in 2025. Based on this situation, the organization’s prestige continues to be seriously questioned and has become a ’cause for reflection’ for other member countries.”
Diplomacy
BRICS internal trade volume hits the $1 trillion mark

Kirill Dmitriev, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), announced that the internal trade volume among BRICS countries has reached $1 trillion.
In a statement on his Telegram channel, Dmitriev noted that surpassing this significant milestone confirms the strengthening of economic ties between member states and the bloc’s growing role in shaping the new global economic architecture.
He also emphasized that Russia continues to strengthen trade relations, particularly through the BRICS Business Council, in line with the directives of President Vladimir Putin.
BRICS’ share will continue to grow, Putin says
During a plenary session at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin recalled that at the beginning of the 21st century, BRICS countries accounted for only one-fifth of the global economy, whereas today this figure has reached 40%.
The Russian leader stated that this share will continue to grow, describing it as a “medical fact.” According to Putin, this growth will primarily be driven by the countries of the Global South.
In April, Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia, also said that the BRICS countries, operating on principles of consensus, have become a key force in the world economy.
BRICS expansion agenda
Initially composed of five countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—BRICS expanded in 2024 with the inclusion of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Ethiopia, and Egypt.
In January of this year, Indonesia became the bloc’s tenth full member.
Diplomacy
Xi Jinping to miss BRICS summit in Rio for the first time

Chinese President Xi Jinping will not attend the upcoming BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro next week.
According to multiple sources cited by the South China Morning Post on Tuesday, this marks the first time Xi will miss the gathering of leaders from major emerging economies.
Officials familiar with the matter stated that Beijing informed the Brazilian government of a scheduling conflict. Premier Li Qiang is expected to lead the Chinese delegation in Xi’s place, a similar arrangement to the 2023 G20 summit in India.
Chinese officials involved in the preparations suggested Xi’s absence is due to his two meetings with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva within the past year. The first occurred during the G20 summit and a state visit to Brasília last November, while the second took place at the China-CELAC forum in Beijing this May.
Xi has never before missed a BRICS summit. In 2023, he was scheduled to deliver a speech at the meeting in South Africa but, at the last minute, sent Commerce Minister Wang Wentao instead. Beijing provided no official explanation for the change.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi participated in BRICS meetings virtually, with Russia hosting in 2020 and China in 2021.
On Tuesday, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry told the Post it “would not comment on the internal deliberations of foreign delegations.” The Chinese embassy in Brazil did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
However, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun told the Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.Paulo, “information regarding participation in the summit will be shared at the appropriate time.” Guo added that China supports Brazil’s BRICS presidency and aims to “promote deeper cooperation” among member nations. “In a volatile and turbulent world, the BRICS countries are maintaining their strategic resolve and working together for global peace, stability, and development,” he said.
In Brasília, officials have not concealed their disappointment regarding Xi’s absence. A source informed the Post that Lula had traveled to Beijing in May as a “show of goodwill” and had hoped “the Chinese president would reciprocate the gesture by attending the Rio summit.”
There was also speculation that Lula’s invitation to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a state dinner after the BRICS summit may have influenced Beijing’s decision, as Xi might have been “perceived as a supporting actor” at the event.
Lula’s special adviser for international relations, Celso Amorim, met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, where he clearly expressed Brazil’s desire to host Xi. “I told them, ‘BRICS without China is not BRICS,'” Amorim stated, recalling that then-President Hu Jintao attended the first BRICS summit in Brazil despite a major earthquake in China at the time. “He only stayed for one day, but he came.”
Amorim emphasized the particular importance of Xi’s attendance in the current global context, citing the “US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization” as a “violation of international rules.”
Premier Li is expected to arrive in Brazil next weekend for the summit, which is scheduled for July 6 and 7 in Rio.
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