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Dynamics of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations

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Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are characterized by a complex interplay of historical grievances, geopolitical controversies, security dilemmas, economic dependencies, and ethnic identities. Unless and until, understanding these layers, it could be hard for all those interested in fostering peace and cooperation in this volatile region, which is much more essential for people of both the neighboring countries facing similar security, economic and political issues.

No one can neglect the fact that the historical narrative of Afghanistan and Pakistan is linked in a very complicated manner, characterized by a series of complex interactions and interferences that have frequently involved accusations, blame-shifting, and concealed motives. Beginning from the British colonial period, various events have played pivotal roles in shaping these dynamics. Prior to the British Empire’s involvement in the region laid the groundwork for future geopolitical tensions and alliances, almost all parts and parcels of both the neighboring countries remained part of one or several empires and intruded rulers, which is now considered bone of contention between the two. Following this era, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked a critical turning point, as it not only altered local power structures but also drew international attention and intervention into the whole region. This was further complicated by the subsequent involvement of the United States lead allies, which aimed at countering Soviet influence, commenced during the Cold War.

What went wrong in the past five decades

Focusing on the past five decades, Pakistan has consistently altered its approach to each new Afghan government that has emerged following various political transitions and takeovers. This pattern of behavior is often viewed as a strategic maneuver, deeply rooted in Pakistan’s desire for what it terms “strategic depth.” This concept refers to the idea that an unstable Afghanistan serves Pakistan’s geopolitical ambitions by providing a buffer zone against perceived threats, particularly from India. Visibly, the instability in Afghanistan allows Pakistan to exert influence over its neighbor while simultaneously pursuing its own national interests but internally it causes stock of issues and hurdles to its powerful military establishment.

Pakistan’s well discussed “strategic depth”, that was planned or originated in the early years following its independence, aimed to counterbalance India’s regional influence. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked a significant turning point that reinforced this outlook, when Pakistan emerged as a pivotal player in supporting Afghan’s armed resistance by (Afghan Mujahideen calling them freedom fighters, scattered in various armed groups, thereby deepening its involvement in Afghan affairs and solidifying its role in the geopolitical dynamics of South Asia.

The biggest issue is the use of proxy’s forces on the part of Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan

The usage of proxies policy represents a significant miscalculation on the part of Pakistan’s policy makers responsible for ups and downs in neighboring Afghanistan. No doubt to mention that this perspective complicates Pakistan’s foreign policy and undermines the possibility of establishing a stable and cooperative relationship with Afghanistan, ultimately jeopardizing Pakistan’s security as well. By framing its approach to Afghanistan apparently through the lens of rivalry with India, Pakistan risks intensifying tensions and conflicts that could further destabilize both nations. Such a strategy fails to acknowledge the intricate socio-political dynamics within Afghanistan and neglects the opportunities for collaboration that could yield mutual benefits for both countries.

Problematic domestic and isolated foreign policies

No one can neglect that the problematic domestic and isolated foreign policies of Taliban-led Afghan government, has further fuelled hardships for Pakistan as, “no other than Pakistan is considered responsible for its (Taliban)re-empowering.” By patronizing Tehrik Taliban Afghanistan also called Emirate Islami Afghanistan, Pakistan’s powerful junta had ignored the fact that TTA founder Mullah Muhammad Omar Akhund has been declared as their unanimous supreme leader by like minded islamists from both the countries. Afghan Taliban in accordance with the guidelines of Mullah Omar are reluctant to honor Pakistan’s demand of either extraditing banned TTP militants or taking action against them. Pakistan is also ignoring another fact that TT established by Mullah Omar Akhund is trying for Islamic State of Khurasan, which is also a threat to geographical limits of several regional countries.

Calling them as Taliban are not new but they are creation or production of US patronized Afghan War. Majority of them were part of different Jihadic groups. Amongst the Jihadis, Haqqannis headed by late Maulvi Jalal Ud Din Haqqani, Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan faction headed by Maulvi Younas Khalis and several others like Ustad Yasar of Prof. Abdul Rab Rasool Sayaf led Ittehad Islami were the first one who had announced joining of TTA soon after its inception.

Pakistan is suffering from his persistently unsuccessful policies toward its neighbor Afghanistan

No one having the intention to oppose or under mind Pakistan’s harsh criticisms concerning the presence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sanctuaries on Afghan soil, but no one can neglect the fact that both countries they have suffered significant harm as a result of Pakistan’s persistently unsuccessful Afghan policies. Instead pursuing failed or flop policies, Pakistan is in possession of stock of opportunities, entering into friendly and trustworthy relations with Afghanistan. Moreover, they could strengthen their ties through economic collaboration, including the negotiations of trade agreements, joint infrastructure development projects, and partnerships in the long-awaited mega energy projects in the region. From a geopolitical perspective, Pakistan and Afghanistan have the opportunity to collaborate on initiatives aimed at promoting regional connectivity and engage in diplomatic endeavors to foster peace and stability within the region.

The conflicting narratives from both sides, especially Pakistani leaders’ remarks only serve to fuel mistrust and escalate tensions between  Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead of working towards resolving their differences and addressing common security challenges, each side continues to point fingers at the other. This vicious cycle of blame and counter-blame not only undermines efforts towards regional peace but also creates an environment conducive to the growth and spread of extremist groups. It’s generally believed in Afghanistan that Pakistan’s assertions are driven by this country’s long-term policy of strategic depth of having an unstable and unsecured Afghanistan in its western border, rather than a genuine concern for security. They think that Pakistan uses the threat of TTP presence in Afghanistan as a pretext to justify its continued involvement in Afghan affairs or to divert attention from internal issues. Others suggest that Pakistan is seeking international support and sympathy by portraying itself as a victim of terrorism.

Meanwhile, Pakistani Taliban (TTP) cannot be defeated through military means

The assertion that the Pakistan establishment is behind the turmoil in Afghanistan is a complex issue with multiple factors at play and holds merit based on historical context, strategic interests, support for insurgent groups, geopolitical considerations, and implications for regional stability.

Regardless of the motives behind Pakistan’s assertions, it is clear that the current strategy of relying on military action alone will not address the security challenges facing Pakistan. The TTP is an adaptive adversary that cannot be defeated through military means alone. A more realistic and comprehensive approach is needed, one that addresses the root causes of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan, such as poverty eradication, depreciation, lack of education, and political instability.

Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan are diverse, covering economic, security, stability, and regional influence considerations. However, significant challenges arise when Pakistan engages in proxy conflicts against successive Afghan governments regardless of their prior friendly relations. This long standing policy of supporting armed opposition groups against ruling authorities has persisted for decades, harming trust and posing a dual threat to both countries. From the last couple of years, the exchanges between Pakistani officials and Taliban representatives highlights a complex web of accusations regarding terrorism and security in South Asia. Both sides appear to be deflecting responsibility while emphasizing the other’s role in perpetuating regional instability. Instead, results oriented dialogues may be encouraged for building up consensus on both sides for addressing common issues of security, extremism, poverty and backwardness.

The issue of IS and controversy surrounding Bagram Airfield to the US drones is a big challenge

Across the border in Afghanistan, the reports of Pakistan’s recent engagement with Afghan warlords, the allegations of harboring ISKP terrorists on its soil against Afghanistan, and the controversy surrounding the provision of air bases to U.S. drones are  issues that promote anti Pakistan sentiment and raise concerns for Afghanistan. It is crucial for Pakistan to promptly and effectively address these matters. In their pursuit of military and political strategies, Pakistani policymakers intentionally create an imaginary emotional narrative that positions Pakistan as a nation sandwiched between two antagonistic neighbors, which serves to rationalize their actions on both domestic and international fronts. This approach not only marks a shift from previous alliances but also underscores the intricate nature of regional politics, where allegiances can swiftly alter in response to immediate strategic requirements.

The implications of this evolving policy are profound for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. For Afghanistan, continued instability may hinder economic development and exacerbate humanitarian crises. For Pakistan, while it may gain short-term advantages through manipulation of Afghan politics, its long-term consequences could include increased militancy within its borders and strained relations with international partners who advocate for stability in the region.

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China plans $411bn private treasury bond issuance in 2025

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Chinese authorities have approved a record issuance of 3 trillion yuan ($411 billion) in private treasury bonds for 2025, according to two sources cited by Reuters. The move signals Beijing’s commitment to using fiscal stimulus to address economic stagnation.

This represents a significant increase from the 1 trillion yuan issued this year and coincides with preparations for potential tariff hikes on Chinese imports as Donald Trump is expected to reassume the U.S. presidency in January.

The proceeds will target initiatives such as consumer subsidies, business equipment upgrades, and investments in innovation-driven sectors. According to the sources, who spoke anonymously due to the sensitivity of the issue, the plan underscores China’s proactive approach to offsetting deflationary pressures.

Officials from the State Council Information Office, Ministry of Finance, and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) did not immediately comment on the development.

Following the announcement, yields on China’s 10-year and 30-year treasury bonds rose by 1 basis point and 2 basis points, respectively. The planned issuance, the largest on record, demonstrates Beijing’s willingness to expand borrowing to stabilize the world’s second-largest economy.

China generally reserves ultra-long-term corporate bonds for extraordinary circumstances, reflecting the significance of this initiative.

Approximately 1.3 trillion yuan from the new issuance will fund “two major” and “two new” programs: A consumer subsidy program to encourage trade-ins for new vehicles and appliances, subsidies for large-scale business equipment upgrades, and infrastructure projects in critical sectors, including railways, airports, and farmland.

The NDRC reported that 70% of the proceeds from this year’s bond issuance funded major projects, while the remainder supported new schemes.

Another significant portion, exceeding 1 trillion yuan, will drive investments in advanced manufacturing, including electric vehicles, robotics, semiconductors, and green energy. Additionally, funds will recapitalize state-owned banks struggling with shrinking margins, declining profits, and rising non-performing loans.

The issuance will account for 2.4% of China’s 2023 GDP. For comparison, Beijing’s 2007 issuance of 1.55 trillion yuan represented 5.7% of GDP at the time.

The announcement follows the annual Central Economic Work Conference, where President Xi Jinping and senior officials outlined economic plans for 2025. The state media summary emphasized “steady economic growth,” raising the fiscal deficit ratio, and increasing government debt issuance, without detailing figures.

Recent Reuters reports indicate China may raise its budget deficit to a record 4% of GDP and aim for an economic growth target of around 5% next year.

China’s economy faces multiple headwinds, including a protracted property crisis, rising local government debt, and weak consumer demand. Exports, traditionally a growth driver, risk new U.S. tariffs of over 60%, threatening another economic lifeline.

Domestic consumption remains subdued, with households grappling with falling property values and minimal social safety nets. To counter weak demand, Beijing plans to expand its consumer and industrial equipment swap programs to more products and sectors.

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“Good” and “bad” armed groups

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These days, the topic of comparing the Taliban and Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has become a hot topic in the media outlets and social networks. The head of HTS recently said that Syria will not turn into another Afghanistan, because both countries have different social and cultural situations and Afghanistan has tribal structures.

His words have provoked different reactions from Afghan social media users – some have confirmed these statements of Jolani, but some have opposed them. However, the words of the leader of the HTS delegation that Syria will not become another Afghanistan and his gentle and flexible approach to the people have attracted the attention of many.

Jolani has now become the next leader of Syria from the leadership of an old “terrorist” group, and both countries, including Russia, which supported Bashar Assad’s regime, also want political interaction with him. Although it is too early to believe all the words of Jolani, it is clear that he has so far introduced himself as a practical and moderate figure.

He has been able to gain the attention of the Syrian people and the media and be ahead of other Islamists. On the other side of the story, we are dealing with the Taliban, the group that in the last three years has only secretly invited people to follow them with the language of force and violence, including threats, beatings, arrests, torture, and murders. The Taliban came to reform the people they believed in, not to listen to the people’s demands through moderation and to respect the internationally accepted principles.

If we analyze the current situation of Syria and Afghanistan from the point of view of political realism, then we are faced with two different attitudes: one representative is the Tahrir al-Sham group led by Ahmed al-Shara and the other representative is the Taliban group led by Mullah Hibatullah.

“Bad” or “worse” “terrorists”, a common scourge of realism in today’s politics.

Both groups are hardline Islamic groups and have extensive backgrounds in “terrorism”, but their attitudes differ from each other. The first group tries to conform to the demands of the people and the world, while the second group stubbornly wants the people and the world to submit to their demands.

The first group wants to interact with the people and the world, but the second group insists that they will not interact.

HTS’s leader (L) and the Taliban Prime Minister (R)

The main fear of the Taliban and other ideological groups, whether they are right-wing or left-wing, is death. Based on this reason, in order to preserve their old beliefs and sacred values, which have become old since time and are no longer hurting the society in the process of change, they are willing to commit any kind of crime.

Some groups, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, when they realize the failure of their long-term efforts to achieve their imaginary and ambitious goals, they come to the conclusion that without accepting flexibility and leaving aside reality for political stability, which is always changing, he has no other choice.

These groups, however outwardly, are trying to change, but all these efforts continue until their power bases are threatened.

For another example, if we compare Hayat Tahrir al-Sham with the Taliban, considering what we have seen in Syria in this short period of time, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is considered a “good” armed group by the countries of the world – known as, while the Taliban have proved that they are “evil” in their three years of actions. “Good” armed groups like Jolani go along with the world and give up ideology, even if only temporarily.

He is a pragmatist and knows that the world is not going his way, and that he must submit to the ruling order of the world. Therefore, “good” armed groups are better than “bad” armed groups who never want to give up their ideological selfishness and be ready for compromise and reconciliation.

The existence of the worst, such as ISIS, makes the others ‘better’.

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China warns economists spreading ‘inappropriate’ views

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The Securities Association of China (SAC), an industry watchdog, issued a directive last week urging chief economists at Chinese brokerages to “play a positive role in interpreting government policies and boosting investor confidence,” according to the state-run financial newspaper Securities Times.

The statement did not clarify what constitutes “inappropriate comments,” but it warned that individuals who “repeatedly trigger reputational risks due to inappropriate comments or behaviors” or cause “major adverse effects” within a specified timeframe could face serious consequences, including termination.

This directive represents Beijing’s latest effort to restore investor confidence and stimulate economic growth in the world’s second-largest economy. However, some analysts and economists express concerns that increasing censorship might heighten the risk of policy missteps.

Nikkei Asia reported that a Chinese economist working at a bank recently received an internal warning for public comments on the economy. According to SAC guidelines—supervised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)—chief economists are prohibited from attending meetings, events, or making public statements without prior approval from their firms. The guidelines also stipulate that brokerage firms should avoid hiring economists with a “spotty track record.”

The warning comes weeks after candid discussions by prominent economists Gao Shanwen and Fu Peng sparked social media debates on the reliability of official economic indicators, including unemployment rates and growth statistics. Following their viral remarks, access to their social media accounts was restricted.

China’s post-pandemic economic recovery has underperformed expectations, leading to debates about whether the economy is nearing recession. In 2022, the country’s official growth rate was 5.2%, its slowest since 1990, excluding the years of COVID-19 disruptions. During the annual economic work conference last year, Beijing urged officials to uphold a “bright theory” of economic conditions amid challenges like a property market downturn and declining stock values. The government also restricted negative commentary on the economy, labeling such rhetoric as “false.”

Since September, Chinese leaders have introduced a range of stimulus measures to restore confidence. These include lowering interest rates, reducing mortgage costs, and offering low-interest loans to encourage stock buybacks. However, these efforts have had limited impact. Consumer inflation dropped to a five-month low in November, exports experienced a sharp decline, and imports fell unexpectedly.

At a key political meeting this month, Beijing announced plans to boost domestic demand and increase fiscal spending through additional borrowing in 2024. The government is also preparing for potential trade shocks as former U.S. President Donald Trump, who has threatened to raise tariffs on Chinese goods, gears up for a second term.

Despite ongoing challenges, officials maintain an optimistic outlook. Han Wenxiu, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs, stated earlier this month that China’s economy is projected to grow by around 5% in 2024.

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