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Europe quietly develops ‘Plan B’ military structures to bypass potential US veto within NATO

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Despite mounting calls to establish a dedicated “European NATO,” politicians and military officials across multiple European nations are quietly developing sovereign military capacity options outside the structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

According to an analysis published by German Foreign Policy, these efforts are driven by deep-seated concerns that even a European-centric NATO—where European nations would provide the core command centers and weapons systems—could ultimately be blocked or paralyzed by the United States if Washington deems that the alliance’s activities do not align with its own strategic interests.

Consequently, calls for a “Plan B” have steadily intensified. In Scandinavia, defense planners increasingly view a robust Northern European defense cluster as the potential core of such an alternative strategy.

Simultaneously, the United Kingdom has been building the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) since 2014. Designed to be fully compatible with NATO but capable of operating entirely independently of it, the JEF maintains a comprehensive sovereign infrastructure at its headquarters in Northwood.

Recently, the ten member states of the JEF agreed to establish a joint naval force directed at countering Russia.

This restructuring comes amid growing criticism that NATO is operating under obsolete doctrines. European defense planners are now seeking to develop distinctly European methodologies of warfare, with a particular focus on drone and unmanned systems integration.

Sweden: The urgent need for a Plan B

Beyond efforts within NATO to increase reliance on European personnel and hardware—aimed at strengthening the autonomy of European member states relative to the US—discussions have shifted toward developing sovereign military capabilities completely outside the Alliance.

The primary driver of this shift is the apprehension that, in the event of an armed conflict involving European nations, Washington might not only withhold military support but could actively block NATO’s operational structures from being utilized.

Given that the US has historically dominated NATO—with key command structures organized around American leadership and built upon proprietary US technology—The Economist recently cited an insider source asking a fundamental question: “If America blocks NATO, what chain of command can be used?”

According to Luis Simón of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, the departure of the US would inevitably lead to a fragmentation of the existing deterrence ecosystem.

Nevertheless, several European armed forces are reportedly drafting confidential contingency plans detailing how they would wage war without relying on NATO’s command infrastructure.

The Economist further quoted a Swedish government official who summarized the prevailing sentiment: “We need a Plan B.”

A joint anti-Russian force emerges in Scandinavia

This “Plan B” is actively being negotiated, particularly among the Northern European countries.

Matti Pesu, an expert at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), noted in November that a “strong Nordic defense cluster” could form the core of this alternative framework.

Pesu observed that while European allies cannot fully replicate or replace US military might at present, “closer Nordic integration” could deliver a credible level of deterrence and defense.

Pesu, who has chaired the FIIA’s Nordic Network since 2023, wrote that the UK—with its operational experience and maritime capacity—and France—with its independent nuclear deterrent and expeditionary forces—represent natural partners for military cooperation with the Nordic countries.

Paris has already been holding discussions with several Northern European nations regarding the potential expansion of its nuclear umbrella.

Furthermore, Pesu emphasized the necessity of “deeper Nordic-Baltic-Polish coordination in foreign and defense policy” to establish a cohesive northeastern European alliance against Russia.

Five Northern European states have maintained structured military cooperation under the framework of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) since 2009.

The UK’s anti-Russian military framework: The JEF

The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is frequently cited as the most mature, established, and operational alternative military structure currently available.

Established in 2014 and fully operational since 2018, the JEF is officially characterized as a force that is “not dependent on NATO but compliant with NATO.”

The force comprises ten member states: the UK, five Nordic nations, three Baltic states, and the Netherlands. Canada’s potential participation is currently under discussion.

The JEF is designed to intervene within a NATO framework, but it retains the sovereign mandate to launch independent military operations even when the broader alliance fails to reach a consensus.

To support this capability, its headquarters in Northwood, northwest of London, possesses comprehensive intelligence, planning, and logistical assets. It also utilizes secure communication networks that are entirely independent of NATO infrastructure.

Edward Arnold, an expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, noted that these independent capabilities make the JEF the most established structure among all proposed alternatives.

The JEF has already been activated multiple times, primarily for military exercises, but also to conduct active naval patrols in the Baltic Sea aimed at countering Russian maritime activity.

While the force maintains rapid-reaction capabilities designed for ultra-short-notice deployments, its primary operational focus remains Northern Europe.

Supporting NATO or operating independently?

In April, JEF member states took a significant step forward by agreeing to establish a joint naval force.

While these naval assets are intended to complement NATO, they are being structured to maintain fully independent operational capabilities.

Their initial objectives include joint exercises and coordinated contingency planning for emergencies. The naval force will be headquartered alongside the main JEF command at Northwood, from where forces will be directed as required.

General Gwyn Jenkins, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff of the Royal Navy, emphasized that these forces are designed to be “ready to fight immediately, if necessary, with real capabilities, real war plans, and real integration.”

Jenkins explicitly identified Russia as the primary adversary for the future JEF naval force, calling Moscow “the biggest threat to our security.”

However, defense analysts point out that both the naval force and the broader JEF framework still lack participation from key European heavyweights, namely Germany, France, and Poland.

While Berlin is currently concentrating its naval activities in the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic, observers remain highly skeptical that Germany would be willing to subordinate its forces to British command.

Obsolete NATO doctrine

In addition to developing operational forces independent of NATO like the JEF, European military commanders are beginning to fundamentally re-evaluate modern warfare doctrines, spurred by the war in Ukraine and the critical role played by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and autonomous robotic systems.

According to remarks made by General John Stringer, Deputy Commander of NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command, at a recent RUSI conference, “tactical-operational conceptual thinking” within NATO largely ground to a halt in 1991.

Military officials and policymakers increasingly acknowledge that the entirety of NATO’s core doctrine has become obsolete, and that many member states lack the advanced technologies required for contemporary high-intensity conflict.

The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that nations traditionally viewed as weaker can successfully mount strategic defenses against adversaries that are far superior by conventional metrics.

Consequently, European armed forces, utilizing direct insights and assistance from Ukrainian military personnel and specialists, have begun exploring entirely new approaches to combat.

The Financial Times quoted a French government official who suggested that decoupling from US military paradigms could offer unexpected advantages: “Less America means we can finally ask the question: ‘If we no longer have to fight like Americans, how will we fight?'”

Europe

Germany expands North Sea military ports and plans new naval base

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With the transformation of the port of Bremerhaven into a high-capacity military hub and the prospective establishment of a fifth German naval base in Emden, the federal government is accelerating the militarisation of the German coastline.

According to German Foreign Policy, the logistics infrastructure in Bremerhaven will be modernised and expanded to unload massive volumes of weapons and ammunition as quickly as possible and transport them onward to potential battlefields in Eastern Europe.

This is set out in a memorandum of understanding signed this week between the Ministry of Defence and municipal authorities in Bremen.

The federal government is providing up to 1.35 billion euros for this purpose, while the federal state of Bremen is contributing more than 212 million euros.

Bremen has the highest poverty risk and the highest child poverty rate of any federal state in the country.

The allocation of hundreds of millions of euros to expand military logistics rather than tackle poverty is also supported by senators from the Left Party (Die Linke) who sit in the state government.

Modernisation intensifies in Bremerhaven

Bremerhaven, Germany’s second-largest port in maritime freight handling behind Hamburg and ahead of Wilhelmshaven, is regarded as ideal for handling military cargo.

The port possesses significant capacity for offloading not only containers but also vehicles, alongside heavy-lift areas capable of handling even heavy military hardware such as main battle tanks. Moreover, because it can be accessed without passing through locks, access is substantially easier and faster.

Finally, it has good links to roads and particularly to railways, which is vital for the rapid transport of weapons and ammunition in the event of a crisis or war.

The port’s particular suitability as a military transshipment hub also stems from its history: it has been used by US forces since the end of the Second World War.

During the Cold War, it served as the central transshipment port in the Federal Republic of Germany and was expanded accordingly.

After 1990, it lost its significance for the US; however, with the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, the US presence increased once more.

US activity escalated initially under exercises such as Defender Europe 2020 and subsequently from 2022 onwards in the context of the war in Ukraine.

As early as 2023, experts noted that Bremerhaven was operating as “an arms hub just like in the old days”.

Ports optimised for military logistics

The federal government is currently working to further increase the port’s military logistics capacity.

For instance, harbor basins will reportedly be dredged, and road and rail connections will be expanded.

Container facilities will be modernised and adapted to carry heavier loads.

This applies to both cranes and storage areas, with plans also in place to expand these storage areas into new zones.

A spokesperson for the port operating company Bremenports was quoted as saying: “The efficient transport of military hardware is no longer limited to tanks alone.”

Today, weapons and ammunition are also delivered in containers, which would need to be rapidly unloaded and forwarded in the event of war.

To ensure this, plans are also being made to build a new railway swing bridge at the Kaiserhafen. According to reports, the existing bridge is described as a “bottleneck” that slows down the movement of military equipment unnecessarily.

In addition, the heavy focus on military logistics demands costly security measures.

For example, not only will new fencing and privacy screens be erected, but drone defence systems will also be installed and cybersecurity measures implemented.

Left Party senators back armaments

The federal government is allocating approximately 1.35 billion euros through 2031 to optimise military logistics in Bremerhaven and, in conjunction with this, adapt Bremen Airport more effectively to the needs of the Bundeswehr.

According to the Mayor of Bremen, Andreas Bovenschulte, this represents the largest grant the German government has ever provided for a project in the federal state of Bremen.

The state of Bremen is contributing an additional 212 million euros to the “Bremerhaven 2031 Deployment Hub” project.

While large sums are being funnelled from Bremen’s state budget into war preparations in this manner, approximately 25.9% of the state’s population was classified as at risk of poverty in 2024, with 28.6% of all children living in poverty.

This makes Bremen the federal state with the highest poverty risk and the highest rate of child poverty.

Approval for funding military logistics in Bremerhaven with hundreds of millions of euros from the state budget also came from two Bremen senators belonging to the Left Party.

The Left Party’s Senator for Economic Affairs and Ports, Kristina Vogt, praised the “pragmatism” of “improving our infrastructure, which is already used for civilian purposes, for military ends” rather than constructing new facilities.

North Sea joins Baltic Sea militarisation

With the expansion of the Bremerhaven military hub, the militarisation of Germany’s coasts is progressing.

Until now, the focal point of Germany’s naval infrastructure has been the Baltic Sea coast. This was partly because during the Cold War, the naval activities of the Federal Republic of Germany were directed against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states.

Alongside several training facilities, the German Navy primarily operates three major naval bases here, situated in Eckernfoerde, Kiel, and Rostock-Warnemuende, as well as the Naval Command based in Rostock.

In the North Sea, these are complemented by the naval base in Wilhelmshaven and the Naval Air Command at Nordholz near Cuxhaven.

The Naval Air Command is the third major unit of the German Navy, alongside Flotilla 1 based in Kiel and Flotilla 2 based in Wilhelmshaven.

At present, approximately 16,000 soldiers and 1,800 civilian staff from the Bundeswehr are stationed at the Navy’s main bases and various smaller installations.

As in other branches of the armed forces, the German Navy aims to expand its personnel numbers.

Germany’s fifth naval base to be built

In addition to the four existing naval bases and the Bremerhaven military hub, the federal government plans shortly to announce the construction of a fifth naval base, also located on the North Sea.

According to reports, Emden has been selected as the site for the base. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius and Lower Saxony’s State Minister Olaf Lies are scheduled to outline the next steps regarding a potential new naval base there on Monday.

Emden previously hosted a naval base during the Cold War, but the facility was closed in 1997.

According to reports, one argument in Emden’s favour is that it holds the largest unused area among Lower Saxony’s North Sea ports.

Discussions have been ongoing for some time over how to utilise this disused land reasonably, although these debates previously centred on civilian use.

According to the German Navy’s plans, the new naval base will accommodate seven frigates, ten minesweepers, and ten tugs, alongside a four-digit number of Bundeswehr soldiers and civilian personnel.

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European nations unite against US pressure over strategic oil stocks

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Five European countries have agreed to respond with “one voice” to mounting pressure from the US government to release their oil reserves.

Three European officials told Politico that France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Ireland, and the European Commission participated in talks to determine how to respond to pressure from Washington to draw down their oil reserves or face a ban on US diesel exports.

Two of these sources stated that all of these countries were placed under covert pressure by the US to run down their oil reserves or face a ban on diesel exports from the US.

According to the sources, these countries, together with the EU executive, agreed on three points: responding to the pressure with a “coordinated voice”, ensuring that “any decision on releasing stocks is brought to the IEA [International Energy Agency] level”, and seeking to “de-escalate tension in talks with the US”.

The Paris-based IEA coordinates energy policy among wealthy countries and oversaw the release of oil reserves earlier this year following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

One of the sources said the objective was to “de-escalate”:

“Being somewhat firm yet positive in communication… When you are facing a hungry lion, you do not necessarily have to play dirty with it.”

The source added that a wider group of countries, some of which have faced pressure from the Trump administration, would discuss how to react at a meeting scheduled for Friday.

Politico previously reported that US Energy Secretary Chris Wright had demanded the release of oil reserves into the market as an alternative to an export ban on which the EU heavily relies.

As a consequence of the wars in Ukraine and Iran, diesel prices in the US are soaring, placing significant pressure on US President Donald Trump to lower prices ahead of critical midterm elections.

The president is not ruling out an export ban, despite fierce opposition from the US oil industry.

Regarding the export ban, Trump said at an Oval Office event: “I am considering it. I speak to [Energy Secretary] Chris [Wright] and [Interior Secretary] Doug [Burgum] about this often. They think it would help diesel prices, but it could also raise the prices of other products.”

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EU wrestles with domestic content rules for ‘Made in Europe’ push

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The EU wants to leverage its immense public spending power to bolster European industry through a “Made in Europe” initiative.

Deep divisions remain, however, over what should genuinely count as European-made.

According to a report by Politico, the European Parliament and member state governments are trying to establish their positions on the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which forms part of Brussels’ effort to turn the “Made in Europe” slogan into an industrial strategy.

The initiative aims to use tenders and subsidies to create a guaranteed market for products of European origin.

Yet doing so requires answering politically contentious questions, such as how “European” a product must be to qualify, and how much more governments and consumers should be prepared to pay to buy domestic goods.

Disagreements are playing out not only between Parliament and the Council, but also among national governments and even between political allies from different countries.

Unveiled by the European Commission in March, the IAA seeks to channel public expenditure on green technology, energy-intensive industries, and motor vehicles towards European firms, helping them compete with dominant Chinese exporters.

Six months on, it is becoming increasingly clear how difficult it is to turn that objective into workable legislation.

Opposing sides broadly agree on the need to strengthen Europe’s industrial base, accelerate permitting procedures, and reduce strategic dependencies.

However, sharp divisions persist over how extensively the EU should support European manufacturing and how much flexibility national governments should retain.

Politico has identified five issues that will dominate negotiations through 2027.

The first issue is the debate over what qualifies as “Made in Europe”.

Defining EU origin is the most politically sensitive topic in the talks. With public procurement accounting for 15% of the bloc’s GDP—equivalent to roughly 3 trillion euros a year—the sums at stake are enormous.

If the threshold defining how European a product must be is drawn too narrowly, Brussels risks alienating close trading partners and disrupting supply chains.

Conversely, if drawn too broadly, the “Made in Europe” preference risks becoming meaningless.

Parliament is pressing for stricter anti-circumvention rules and demanding that at least 50% of a product’s value be created within the EU.

This condition would also make it harder for goods or components from third countries to be treated as equivalent to EU-origin items.

Lawmakers also aim to impose tighter conditions, including reciprocity, economic security measures, climate commitments, labour standards, and human rights safeguards.

The Council is more open to treating content from countries covered by the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or relevant free trade agreements as equivalent to EU-origin content under specified conditions, including certain reciprocity principles.

Yet EU member states are still debating their positions and putting forward various conflicting proposals.

Ireland, which holds the Council presidency, plans to submit a fresh compromise proposal featuring the “Made in Europe” designation by mid-October.

Another issue is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screening.

Parliament wants a more comprehensive and stringent system to screen foreign investment in strategic sectors.

Underpinning this demand is the concern that, despite the EU spending billions to develop strategic industries, subsidized or otherwise state-backed foreign investors could acquire the very companies and assets the EU helped build.

Lawmakers want to lower the review threshold from the proposed 100 million euro investment figure to 50 million euros, bring affiliates of foreign investors under the rules, and lower the control threshold that triggers mandatory notification.

They also want to give the Commission a stronger role, granting it the power to block investments in critical raw materials when EU funds are involved.

The Council’s position is narrower: it broadly retains the 100 million euro FDI threshold and the 30% control threshold set out in the Commission’s original proposal, while granting national authorities greater flexibility in managing the approval process.

The two institutions are at odds not only over the scope of screening, but also over the institutional balance of power between Brussels and national capitals.

The third issue centres on the scope of tenders and subsidies.

Both sides want public tenders and state support to drive demand for European-made, low-carbon goods.

However, opinions diverge on how broadly the rules should apply.

This is where political goals collide directly with public purse strings. Requiring governments to purchase European-made goods could spur demand for domestic manufacturers, but it could also force taxpayers to pay more when cheaper imported alternatives are available.

Parliament wants various requirements—such as green, social, or “Made in EU” criteria—to cover up to 90% of state aid or subsidy programmes, compared with 45% in the Council text.

It also proposes tighter social and labour conditions, relocation curbs, and stricter verification and enforcement mechanisms.

The Council favours broader exemptions where suitable products are unavailable, excessively costly, or technically unviable.

This posture reflects governmental concerns over higher public spending or project delays linked to reliance on imported components.

The fourth issue is the divergence over sectoral targets.

Parliament generally seeks higher and more granular European-origin content requirements for batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, electrolysers, nuclear technologies, and electric vehicles.

Electric cars illustrate how complex the “Made in Europe” concept can become in practice.

A vehicle assembled within the EU may contain a battery and raw materials sourced through supply chains spanning the globe.

Parliament plans to raise the required EU-origin share for non-battery vehicle components from the 70% proposed by the Commission to 75%.

Requirements governing battery materials, binders, and strategic raw materials would also be introduced.

The Council’s stance, by contrast, is less prescriptive and allows for a more phased implementation.

The dispute is not over whether strategic sectors should receive support, but whether the IAA should impose binding content targets that could push up costs for manufacturers and consumers.

The fifth and final debate concerns the sectors covered by the Industrial Accelerator Act.

The argument centres on whether the IAA should remain a targeted response to strategic dependencies or become a broader vehicle for EU industrial policy.

Parliament wants to expand the legislation to cover areas such as maritime manufacturing, materials recovery, and certain plastic products used in construction.

It also wants sectors such as fertilizers, rolling stock, robotics, and aerospace considered in future reviews.

The Council text focuses more tightly on sectors already identified, including energy-intensive industries, automotive, net-zero technologies, and critical raw materials.

The debate reflects wider friction over how far the EU should extend “Made in Europe” preferences.

When public procurement and subsidies are deployed in certain strategic sectors to shield domestic manufacturing, other industries gain a strong incentive to argue that they too should benefit.

According to a separate report by Politico, Brussels is prepared to grant candidate countries access to its single market, provided they agree to align with the bloc against “hostile states” and industrial competitors.

Under the draft plan, candidate countries would receive unprecedented “gradual integration” into the single market while their accession bids are assessed, including frictionless trade and access to research programmes.

An assessment of “pre-enlargement” benefits to be offered to candidate nations states: “The single market is the primary driver of economic convergence.”

The draft states:

“Earlier integration will create opportunities for businesses across the Union, strengthen European value chains, and reduce strategic dependencies. The Commission will identify sectors where verified regulatory alignment and enforcement capacity allow for deeper participation in research, innovation, and industrial cooperation, as well as broader market access. Priority should be given to opportunities that advance accession preparations and address shared economic and strategic needs.”

Overseen by Alexandre Adam, top adviser to Ursula von der Leyen and former aide to French President Emmanuel Macron, the review would fundamentally transform the EU’s approach to neighbouring countries.

At present, almost all the economic advantages of closer cooperation remain reserved for member states.

No new country has joined the EU since Croatia’s accession in 2013.

As part of Adam’s package of measures, Ukraine, Moldova, Albania, and Montenegro are set to receive “roadmaps” designed to accelerate their accession process in the coming years.

For other nations, including North Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Türkiye, the process continues to drag on amid mounting fears that they could drift away from the EU or draw closer to Russia or China.

Under the Commission’s blueprint, economic benefits extended to candidate countries would depend on their backing of EU foreign policy goals.

Single market access would hinge on candidate states not sharing key technologies with hostile governments and commercial rivals.

The review document notes:

“As industrial and market integration deepens, participation in sensitive sectors must go hand in hand with cooperation on investment screening, export controls, sanctions enforcement, and the protection of sensitive technologies. Access assessments must consider strategic alignment, critical dependencies, and the capacity to manage risks to infrastructure and supply chains. Where these conditions are not met, the scope of participation should be recalibrated under the relevant regulatory framework.”

Areas being considered for closer cooperation include semiconductors, quantum technologies, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and space.

According to the review, full EU membership must remain the ultimate goal for candidate countries.

“Yet accession takes time: candidate countries must complete a rigorous, merit-based process and deliver comprehensive, enduring reforms,” the report notes. “This period must be fully exploited strategically, both to prepare the Union for a wider membership and to deepen gradual integration in areas of mutual interest.”

The benefits gained, however, will be contingent on countries fulfilling their obligations:

“Where these commitments are not honoured, integration must be reversible. The accession process should be suspended or rolled back where deemed necessary.”

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