Nikola Mikovic, Journalist-writer

Central Asia’s rich energy resources and strategically important location are making it a key area of interest for major world powers. Although China, the European Union, and, to a certain extent, the United States, are seeking to increase their presence in a region traditionally within Russia’s geopolitical orbit, small and mid-sized countries from around the world are also aiming to develop closer ties with the Central Asian states.

Moscow preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has opened the door for other actors to expand their influence in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. As a result, in 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8 billion. At the same time, it surpassed Russia to become the main trading partner of Kazakhstan, the biggest country in the region.

The European Union, on the other hand, through its Global Gateway project – which is the EU’s version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – as well as through regular summits with Central Asian states, is also working to secure its presence in this energy-rich region. Its decision to provide emergency funds to help keep Radio Free Europe (commonly known in Central Asia as Radio Azattyq) afloat after the Trump administration stopped grants to the media outlet, clearly suggests that Brussels is more than interested in winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

Individual EU members are also showing their ambitions to develop stronger relations with the region. The best example is Italy, whose Prime Minister Georgia Meloni took part in the Astana International Forum (AIF) on May 30 in the Kazakh capital. This two-day event saw the attendance of political and business leaders from around the globe who gathered under an expanded agenda that includes climate change, energy security, and sustainability. Meloni also participated in the first-ever Central Asia–Italy summit in Astana, having come from Uzbekistan where she met with the country’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

During her speech at the AIF, she quoted Halford Mackinder, a British political geographer, who said that Central Asia represents one of the “pivots” around which the fate of the world revolves. Mackinder is known for his Heartland Theory, which states that control of the Heartland — with Central Asia as a key part — grants control over the entire Eurasian continent. It is, therefore, no surprise that Italy, as well as other EU members, strongly push to establish its own foothold in the energy-rich region.

But besides the European Union and China, other actors are also pursuing a stake in Central Asia. While big players like Türkiye aim to achieve at least some of their geopolitical goals in the region, other nations such as Afghanistan view Central Asian states as potential partners that can help them overcome financial difficulties.

“Over the past few years, we have managed to establish good relations with Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy, and now we hope to strengthen economic ties between our two countries,” Muhammad Rehman Rahmani, the Taliban-appointed Chargé d’Affaires of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to Kazakhstan, told Harici in an interview.

While speaking at one of the sessions of the Astana International Forum, Nooruddin Azizi, the Taliban’s acting Minister of Industry and Commerce, said that Kabul expects Kazakhstan’s assistance in building road and railway infrastructure in war-torn Afghanistan. It is not a secret that Astana views Afghanistan as an important transit country for its exports to the South Asian markets, which is why it seeks to increase its positions in what is often referred to as “The Graveyard of Empires.”

Kazakhstan’s 2024 decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations has created room for Astana’s potential participation in the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan. Astana’s presence in the Taliban-ruled country would perfectly align with what Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko described as a “balanced, constructive and pragmatic foreign policy.”

“We have no tense relations with any country in the world, and we aim to contribute to international peace, security and stability,” Vassilenko told Harici, emphasizing that foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan reflects the country’s foreign policy priorities.

If, however, Astana manages to achieve its goal of increasing trade turnover with Afghanistan to $3 billion, it could easily become the Taliban-ruled nation’s main economic partner in Central Asia. This approach suggests that, amid the rush by major global powers to expand their influence in Kazakhstan, Astana may seek to leverage its relationship with Afghanistan to advance at least some of its geoeconomic goals.

Simultaneously, the oil-rich country of around 20 million people will undoubtedly seek to improve its own position vis-à-vis foreign energy corporations, which currently control 98 percent of Kazakh oil revenues. There is no doubt that major foreign powers operating in Central Asia aim to make similar arrangements with other regional states, as this would allow them to fully benefit from the region’s critical minerals, oil, gas, and water resources.

But will Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have the strength to establish energy partnerships with foreign corporations in the same way that oil-rich Arab states did, where the state controls most of the revenue? From the perspective of the Central Asian nations, such an ambition should be among the top priorities of their energy policies.

A striking critique of Europe from the US State Department: Who are human rights and freedom of expression targeting this time?

An article targeting European politics through the lens of US bilateral relations was published on the official website of the US Department of State.

The article, penned by Samuel Samson, Senior Advisor at the Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), is a quintessential piece illustrating how the era, potentially inaugurated by Donald Trump’s re-election as President, is reshaping the U.S. official institutions’ view of Europe.

In his article, Samson states that the relationship between the US and Europe is not merely about geographical proximity or mutual interests. He argues that this bond is nurtured by shared culture, faith, family ties, and especially the heritage of Western civilization, and that this relationship is “reinforced by a tradition of mutual assistance in troubled times.”

‘America is grateful to Europe’

Samson traces the origins of the Transatlantic alliance, which he says is “strengthened by traditions unique to the West,” back to Athens and Rome, and states that America “is grateful to Europe”:

“The revolutionary statement in the Declaration of Independence that ‘all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights’ reflects the ideas of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and other European thinkers. These ideas are based on the principle that people’s natural rights cannot be subjected to the arbitrary decisions of any government. America is grateful to Europe for this intellectual and cultural heritage.”

Samson believes that even when disagreements arise, this ‘bond’ allows for dialogue between America and Europe. However, according to Samson—that is, Trump’s America—this bond has been damaged. The article’s reference to the controversial speech delivered by US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2025, regarding this concern, is noteworthy.

Apparently, the Trump administration’s mouthpieces see Vance’s Munich speech as a ‘turning point,’ much like Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference (February 10, 2007).

Putin’s historic speech, considered a turning point, in which he sharply criticized the unipolar world order, NATO expansion, and Western interventionist policies, and Vance’s controversial speech themed “the real danger is within us”…

Samson, too, directly quotes the following sentence from Vance’s speech in his article:

“My real concern is internal threats. Europe’s retreat from its most fundamental values, shared with the US.”

Samson also, referencing Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, believes that the new order Europe established with supranational structures after two major world wars ‘to avoid further catastrophes’ has ‘turned into a wreck’:

“Today, however, this promise lies in ruins. It has been replaced by an aggressive campaign waged against Western civilization. Across Europe, governments have turned political institutions into weapons against their own citizens and our common heritage. Instead of strengthening democratic principles, Europe has become a hub for digital censorship, mass migration, restrictions on religious freedom, and many other threats that undermine democratic self-governance.”

As examples of Europe’s deviation from ‘Western civilization,’ Samson points to ‘the arrest of over 12,000 British citizens in the UK for opposing abortion or making ‘critical online comments’ about the migration crisis,’ the designation of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party as ‘extremist’ by German intelligence, and the obstruction of political parties (referring to right-wing parties) in Poland and Romania. Describing an ‘atmosphere of oppression’ in Europe, Samson believes this negatively affects electoral processes on the continent.

‘An Orwellian surveillance tool’

Samson stated that the European Union’s Digital Services Act, though presented as a measure to protect children from harmful content, has actually turned into an Orwellian surveillance tool used to silence dissenting voices. He added that independent regulatory bodies are monitoring social media companies, including X (formerly Twitter), and threatening them with massive fines.

Samson’s solution to all the problems he describes is ‘the revival of our common global heritage’:

“Our hope is that Europe and the United States will recommit to their Western heritage and that European governments will cease to use the state as a weapon against those who defend this heritage. We may not always agree on scope and tactics, but concrete steps by European governments to protect political and religious expression, secure borders, and guarantee fair elections would be welcome developments. Our relationship is too important, our history too precious, and the international risks too great. We cannot allow this partnership to falter. Therefore, on both sides of the Atlantic, we must preserve the values of our common culture and ensure that Western civilization endures for generations as a source of virtue, freedom, and human flourishing.”

What do Samson’s theses mean?

The article, shaped around the idea that the US needs ‘civilizational alliances’ in Europe, elaborates on the notion that the US-Europe relationship ‘cannot be explained solely by geographical proximity and mutual interests,’ but is shaped by ‘shared culture, faith, family ties, and the common heritage of Western civilization.’

This emphasis on historicity in US-Europe relations is based not only on strategic cooperation but also on the thesis of ‘a legal and cultural kinship spanning thousands of years.’

The contemporary political reflection of Samson’s narrative is the rising right in Europe, or, in one of the right’s popular phrases, ‘despised conservatism’. Samson describes the ‘right-wing’ and ‘Christian-conservative’ segments in Europe as ‘the fundamental defenders of civilization’ and laments that ‘Christian nations’ are unfairly branded as authoritarian and violators of human rights.

In other words, according to Samson, Christianity is a form of identity that must be embraced in Europe today.

Furthermore, according to Samson, the rising right-wing movements in Europe are political currents that have undertaken the mission of protecting Western civilization and possess a Christian identity.

The enemy, then, is roughly all parties ranging from the liberal center or center-left to the center-right. According to Samson, these are the parties that are ‘de-civilizing, alienating Europe from its values, and corrupting’ it.

The values championed by the Trump administration in the US under the main banner of ‘conservatism’ were/are welcomed by segments and even governments uncomfortable with the conceptual framework of the Democratic Party’s America.

So much so that the dismantling of USAID was met with great enthusiasm by some ‘anti-American’ circles.

The Trump administration’s particularly anti-LGBTQI+, Christian faith-based, and traditionalist rhetoric garnered widespread sympathy in countries known for their anti-American stance in Europe, especially Russia.

So, what was really happening?

As an imperialist superpower, the ideology implemented and exported by the US during the Democratic Party (Joe Biden) era was shaped by sexual/ethnic identity politics, emphasizing concepts like social justice and equality—in the broadest terms, ‘woke’ ideology.

This ideology, often labeled ‘radical left/Marxist’ by ‘Trumpism,’ serves a function that does not conflict with the capitalist order, is highly compatible with neoliberal market mechanisms, and overshadows class struggle by deepening identity-based divisions.

‘Recalibrating the course…’

The Trump administration, however, after coming to power, rolled up its sleeves not to dismantle the existing order but to rebuild it within a more conservative and nationalist framework. In other words, we are facing a course change that, at its core, still targets US geopolitical interests, with different concepts coming to the fore as the focus shifts.

The most acute effects of this transformation in US politics are naturally being felt in Europe. This article, penned by Samson from a classic Trumpist perspective, is precisely an expression of the tension between Trumpism and the European politics shaped by the Democrats.

Samson’s description is very likely to find supporters in Europe. This is because, in a political climate where leftist demands for security, stability, and welfare have been systematically suppressed for many years, right-wing alternatives have been strengthened. This has served to build a new kind of right-wing nationalist hegemony, especially in anti-Western countries. A striking example of this is the Romanian right, which until a few months ago filled squares with anti-US slogans, now filling the streets with US flags in alignment with Trump.

US imperialism has thus developed a method capable of confining ‘EU-skeptic’ and ‘anti-Western’ forces in Europe—even in an ‘enemy’ country like Russia—within its own ideological framework. All European countries where the right is on the rise or in power and where various levels of ‘anti-Western’ politics exist in their political life—such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, Serbia, and Romania—are nowadays applauding Trump for ‘saving the world from homosexuality.’

At the end of his article, Samson says, “The United States is determined to build a strong partnership with Europe and to work together towards common foreign policy goals,” and with the statement, “We cannot allow this partnership to falter,” he is, in a sense, issuing a veiled threat.

The US emphasis on ‘working together to solve problems’ is always followed by regime change operations. In Europe, policies aligned with Trump’s America have already achieved significant success.

Concepts such as human rights, civil liberties, and freedom of expression have been used by Democrats and European elites against Russia, especially since 2022. It is clear that these same concepts will this time be part of the Trump administration’s official narrative to describe the grievances of new conservatism and rising right-wing movements.

On May 22, Russian President Putin announced that he had decided to establish a necessary security buffer zone along the border with Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nikolenko immediately responded, stating that Putin’s remarks showed that Russia is the true obstacle to peace. Generally, creating a buffer zone along the border or front line implies that one or both warring parties intend to consolidate existing conflict results and establish a new long-term ceasefire or even de facto boundary of control. Russia’s decision signals that, in terms of territorial disputes, the three-year-long Russia-Ukraine war has tipped clearly in Russia’s favor. With this as a foundation, Russia seeks to shift the conflict to peace talks and thus reshape the geopolitical landscape and establish a new security order.

On the same day, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine was striving to ensure the next round of bilateral talks would happen soon but noted that Russia had not yet demonstrated equal readiness. Zelensky’s remarks showed a similarly unyielding position, indicating no willingness to make major territorial concessions.

In contrast, U.S. President Donald Trump, who once confidently promised a quick resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, appears to have lost both confidence and interest, having encountered unexpected difficulties. Trump has no intention of offending Putin, whom he admires, nor can he influence Zelensky, whom he disparages. Thus, the idea of restarting a peace process upon returning to the White House has become an easily burst illusion. In fact, the positions of Russia and Ukraine are not only far apart, but the U.S. and Europe also hold diverging views. The Trump administration failed to realize that the slogan “Defend Ukraine” had become a strategic consensus among European allies for mutual support and collective defense. As a result, the Trump administration’s peace efforts are mired in strategic difficulties due to the lack of consensus.

Before and after taking office, Trump cooperated with Israel to defeat nearly all its regional adversaries, effectively ending what could be seen as the “Sixth Middle East War” by dismantling the “Axis of Resistance.” Currently, only Yemen’s Houthis are actively resisting Israel in support of the embattled Palestinian Hamas. Moreover, Trump successfully visited three Gulf nations, strengthened ties with Turkey, reconciled with longtime foe Syria, and is working to foster a historic breakthrough in Syrian-Israeli relations.

Despite having the capacity to reshape the Middle East, Trump is powerless in the complex Russia-Ukraine war. He admitted that his campaign claim to “end the war in 24 hours” was an offhand remark. His pressure on Ukraine and Europe failed, and he has even lost the initiative in leading peace talks.

On May 16, Russia and Ukraine resumed direct negotiations after three years, with Turkey—maintaining good relations with both sides—serving as a mediator. Apart from a humanitarian agreement to exchange 1,000 prisoners of war, no other progress was made due to the vast differences in peace conditions. Half the Ukrainian delegation wore military uniforms, signaling their readiness to fight to the end.

Russia’s conditions are well-known: Ukraine must relinquish its claim to Crimea, cede four eastern and southern regions to Russia, and vow never to join NATO. Ukraine’s bottom line is to cede no territory and continue its NATO membership pursuit.

After the Istanbul talks, Putin inspected the fully recaptured Kursk region and will soon visit Donbas, controlled by Russian forces. This over three-year war has now entered a new stalemate phase marked by a temporary Russian victory. With overwhelming military strength and vast occupied territory, Russia refuses Ukraine’s call for a ceasefire before negotiations and instead favors negotiating while fighting. This strategy prevents Ukraine from regrouping and aims to drive Ukrainian forces out of the remaining contested areas, securing full control of the four regions. The “border buffer zone” Putin spoke of essentially represents a redefined Russia-Ukraine boundary, securing complete victory in the war.

Russia holds battlefield initiative and strategic upper hand, Ukraine refuses to yield, and European countries are unwilling to abandon Ukraine. This complex situation has gradually drained the Trump administration’s confidence, patience, and courage, increasingly signaling a hands-off approach.

Trump once threatened Russia that if it refused to reach an agreement, the U.S. would impose “secondary tariffs” on its oil exports. However, after a two-hour phone call with Putin on the 19th, Trump completely discarded this verbal threat. Subsequently, in consultations with European leaders, Trump even openly indicated that the U.S. not only had no intention of sanctioning Russia but also planned to fully withdraw and let Russia and Ukraine resolve it themselves. Trump clearly emphasized: This is not America’s war — “This is Europe’s problem, and it should always remain Europe’s problem.”

Russian TASS commentator Hoffman stated after the Trump-Putin call that the conversation was less about future U.S.-Russia trade relations and more about Washington’s acknowledgment of a new geopolitical reality — one in which Russia defines the key parameters of a long-term solution. Another Russian commentator, Ivanikov, emphasized that the call opened the door to historic peace, needing only legal formalization. He also believed that “Trump obviously shares Russia’s perspective on the root causes of the Ukraine conflict.”

Trump’s efforts to resolve the Russia-Ukraine war have been severely frustrated due to several factors. First, he and his advisors overestimated the influence of American leadership in persuading European allies to compromise their core interests, mistakenly treating the territory and sovereignty of other nations as tradable commodities. Second, his advisory team consists largely of political amateurs, many of whom blindly idolize him and follow his lead without question. They lack strategic minds akin to Kissinger or Mearsheimer, turning U.S. mediation into empty talk, detached from geopolitical realities and national interests. Third, Trump and many of his cabinet members lack a deep understanding of European history and fail to grasp the basic rule that wars are easy to start but hard to end.

From the perspective of European history, today’s Russia-Ukraine crisis, conflict, and war are a continuation and repetition of centuries-old tensions between Russia and European nations. It reflects the cultural rejection of Russia by the West, despite its attempts to integrate; the collision between Russia’s quest for “imperial space” due to its deep-seated insecurity and the West’s entrenched Russophobia. It also echoes a long-term struggle between Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy over religious authority and legitimacy.

Throughout this long history of European land-based conflict, the more Russia fought, the more its territory expanded, with neighboring adversaries either eliminated or fragmented into small states. This has heightened Russia’s westward ambitions and intensified the defeated parties’ fear of Russia. The Baltic states repeatedly changed hands in power struggles involving Russia and its powerful neighbors; Poland was partitioned four times, including by Russia (and later the Soviet Union). A fragmented Europe, after WWII, had to rely on the distant yet powerful U.S. across the Atlantic to establish NATO — aiming to prevent a third German resurgence and to counter Russia’s long-term strategic pressure.

The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc led the West to continually erode Russia’s strategic space through EU and NATO expansion, undermining Russia’s national confidence and directly triggering conflicts such as the Georgia war, the two Nagorno-Karabakh wars, and today’s Russia-Ukraine war.

Therefore, European countries—whether small nations bordering Russia or traditional powers like Germany, France, and the UK farther from the frontlines—are unlikely to “reward” Russia by ceding Ukrainian territory. Instead, they are resolutely increasing military spending, strengthening defense capabilities, and continuously supporting Ukraine. This is part of a long-term strategy to independently defend Ukraine and Europe if the U.S. eventually betrays its allies completely.

Under such circumstances, Trump’s wishful thinking—hoping to exchange Ukrainian territory for European peace or sacrificing European security interests for U.S.-Russia reconciliation—will inevitably meet with collective resistance from both Ukraine and most European countries.

Of course, the awkward reality is that NATO remains under absolute U.S. leadership. European nations are unable to independently deploy NATO forces to defeat Russia or help Ukraine reclaim lost territory. The idea of an independent European military isn’t even at the stage of being a comforting illusion. Without full U.S. support, Europe becomes a “strategic orphan” composed of many dwarves—fragmented, bloated, and powerless. It can neither act alone nor together to confront a powerful neighbor like Russia. The new reality of Ukraine losing half its territory is also difficult to reverse.

The Trump administration is gradually abandoning leadership of the Western world and relinquishing its dominant position in NATO. Its focus on making America strong alone means it will never bleed to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity or help Europe fulfill its strategic dream of containing Russia. Although the Russia-Ukraine war has entered a new phase of direct negotiations, there is no chance for a win-win outcome. Ukraine and Europe’s best hope at present is to maintain the status quo and wait for the Republican administration to step down, hoping that a Democratic administration will return to the previous hardline policies. Even so, Ukraine and Europe are unlikely to win the war—unless a dramatic internal change occurs in Russia, or the country disintegrates. A united, nationalist Russia remains undefeated, especially not on its own doorstep.

History has long witnessed the power struggles between Russia and Europe. It shows that Russia has never willingly returned land it has occupied or annexed unless it was truly defeated—especially not places like Crimea or the four eastern and southern Ukrainian provinces, which are historically connected and home to many generations of ethnic Russians.

Three years ago, shortly after the Russia-Ukraine war broke out, the author predicted that this century’s war would end with a tragic Russian victory and a disastrous Ukrainian defeat. The forecast was that this continental war involving multiple actors would first become “Afghanistan-ized,” and eventually “Palestinian-ized.” Unfortunately, reality is step by step confirming this prediction.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.