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Iran has elected a new president: Where are the conspiracy theorists?

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In the second round of the presidential election last Friday (5 July), Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president with more than fifty-three per cent of the vote. At the time of writing, he may have formed his cabinet. The election process, which began in accordance with the Iranian constitution after the deaths of former President Raisi and Foreign Minister Abdullahiyan in a helicopter crash, ended in a very transparefnt and colourful manner and, as is often the case, between two candidates, the so-called conservative and the reformist. And the ‘reformist’ candidate, Pezeshkiyan, took the lead.

In short, there is nothing strange, incomprehensible or anything that would provide extraordinary material for the conspiracy theorists in our country, because it is not the first time that a so-called reformist candidate has been elected president. First Mohammad Khatami between 1997 and 2005 and then Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021) were elected for two terms each. Indeed, I still remember the first time I visited Iran, when Khatami’s foreign minister, Kemal Kharazi, graciously received me and we talked about the adjustments they were trying to make in Iran’s foreign policy, their desire to improve their relations with Turkey and Egypt in particular, and how important it was/would be for these three major countries of the Middle East to come together and establish a mechanism for political dialogue.

Why did we need so many conspiracy theories?

More precisely, what or who were the conspiracy theories about the deaths of Raisi and Abdullahiyan, which were broadcast for days on Turkish television, supposed to explain or analyse (!)? It is obvious that dealing with this question will not contribute to a better understanding of Turkey-Iran relations or shed light on how the foreign policy of a reformist president will be shaped, especially with regard to our region; however, it is of some importance in terms of deciphering the conspiratorial mindset in Turkey.

According to the conspiracy theories produced at the time and presented with mysterious words and writings, this could not have been a coincidence. Why was/is a great president on board such an old model helicopter? The same helicopters had been used by previous conservative or reformist presidents. What could have happened? But it was not so, or it should not have been so simple. According to our conspiracy theorists, Khamenei, the religious leader, should have done it through the Revolutionary Guard Corps, probably to establish a repressive regime.

But Raisi and Abdullahiyan, as representatives of the conservative wing, were closer to the religious leader within the Iranian system. From the beginning, Raisi ran as the religious leader’s candidate, won, became president, but now he had set his sights on replacing the old religious leader. So he had to be removed, and this was done because the Supreme Leader was in favour of replacing him with his son. But according to the Iranian constitution, his son was not even a member of the council that would elect the religious leader. Moreover, under the Iranian constitution, it was neither possible nor likely to establish a more repressive regime or to appoint anyone as a possible religious leader. As a result, the reformist candidate won the presidential election to replace the conservative Ayatollah Khamenei.

Conspiracy theories in Turkey-Iran relations

Conspiracy theorists and theorists continue their efforts to create obstacles in the development of Turkey-Iran relations, as they do in many other issues, with their theses that seem logical at first glance but fall apart when analysed with a little knowledge. Recently, they frothed and frothed over the news (!) of an American magazine. Middle East Eye magazine wrote that Iran had supplied dozens of advanced drones, anti-tank and other weapons and their ammunition to the PKK/PYD. And the conspiracy theorists in Turkey suddenly jumped on this and tried to explain that Iran was against us in Syria. They were probably trying to prevent the coming Turkish-Syrian reconciliation.

Neither Turkish nor other security sources confirmed the news, but this propaganda was widely spread, especially on social media and in some pro-government newspapers. Under the current circumstances, there is/can be no logical explanation as to why Iran, which is engaged in a tit-for-tat struggle with the US and Israel, would take such an action that would bring it into immediate confrontation with Turkey. But for the conspiracy theorists, this does not matter.

Ankara-Tehran relations in the new era

Aside from this, there is no reason why relations between Turkey and Iran should not continue to improve in the Pezeshkian era. If the normalisation process on Syria, which is expected to start with the messages from President Erdoğan and Syrian President Assad, develops as quickly as hoped, there is no doubt that this will have an additional positive impact on Ankara-Tehran relations. After all, Iran, like Russia, wants the war in Syria to reach a diplomatic conclusion that confirms the Damascus government’s success/victory. It may even want to be as active as Russia in the Turkey-Syria normalisation process. There should be no significant problem in terms of our national interests. After all, Iran and I are participating together in the Astana platform, which aims to bring peace to Syria.

Some of the news (!) about Iran, most of which is speculative and even manipulative, is related to the Zangezur corridor. In fact, at this point in time, there were (were) some partial truths that could be attributed to the news. For example, at the beginning of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (September-October 2020), the then reformist Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, as if he did not want Azerbaijan to succeed, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return to the pre-war situation in statements on his social media account. However, when he realised that this would not be the case, and especially when he realised that Russia, due to its close relations with Turkey, would not be fully committed even if it helped Armenia, he gradually changed his position and showed his acceptance of the new situation, which resulted in Azerbaijan’s overwhelming and decisive victory.

The conservative leadership of Raisi-Abdollahian, which at first made statements as if it would not accept the new situation created by the Second Karabakh War, after a while, when it realised that Moscow did not agree with it on this issue, finally changed its demands to opposition to the violent opening of the Zangezur corridor and thus the elimination of the territorial border between Armenia and Iran.

This problem was largely solved by the Azerbaijani operation in the summer of 2023, when the extremist groups in Armenia that were trying to undermine Pashinyan’s peace initiatives were expelled from Karabakh by Azerbaijani forces. What remains is the signing of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia and, as part of this, the opening of the Zangezur corridor through Armenia’s sovereign territory, to which Tehran cannot be expected to object. Indeed, it has repeatedly stated that it does not. Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash, posed for the cameras at the inauguration of a bridge on the border between the two states, which had not been used in recent years because of the Armenian occupation.

Iran and relations with the West

Can a reformist president and his cabinet make a significant difference in Iran’s relations with the West, especially now? In the previous period, President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif seemed to have made a significant difference by signing the so-called nuclear deal (2015) after long negotiations with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France – and Germany. However, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States under Trump, forced by Netanyahu, the inability of the other five countries, which had strongly opposed it, to develop an alternative policy, and Iran’s enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons, which rightly responded to all this, reversed the whole process.

It is unlikely that the Pezeshkian government will be able to take steps that will lead to significant policy changes in the eyes of the US and the West on this issue. The fact that Iran has acted as an ally of Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, which marked the beginning of the multipolar world system, rules out such a possibility. Moreover, it is unlikely that any American administration would want to open a new page with Iran without the consent of Israel, which has been carrying out a genocidal ethnic cleansing in Gaza for almost ten months.

Under these circumstances, what remains is a scenario of war with Iran, in which a Trump administration that might come to the White House would likely wage a war against Iran together with Israel. If Trump, who is likely to end the war in Ukraine by not supporting the war in Ukraine, wants to get the support of the Israel lobby against the American deep state – which was clearly the reason for many of the steps he took in favour of Israel in his first term – could he turn to such a policy?

Such a scenario, which would shake everything in the Middle East, could be the result of a possible war between Israel and Hezbollah, even before Trump’s arrival. In all these scenarios, the likelihood of the new President Pezeshkian making sweeping policy changes is virtually zero, since there is no Western world to respond to such initiatives, nor are these areas for him alone to decide. In any case, he will have to act in concert with Supreme Leader Khamenei. Therefore, it seems that Iran will continue to oscillate between its active policy against Israel through its support for the Axis of Resistance forces on the one hand, and its policy of avoiding direct war on the other, based on the correct assumption that time is working in its favour.

OPINION

Haniyeh’s death and its implication to the Middle East

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On July 31, Haniyeh, the supreme leader of the Palestinian Hamas, was killed in Tehran after attending the inauguration ceremony of the new Iranian president. Unfortunately, as of now, the details of Haniyeh’s death has many versions, highlighting the complexity of this attack. However, Hamas, Iran and other countries have firmly believed that Israel is the power behind the throne. Based on this judgement, Iran and the “axis of resistance” it supports will inevitably retaliate against Israel.

For Israel, it will also take advantage of the “window period” of the Biden administration of the United States to increase its provocations in the Middle East. On the one hand, Israel will continue to take actions aiming to completely eliminate Hamas and thereby weaken the unity among all Palestinian parties. On the other hand, it will continue to provoke Iran in order to win greater support from the United States and help Israel and Netanyahu get out of this round of Gaza crisis. As a result, the situation in the Middle East will further fall into turmoil in the next few months.

The reasons why Hamas’ top leader was killed

It’s commonly admitted that the Decapitation Strike is a method often used by Israel to attack its opponents. There are more examples about this assumption this year. In April, Israel launched an air strike, resulting in the loss of three sons and many grandchildren of Haniyeh. It is reported that more than 60 members of his entire family have been killed by Israel. On July 30, an Israeli drone attack reportedly killed Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah commander, who was considered as Hezbollah’s “second-in-command”. On August 1, the Israeli military issued a statement confirming the killing of Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif in the Gaza Strip on July 13. But the frequent use of this tool also highlights Israel’s decline and hysteria in the Gaza conflict. It can be seen that when the winner cannot be determined on the battlefield, more murders or “decapitation strike” will occur in the Middle East, resulting in a dangerous situation and more uncertainties in the Middle East.

However, no matter who is behind this attack, this is beneficial to the Israel for several reasons. Haniyeh’s death can be used by Israel to ease the Netanyahu government’s internal and external pressure. There are a lot of criticisms inside Israel, accusing Netanyahu of being too weak and making no progress in 10 months’ military actions. The US Biden administration and Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris have both made clear statements that Israel should cease fire as soon as possible and sign a peace agreement. Under such huge pressure, Israel resorts to purge of Hamas leaders. On the one hand, it can appease the extreme right-wing forces and hardliners in Israel, and on the other hand, it can seriously weaken the power of Hamas.

It can be used to disrupt or even to stop the peace talks between Israel and Hamas. At present, the peace talks between the two sides are not going smoothly. Compared with the Hamas hardliners, Haniyeh was one of the people who would like to negotiate with Israel. The death of the relatively moderate Haniyeh will inevitably lead to greater obstacles in the negotiations between the two sides.

Israel can exert great pressure on Iran not showing goodwill to the West. Ismail Haniyeh’s death happened in Iran instead of other countries, which is a huge humiliation to the new Iranian government. It was a continued provocation and pressure on Iran, and also a warning to the new Iranian president not to try to improve relations with the West. Israel would like to see an Iran that returns to confrontation with the West.

The death of Haniyeh will bring bad impacts towards process of reconciliation within Palestine. Israel is very wary of the 14 Palestinian factions reaching a reconciliation and signing the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity. It is urgent for Israel to divide them as much as possible and prevent the Palestinian factions from uniting together.

Besides, Israel intends to show the major powers in the Middle East and the world that it has the ability to eliminate any one of the leaders of all resistance organizations at anytime, anywhere. If someone choose to continue to confront Israel, it will inevitably suffer a heavy blow from Israel. This is actually a further deterrent to the “axis of resistance”.

Last but not least, Israel intends to bring Iran down and even drag Iran into a war with Israel. Israel has not achieved its set goals in the Gaza conflict and is helpless against Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah and other organizations. It can only hope to continue to provoke Iran in an attempt to drag Iran into a protracted war and then attract the United States to join in, thus helping Israel get out of the predicament.

The possible responses of Iran and the “axis of resistance”

It is for sure that Iran and the “axis of resistance” it leads will retaliate against Israel, further weakening the power of Israel and the United States in the Middle East.

Specifically speaking, Iran is bound to strike back, but the intensity of the strike will be within controllable range. Iran does not want to have a direct conflict with Israel, nor does it wishes to trigger a military conflict with the United States. After the killing of General Qasem Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Syria, Iran adopted a “turn-based strategy” retaliation method to control the confrontation between Iran and Israel. It is expected that Iran will still retaliate in this way this time. But there is a hard question for Iran that how it can have a balancing act, which is that it can strike Israel substantially without escalating the conflict between the two countries.

Although Iran’s counterattack is controllable, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias supported by Iran will further coordinate and intensify their attacks on Israel. During the past 8 months, it can been seen that this is the most effective way to confront Israel now and for a long time to come. That’s why it is unwise to be brave for a moment. In another word, there is still no need for Iran to have a direct confrontation with Israel and United States, but the anger of the people needs to be appeased.

Another point worth mentioning is that although Haniyeh’s death will not affect the normal operation of Hamas’ institutions, Hamas’s force has been severely hit since October 7 last year, and its ability to launch a larger-scale attack on Israel has significantly declined. There are still two months to go before the first anniversary of the Gaza conflict, and Hamas may face a more severe attack from Israel. If it can hold out for these two months, it will inevitably deal a heavy blow to Israel’s status as a military power.

The implication of Haniyeh’s death to the Middle East

After the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation and the internal reconciliation of Palestine, the contradiction between Israel and Iran has gradually become the main contradiction in the Middle East, and the “anti-Israel” united front in the Middle East is in the process of formation.

The resistance faction, mainly under the leadership of Iran, has become the main force against Israel and the United States. Although the moderate faction, mainly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and other countries, still has hope for Israel and the United States, Saudi Arabia has recently significantly improved its cooperation with China in economic and security affairs, and expressed appreciation and support for China’s mediation of internal reconciliation in Palestine. The hardliners, mainly led by Turkey, have not only stopped reconciliation with Israel recently, but have once again taken up the banner of anti-Israel and pro-Palestine. On July 28, 2024, Turkish President Erdogan threatened that Turkey could intervene militarily in Israel as it did in Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya in the past.

The contradictions between the United States and Israel on the Middle East issue will become more prominent, and the Gaza conflict will further spill over to more areas. With Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential election, the Biden administration has entered a “window period”. It is expected that Israel will become fearless during this period, aiming to increase provocations against Iran and intensify the Gaza conflict to a new level.

From Israel’s perspective, not only can there be no ceasefire in the Middle East, but the war must be bigger and more tragic, pushing the Middle East into greater chaos. First, it is beneficial to Netanyahu, and only by continuing the war can he preserve his political career. Second, it is beneficial to Israel, hoping to achieve the goal of completely eliminating Hamas, interrupting the internal reconciliation process in Palestine, and taking advantage of the “window period” of the Biden administration of the United States to do whatever it wants in the Middle East and weaken the resistance forces led by Iran. Third, it is beneficial to Donald Trump. Israel’s rampage in the Middle East will bring tremendous pressure to the Biden administration and presidential candidate Harris, which will indirectly benefit Trump’s presidential campaign.

Although the situation in the Middle East will become more tense, there is still some room before the critical point of a major war. The United States, Iran and Israel are the three most important forces that will determine the next steps in the Middle East.

For the United States, it has neither the will nor the ability to deal with the three crises of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea at the same time. The biggest political issue in the United States at present is the US presidential election.

For Iran, it can deal a major blow to the United States and Israel with only the Houthi armed forces, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and militias in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, it has no reason to engage directly with Israel until now.

The only uncertainty is Israel’s next move, especially whether it will launch a large-scale war against Hezbollah in Lebanon or launch more provocative actions against Iran. This assassination is just the beginning of a new round of conflict. For Israel, the death of Haniyeh is a test of Iran’s anti-Israel attitude. It will continue to increase its provocations and constantly test the anti-Israel attitudes of Turkey, Syria and other countries, so that it will be in preparation for whether to expand the scope and scale of the war in the next step.

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OPINION

The aftermath of Haniyeh’s assassination and critical challenges

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The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the prominent national leader of Hamas and head of its political bureau, was not just a military operation. Its objectives were complex and posed exceptional risks to efforts to end the war, regional security and the implementation of the post-Beijing reconciliation agreement. It could also challenge the internal stability of Hamas. The ongoing conflict between the occupying state and the Palestinian resistance requires careful analysis beyond attempts to minimise the impact of this incident.

It can be seen as an extension of Israel’s military effort to achieve, in the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu, “absolute victory”. This effort works on many levels: tactically, it aims to weaken Hamas’ political capabilities at home and abroad, thereby undermining its external ties and organisational cohesion. It also involves weakening its ability to organise attacks and operationally dismantling Hamas’ military and political infrastructure. Strategically, it aims to impose comprehensive security arrangements on the Palestinians. In the aftermath of the war, all of this is aimed at preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state by further separating Gaza from the national project, perpetuating the geographical and political division that has existed for more than 17 years since the division of Palestine following the armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah in 2007.

Therefore, the assassination targeted Ismail Haniyeh not because of his military or political role, but because he represented the unity of Hamas internally and externally and was widely accepted within the movement. Haniyeh also represented an important political symbol, as he was a former Palestinian prime minister and his government enjoyed considerable credibility in the Palestinian Legislative Council at the time.

From this perspective, Tel Aviv saw Haniyeh’s continued leadership as a threat to Israel’s war strategy aimed at dismantling him. It can be argued that Israel’s calculation in assassinating Haniyeh was not only to avenge Hamas or neutralise its political or military role, but rather to target Haniyeh’s very existence, which preserved Hamas’s internal unity. This policy of selective assassination, both internally and externally, deepens Hamas’s dilemma in managing its complex internal affairs and makes the situation more difficult to manage given the geopolitical disparities in Gaza, the West Bank, the Diaspora and other countries, each with different legal, security and political realities.

In this context, it is clear that Israel has allowed the war to continue and escalate by flatly rejecting any agreement with Hamas, especially after the assassination of a key figure involved in negotiations with the movement. After several attempts to force Hamas to withdraw from the negotiations, which Hamas did not abandon, it seems that Israel’s aim from the beginning was to use the “negotiations” as a cover to prolong the war, to gain time to impose irreversible field and political realities and to appease the Israeli public opinion, which demands an agreement between the Palestinian resistance and Israel on the exchange of prisoners.

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and the announcement of the assassination of other Hamas military and security leaders, including the general commander of the Qassam Brigades, Mohammed Deif, are part of a strategy aimed at undermining the possibility of reaching an agreement to end the war. This means that the war will continue and possibly escalate into a regional conflict, reflecting a tacit American rejection of the principle of “heroic flexibility” espoused by Iran’s new leadership under President Massoud Pezeshkian, who is interested in improving relations with the West and seeking to avoid a war of attrition or open confrontation with the United States.

The most dangerous aspect of this scenario, however, is that such a full-scale regional war, which Iran has so far sought to avoid, would be strongly desired by the Netanyahu government, backed by Washington, and would put the Palestinians under severe pressure. While it is clear that Israel is not seeking a ceasefire or a temporary truce with Hamas, the humanitarian risks in Gaza would be doubled and the repercussions of the planned regional war could spread to the West Bank, where the occupation aims to create a situation of collapse and chaos through economic siege and various security instruments.

In this context, and in relation to the reconciliation efforts, the assassination of Haniyeh may have been aimed at preventing the implementation of the Beijing agreement. Haniyeh was known to have played an important role in unifying Hamas’ stance behind the agreement and reaffirming its strong commitment to its contents. With Haniyeh’s death, Hamas is preoccupied with organising its internal affairs, which may affect its ability to make progress in implementing the terms of the agreement. Breaking reconciliation agreements is one of the main objectives of Israeli policy, as Israel seeks to prevent the Palestinians from rebuilding their political system and maintaining the legitimacy of their institutions.

This Israeli approach was clearly demonstrated by the Knesset’s majority rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, coinciding with the International Court of Justice’s decision declaring Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories captured on 4 June 1967 illegal. This move dealt a blow to Israel’s efforts to undermine the chances of establishing a Palestinian state based on Palestinian unity and unified representation, which it seeks to undermine by encouraging and perpetuating Palestinian division and creating a political vacuum in the West Bank and security chaos in Gaza in order to reshape reality according to its own security and political standards.

Returning to Haniyeh’s assassination, the delay in filling the vacuum created by his absence as head of Hamas’ political bureau could lead to the risk of a leadership crisis within the movement, which could directly affect the movement’s ability to implement the terms of the Beijing agreement, particularly those relating to the formation of a national unity government or an interim leadership framework. This move could frustrate attempts by the occupiers to impose an alternative in Gaza or create a political vacuum in the absence of President Mahmoud Abbas.

While recognising the potential difficulties in agreeing on a successor to Haniyeh, who is a point of balance between the different power centres within Hamas, the movement is known for its flexibility and strong structure, which allows it to overcome these difficulties. However, the main challenge remains the prevention of any external interference with negative agendas against the movement. This underlines the importance of having allies and friends within Hamas who can help create a conducive environment for a smooth leadership transition and isolate harmful interference.

Similarly, forces interested in the Palestinian people can help absorb and contain the pressure on the Palestinians to prevent the implementation of the Beijing agreement, which strengthens Palestinian unity and their position against Israel’s regionally and internationally supported attempts to weaken and marginalise them.

If Hamas were to agree on a successor to Ismail Haniyeh and the PA were to move quickly to form a national unity government with the support of pro-Palestinian forces, these steps would strengthen the Palestinian position and frustrate Israeli plans to undermine the Palestinian national movement. The solidarity shown during the funeral of Ismail Haniyeh, which revealed many positive indicators on the Palestinian scene, is a fulcrum for reorganising the internal situation and discrediting Israeli pretexts. Regional solidarity and international attention to Palestinian demands can provide an important opportunity for the Palestinians to achieve their national goals and transform their sacrifices into political results that serve their interests and promote security and stability in the region.

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OPINION

Will Israel’s move against Haniyeh change the balance in the Middle East?

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Prof. Ma Xiaolin

Zhejiang International Studies University, China
Director of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies

On 1 August, a solemn funeral was held for Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, who was killed in an attack in the Iranian capital, Tehran. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is reported to have ordered direct retaliation against Israel. That night, more than 60 revenge rockets were fired by Lebanese Hezbollah into northern Israel. Despite Israel’s deliberate efforts to inflame the Middle East crisis, Haniyeh’s death was not enough to bring the situation out of control.

On the night of 31 July, Haniyeh, who was in Tehran to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Iran’s new president, Mohammad Pezeshkian, was killed in a surprise attack on his residence. The Iranian government claimed that Israel was behind the assassination. The Israeli government’s press office published a portrait of Haniyeh with the words ‘wiped out’, and Prime Minister Netanyahu euphemistically declared that he had ‘dealt a devastating blow to Iranian proxies’. The Jerusalem Post quoted Israeli intelligence sources as saying that Haniyeh had been killed by a remote-controlled bomb prepared by Israelis and that Tehran had been chosen as the site of the attack to humiliate Iran.

Haniyeh’s death showed that Israel has once again flagrantly violated Iran’s sovereignty, territory and airspace, grossly violated the norms of international law and deliberately provoked a violent conflict between countries, and violated humanitarian law by physically eliminating the leader of the enemy group without due process. The Chinese Foreign Ministry strongly condemned it, as did Iran, Russia, Turkey and others. The United States claimed it had nothing to do with the incident and, together with the UK and France, blocked the adoption of a Security Council resolution condemning Israel.

Haniyeh’s assassination comes as no surprise, as Haniyeh has long been someone Israel has put a price on, hounded and officially described as a ‘walking dead’. Since 2004, Israel has killed two generations of Hamas leaders in Gaza, Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Lantis, and other Hamas military and political leaders are on the death list.

Intelligence officials say Haniyeh’s death was “specifically orchestrated in tightly secured Tehran to make it more visible and embarrassing for Iran”.

Since the start of this round of hostilities, Israel has vowed to “root out” Hamas, “cut off its branches” and even made it clear that Qatar is the only place where senior Hamas officials are “exempt from death”. In April this year, the Israeli army blew up Haniyeh’s three sons and four grandchildren, including three girls. Haniyeh was not impressed by the news. Sources say that more than 60 members of his family have died at the hands of Israel, just a fraction of the tens of thousands of Palestinians who have been killed.

Haniyeh, one of the founders of Hamas and its first Prime Minister after being elected to an autonomous legislature in 2006, is known for his relative moderation and determination and has been the leading Palestinian negotiator pushing for a ceasefire since the outbreak of the current conflict. Israel’s physical elimination of the key negotiator in the face of repeated setbacks in the talks is a clear rejection of peace talks and to keep on continuation of the state of war.

A week before Haniyeh’s death, 14 Palestinian factions had signed the landmark Beijing Declaration, in which Hamas and other radical groups announced their acceptance of the two-state solution and their recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This was a powerful sign that, after 18 years of accepting the Oslo Accords and contesting the leadership of the autonomous institutions through elections, Hamas had once again demonstrated its willingness to reconcile and accept Israel’s legitimate existence. Israel’s current insistence on eliminating Haniyeh is an attempt to block the path to intra-Palestinian reconciliation and to further divide and weaken the Palestinian camp in order to exploit it in the long term, maintain the status quo and reject the two-state solution.

After Haniyeh’s assassination, Hamas announced a freeze on ceasefire and hostage exchange talks, reiterated that it would “never recognise Israel” and would fight to the end, which is exactly what the Israeli government expected, justifying its insistence on “cleansing, disarming and de-extremising Hamas” in Gaza.

After these twists and turns, it is expected that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will be the main battleground in Gaza, that the war will remain low-intensity and protracted, that Hamas and other armed groups will continue to use guerrilla warfare to attack Israel, that its regional allies will continue to hunt Israel, and that Israel’s state of war will continue and the opposition’s “showdown” with Netanyahu will be postponed indefinitely.

Israel’s pursuit of Haniyeh in Tehran, following its air strike on the Iranian consulate in Syria in April this year, is another blatant violation of Iranian airspace, territory and sovereignty, openly provoking, threatening and even humiliating the Iranian leadership. The Israeli cross-border bombing of the consulate triggered symbolic and punitive Iranian long-range air strikes, but the two sides settled the score and applied the brakes in time to prevent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from spreading to the entire Eastern Mediterranean region and then to the Persian Gulf, “the world’s oil depot”.

Israel’s attack was a step too far, which made Iran want to stop and made the international community worry about whether Israel and Iran would again come into direct confrontation. In addition, the day before, Israel bombed and killed Fouad Shukr, one of the most senior members of Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollah has vowed to avenge Shukr and Haniyeh, and the Houthis have made similar statements. Israel is creating a major incident by stirring up several hornets’ nests at once.

However, Hamas does not have the power to fight fire with fire against Israel, Iran will not impulsively enter into a full-scale war with Israel, and Hezbollah will refrain from triggering a third Lebanon war. Nor does Israel have the will or the ability to launch a large-scale “northern campaign” and get into an even bigger quagmire. The US has reaffirmed its commitment to protect Israel as it enters a critical phase of the elections, but has also urged Israel not to “add fuel to the fire”. In short, Haniyeh’s death will not significantly alter the regional situation.

Haniyeh is a key figure in Hamas and the last name on Israel’s “hit list”. But in the grand scheme of the Middle East conflict, Haniyeh is a minor figure who died an unnatural death, and many leaders have died before him: King Abdullah of Jordan (1951), President Sadat of Egypt (1981), President Gemayel of Lebanon (1982) and Prime Minister Karami (1987), PLO number two Abu Ghad (1988), President Mouawad of Lebanon (1989), Prime Minister Rabin of Israel (1994), Prime Minister Hariri of Lebanon (2005)…

Haniyeh will be neither the first nor the last leader to die in the region.

The question is: how long can Israel, which is not a great power, survive against the “Axis of Resistance” made up of Iran and four regional armies?

* Prof. Ma, who knows the Middle East well, has worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq. His academic studies focus on the Middle East, Arab geography and China-Middle East relations.

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