Middle East
Silicon Valley eschatology — 4: Even your god shall rejoice for you
“The group sex that night was fun, but it was like trying to sleep in the middle of a loud beach party. The only place big enough for all of us to sleep was the mess hall; they scattered a few mattresses around for the couples and unleashed the eighteen frenzied men of Stargate on our women, who, in accordance with military tradition (and law), were docile and not particular about partners, wanting nothing more than to sleep on the hard floor.”
Joe Haldeman – The Forever War
“The fact that everyone between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five is ‘bindable to child-rearing,’ as Nim puts it, means that in fact nobody here is quite so thoroughly bound—psychologically and physically—to child-rearing as women are elsewhere. The burden and the privilege are shared out pretty equally; everybody has the same risk to run or choice to make. Therefore nobody here is quite so free as a free male is elsewhere.”
Ursula K. Le Guin – The Left Hand of Darkness
As we examine the final destination of tech capital, which eagerly awaits the apocalypse, we return to the beginning, to our hero, Peter Thiel.
In his 2009 essay “The Education of a Libertarian,” published by the Cato Institute—which can be seen as a forum for libertarians—Thiel wrote that democracy and freedom were “no longer” compatible. Before sharing his views on elections and suffrage, he put forth “authentic” (a word choice reeking of Heidegger!) human freedom as his highest principle, declaring his opposition to “extortionist taxes, totalitarian collectives, and the ideology of the inevitability of the death of every individual.”
For Thiel, this was the meaning of being a libertarian. Our billionaire, who does not recall his years at Stanford fondly and admits he had little success in his attempts to change the university’s establishment,(1) believes that when people like him entered the business world, they retreated into their shells, or to put it crudely, they “settled for less”:
“The higher one’s IQ, the more pessimistic one became about free-market politics—capitalism simply was not that popular with the crowd. Among the smartest conservatives, this pessimism often manifested as an affinity for conspicuous drinking; in contrast, the smartest libertarians were less obsessed with positive law and escaped not just to alcohol, but beyond it.”
This escape beyond positive law seems to have accelerated with the 2008-9 crisis. The date Thiel wrote this essay encapsulates the severe depression and the counter-reaction to the response of capitalism, and most importantly its leader, the US, to this depression. Thiel writes that the cries of free-market proponents like himself were drowned out by the roar of the hurricane of more government and more debt. By 2009, it had become clear to libertarians that “educating” the establishment, or reforming it, was a futile effort.
Although the financial crisis was the last straw, this pessimism has a history of over 100 years. Thiel believes the last financial crisis in American history that subsided without the state growing even larger was in 1920-21; this was a Schumpeterian moment of creative destruction, and had things continued that way, an economic boom could have occurred. But it didn’t. Why not? Thiel writes:
“The 1920s were the last decade in American history during which one could be genuinely optimistic about politics. Since 1920, the vast increase in the number of welfare recipients and the extension of the franchise to women—two constituencies that are notoriously tough for libertarians—have rendered the notion of ‘capitalist democracy’ into an oxymoron.”
Thiel later had to write another article to explain these lines. After stating that he wanted to provoke a reaction and succeeded, he noted, feigning some surprise, that his rather commonplace “statistical observation” on voting trends like the “gender gap” had received the most backlash. It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that women’s suffrage should be revoked or that this would solve the political problems that trouble us. He believed no class should be deprived of the right to vote, but he had very little hope that voting would improve the situation.
There is no doubt about the sincerity of Thiel’s views on women’s suffrage. Moreover, they are quite consistent with the issue he pessimistically raises alongside it: “the increase in the number of welfare recipients.” The Nietzschean aristocratic rebellion and its embodiment in Silicon Valley libertarianism a century later see poverty and colonial peoples, and colonial peoples and womanhood/femininity, as different manifestations of the same essence: racial/biological and geographical hierarchies are also gender hierarchies. The poor, referred to as the masses, the rabble, and so on, are “like children”; they act on emotion, not reason, and are prone to hysteria. Just as IQ, artificial general intelligence, neuro-casts, gated communities, colonized space, and cities built in the middle of the ocean are shelters for the rich while they await the apocalypse, the trinity of religion-nation-family is likewise a safe escape zone.
From the Iron Lady to ‘eastern’ values: The Singapore dream
But why and how? It has often been said that religion, nation, and family went out of fashion during the four decades of neoliberalism. Silicon Valley elites, libertarians, and the New Right think so too, and they advocate a return to these values to escape the apocalypse that this “damned” welfare state is dragging us into.
For instance, the famous American sociologist and neoconservative Daniel Bell criticized the welfare state for disrupting the proper order of family relations and expanding consumption beyond the limits prescribed by the Protestant ethic. He believed that inflation was closely linked to the degeneration of moral values. The great inflation of the 1970s was associated with the collapse of the family structure, and attention was drawn to the public assistance program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which consumed a very small portion of federal social spending.(2)
In her book Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social Conservatism, which focuses on the “moral” partnership forged between neoliberalism and neoconservatism in the 1970s, Melinda Cooper writes that until the 1970s, there was a general consensus between Republicans and Democrats on social welfare programs. However, starting in the 1970s, criticism began to emerge that the welfare state contributed to the inflation problem by “undermining the family structure”:
“It was now agreed that the redistributive welfare programs of the New Deal and the Great Society needed to be radically curtailed; there was even talk of strengthening the private family as an alternative to social welfare. Welfare reformers began to contemplate a return to a much older tradition of public assistance as an alternative to the New Deal welfare state—the poor law tradition and its attendant concepts of family and personal responsibility. In this shift, we can see the simultaneous emergence of neoliberalism and neoconservatism as mature political philosophies. Neoliberalism and neoconservatism may be diametrically opposed on many issues, but they display a surprising affinity when it comes to family values.”(3)
The awakening on the other side of the Atlantic begins with Margaret Thatcher, the symbol of Eurosceptic and neoliberal conservatism in Britain. She wants to liberate a Britain chained by a Europe corrupted by the welfare state. She turns her gaze to a former British colony: Singapore.
The ambition to turn London into a “Singapore-on-Thames,” a common theme among Conservatives during the Brexit era, emerged in the 1980s. The father of modern Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, invented something called “Asian values” and brought back into fashion the Confucianism that the Chinese Revolution had declared anathema. Thatcher eagerly embraced these values. In this city-state, she saw the self-sufficient, industrious, conservative liberalism of the Victorian era. She looked with envy upon the ethnic Chinese who make up the majority of Singapore’s population, considering them “natural capitalists” and “born traders,” while also praising them for having adopted the values of the Anglo-Saxon world. She even once asked her Singaporean friends how they managed it, and the answer she received was astonishing to her: “But we learned everything from you, all the lessons of free enterprise… You have just forgotten them, while we have accepted them!”
In his book Crack-Up Capitalism, which I have cited before, Quinn Slobodian recounts that Singaporeans are raised from a young age with the understanding that “The world does not owe you a living.” A mandatory savings account is opened for every Singaporean at the bank, and residents use the money in these accounts for healthcare, retirement, and real estate purchases instead of “welfare state” extravagances like compulsory health services.
A critical element for our topic emerges here. Neo-Confucianism, harnessed in the service of property owners, underscores conservative family values. The supposed loving relationship between children and their parents serves a function that legitimizes the state’s abdication of its social duties.
Moreover, another academic aptly points to the role of texts produced across the Atlantic in the rebirth of Confucianism. The same article quotes a Korean academic who said that the “overnight change” in academic ideas about Confucianism was “unique” in the evolution of any modern religion or society. Arif Dirlik provides information that leaves no doubt about the extent of “organized academic activity” on Confucianism from the 1980s onwards; discussions on Confucianism and alternative modernizations became an intellectual sector.(4)
The puritanical ethic lost in the West emerges in the East. The path to economic growth and a dynamic structure is through embracing traditional values. Hierarchy, the defense of the family, and the superiority of the nation over the individual are preached. This is, of course, accompanied by low taxes, distance from voters-unions-democracy, and a reduction in public debt. Singapore’s eternal chief, Lee, shows the way:
“In the eighties, Lee expressed ‘regret on several occasions that they had not followed the example of the Japanese and kept their educated women at home,’ adding on one occasion that ‘in the long run, the most important issues were eugenics and providing children with a good education to build a strong society.’”(5)
The myth of the “eternal dynamism of the East,” as a kind of reverse Orientalism, is harnessed in the service of property owners, while the struggles of workers, nations, and women are erased from the picture as “Western decadence” in the name of a supposedly harmonious Asian society.
Tech bros and the masculine business model
In the 2000s, there was an explosion of “scientific” publications on whether financial markets and their crisis-prone aspects were related to hormones in general, and testosterone in particular. Women in the financial sector were risk-averse by nature, while men were more aggressive. There was no absolute rule that an increase in the proportion of female investors would definitively reduce market volatility, but the presence of women would decrease the frequency of market crashes. The implication was clear: our hormones were behind the 2008-9 crisis.
In Silicon Valley, which grew out of Stanford and has long been known for its close ties to the American government, especially the Pentagon, masculinity has been used as a business model since the 1960s. Yet, in the US military, which began developing the first computers during World War II, the task of “programming,” i.e., software, was mostly performed by women. In her book Brotopia, which describes the male world of tech billionaires, Emily Chang provides interesting details: at that time, “programming” was not highly regarded in the male world as it was seen as a woman’s job. Since computers were still mostly associated with typing, it was equated with secretarial work, a known female profession, and looked down upon. Later, as the industry developed, “professionalism” would come into play, programming would be presented as a kind of black magic, and it would be masculinized as an intellectual pursuit.
The Silicon Valley culture, later embodied in the “PayPal Mafia,” would declare war on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) policies poisoned by multiculturalism and the “woke” mentality. This group, operating under the claim of meritocracy, would, as one might expect, strive for the caste-like separation of people like themselves in a welfare state world they considered apocalyptic. Chang writes:
“The members of the PayPal Mafia believed that hiring ideologically diverse people early on would explicitly slow the company down, and some still think that. All they wanted to do was move faster. [PayPal Mafia member Keith] Rabois told me, ‘I don’t think you can have debates about core first principles at the beginning of a startup. It’s better to have people who are similar rather than diverse ideologically at the beginning. Once you have alignment, I think you can have a wide variety of people and opinions and perspectives.’”
It must be said that ideas about masculinity being under threat are quite widespread. For example, Josh Hawley, one of the names Thiel pushed into the Senate, pointed to the “assault on masculine virtues” in his speech at the 2022 National Conservatism Conference. Also attending that conference was right-wing YouTuber Jack Murphy, who was trying to establish a fraternity of men with a belief in “positive masculinity,” which he named the Liminal Order. I won’t even mention the reactionary Curtis Yarvin, funded by Thiel, whose extensive profile we have previously featured.
But what is truly significant is the microphone extended to the newly minted Vice President JD Vance, also launched into the political world by Thiel, in the same Vanity Fair article:
“If what he’s doing works, he said, ‘it will mean that my son grows up in a world where his masculinity—his support for his family and his community, his love for his community—is more important than whether he works for fucking McKinsey.’”
In the previous article, I mentioned Antonio García Martínez, who wrote about his Silicon Valley memoirs in the book Chaos Monkeys. Martínez’s book appears to be a “goldmine” in many respects. The author sees most women in the Bay Area as “soft and weak, pampered and naive, and generally full of shit.” The women of the Valley have a self-important brand of feminism, but in reality, “come the epidemic or foreign invasion, and they’d be precisely the sort of useless baggage you’d trade for a box of shotgun shells or a jerry can of diesel.”
Chip Huyen, who reviewed Martínez’s unforgettable work, points out that whenever a female character appears in the book, the author invariably comments on her appearance: “jaw-dropping,” “lost her way to New York Fashion Week,” “ass in jeans,” and other creative expressions… According to him, “if a woman is not ugly, her only purpose in the office is to be gazed at.” Huyen writes more:
“To make sure readers understand how much sperm he can produce, the author takes pains to highlight his sexual adventures. He recounts in disturbing detail a drunken sexual encounter with a female coworker in a Facebook broom closet. He proudly describes himself as a man who ‘flouts the rules of safe sex,’ but his Ph.D. in physics doesn’t seem to help him understand that unprotected sex leads to pregnancy … He seems unable to empathize with women’s fear of pregnancy: ‘Look, lady, unless you’ve got a screaming infant in your arms, and it looks like me, we have nothing to talk about.’”
Interlude: The ‘attack on the family’ and biologizing unequal pay for equal work
Economist Ludwig von Mises, one of the godfathers of libertarians, the New Right, and tech capital, believed that the motive he attributed to feminism—“to destroy the family”—completely misunderstood a woman’s place in society.
After criticizing “so-called-democratic” endeavors that try to eliminate “natural and socially conditioned” inequalities by decree, Mises argues that the radical wing of the women’s movement wants to make women equal to men, “just as it would like to make the strong equal to the weak, the talented to the untalented, and the healthy to the sick.”
“Anarcho-capitalist” Llewellyn H. Rockwell, in his book Against the Left, relays these views of Mises and then turns to another libertarian prophet, a regular of the Mont Pelerin Society and founder of the Mises Institute, Murray Rothbard, writing that equality before the law “does not eliminate biological differences.” Therefore, the fact that women do not earn as much as men or hold positions as powerful as men “does not mean that they are victims of discrimination.” He then returns to Mises and quotes these long lines:
“But the difference between sexual character and sexual destiny can no more be eliminated than other inequalities of mankind. It is not marriage which keeps woman from being inwardly free, but the fact that her sexual character demands surrender to a man and that her love for husband and children consumes her best energies. There is no human law to prevent the woman who looks for happiness in a career from renouncing love and marriage. But those who do not renounce them are not left with sufficient strength to master life as a man can. It is the fact that sex possesses her whole personality, and not the facts of marriage and family, that enchains woman. To ‘abolish’ marriage would not make woman any freer and happier; it would only take away from her the essential content of her life, and would leave nothing but the career.
The woman’s struggle to preserve her personality in marriage is a part of that struggle for personal integrity which characterizes the rationalist society of the economic order based on private ownership of the means of production. It is not to the interest of the woman alone to be successful in this struggle; to contrast the interests of men and women, as the extreme feminists have done, is very foolish. All mankind would suffer if woman should fail to develop her ego and be unable to unite with man as a free-born comrade and friend.”
Rockwell argues that the developing technology of capitalism has greatly lightened the burden of housework and that many wives have formed “an increasingly idle class.” The proof? Like a good liberal, he idealizes his own neighborhood, the life of the middle-class American, and observes the “oppressed” and “hard-faced” women here “donning their mink stoles to march down the street to the next bridge or mah-jongg game,” while noting that the husbands of these same women “were working themselves into an early heart attack in the garment district to support their wives.” The kind-hearted and hardworking Robinson Crusoes of Anglo-Saxon liberalism seem to have embarked on a journey from eternity to eternity.
White, Christian, mother
In Arkansas, a group called “Return to the Land” is building homes on their own land, engaging in agricultural activities, and not allowing anyone but people like themselves to join them.
Among those not permitted to enter this “bantustan” are primarily Black people, followed by homosexuals and Jews. Additionally, “members of non-European religions” are also barred. The Sky News reporter announces that a new community is being established in the Ozark mountains.
The community’s leader, Eric Orwoll, emphasizes that by returning to the land, they are trying to build a place where they can choose their own neighbors. “We’re just,” he says, “doing it to preserve our own culture.” White, American culture; our reporter asks if it sounds like “segregation.” Orwoll replies that people come there freely and voluntarily but adds: “You don’t let everyone into your home.”
About 40 people live in the community. According to the Sky News reporter, hundreds of people from around the world have also paid to become members.
The part relevant to our topic comes later. In the community, men do the physical labor, while women are tasked with bearing and raising children. When one woman is asked why they don’t allow Black people, gay people, or Jews to join, she replies, “They can have their own communities, and they do.” Sky News reports that this is vital to the Return to the Land mission, which is to “encourage strong families with shared ancestry.”
Furthermore, an online fundraising campaign is being held to “give cash rewards to parents of newborn babies to encourage population growth.” “Just before we arrived,” says the Sky News reporter, “they donated $1,000 to a family who had just had their sixth child.”
Old-new hierarchies in a “Herrenvolk” [Master Race] democracy
We return to Thatcher and Thatcherism to conclude. The British leader, who for some reason is sometimes hailed as a “feminist icon,” had no interest in women’s suffrage; instead, she focused on privatization, the free market, and a smaller state.
Just like the debate I saw in the US, her policies generally led to spending cuts in areas that traditionally benefited women. Cuts were made in health and housing. Thatcher even noted in her memoirs that she had to fight against “great pressure” to provide tax relief or subsidies for childcare. Zac Denman writes:
“Thatcher did not want to help society, she wanted everyone to fend for themselves, individuality was key. For her, it was about grit and mettle. This belief is, of course, a pleasure afforded by a life of privilege. Our society is not meritocratic, hard work can only get you so far. She also ignores the help she received; her millionaire husband paid her fees to become a barrister and bought their family home in Kent and Chelsea. She had the advantage of a full-time nanny, so she could go out and work without worrying about childcare, an advantage most women do not have. She believed women should stay at home and look after the children; she did not want the UK to become a ‘creche society’. These rules, of course, did not apply to her, only to the women below her. Hypocrisy was a policy for the Prime Minister.
In keeping with her belief that women should be mothers and nothing else, a bit of part-time work was allowed to keep the brain ‘ticking over’. Thatcher was a great advocate for the nuclear family. For her, it was a ‘call to a return to a traditional and moral way of life’. Women who strayed from traditional roles were mocked. The Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp protest was mocked as ‘left-wing propaganda and the gay and lesbian militancy of some councils’. Men as breadwinners, women as housewives, and children born in wedlock were encouraged to the detriment of society. Of course, for Thatcher, this was irrelevant, as ‘there is no such thing as society. There are individuals and there are families.’ Women do not appear as individuals in this conservative vision. Their roles are restricted, their ambitions curbed. This effectively ensures that no other woman follows in Thatcher’s footsteps, unless they have the backing of a rich man.”
Rose and Milton Friedman also point out in their book Tyranny of the Status Quo that if “public opinion is moving away from the belief in big government and from the doctrine of social responsibility,” this shift will tend to “bring back a belief in individual responsibility by strengthening the family and restoring its traditional role.” The return of Christian faith and the anti-socialist and anti-state stance of Rerum Novarum (6), the escape to the family, and the re-establishment of the male-female hierarchy emerge from the instinct of declining capitalism to save itself from the apocalypse.
Moreover, we can now say that this is not unique to Thatcher or Thatcherism, but a ruling-class consensus: as early as 1987, Elizabeth Wilson pointed out that the “soft” left, by focusing excessively on Thatcherism, overlooked the “familist” tendencies within the Labour Party. According to Wilson, the reason for this could be that it is reassuring in times of crisis and that it expresses “different and sometimes very disparate hopes and fears, such as those about crime, the breakdown of law and order, sexual immorality and deviancy, and, most important but least explicit, the desire of men to hang on to the privileges of their sex.”
Therefore, the reconfiguration of a woman’s place in the home and of the family is not solely about confining women to the home, but about rebuilding class hierarchies to also encompass gender hierarchies; it is about finding ways to enable women, who also handle family affairs, to participate in the workforce.(7)
These are the solutions proposed by Silicon Valley capital and its “scientific” allies to emerge from the apocalyptic depression. They are making moves to create castes based on their biology, spaces, religions, nations, cultures, and genders to secure their own positions. They serve their own marginality to the masses packaged as meritocracy. While it’s every man for himself, they want to achieve an eternal existence by eternalizing the differences between themselves and the rabble.
(*) The reference in the title is from Isaiah 62:5: “As a young man marries a young woman, so will your Builder marry you; as a bridegroom rejoices over his bride, so will your God rejoice over you.”
(1) In 1987, Thiel founded the right-libertarian student journal The Stanford Review. The journal opposed “diversity policies” like affirmative action, defended free speech and the “Western canon,” and spoke out against “administrative bloat” and left-wing tendencies in academia. Here he found allies like Keith Rabois, David Sacks, and Joe Lonsdale, who would continue to work with Thiel later on. During his student years, Thiel also befriended Father Arne Panula, the Stanford director of Opus Dei. Opus Dei is, of course, a Spanish Catholic right-wing sect that recruits male members at universities around the world, collects large sums of money from them when they become wealthy, and uses it to support far-right political causes worldwide.
(2) Melinda Cooper points out that the AFDC, which was seen as a program for white women more than for Southern African-American women when it first started in the 1930s, over the years became a federal practice predominantly accessed by poor African-American women. Thus, for its opponents, this welfare state practice became a specter based on both gender and race.
(3) In a report written in the 1960s on the post-war Black family structure, Democratic senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan focused on the negative consequences of the disintegration of the “traditional” Black family structure, detailing this disintegration as follows: separation, divorce, out-of-wedlock births, and an increase in the proportion of female-headed households where women assumed an unnaturally dominant and authoritarian role. The AFDC program was also included as a contributing factor to this disintegration.
(4) Dirlik writes that of the eight education experts Singapore invited to the country for its efforts to create a new curriculum based on “moral values” and Confucianism, all but one were from the US.
(5) The very “Western” ideas of the ethnically Chinese Lee on genetics, eugenics, and the Malay minority in Singapore are examined in detail by Michael D. Barr in this article.
(6) I will separately discuss what purpose this famous papal encyclical, issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1891, might serve in today’s techno-libertarian world, but for now, I want to say in passing: as the founding text of Catholic social policy, Rerum Novarum is a godsend for tech capital’s myth of a return to religion-nation-family.
(7) Wilson describes this, especially in the US, as the “feminization of poverty”: “The decline of the manufacturing sector, the rise of part-time work in the service sector, changes in technology and consumption habits (for example, the proliferation of fast-food restaurants), combined with changes in family structure and especially the rise in divorce rates, have created a situation where more and more women have become wage earners, but have become an increasingly vulnerable part of the workforce.” Part-time work in the service sector plays a significant role in the formation of this new poverty for women (in the 1980s). As Wilson quotes, Joan Smith writes with great foresight, “In short, the contemporary economy has moved to center stage a workforce that must be constantly endowed with marginal characteristics.”
In an extensive broadcast on the Harici digital platform’s Strategic Compass programme, prominent Turkish international relations scholar Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal and investigative journalist Alptekin Dursunoğlu, editor-in-chief of the specialized regional outlet Yakin Doğu Haber, delivered a comprehensive operational assessment of escalating geopolitical turbulence across the Middle East.
The dialogue dissected the severe institutional, political, and strategic crises currently paralyzing the Tel Aviv and Washington administrations, the profound doctrinal evolution in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s defence apparatus, and the operational collapse of the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen.
Setting the analytical framework, Prof. Dr. Ünal noted that regional stability remains held hostage by political leaderships in Washington and Tel Aviv whose military ambitions diverge sharply from institutional reality. Ünal asserted that US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are functioning under immense domestic and international vulnerability, observing that the wider West Asian arena has been left swaying under the command of two unpredictable figures whose room for operational manoeuvre has contracted severely following domestic political defeats.
Turning directly to the internal institutional turmoil inside the Israeli security and defence establishment, Dursunoğlu detailed the unprecedented breakdown in the civil-military chain of command that surfaced in the Israeli press following the national elections. Specifically addressing the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Eyal Zamir, Dursunoğlu underscored that the military top tier actively resisted prime ministerial instructions designed to embroil the country in an existential conflict.
“Before the Israeli elections, Netanyahu made a serious demand for war,” Dursunoğlu stated, detailing the internal Israeli deliberations. “However, the Chief of General Staff, Eyal Zamir, did not heed this. We learned from the Israeli press after the elections that outright insubordination had effectively taken place. It was noted with irony that in the Middle East’s supposedly sole democracy, the military commander was subordinate to the political will, yet refused to listen to that political will. This is likely an unprecedented development in the short history of that regime.”
Dursunoğlu observed that this refusal followed a direct appeal by the domestic political opposition, known as the Change Bloc under the leadership of Gadi Eisenkot, who had cautioned the general staff against acting as a political instrument. Dursunoğlu explained: “Prior to that, the Change Bloc warned the Chief of General Staff directly. It was anticipated that Netanyahu would attempt to sway the elections in his own favour by launching a war against Iran, which prompted the warning not to enter such an adventure.”
Addressing the persistent rumours that the US administration might launch an assault using massive conventional munitions, Dursunoğlu dismissed the strategic utility of deploying ordnance such as the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast. “Your own military experts state that this bomb detonates prior to impact to devastate wide open areas,” he noted. “That was why it was dropped in Afghanistan, to eliminate dispersed headquarters across broad surface terrain without targeting each facility individually. But your own assessments state that the Iranian facility is carved deep into granite, under hundreds of metres of mountain rock. What is the Mother of All Bombs supposed to do against that? It is widely recognized that even tactical nuclear strikes could not affect it.”
“What objective will you achieve in a short strike that you failed to secure in 40 days?”
Scrutinizing the strategic logic of Tel Aviv and Washington threatening an intense, three-day air blitz against Iranian sovereign territory, Dursunoğlu questioned the credibility of the entire premise when compared to earlier operational outcomes.
“There is an unavoidable military reality to confront,” Dursunoğlu stressed. “What objective will you achieve in an intense, short-duration strike that you failed to achieve during the 40-day war? Moreover, the Iranian side is explicitly warning that the Iran of today is fundamentally different from the past. Tehran states clearly that while you may possess the capability to initiate hostilities, you will not be the party that determines when a ceasefire takes place.”
Dursunoğlu pointed out that Washington’s quiet diplomatic manoeuvres contradict its public posturing. He highlighted that despite aggressive posturing from cabinet hardliners, substantive communications to Tehran had taken a noticeably conciliatory posture through alternative channels.
“If the United States is serious about these existential military threats, why is Vice President JD Vance sending a letter directly to Mohsen Rezaee?” Dursunoğlu asked. “Why are the hawks like Trump himself, Hegseth, or Rubio sidelined in this instance, while Vance sends a letter to Mohsen Rezaee characterized by a completely softened, polite tone proposing dialogue? Iran’s answer has been resolute: seven explicit conditions have been placed on the table. Tehran is demanding concrete implementation before any meaningful talks can proceed, stating frankly that it possesses zero trust in American commitments.”
Dursunoğlu emphasized that institutional rationality within both the US and Israeli armed forces acts as an impediment to reckless unilateral strikes. “Both regimes contain institutional architectures, professional armed forces, intelligence agencies, that are not required to sacrifice sovereign national interests purely for the immediate political survival of individual leaders,” Dursunoğlu argued. “Military analysts and security figures inside Israel are openly voicing this apprehension: if the US posture recedes following the shifts in Congress, how can Israel sustain an isolated conflict against Iran?”
“Iran has lifted the 2,000-kilometre missile limit”
Examining Iran’s revised deterrence architecture, Dursunoğlu revealed that the parameters governing Iranian retaliatory measures have expanded dramatically, both technologically and geographically. He underscored that Tehran’s strategic calculations no longer adhere to previous voluntary self-restraints.
“Iran has formally stated that if an attack occurs, there will no longer be any geographical boundaries,” Dursunoğlu remarked. “This stance is not confined to the immediate theatre. Iran has lifted the 2,000-kilometre missile limit that had previously governed its strategic arsenal. Historically, when the late leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei was questioned on this, he confirmed that while the armed forces possessed the technical capability to exceed that range, he had restrained it specifically to avoid handing European capitals and Netanyahu an excuse to construct an Iranian threat narrative.”
Dursunoğlu stated that this self-imposed doctrine is now defunct: “Today, that limit has been discarded entirely. Mojtaba Khamenei, the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Mohsen Rezaee have all affirmed that geographical limitations no longer apply. This implies directly that US facilities across Europe and broader regional perimeters are within scope. If Iranian energy infrastructure is struck, the vulnerability extends outward. While the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could theoretically be reversed via maritime agreements, a sustained strike against Iranian energy networks could trigger the absolute flattening of primary export terminals and processing facilities across the Gulf, including Fujairah and Yanbu.”
Dursunoğlu argued that the operational assumptions under which Western strategists operated have been completely invalidated by Iranian technological demonstrations. “The entire narrative that Iran lacked advanced signal processing, satellite data links, and long-range operational precision has collapsed,” Dursunoğlu asserted. “Iran demonstrated these sophisticated capabilities in full measure, neutralizing the element of surprise that the adversaries relied upon earlier in the conflict.”
“All options are on the table, including the ground invasion of Gulf monarchies”
Expanding on the systemic consequences of an unconstrained regional conflagration, Prof. Dr. Ünal and Dursunoğlu explored the absolute vulnerability of the Arabian Peninsula, where political geography itself faces radical transformation if open hostilities commence.
“Should a wide-scale regional confrontation break out, the traditional American phrase that all options are on the table will apply in reverse,” Dursunoğlu declared. “At that juncture, the ground invasion of Kuwait is on the table, Bahrain is on the table, the Emirates are on the table, and the Saudi state will face unprecedented devastation from both the north and the south. When Iran states that it will dictate the operational scope and duration of the war, this encompasses the reality of ground manoeuvres that could dissolve the current political map of the Gulf.”
Prof. Dr. Ünal contextualized this vulnerability by analysing the asymmetric demographics and geography of the Gulf states. Ünal pointed out that significant Shiite populations across Kuwait, eastern Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain remain acutely disenfranchised, creating vast internal faultlines should regional conflict erupt. In Bahrain specifically, where an estimated 70% of the indigenous population is Shiite, systemic political repression by the ruling monarchy has established an exceptionally volatile internal environment. Furthermore, Ünal emphasized that Saudi Arabia’s principal oil extraction assets reside squarely within its historically marginalized Eastern Province, meaning that any systemic internal or external military destabilization would instantly paralyze the kingdom’s economic foundation.
Addressing the military dynamics in Yemen, Dursunoğlu and Ünal observed that the Saudi state apparatus has become thoroughly mired in a strategic quagmire against the Ansarullah movement. Ünal underscored that the Ansarullah forces have executed precision strikes deep into Saudi territory, consistently targeting critical infrastructure belonging to the state oil firm Aramco in Yanbu and elsewhere, alongside regional administrative hubs and major international airports.
Dursunoğlu detailed the extreme disparity in air defence effectiveness between different theatres, pointing out that Western partners have failed to provide the Gulf monarchies with an impervious operational umbrella: “Consider a goal in a football match to represent territory. Israel’s territorial footprint is protected by multiple layered air defence umbrellas deployed in extreme density, yet even that barrier was repeatedly penetrated during recent engagements. Saudi Arabia’s landmass is vastly larger, and no state on earth possesses the defensive inventory to establish comparable multi-tier coverage across such a huge geographical scale. Consequently, Yemeni missiles and drones easily penetrate Saudi airspace and strike designated strategic targets at will.”
Dursunoğlu underlined the total failure of the Saudi ground intervention: “When the campaign was initiated in July with an equipped mercenary proxy force of 70,000 intended to march onto Sanaa, the expectation was a swift victory. Today, Ansarullah is not retreating; their units are steadily advancing towards the gates of Aden. Riyadh cannot safeguard its own critical infrastructure, its domestic proxy forces are collapsing across southern Yemen, and its historical border areas adjacent to northern Yemen face persistent strategic exposure.”
“Netanyahu is politically finished, while Washington braces for a lame-duck presidency”
Assessing the executive dynamics in Washington and Tel Aviv, Dursunoğlu identified deep systemic exhaustion and the prospect of cascading political crises that threaten the immediate survival of both administrations.
“In Washington, the drive toward accountability has targeted figures like Pete Hegseth,” Dursunoğlu stated, detailing the mounting pressure exerted by congressional Democrats. “The political opposition is demanding his removal, creating an acute dilemma for the Trump administration. If Hegseth is sacrificed, the evidentiary trail leads directly upward to executive orders issued by Trump himself. While there are suggestions that Israel could serve as a convenient scapegoat for failures in West Asia, sacrificing key officials will only accelerate moves toward congressional impeachment once the balance of power solidifies in January.”
In Israel, Dursunoğlu outlined an equally fragile matrix confronting the Likud establishment. With Gadi Eisenkot tasked with exploring coalition options, the domestic balance rests on razor-thin parliamentary mathematics. “Eisenkot faces the difficult task of cobbling together a 61-seat majority through arrangements with either Haredi factions or outside confidence from Arab lists, both of which provoke fierce resistance within the Zionist political spectrum,” Dursunoğlu explained. “The Haredi parties, representing Ashkenazi United Torah Judaism and Sephardic Shas, remain fixated entirely on preserving broad military draft exemptions for their communities. If Eisenkot provides credible assurances on this front, a viable alternative coalition can emerge. Alternatively, the defection of merely three to four Likud lawmakers would decisively break Netanyahu’s grip on the Knesset.”
Dursunoğlu characterized Netanyahu’s persistent war agitation as a desperate strategy of personal preservation: “Netanyahu is the actor with the most existential requirement for active war, precisely because the collapse of military momentum leaves him immediately exposed to electoral annihilation and legal reckoning. Yet the Israeli military apparatus is exhausted. The army has run out of operational manpower, which is precisely why the bitter domestic fight over drafting the ultra-Orthodox has escalated so violently. The Israeli Chief of Staff himself admitted on multiple occasions in internal assessments that the military structure was raising red flags over systemic institutional collapse under the weight of prolonged multi-front warfare.”
Addressing the friction between the US and Israeli leaderships, Dursunoğlu highlighted reporting from Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth concerning explosive arguments between Trump and Netanyahu over direct military commitments. “Reporting indicates that violent shouting matches, described literally as emerging from hell, have characterized recent exchanges between Trump and Netanyahu,” Dursunoğlu noted. “Netanyahu continues to plead for a direct, collaborative American offensive against Iranian sovereign territory, but Trump recognizes the prohibitive domestic and military price tag and refuses to commit forces to an unwinnable strategic morass.”
Prof. Dr. Ünal concluded the discussion by noting that the traditional pro-Israel consensus in the US capital is fracturing irreparably under the weight of Netanyahu’s international isolation. “Netanyahu has become an absolute object of hatred globally, severely complicating the lobbying efforts of pro-Israel organizations across Western capitals,” Ünal observed. “With generational political shifts evidenced in US metropolitan hubs like New York, where substantial portions of the Jewish electorate are backing progressive, anti-war candidates, future administrations in Washington will inevitably tilt toward restrictive policies and potential sanctions against Israeli unilateralism. The era when Tel Aviv could dictate unconditional US military interventions across the Middle East has definitively closed.”
Following the conclusion of elections in both the United States and Israel, the political landscape across the Middle East faces fresh uncertainty as regional actors reassess the balance of power surrounding Iran.
In an in-depth interview broadcast on the Harici YouTube channel, host Mehmet Kıvanç discussed the regional fallout, electoral dynamics, and military contingencies with Oral Toğa, a researcher at the Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM). Toğa provided a comprehensive assessment of how domestic economic pressures and foreign policy entanglements reshaped voting behaviour, the strategic predicaments facing both Washington and Tel Aviv, and the operational calculations unfolding in Tehran amid the threat of renewed conflict.
Kıvanç opened the discussion by observing that the long-anticipated elections in both countries had concluded, leaving the region at an analytical crossroads. Addressing the shifting political currents in the US, Kıvanç highlighted that within the Democratic Party, figures critical of the ongoing genocide in Gaza and those questioning unconditional support for Israel had gained visible momentum, with even figures like Kamala Harris expressing reservations regarding war with Iran. In response, Toğa noted that while microeconomic concerns such as fuel prices and inflation historically drive voting behaviour, they often serve as catalysts prompting the electorate to question broader foreign policy commitments.
“Standing by Israel has now become a political cost”
Reflecting on the domestic drivers behind the US vote, Toğa emphasised that economic friction inevitably pushes voters to scrutinise governance from a structural perspective. “For decades, there have been analyses concerning the impact of kitchen table issues on the ballot box,” Toğa stated, recalling former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel’s famous aphorism regarding economic discontent. “Certainly, we can say that petrol prices and inflation influenced these election results for Americans. But when these micro issues, matters directly affecting the public, begin to bite, the people start questioning macro matters. They ask: Why are we experiencing this?”
Toğa observed that a broad consensus exists among political analysts regarding the electoral repercussions of foreign entanglements. “All experts agree that Middle Eastern developments, alongside the domestic economic situation, exerted a direct influence on the election and extracted a political cost from Trump,” Toğa said. “Standing by Israel has now become a political cost. This debate is even occurring within domestic politics in Greece today, where people ask why they are taking a position alongside a country committing genocide while everyone else is stepping back. Aligning with Israel is becoming a distinct political liability.”
According to Toğa, this dynamic directly clashed with the core promises made to the American electorate. “Trump, who pledged an America First policy, ran a campaign whose service to American interests remained ambiguous for two years, generating direct and indirect consequences for the American public and raising serious questions,” Toğa remarked. “While he promised to be a president who avoids and ends wars, we arrived at a point governed by continuous conflict, war, and fragile ceasefires since last year. All these elements produced the outcome of the US elections.”
Addressing Kıvanç’s question regarding whether traditional pro-Israel lobbies like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) are suffering an enduring erosion of power, Toğa argued that the information environment has fundamentally transformed. He pointed to the emergence of independent digital platforms and social media channels scrutinising political donations, revisiting historical foreign policy decisions, and questioning narratives that were previously dismissed as conspiracy theories.
“Netanyahu and his contemporaries are only now realising that we no longer live in the world of the 1990s,” Toğa said. “Prior to the rise of social media, holding specific broadcast channels granted you a monopoly. You could make someone famous overnight or destroy someone prominent just as quickly. Controlling the press made it simple to market your own narratives. Today, however, people are watching a genocide in high-definition quality. They could not conceal what occurred in Minab despite significant efforts, and it continually returned as an uncomfortable question before the president. People also question incidents such as strikes hitting weddings.”
Toğa explained that past precedents continue to weigh heavily on public trust. “There is historical baggage,” he said. “Why did the Iraq War begin in 2003? It was claimed there were chemical weapons. Later, numerous books and memoirs by senior bureaucrats revealed this was untrue and argued that it served Israeli interests, openly assigning blame to Israel for these engagements. The accumulation of this baggage, combined with social media’s rapid dissemination of information, has made it impossible to monopolise narratives. If one platform loses credibility, an alternative emerges immediately, and information keeps flowing. This constitutes the greatest challenge for the current Israeli government and represents the primary factor weakening its influence in the US.”
“The security climate after October 7 ties the hands of the Israeli left”
Turning to the Israeli elections, Kıvanç noted that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition lost 10 seats rather than suffering an outright collapse, while Arab parties surged from 10 to 19 seats. Meanwhile, the opposition camp led by Gadi Eisenkot viewed its own performance as a failure despite Netanyahu’s vulnerabilities. Kıvanç asked whether the conflict with Iran had consolidated Israeli society behind a more aggressive security posture.
Toğa responded that Israeli political consciousness remains anchored to the trauma of the October 7 attacks. “Israelis cannot move past October 7,” Toğa stated. “Whatever occurs, the ultimate card played in Israel returns to October 7. Consequently, the security climate after October 7 ties the hands of the Israeli left regarding the genocide, the assaults in Lebanon, Iran, and Yemen, and actions concerning West Bank settlers. The political right directly challenges the left by pointing to what the Palestinians they defended did. Netanyahu captured a substantial security tailwind, entered into what he termed a seven-front war, and framed his campaign around the narrative that Netanyahu never surrenders, manipulating this security environment to emerge with the leading bloc despite dropping 10 seats.”
Toğa drew an operational distinction between public sentiment regarding Gaza and attitudes toward Tehran. “Opinion polls show the Israeli public is deeply divided over Gaza because of reserve soldier casualties and the question of why they are dying,” he explained. “Yet that division does not exist regarding Iran. The Israeli public is far more unified in viewing Iran as an existential threat. The narrative of unfinished business with Iran was central to the election campaign, reinforced by Trump’s open endorsements from abroad. Eisenkot was repeatedly accused of being soft on this front, forcing him into a defensive posture where he emphasised his military credentials and the personal loss of his son and nephew.”
When asked about Eisenkot’s prospects of forming a governing coalition through either external Arab party support or a national unity government, and whether Eisenkot would pursue regime change in Tehran, Toğa underscored that Israeli institutional strategy transcends individual leadership.
“Altering and breaking the political will in Iran is an established state policy for Israel, rather than merely changing the regime,” Toğa stated. “They perceive a genuine threat from Iran. One must not forget the evacuation of northern communities following October 7 due to Hezbollah’s posture, the constant threat posed by allied proxy forces prior to October 7, Iran’s rapidly developing ballistic missile capabilities, and its proximity to nuclear status. A nuclear Iran would fundamentally alter the security doctrines of Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the Gulf states, creating a domino effect that Israel desperately seeks to avoid. Furthermore, Israelis have no way of predicting which capabilities Iran will transfer to which actor, as demonstrated by the advanced missiles and drones supplied to Hezbollah, Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces.”
Toğa warned against misinterpreting Eisenkot’s political standing or doctrine. “People should not view Eisenkot as an inherently peaceful figure,” Toğa observed. “He is a former military commander who formulated the Dahiya doctrine, which explicitly outlined the systematic targeting of civilian and urban infrastructure in Beirut’s Dahiya district. His argument is simply that military operations must be directed where they yield tangible results. Regarding government formation, relying on ultra-Orthodox parties brings severe constraints, while partnering with or relying on Arab parties alienates factions that refuse to appear alongside them. A minority government would be exceedingly fragile. While a 28-day mandate with a potential 14-day extension is underway, if the task eventually falls back to Netanyahu and fails, a return to elections appears the more probable trajectory.”
“The primary objective is turning Iran into a failed state”
Addressing the transition period before the newly elected US Congress convenes in January, Kıvanç pointed to media speculation and remarks by figures such as Tucker Carlson regarding potential nuclear contingencies or strikes targeting Iranian facilities. Asked whether the threshold for a nuclear strike was approaching, Toğa offered a cautious assessment, indicating that while talking about nuclear strikes breaks long-standing taboos, it remains an unlikely primary course of action.
“The nuclear scenario is not something I place in my top five contingencies,” Toğa stated. “If it were ever considered, it would be under conditions of extreme operational desperation or as a punitive demonstration to enforce surrender, perhaps targeting unpopulated desert expanses near Natanz or the Qazvin Mountains rather than launching a strike on Tehran that would kill 15 to 20 million people. However, that is not the primary objective. The primary objective is turning Iran into a failed state by destroying its conventional capabilities, civil infrastructure, and administrative systems, leaving it permanently unstable and incapable of projecting regional power, much like Iraq after 1991 where the state was crippled under sanctions despite Saddam remaining in place.”
Asked to detail the practical operational contingencies currently being considered, Toğa pointed toward targeted amphibious and covert operations designed to enforce diplomatic capitulation.
“Amphibious landings are not a scenario to be excluded, as military preparations point in that direction,” Toğa explained. “This does not mean an American army marching to Tehran. Instead, we could see special forces deployed to specific zones to conduct sabotage against targets inaccessible to air strikes, alongside operations to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz to break Iran’s political will. The objective would be a limited occupation in strategic economic corridors like Hormozgan or Chabahar, essentially telling Tehran that forces will remain until an agreement is signed.”
Toğa noted that Iran’s internal economic vulnerabilities make it susceptible to external strangulation. “Iran’s economy is currently in an exceptionally severe condition,” he said. “Public sector salaries remain unpaid across numerous sectors, with parliament recently debating unpaid wages for healthcare personnel, while retirees staged major protests in mid-October. Reports indicate instances where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struggled with payrolls, necessitating financial transfers from Iraq via the Popular Mobilization Forces. If an adversary destroys water distribution networks and vital civilian infrastructure, Iran could be left with a structural burden requiring 15 to 20 years to overcome, compounded by continuous secondary sanctions.”
When Kıvanç asked whether a sustained war of attrition was viable or if Washington sought a rapid resolution, Toğa clarified the strategic utility of such operations. “Even a punitive strike-and-withdraw operation generates identical long-term instability,” Toğa said. “To craft a victory narrative, Trump could leverage amphibious control over strategic islands or ports like Bandar Abbas to force Iran into signing an agreement that concedes total transparency on the nuclear file and broader demands. However, such devastation ensures prolonged internal crisis because sanctions would remain intact, precisely as occurred in Iraq. This reality explains the intense diplomatic engagement from regional capitals like Pakistan, Türkiye, and the Gulf, including the discussions surrounding the Mecca alliance and talks in Tehran aimed at preventing a catastrophic regional escalation.”
“Tehran is actively preparing for direct war”
Evaluating Iran’s internal readiness, Kıvanç asked about the military and political stance of the leadership in Tehran given the severe socioeconomic pressures. Toğa confirmed that Iranian military planners have been operating on a war footing for an extended period, particularly following the strike on Iran’s diplomatic mission in Damascus.
“Tehran is actively preparing for direct war,” Toğa said. “The Iranian military expected war throughout 2024. However, Israel’s targeted decapitation campaign against senior commanders has begun to disrupt the decision-making apparatus. The commanders who were killed were the very architects who doctored Iranian defence doctrines, authored the contingency plans, and managed defensive preparations. Iran possesses ready-made plans for the initial days of a conflict, but sustaining operations beyond that point is complicated by emerging political friction within the establishment.”
Toğa highlighted internal disputes over key appointments, pointing to the polarising profile of Mohsen Rezaee. “Mohsen Rezaee was never the natural first choice for such roles,” Toğa noted. “He is a highly controversial and often sensationalist figure in Iranian public life. In times of crisis, domestic political divisions can lead factions to accuse one another of treason over the slightest misstep as groups jockey for influence in the future hierarchy. What Iran needs most right now is the unchallenged authority of an Ali Khamenei who can strike the table and unify the political structure.”
When asked if the current Supreme Leader could still exercise that unifying power or if Mojtaba Khamenei held equivalent influence, Toğa drew a stark contrast between their political profiles. “Mojtaba Khamenei does not currently possess that level of overarching authority,” Toğa explained. “Mojtaba is a remarkably influential figure who exercises substantial control within the IRGC and played a vital role in establishing its intelligence apparatus. But he is not Ali Khamenei. Ali Khamenei experienced the revolution firsthand, survived an assassination attempt, served as president during the Iran-Iraq War, and led the country for over three decades, which explains why he consistently sought to keep Iran out of direct war. Mojtaba, though trained at the office of the Supreme Leader over the last 20 years, has not yet demonstrated that independent political weight publicly. That authority cannot easily be consolidated before the conflict concludes.”
Toğa detailed how the Iranian state is restructuring its internal procedures to withstand systemic pressure. “Parliament has amended its internal regulations to permit online sessions and convene in alternative locations during wartime,” he said. “Iran is banking entirely on strategic endurance and resistance. Through civilian mobilisation initiatives like the Jan Feda campaigns, authorities are training diverse civic groups in urban combat and first aid to ensure ground stability. Institutionally, they have instituted redundancy mechanisms up to four leadership tiers should senior officials be assassinated. Furthermore, they are refining the mosaic defence concept, integrating the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters with the general staff to eliminate bureaucratic multi-headedness and endure enemy strikes without capitulating.”
“Iran will expand the conflict horizontally”
Regarding the trajectory of a potential new military escalation, Kıvanç asked how far Tehran could push its asymmetric response given that conflict cannot continue indefinitely. Toğa asserted that Iran’s operational doctrine relies on horizontal escalation rather than absorbing blows passively.
“Iran will expand the conflict horizontally,” Toğa stated. “If its civilian infrastructure is targeted, it will target Israeli infrastructure in return. Unlike Iran’s dispersed assets, which were decentralised after studying the 1991 Gulf War, Israel’s infrastructure is far more centralised. US military bases across Saudi Arabia and the Gulf will inevitably become targets. Tehran’s target set could expand to include facilities in Azerbaijan, Crete, and European installations, as hinted by recent statements. It could even extend to activating sleeper cells across Europe and globally, as recently witnessed in the UK.”
When Kıvanç asked whether this implied that Tehran would deploy all available leverage, Toğa emphasised the existential nature of the confrontation for the Iranian leadership. “From the Iranian perspective, this is an existential struggle for national survival,” Toğa said. “They are fighting to prevent the country from collapsing into a fragmented, perpetual war zone like Libya. Regardless of whether an Iranian citizen supports the Islamic Republic, there is a fundamental desire for safe schooling, operational businesses, and stable livelihoods. This civic and patriotic consciousness exists across both reformist and conservative factions, even if political reconciliation between them remains elusive.”
Toğa noted that the administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian was engineered partly to solidify the internal front ahead of potential conflict, citing the appointment of the first Sunni governor to Sistan and Baluchestan and security operations targeting militant camps in Iraq. However, turning to the prospects for mutual diplomatic concessions, Toğa observed that internal rigidity hampers progress.
“A written mutual understanding could provide breathing space, but maximalist demands surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the domestic drive to inflict a political cost on Trump obstruct a breakthrough,” Toğa stated. “Trump has already paid an electoral cost, meaning he has little left to lose during his remaining window in office to construct a victory narrative. While diplomatic channels facilitated by Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia remain vital, Iran’s maximalist positioning regarding Hormuz complicates matters. Neither Washington nor Tel Aviv is willing to leave the Strait under its current status or allow Iran to emerge from this crisis with its regional deterrence intact for the next 20 years. If Tehran makes concessions on Hormuz and offers nuclear transparency, diplomatic de-escalation remains viable.”
In a concluding query, Kıvanç asked whether an increasingly cornered Iran might conduct a nuclear test in international waters, such as the Indian Ocean, to demonstrate a working deterrent. Toğa assessed that intelligence assessments currently discount an operational weaponised capability, though desperate measures cannot be entirely ruled out.
“Available information suggests Iran has not reached that operational stage,” Toğa said. “If US and Israeli intelligence possessed definitive evidence of a completed nuclear warhead, their operational posture would differ significantly. Reports indicate that while Iran mastered uranium enrichment, it remained bottlenecked at the weaponisation stage, specifically miniaturising a warhead to fit ballistic missile delivery systems before the current war began. Nevertheless, strategic capability remains closely guarded. Iran has operated like a chess player, gradually escalating its demonstrations from rudimentary strikes in True Promise 1 to advanced missiles in True Promise 2. If the country faces absolute existential collapse and possesses such a capability, exercising that ultimate card cannot be dismissed.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his call for a unity government in a speech delivered on Tuesday, 10 November, following the swearing-in ceremony of the new Knesset.
Opposing the prospect of forming a government with the backing of parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, Netanyahu accused the lawmakers of those factions of “supporting terrorism” and “seeking the destruction of the Jewish state”.
According to a report by The Times of Israel, Netanyahu’s remarks drew sharp backlash from the opposition.
Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar Party and tasked with forming the government, cancelled a scheduled meeting with Likud representatives.
Netanyahu’s efforts since the election campaign to delegitimise the Arab parties target the possibility of Eisenkot forming an administration with their support.
In the parliamentary arithmetic, Netanyahu’s bloc remains at 53 seats, whereas the parties recommending Eisenkot for the premiership hold a combined total of 67 seats.
Objections by Jewish opposition parties to collaborating with Arab parties, however, complicate the translation of that numerical majority into a government.
Netanyahu opened his address by turning to Iran, claiming that Tehran is once again seeking to advance its nuclear programme.
“The only way to permanently eliminate this existential threat is to bring down the regime of the ayatollahs,” Netanyahu said.
Citing security risks as the justification for establishing a national unity government, Netanyahu assessed: “We must set aside all other considerations and form a national unity government. Only a government of this kind can handle challenges of this scale.”
Netanyahu devoted the bulk of his speech to the prospect of opposition parties cooperating with Arab lawmakers.
Refusing to distinguish between Ra’am and the Joint List, Netanyahu asserted that both political movements aim to bring about the downfall of the Jewish state.
On this subject, Netanyahu said: “They differ only over what kind of Palestinian state will be built on the ruins of the Jewish state: an Islamic state on the Muslim Brotherhood model, like Hamas in Gaza, or a nationalist Palestinian state on the Fatah model? That is the entire difference between them.”
Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas had previously stated on multiple occasions that Netanyahu held negotiations with him in 2021 with the aim of forming a government.
Netanyahu’s attempt at the time yielded no result, and Ra’am subsequently joined the Bennett-Lapid coalition government.
Netanyahu also opposed Eisenkot’s efforts to engage ultra-Orthodox parties, addressing Haredi lawmakers and arguing that Israel’s Jewish identity is under threat.
Urging Haredi representatives not to trust the pledges made by the Eisenkot bloc, Netanyahu said: “They will make you a mountain of promises. But as soon as a government led by the left is formed, all those promises will evaporate. They will have a guarantee from the Arab parties and do whatever they want.”
Netanyahu reiterated his commitment to establish a legal framework for the status of yeshiva students and to pass a military conscription law through consensus with rabbis.
The United Torah Judaism party has expressed anger at the Netanyahu administration over its failure to implement legislation exempting religious school students from mandatory military service.
During the process of recommending a candidate to the President for forming the government, the party did not put forward any name.
The Shas party, by contrast, continues to maintain its place within the Netanyahu bloc.
The principle of mandatory national service for all, advocated by Eisenkot, remains one of the primary obstacles to any potential partnership with United Torah Judaism.
During Netanyahu’s address to parliament, protests erupted from the opposition benches regarding his advisers’ connections to Qatar and the failure to establish a state commission of inquiry into the attacks of 7 October 2023.
Former prime minister Naftali Bennett, leader of the Together Party, asked: “What about the state commission of inquiry? Why do you not declare Qatar an enemy state? What about your Qatari consultants?”
As Democrats Party leader Yair Golan and members of his party walked out of the chamber, lawmaker Gilad Kariv asked: “How much money did you take from Qatar?”
For many years, Netanyahu followed a policy that facilitated the transfer of financial funds from Qatar to the Hamas administration in Gaza.
Several close advisers working within the Prime Minister’s Office are under investigation over allegations that they obtained financial gains in exchange for safeguarding Doha’s interests.
It had been reported that Jonatan Urich, a longtime adviser to Netanyahu, admitted in a police statement to receiving hundreds of thousands of shekels for Qatar-linked activities, and that this work continued after 7 October.
Urich continues to work on Netanyahu’s team.
In his speech, Netanyahu revived allegations of foreign interference in election processes, demanding the lifting of restrictions placed on the investigation file.
Police inquiries are known to have yielded limited evidence regarding the allegations in question, with judicial authorities having indicated that the outcome would not change even if the claims were confirmed.
Following the speech, Eisenkot stated on his X account that Netanyahu had exploited an official ceremony for political ends.
Eisenkot said in his statement: “I sat and listened to the outgoing prime minister’s disconnected, divisive, hateful, and disgraceful speech. I became even more convinced that he is unfit to remain in office for a single minute longer.”
Reaffirming his goal of forming a “national emergency government”, Eisenkot stressed that Netanyahu’s administration had polarised the country and jeopardised its security.
The Joint List described the parliamentary speech as “inciting and racist”, announcing that it would work toward removing Netanyahu from office.
The party stated that it remains committed to representing in parliament the will of more than 500,000 citizens who supported it at the ballot box.
Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas told Channel 12 television that he was astonished by Netanyahu’s use of an official state ceremony to “lie, incite, and defame Arab parties”.
“We are law-abiding Israeli citizens. We do not want to establish an Islamic state or an Arab state,” Abbas said.
Abbas added: “We support peace and ending the conflict through a two-state solution. We condemn terrorism; we too are victims of terrorism.”
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