INTERVIEW
‘The US doesn’t have a policy on Gaza, does not have a peace plan…’
Published
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Vali Nasr, former senior adviser to the US State Department, spoke to Harici: “The US does not have a policy on Gaza. The US doesn’t have a peace plan, does not have a ceasefire plan, does not have a long-term stability plan for the region…”
Vali Nasr is the Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins-SAIS. Nasr, an Iranian-American, is one of the most prominent figures in the field of US-Iranian relations and US policies in the Middle East.
A former member of the US State Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board, Nasr served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2009 and 2011.
A nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations CFR, Nasr is the author of several books including, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, The Shia Revival and How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.
Vali Nasr answered journalist Esra Karahindiba’s questions on the Biden administration’s position on the Gaza conflict, US Middle East policy, the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the future of Gaza.
‘If Iran and the US escalation happens, Iran will go back to a more aggressive nuclear policy’
Before the Gaza war, there was news about an unofficial nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States. Is that agreement still in place or has Iran accelerated its nuclear work because of the Gaza war?
I don’t think the Gaza War has yet has a direct impact on the change of policy in Iran. But what the Gaza war did was to escalate tensions between the United States and Iran. So as soon as the Gaza War happened, the United States put a new freeze on the money that had gone from South Korea to Iran, the $6 billion in exchange for the release of American prisoners in Iran. And so, both countries have now are seeing an escalation of tensions between them. There have been attacks by Iranian backed forces in Syria and Iraq on American positions. And there have been American bombing of those same targets. Iran has said that it might sell advanced ballistic missiles to Russia. So, what we’re seeing is that is a gradual escalation of tensions between Iran and the US. If that escalation happens, then inevitably, it translates into Iran basically going back to a more aggressive nuclear policy.
‘If there’s population expulsion, the US would confront a much wider war in the region’
Although Iran is not in favor of the expansion of the war, the Houthis and Iranian-backed militias continue to attack US forces in the region. Do you think Iran will increase its influence in the region after the Gaza war? How will this affect the US policy in the region?
Three things here: One is that, yes, I don’t think Iran or Hezbollah or any other force in the region wants an expansion of the war but at the same time this access of resistance that includes Iran, Hezbollah militias in Iraq, in Syria and the Houthis and Hamas, they want to show support for the Palestinians. And they want to show that they are doing something while many other Arab countries are right now not doing anything militarily. They might be doing some things diplomatically but not militarily. So, partly they are making these attacks as a way of showing support for Hamas. But I also think it’s warning shots at the US. It’s not so much escalation as I think they want to sort of tell the United States that if Israel attacks without any kind of a restraint if it tries to completely finish off Hamas and Gaza, if too many Palestinians die, if there’s population expulsion that the US would, then, confront a much wider war in the region. So, I think we’re at that stage that both sides are sending signals. The Americans hit Iranian or militia positions in the region as a way of suggesting that they are prepared to counterattack. But I think the Houthis, Hezbollah militias in Iraq are also sending their own signals.
Secondly, I do think Iran’s position has become stronger because when the Palestinian issue becomes front and center for people across the region that’s an issue that Iran has always tried to rely on and has always championed. I think whereas other countries in the region, saw their interests best served by call and even having either secret or open relations with Israel. Abraham Accords, maybe normalization between Saudi and Israel, relations between Türkiye and Israel… These are all now jeopardized. So, the country that actually benefits most from this shift is actually Iran. And in the short run also Israel is now busy with Gaza as opposed to be being busy with Iran. The United States is now also busy with the Palestinian issue which until October 6, it thought that the Palestinian issue was over. I think Iran is been the big beneficiary of the region and some of the issues. That maybe people in the Sunni world, in the Arab world had anger towards Iran because of its support for the Assad regime in Syria. I think all of that’s forgotten. Now that everybody’s thinking and crying for the Palestinians, Iran or Hezbollah is seem to be on the right side for them. So, it’s a big success for Iran. Now, whether this translates into longer term benefit for Iran, it all depends. I’m not sure about that. Also, the future of us Iran relations in the region, I think, is it all depends on how this war ends, what kind of a vision the United States has for the end of the war, and what comes after this war. If after this war we see more escalation on the nuclear issue between Iran and the US, if we see increasing tensions between Iran and Israel attacks, semi-attacks and etc., then I think the region could be for a prolonged period of instability.
‘The only US policy of Gaza is to let Israel conduct the war’
The US allies in the Middle East did not support it on Ukraine. OPEC countries continue to cut oil prices. Now the US’s unlimited support for Israel has led to a further loss of credibility in the region. Do you think Washington has started to lose its political weight in the Middle East after the crises in Ukraine and Israel?
I think Ukraine was never central to the Middle East. It was a war somewhere else. So, people in the Middle East may have had opinions about it but it was never important to average Arabs, it was maybe more for Turks because Turks sit on the Black Sea and maybe for them is more important. But people, I would say, in Egypt or Jordan or or the Persian Gulf region, they didn’t sleep at night and wake up in the morning thinking about Ukraine. The governments were looking at basically what’s their interest. Saudi Arabia has oil interests with Russia. Türkiye has a balancing relationship, it has relations with Russia it also has relations with Europe. So, I think the Middle East basically reacted to Ukraine not based on what America wants but based on how to protect their own interests, how to basically be supportive of Europe but also be supportive of Russia. I think nobody wanted to be sucked into the Ukraine war in a direct way
I think Gaza is different. Yes, there is a lot of anger towards America’s moral stance on the Palestinian issue that the US basically has supported Israeli policy wholeheartedly and has not been critical on the number of people died in Gaza. But I think the larger issue is not the US’s moral credibility because I never thought that was very strong in the Middle East. I think people of the Middle East always thought that the US is biased towards Israel. They always thought that the US is Islamophobic. They were angry at the Iraq War. There were many reasons why the middle easterners had anger towards the US’ double standards in the Middle East. I think the critical credibility issue is lack of a US policy, because even the times when the United States was very unpopular for its moral stances, nevertheless it had a very clear sense of what it wanted to do and ability to deliver. But what we are actually seeing is that the US does not have a policy on Gaza. Its only policy is that they’re going to sit back and let Israel conduct this War based on it’s own objectives and however it wants to conduct the War. The US doesn’t have a peace plan, does not have a ceasefire plan, does not have a long-term stability plan for the region. That is where the credibility issue is because with a superpower its credibility doesn’t come from its moral position. It comes from its ability to construct policy and to implement policy. I think those are the issues that are now in doubt so if you asked any country and I don’t mean people in the street but you asked any government in the region what is American policy for how to end this war and how to make sure that the war doesn’t start and how to make things better bring stability back to the region, I don’t think they can answer.
‘Beijing visit of Arab leaders mean; we will invite China into the Middle East issues’
What that the reason why the ministers of the Arab countries visited China as the first stop on their trip to find a solution for Gaza. What do you think this means? Has the US failed in its policy of balancing China in the Middle East?
I think it was important. I think the more important issue is when Saudi Arabia decided to invite all the leaders of the Islamic and Arab countries together, and so for the first time, leaders of countries that don’t usually talk to each other like we’re all in the same place, in the same photograph, Iran and Egypt, Assad and Erdoğan. That was very significant. In other words, the first time that basically the region said “you know what, there is no American policy, we’re going to get together, and see how we can solve this.” So, I think that was the most important statement that they were not happy with where the US was going. Now they made the decision that they were going to visit the capitals of all of the five members of the security Council. But the significance was that they decided to start with Beijing, not end with Beijing. So, I think it was the significant part is that. But, and yes, I do think that not that they think that China can bring solution, but I think they want to signal their displeasure for lack of US policy by basically saying “we’re not only not going to cut ties with China, we’re actually going to try to invite China into the Middle East issues”.
‘The right candidate for the mediation is Saudi Arabia’
In your article for Foreign Affairs, you wrote that the United States could manage its relations in the Middle East through Riyadh, thereby easing its responsibility in the region. Is the model you propose compatible with the current Saudi foreign policy perspective, which is based on a multilateral win-win approach. How do you convince a country that has joined BRICS to return to a US-oriented model again?
I don’t think the Saudis can have to choose between this and that. In fact, that they have chosen BRICS. The fact that they have relations with Iran, they have relations with China, is exactly what makes Saudi Arabia the sort of the right candidate because a country that is very close to the United States only, then is not able to bring in Türkiye and Iran and other actors also into the picture which are very important for the stability of the Middle East. But Saudi Arabia increasingly has very close ties with America, but also has close ties with China, has close ties with Russia, has now built it relationship with Türkiye after many years of relationships being very cold and frosty, has rebuild its relations with Iran, has repaired its relations with Qatar and so. And also, it has some leverage on Israel because the Israelis still want normalization with Saudi Arabia so they sit in a right position to exercise this influence if the United States is willing to support that role and where the United States has greatest leverage is actually on Israel. When you want to cut a deal that would bring stability in the region, every actor in the region has to agree to it. Americans don’t talk to Iranians right now, so they cannot discuss this with Iran. The Chinese talks to Iranians. And the Saudis talk to Iranians. And the Chinese and the Saudis depend on one another at the same time. The Russians have to support this and not undermine it. Tehran and Ankara have the best relationship with Russia right now of getting it to beave. The Americans have the best relationship with Israelis. So, as a result, the US’s policy right now is only supporting an Israeli War. But if you actually want stability in the region, the stability will not come with just supporting Israel conducting the war. The stability will come by supporting a broader sort of a regional security agreement that everybody has to accept and agree to. And there is no single actor who speaks to everybody basically and also has leverage with Israelis as well. And Saudis can play that role.
‘None of the regional countries will want to take part in the Gaza’s reconstruction unless there is an agreement for a final settlement’
The Biden administration wants a revitalized Palestinian Authority to administer post-war Gaza, but Netanyahu said they would not accept that. “After the war, Gaza must be demilitarized under Israeli responsibility,” he said. What does this mean? What kind of political situation do you think awaits Gaza after the war? Can regional countries play an effective role in the reconstruction of Gaza?
It all depends on how and when the most of the war ends. If we thought about Ukraine, when the Russians went into Ukraine, they thought they’re going to take all of Ukraine. Then the Ukrainians thought, they’re going to win the war themselves and push Russia all the way out of Ukraine. Where we are is that neither side is winning. It’s a new reality. Right now, we’re in the middle of a war that where Israel thinks it can have everything. It can destroy Hamas, take over large parts of Gaza. So, it all depends on whether does it get its way or does the war stop somewhere else. So, it all depends on when and how this war stops. When does it end? Does it end in total victory by Israel or Israel is forced to stop the war at some point without winning total victory? Once the war stops, then there’s a question of what’s the order that can be negotiated for postwar. I think that’s where we don’t know what the case is going to be. I do think the countries in the region have a role in the future security of Gaza but also in reconstruction of Gaza. But it all again their involvement in Gaza will depend on what is the final scenario in Gaza. I don’t think anybody wants to go in to own a disastrous territory. Everybody wants to go in believing that there is an agreement between United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Türkiye, even Iran quietly from afar about a situation. Then, say, “okay, we can support that”. But if there is no internationally agreed situation for Gaza, then I don’t think any Arab country or Türkiye would want to go in a situation where there’s no international or regional support for. It’s a recipe for disaster. It’s similar to the situation in Syria. Because there is no agreement about the final end to the war in Syria. Countries are in Syria basically protecting their own military positions but there’s no agreement about reconstruction. So, I think you have to first have an agreement political agreement over what happens to Gaza when the war stops. That itself depends on how the war stops. And then, countries in the region would come in to support a final settlement of Gaza. They won’t come in before there is an agreement on a final settlement for Gaza.
‘YPG involves Americans more than Syrians’
Can you also comment about the frozen normalization initiative of Türkiye towards Syria? It’s now for a year and a half that we were discussing a lot if whether Bashar Assad and President Erdoğan will meet or not, whether the normalization will be fully applicable. But we see that now it’s frozen…
Repairing relations is going to take time because these two were on the opposite sides of the war and the war hasn’t even concluded completely. There is again much like we discuss about Gaza, there is no other final settlement, internationally recognized final settlement for the for the war in Syria. There is basically a de facto situation on the ground. “So, the fighting has stopped”, “Assad controls here”, “Turkish troops are there”, “Americans control this piece”, “Iranians control that piece”. But there is no sort of an agreement about the future. I think there are some big issues for Türkiye on the table. One is the future of Idlib, the other one is the future of YPG group which actually involves the Americans more than it involves the Syrians. Of course, Assad would want to see Turkish troops leave Syrian land. I mean any leader of an Arab country would say the same thing. But on the other hand, Türkiye also wants no more refugees to come to Türkiye. So, if they leave Idlib, and you know Syrian troops go into Idlib, and another million Syrians are pushed into Syria. That’s an issue. On the other hand, they actually want Assad to provide security guarantees that would allow many of the Syrian refugees in Türkiye to return home. Then, the question is also about the Kurdish movement in Northeast Syria, it’s military capabilities etc. So, I think we’re far apart on those things.
And then the other thing that’s happened is that the Gaza War has taken the attention off of the Syria issue. I think we were reaching a point where in a different kind of a Middle East setting, different kind of an American relations with the Middle East, it was possible to sort of imagine that there was a political space for even Americans to think differently about Syria, let alone Türkiye and Syria. So, we saw that the Arab world was getting closer to Assad in the sense of accepting him in the Arab League. But still the issue of returning; the Assad will not agree to the return of refugees until economic sanctions on are lifted so that they can actually feed the people who come back. The sanctions will not be going to be lifted it because of the United States will not lift them. So, everything is sort of in a way is tied together. So, things may move ever so slightly, but I think it’s going to be very difficult to untangle this in the short-term period.
‘Ukrainians don’t care about the motivations of the West as long as they get the support’
I want to ask you about the statements of David Cameron, the British Foreign Secretary. He was in Washington and he said “You spend an extra 10% of your defense budget, and with the courage of the Ukrainians, you destroy 50 percent of Russia’s pre-war defense equipment and people. Without losing the lives of the Americans and the British. This is a great investment.” Is this a type of confession that what is going on in Ukrainian land is a semi-proxy war?
I think for Ukrainians this is a real war. It’s about their territory. It’s no different for them than it was for Turks in 1921 when their country was being divided up and given to different European powers, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rallied the Turkish military to unite the Turkish Republic. For them, it’s an act of nationalism. But I think that what David Cameron said, unfortunately is exactly the way Putin thinks. He thinks that the Ukraine war is really a western proxy war. I think what David Cameron meant to say is to encourage the US Congress to continue to support the war by saying it’s a very small price to pay to keep Russia weak and prevent it from becoming a great power by keeping it busy in Ukraine. But it’s going to be read the wrong way to mean that the Ukraine war is a proxy war. But I don’t think that’s the reality. I think for the Ukrainians the war is real. They’re defending their territory. They need the Western support. I don’t think Ukrainians care about what motivates the West as long as they get the support. So, I mean how Ukrainians see the war is very different from somebody sitting in London or in Madrid or in Amsterdam or in Washington may see the war. For them it might very well be about keeping Russia weak. But for the Ukrainians it’s about protecting their country.
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INTERVIEW
German economist: Militarization of industry is a path to disaster
Published
4 weeks agoon
17/02/2025By
Tunç Akkoç
Lucas Zeise, a German economist and co-founder of Financial Times Deutschland, shared his views on the militarization of industry in a recent interview. Zeise said, “If more and more is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of the road to disaster.”
Born in 1944, Lucas Zeise is a financial journalist with a background in philosophy and economics. His career includes positions with the Japanese Ministry of Economics, the German aluminum industry, the Frankfurt-based Börsen-Zeitung, and the Financial Times Deutschland, which he co-founded. Until 2017, he served as editor-in-chief of UZ, the weekly newspaper of the German Communist Party (DKP). He currently writes a regular column for Junge Welt and contributes articles to various publications.
Lucas Zeise answered Tunç Akkoç’s questions about the debate on German industry and economy and global developments.
Tunç Akkoç: First of all, is deindustrialization a reality?
Lucas Zeise: Yes, I think so, but of course it is a long-lasting reality. Deindustrialization is a process that coincides with capitalist development in general. Industry has been the main surplus-value-producing element of capitalism in all countries, and in some of the more developed countries, notably Britain, deindustrialization has reached a more advanced level. Since Britain was the first fully developed capitalist country, this process started earlier.
Economists often refer to this process as the tertiary sector, i.e. the service sector in general. In capitalist countries, the share of services in the economy is steadily increasing. This is a general trend that can be observed everywhere, and is particularly related to the fact that developed countries are gradually shifting their industries to other regions, especially South-East Asia, by exporting capital. While industrialization is taking place in these regions, the process of deindustrialization in developed countries has accelerated.
In addition, the process of financialization has also accelerated and the financial sector has become stronger. However, the finance sector is a service sector, not an industry. Nevertheless, all these service sectors depend on industry remaining strong. When we analyze the UK, we can see that the country has experienced a relative decline compared to other regions. For example, Germany had overtaken the UK in the industrialization process and even surpassed it before the First World War. Likewise, the US has also overtaken the UK in terms of industrialization.
This is a long-term trend. However, two major industrialized countries, Germany and Japan, have managed to resist this process for a long time. The recent economic shocks, however, have accelerated Germany’s deindustrialization process, which has brought about an inevitable crisis. This is the essence of the whole issue.
Tunç Akkoç: Some influential figures in the European Union, such as Mario Draghi, have argued that Germany should move away from the car industry and invest in new technologies such as artificial intelligence. What do you think about such proposals for structural change?
Lucas Zeise: I think such proposals for structural change will happen spontaneously on the one hand. I mean, this process is already going on naturally. China has already overtaken Germany in the car industry. Therefore, Mario Draghi’s advice on this issue is actually a cheap suggestion. It is easy to suggest something like this and then say ‘Great job!'”
On the other hand, it would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to steer the economy in this way. It is not enough to say, ‘OK, now we are investing heavily in artificial intelligence and we will get ahead in this field.’ Moreover, it is debatable whether artificial intelligence is really a great revolution or just a passing fad. Artificial intelligence can actually be considered as a sub-branch of the semiconductor industry, i.e. microelectronics.
Of course, the development of microelectronics is important and all countries are making state-sponsored investments in this field. The European Union and Germany are already encouraging this. However, this is not something that is unique to Germany or something that makes Germany different from others. While it is possible to make great progress in this area, this alone is not the final solution to a problem.
Tunç Akkoç: In general, how do you assess Germany’s future energy supply strategy?
Lucas Zeise: Obviously, I am not an expert in this field, so it is difficult for me to give a really good assessment. But it seems very clear to me that all states have to pay attention to such a central sector of the economy.
Germany was already in a different position in that it did not have its own oil companies. This has become a historical tradition. As for natural gas, there used to be two big centers: one centered around BASF, the other around Ruhrgas. These two structures were interconnected and worked well for a while. Over time, however, this system changed and other areas of the energy sector, especially electricity generation, were restructured.
However, this does not change the fact that the energy sector must be guided by the state. Energy policy should be managed by the state in a holistic manner. Developing a common energy policy in the European Union already seems unlikely. However, such a policy should have been mandatory for such a large common market.
At this point, if we look at the example of Turkey, the energy sector there is handled, managed and coordinated in a relatively centralized manner. In Germany, and at the EU level in general, there is a major deficiency in this respect. The state does not really take enough ownership of the energy issue.
Tunç Akkoç: On the other hand, German industry is increasingly turning to the defense industry. Some see in the militarization of the economy the potential for a kind of ‘re-industrialization’. After the war in Ukraine, more and more German companies are breaking the taboo on supplying the defense industry and entering the military equipment sector. How should we assess this development?
Lucas Zeise: On the one hand, this is clearly a sign of the collapse of the still developing and relatively well-functioning global economy. If more and more of it is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this activity is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of a road to disaster.
It is also clear that there is competition for the best defense tenders in the international arena. That is why everyone feels that it needs to enter this field strongly. Nobody just wants to buy aircraft from the US, but wants to build their own defense industry. Germany was already taking part in this process. Although not always at the forefront, tank production in particular has long been strong. This sector was progressing steadily, albeit at a slow pace.
However, this development seems to herald an impending catastrophe. It shows that everyone is preparing for war. This is very similar to the atmosphere before the First World War.
Tunç Akkoç: Elections are approaching in Germany. Do you think that after these elections, Germany’s economic policies will change with a new political order?
Lucas Zeise: More likely no, I don’t think so. I think that economic issues have become a bit more prominent, but if we look back, I remember that in the German Bundestag elections in 1969, one of the main debates in the election campaign was whether the German Mark (D-Mark) should appreciate against the US Dollar. So, a very specific and economically critical issue for Germany at that time was at the center of the election campaign. This debate was directly related to the position Germany should take vis-à-vis the US and Europe.
Today such a debate is missing. The issues that really need to be addressed —energy policy, deindustrialization— are being dealt with in a strangely distorted way. The only thing that everyone seems to agree on is the Agenda 2010 program that Gerhard Schröder launched in 2002 or 2003. This program meant lowering wages, reducing social benefits and increasing profit-making opportunities for companies.
But this approach was already wrong at the time. Schröder’s move enabled some big companies to make a big leap forward and strengthened German capital, especially in the European domestic market. This had certain advantages, but repeating it now would only worsen the situation.
That’s why I think the debate is being conducted in the wrong way and not particularly along party lines. On the contrary, there seems to be a consensus among most political actors on this issue.
Tunç Akkoç: How do you assess the first actions of the Trump administration and what will be the impact on international relations and the global economy?
Lucas Zeise: In my opinion, there is not a new wave of deregulation (liberalization). The US government’s more aggressive stance towards other great powers, or as Trump calls them, ‘shitholes’, or small states, ruthlessly suppressing and crushing them, is not deregulation. It is, in fact, a further intensification of the rivalry between the capitalist states, which are essentially allies, by any means necessary. We can see this situation clearly.
This is not deregulation; it is more like what happened during the Ronald Reagan era. At that time, the US tried to revitalize its rivalry, not with China, but especially with Japan and Western Europe. Reagan’s ruthless behavior towards his own allies was aimed at strengthening the US global position. Today, I think it has become even harsher, so much so that the President of the US can stand up and say, ‘Oh Denmark, you have to give us Greenland, or else we will buy it.’ They even imply that they can intervene directly if necessary.
This kind of behavior is actually a continuation of the past US policies towards Panama. Panama was detached from Colombia and made independent because the US wanted to build a canal there. In other words, this imperialist behavior towards weak countries is already a tradition. But the behavior towards medium-sized states such as Germany, Britain, France or Japan is becoming more and more brutal. I see this as the result of an intensifying and ever more bitter rivalry.
The US in particular is less and less reluctant to use its military power more recklessly, and this is becoming more and more prominent. This is not a new era; it is a further advance of neoliberalism and laissez-faire. The so-called ‘rules-based economic policy’ rhetoric has been completely discarded.
Tunç Akkoç: We see both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic comments about the Chinese economy. When government bonds lose value, pessimists sound the alarm; when exports break records, optimists raise their voices. Does China have the intention or the power to ‘share’ the world with the US?
Lucas Zeise: I completely agree with you; the overly optimistic comments are as exaggerated as the overly pessimistic ones. If I try to think from the point of view of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders, their tradition has been to position China as the largest economic power and to take the first place in the capitalist world.
In the present situation, if I am the second most powerful country, naturally my goal is to equalize with the first. And I have to do this because there is almost no scenario in which the US will accept this and say, ‘OK, we can live in peace with China.’ For a while it seemed as if there was this understanding, that we were working well with China and we were happy with that. But this is clearly no longer possible.
The official US policy is based on not allowing China to become an equal power. They want to continue to set the rules and, if necessary, to violate them according to their own interests. Therefore, China is forced to act like an imperial power.
INTERVIEW
Head of Roscongress: Local currencies are used to bypass sanctions
Published
1 month agoon
16/02/2025
Alexander Stuglev, the Head of Roscongress Foundation, spoke to Harici: “For easing the sanctions regime, national currencies are currently used, and potentially in the future, a digital currency developed by the BRICS can be used.”
With the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow has increasingly turned to business diplomacy and international trade cooperation as strategic tools to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. Central to this effort is Roscongress Foundation, Russia’s premier organization for fostering global economic dialogue and partnerships. Established to enhance Russia’s business ties internationally, Roscongress serves as a bridge connecting Russian enterprises with global markets through high-profile forums such as the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). The organization plays a critical role in reshaping Russia’s economic development by emphasizing collaboration with emerging economies, strengthening ties with traditional partners, and exploring new trade opportunities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Roscongress was organized a meeting in Istanbul and Alexander Stuglev, the Head of Roscongress Foundation, replied the questions of Harici.
As we understand, Roscongress is the main tool for business diplomacy and to eliminate the impacts of Western sanctions. Can you tell us more about the organization?
Yes, you have noticed correctly, Roscongress was established in 2007 as a non-financial development institution that deals with the organization and holding of major international economic and political events in Russia in the interests of attracting investments to the Russian Federation and developing the economy of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, while organizing events we, of course, proceed from the fact that in addition to interaction between Russia and businessmen from a particular country, direct connections can also be established with third countries, that we are also welcoming.
Could you tell us more about the opportunities and risks you see in Turkish-Russian relations in business sector?
Undoubtedly, to some extent, sanctions affect the development of Russian-Turkish relations and, in general, business relations with Russia.
Nevertheless, today, all those who use these turbulences in a pragmatic way to build their business projects in Russia are winning, occupying the vacated niches from Western countries, developing their own business. And from the point of view of easing the sanctions regime, national currencies are currently used, and potentially in the future, a digital currency developed by the BRICS association (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) can be used.
First of all, there are always risks out there, marketing risks included. Secondly, in addition to the fact that Turkish companies have occupied the niches vacated by Western companies, we see a general change in the structure of the Russian economy with a greater focus on creating products and services within Russia.
Tourism for example; the number of tourist trips that have now emerged in Russia is many times higher than there were before COVID, about 83 million trips are made by Russian citizens annually within Russia. And this requires the infrastructure development.
Taking into account the large number of support programs from the Russian state for companies that are developing tourism infrastructure, there are great chances, for foreign companies as well, if they organize a Russian legal entity in the format of an LTD and get the opportunity to develop their projects. This is one of the possibilities.
Creative industry, computer IT security, IT products; in all those areas we can cooperate completely freely. These are such cross-border industries, where, I think, it’s very difficult to be a subject for sanctions.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin set a goal of increasing bilateral trade volume to $100 billion. Do you see an expansion or a contraction in the Turkish-Russian trade volume in 2025?
Firstly, this is practically 100% growth to what we have now.As for the forecast for 2025-2026, the main thing is,first: in my opinion, the construction of transport and logistics projects.There is the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea for example.Second; this is cooperation in the field of energy. Thirdly, this is cooperation in the field of chemistry (creation of chemical products) from supplied raw materials, from oil and gas.This is a promising area of pharmaceuticals, supplies of medical equipment, as well as medical services in Türkiye.Undoubtedly, the development of tourism is very promising but also creative industry, IT industry, Cybersecurity.These are the areas that, in my opinion, will develop in the near future. Of course, traditional cooperation in the field of metallurgy.Traditional cooperation in the field of agriculture and food supplies will grow for sure.
What challenges do sanctions pose to bilateral relations?
The first is an axis from the sanctions regime, including through payment in national currencies and using digital currencies. The second is business, thanks to its capabilities, will find a solution to any restrictions. I do not want to go into details now, do not want to disclose the details of the opportunities that companies can use to maintain a normal trade balance.
Anti-colonial movements in Africa seem to have opened up space for Russia in both diplomatic and commercial terms. How do you assess the situation there?
This is an anti-colonialist movement not only in relation to France, but also in relation to other countries. This is also a movement in relation to proposals that are unfair to Africa, for example, on the green transition, because it will destroy African business and will give great advantages to global companies. In my opinion, it is necessary to proceed from the interests of African countries, which, in fact, Russia always does. This is the advantage of our economy and politics.
We work in a ‘win-win’ mode. In the same way, the Turkish side can work in Africa. In the same way, Chinese investors have been actively working in Africa to this day in the form of the prospects of this market. But based on common interests, on the one hand there is a creation of profitable enterprises. On the other hand – the development of the African economy. Only this will provide an opportunity for further mutual growth. If we simply export material resources from the colonies as a consumer and do not give anything in return, nothing good will come for sure.
After the fall of Assad government, does Russia have any interest in doing business in the reconstruction of Syria?
I am sure that Russian companies will take part in this process, just like other international companies. Now a period of political stabilization will pass and a period of certain growth will begin. The main thing is that extremist movements and non-constructive movements in relation to Syria and the Syrian people do not prevail in politics. I believe that politics and economics will improve in the near future.

From January 9 to 11, the World Festival of the Antifascist International took place in Caracas, Venezuela. More than 2,000 national and international guests from more than 100 countries, as well as other Venezuelan cities, attended the event. Among them were representatives of social movements, political parties, cultural and popular organizations, intellectuals, indigenous peoples, youth, students, workers, parliamentarians, communicators and other personalities. The mega activity was carried out within the framework of the Inauguration of Nicolás Maduro, who on January 10, was sworn in as President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the period 2025-2031, and also served as an example of international support for the continuity of the Bolivarian Revolution under the leadership of Maduro. Another important event that surrounded the Festival was the Inauguration of Donald Trump this January 20.
The Italian-Argentine philosopher Rocco Carbone, who has delved into the discursivities and political and cultural processes of Latin America, was born in Cosenza, Calabria, in southern Italy, but has lived for more than 20 years in the Argentine capital, Buenos Aires. Carbone studied at the Università degli Studi della Calabria. He received his doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Zürich, Switzerland, and currently teaches at the National University of General Sarmiento (UNGS) and is part of the prestigious world of Argentine scientific research center CONICET.
In addition to the aforementioned International Fascist Festival, Carbone participated in other activities carried out in Caracas within the framework of the Inauguration of President Nicolás Maduro, such as the January 9 March; the Swearing-in on January 10; and, the III World Communication Congress of the University of Communications (LAUICOM) held on January 11, among others. In that sense, Harici was able to talk with the Italian-Argentine philosopher about what fascism is, who is Argentine with Javier Milei as its president, and what is coming for Latin America and the world with the arrival of Trump to the White House.
Venezuela has just celebrated the International World Anti-Fascite Festival. Can you give us a definition of what fascism is and how it is expressed today?
The first thing I would tell you is that fascism is never something new, fascism is always old. With this I want to tell you that I am a little reluctant to talk about neofascism, but rather the word fascism convinces me more. I know that, at least in Argentina, where I have lived for more than 20 years, and also in the rest of Latin America this is a difficult word. It is a difficult word from political theory, from political action, for different reasons. But, without a doubt, when we say fascism we are referring to the Italian experience, to the German experience of the 20th century, which were experiences that extended more or less between the 20s, 30s and 40s. But if one theorizes this word a little, in the 20th century we see fascism in different places, that is, fascism in the 20th century was an international force. We find fascism, for example, in Great Britain, where in the 1920s and 1930s there was the British Union of Fascists, led by Oswald Mosley, a guy who had trained with Lord Keynes, the key to economics who was part of a brain of the Blackmore Group.
For example, in old China in the 1930s, within the Kuomintang of the Chinese Nationalist Party, founded by Sun Yat-sen, there also existed a dual power apparatus called the Blue Shirt Association, which was an apparatus fascist type military politician. If we think about Our America, for example, in Cuba governed by Gerardo Machado y Morales, the greatest fact against that political experience is that he persecuted a great militant who was part of the student movement and the Cuban labor movement, Julio Antonio Mella. Being an avid writer, in some of his texts, which we can read today because they have been preserved, Mella called Machado Morales “the tropical Mussolini”, that is, Mella identified Machado as a fascist. Then Mella had to exile himself from Cuba and went to live in Mexico and Machado had him murdered.
And if we think about Argentina in the 1930s, the so-called “Infamous Decade”, there was an Argentine fascist party recognized by the Italian fascist party that had a mass experience, especially in the city of Córdoba, where it was led by a relatively important Argentine Thomist philosopher, Nimio Juan Manuel de Anquí.
And why do I say all this? Because everything that is in history, everything that is in the political history of the world and in the political history of Latin America, at some later point, that history can be reactivated again. And it seems to me that this is happening today in Our America with different expressions of politics that if we call it right or extreme right or extreme right, we say absolutely nothing, because that is an insufficient descriptive expression.
So it seems to me that using these categories says nothing, for example, about the Venezuelan opposition, about Milei, about Bolsonaro. And it seems to me that this word, fascism, has indeed been reactivated. Now you ask me to give a definition of fascism, and I believe that we can think of fascism in many ways, we can think of it in relation to statehood, but we can think of it as political power without necessarily linking it to the nation-state.
Regarding Javier Milei, you have just released a book about the type of fascism that the Argentine president characterizes. Tell us a little about that.
Yes, the book is precisely called “Flamethrower: Milei and Psychotizing Fascism.” Fascism is a psychotizing power because it is a power that tends to drive the citizen, the free organizations of the people, the political parties, and politics crazy… Fascism is a power that discursively, but also politically, when it makes policy, always says two things at the same time and these things contradict each other.
In the case of Milei we can see it clearly, for example, when he was in the middle of the presidential campaign, Milei said that the current Minister of Economy, his Minister of Economy, Luis Caputo, was a criminal and a thief, because he had requested a loan from the IMF for 45 billion dollars, which became an enormous Argentine external debt. But then, when Milei won the presidential election, he chose Caputo as economy minister and now praises him.
Well, there we effectively see a power that narratively says two things at the same time that deny each other. That is why I say that it is a psychotizing power, that is, a power that tends to drive the citizens crazy. And, from my point of view, that psychotizing style basically tends to at least inhibit the popular response to fascism. That is the psychotizing element, the permanent contradictory element, that activates fascist power. We also see it in the permanent development of policies.
In the case of Milei, before becoming president he was briefly a deputy, and when he was a parliamentarian he voted in favor of the elimination, for example, of a tax that is the Income tax (also called the tax on great wealth). Milei voted against that entry, because for him, the Argentine State is a kind of evildoer, it is a kind of thief. The State is a kind of criminal because it taxes the citizens. However, now that he is president he is reinstating the income tax. Once again we see a contradictory policy that balances between a denial and an affirmation.
I believe that in this way we can understand fascism: as a kind of latent political force that is present in the life of people, as a kind of small person (a dwarf) that is – to a greater or lesser extent – in each one. of us and that, appropriately stimulated, grows again.
This January 20, the White House has a new tenant. What can we expect from Trump’s international policy towards Venezuela and Latin America?
Klara Zetkin in her 1923 text: “Fight against fascism. And how to defeat it”, argues that fascism is “a tool of capitalism in crisis.” In that sense, Trump is the head of state who represents the maximum expression of capitalism, and when capitalism is in crisis (in fact, Trump feels that the United States is in crisis, is in danger) to surf that crisis and stay afloat, capitalism expands. a much more radical tool than capitalism itself: fascism. It seems to me that this is a great definition to understand what we are talking about when we talk about fascism, because as we said before, that word activates historical comparisons, which can confuse us or divert us a little. And it seems to me that if, on the contrary, we connect it with the rationality of capitalism, especially the capitalism in crisis that we are experiencing in the 21st century, that is, a capitalism that has many dimensions, there is a productive capitalism, analog capitalism, there is another platform capitalism, financial or digital, there is another type of capitalism, specifically in Latin America, the narco capitalism.
And capitalism at this moment is going through a transition phase, because there is a dispute for the hegemony of capitalism between the old US imperialism and new emerging countries, such as the BRICS. I am referring to Russia, I am thinking of China, India, Iran, which are disputing that hegemony, that leadership.
And so, because capitalism is closely linked to imperialism, the United States feels the pressure of that crisis. Trump has expressed it several times, for him American power is in crisis, in decline. So in different places in the Western world, forms of fascism are activated so that capitalism stays afloat, stays alive and reaffirms itself in this moment of transition from one hegemony to another hegemony, which we still do not know what it will be. Let’s say, this neo-hegemony or hegemonism is still uncertain, but it seems to me that the world is moving towards it, therefore, it seems to me that we must effectively understand it under that paradigm: fascism as a tool of capitalism in crisis.
As to how Trump’s arrival at the White House may affect Venezuela, this is also a bit uncertain. But the obvious thing is that the Trump administration needs an antagonist. If Israel and Gaza reach a prolonged peace agreement, beyond the circumstantial ceasefire, and if Trump manages to end the war in Ukraine. The United States will exert greater pressure and interference against Venezuela. Trump is acting psychotically against the Chinese government, his main enemy in the fight to maintain global hegemony. That is why thinking about a “reasonable capitalism” is nonsense, which is why people must unite and organize.
What do we do?
Imagining and organizing a new world, alternative to the power schemes of powers that do not fight to achieve something but rather covet everything that exists is the task of participation and struggle for the forces of emancipation that vibrate in the ideas of social justice. and egalitarianism. National and popular forces with the Latin American perspective of the great Homeland. Because, what is a town, after all? It is not a fixed or eternal idea but an idea that names and summons the possibility of being constituted in each historical stage. That idea indicates less a large number, a large conglomerate, or a conspicuous number of people mobilized than a fluctuating community experiencing an epiphany. A revelation of power, of knowledge, of beauty, of shared knowledge. A social bond, a hug. An experience: a constitutive part of what one is and without which one cannot be, nor continue to be. From Our America it must still be possible to imagine and organize an emancipatory action – spliced with the dimensions of multipolarity and the BRICS – constituted around a popular slogan: Make Antifascism Great Again, on the 80th anniversary of the subordination of archaeological fascism at the hands of the revolution.
Notes
“Flamethrower. Milei and psychotizing fascism” (2024) by Rocco Carbone. In this essay, the Italian-Argentine philosopher maintains that “fascism is a highly psychotizing or maddening political power. And this characteristic is expressed very well in Milei, because Every time Milei speaks he says two things that clash with each other, for example: First he said: ‘Pope Francis is the representative of the evil one on earth’ and then, when he makes a trip to Rome and visits the Vatican, he says: “The Pope is the most important Argentine in history.” In this text, Rocco invites us to resist and combat this political power because “fascism does not imply an idea different from our own, but the death of all ideas.” And he concludes that “Fascism is a tool of capitalism in crisis,” a thought previously postulated (1923) by the feminist and German communist deputy Klara Zetkin (1857-1933) in the text “Fight against fascism. And how to beat it.”
In “Mafia capital: The hidden logics of power” (2019) the philosopher maintains that: “Organized crime (now nationalized) has a very broad advantage over Argentine democracy and its laws.” In his text, Rocco reviews Latin American history and the recent radicalization of neoliberal governments. It also describes the development of the Mafia, from its origins and how: “in just two generations it stopped being a regional and rural organization to become another, made up of modern, cosmopolitan and refined businessmen, with doctorates, capable of expressing themselves and doing things.” His work has been published in many languages.

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