Diplomacy
‘There is no shift in Turkey’s axis’
The NATO summit in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius has ended. Do Turkey’s intra-NATO maneuvers signal a change or a fine-tuning of Ankara’s post-election foreign policy course? According to Dr. Kaan Kutlu Ataç, there is no shift in axis or geopolitical reason for it. Stating that Turkey has two main agendas focused on economy and defense, Ataç emphasizes that the maneuvers, negotiations and steps in foreign policy should be viewed from this perspective.
The NATO summit in Vilnius is the second meeting held in the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine war. Having been on its agenda since the war, NATO’s enlargement policy is noteworthy as a bargaining chip that Ankara uses against its Western allies.
At the Spain Summit, Ankara put forward certain demands in exchange for Finland and Sweden’s membership, and although it gave its approval to Finland, it kept the Sweden card until this summit. In Vilnius, the new foreign affairs team re-set the bargaining table by bringing up the back-burner issue of “opening Turkey’s path to the European Union (EU)”.
While lifting sanctions on the defense industry, paving the way for the sale of F-16s, and Sweden’s consideration of Ankara’s sensitivities in the fight against terrorism were the most prominent demands, according to Dr. Kaan Kutlu Ataç, “the economic pendulum is the most important parameter for Ankara in foreign policy.”
“Ankara is maximalist in negotiations”
Commenting on the NATO summit to Harici, Dr. Kaan Kutlu Ataç, a lecturer at Mersin University, shares the view that the sometimes hardening or softening relations between Turkey and the West cannot be discussed in the brackets of “axis shift”. According to Ataç, “the typical approach of Turkish foreign policy is maximalist.”
Underlining that “middle powers act with a maximalist approach in their foreign policies and aim for the highest benefit,” Ataç says, “Lifting sanctions is a priority for Turkey.”
Ataç assesses that the rapprochement process with Russia after the 2016 coup attempt was also driven by pragmatic priorities and reminds that both countries have deep mutual mistrust.
Ataç says that although Turkey and Russia have conflicting interests in the Caucasus, Africa and Libya, these differences do not prevent them from developing deep relations in trade, tourism and energy.
“There are security-related tensions and mutual concerns,” Ataç says, adding that despite these, Ankara and Moscow will continue to develop relations based on pragmatic mutual benefit.
Why is there no axis shift?
How will the prioritization of NATO and the EU agenda and Ankara’s desire to open a new page with Western allies affect relations with Moscow? According to Russian statements, there will be no significant change. Indeed, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, “Turkey has obligations to NATO regarding Sweden’s NATO membership,” adding that Moscow is willing to develop relations with Ankara despite differences of opinion.
“Historically, relations with Russia have always been based on tensions,” said Dr. Kaan Kutlu Ataç, adding that “Turkey is developing the relations with Moscow that it needs. There are conflicts of interest in Turkey’s relations with Moscow.”
He summarizes the relations between Ankara, Brussels and Moscow as “Turkey has pragmatic relations with Russia, and there is no strategic rupture with NATO.”
Ataç justifies why he thinks there is no axis shift as follows: “There does not seem to be an axis shift in a technical sense. For there to be an axis shift, the importance of the Anatolian peninsula must strategically increase or decrease. On the axis stretching from North Africa to the Baltic, Anatolia is right in the middle. In NATO’s security policies, Anatolia should be one of the thickest links in the chain.”
“The US is taking Greece to another level”
According to Prof. Kaan Kutlu Ataç, Turkey’s desire for the lifting of Western overt and covert sanctions has two goals. The first is to meet the need for modernization in the defense industry. The second is to ensure the flow of Western resources into the blocked financial system.
On the other hand, “there is a sharp line in Turkey-US relations,” says Ataç, adding that the US has “shifted security from Ankara to Athens.
Emphasizing that modernization is a priority in Turkey’s defense, Ataç says Washington has “elevated the Greek army to another level.”
“The West will not give too much”
“Turkey is looking to get what it can from the West in terms of economy and defense industry,” says Ataç, noting that there is a bottleneck on financial and monetary issues.
To what extent can Ankara, which focuses on creating a positive agenda with NATO, the US, the EU and the West in general, achieve the desired results?
At this point, Ataç says, “It seems that they will not give too much. Turkey is looking to Arab capital for this. However, Arab capital also has close financial ties with the West,” he notes.
“The US wants to further wear Russia down”
Ukraine’s NATO membership agenda has been postponed indefinitely, but signs of escalating war have raised tensions. Moscow responded harshly to the G7 countries’ pledge of security guarantees for Ukraine and the hot topic of supplying Kiev with fighter jets. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called Western plans to supply Kiev with US-designed fighter jets “an extremely dangerous development” and said Moscow sees the F-16 supply as a nuclear threat.
“For the United States, Russia is an adversary that can be overcome,” Ataç said, adding that Washington “wants to further wear Russia down.”
Ataç continued:
“Creating an adversary you can overcome… This is how Russia is defined in the strategy. And crisis management is important for managing tensions, so you need to keep that tension with Russia. The West has not technically integrated Moscow into Western institutions, neither during the Cold War nor after the Cold War.”
“The US is playing this game very hard,” Ataç says, emphasizing that the US “needs the Russian threat” to maintain its domination over Europe.
Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan announced that Yerevan might decide to withdraw entirely from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) if member states fail to “demonstrate a clear political stance” regarding Azerbaijan’s actions. Kostanyan emphasized that Armenia is no longer making insinuations but is speaking very openly.
According to the Novosti-Armenia news agency, Kostanyan stated, “Ultimately, if our partners in the CSTO, including the Russian Federation, do not make the political statements that were mentioned several years ago after the aggression against the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, then Armenia will make a final decision.”
The Deputy Minister also underscored that Armenia, as a sovereign state, will determine the right time for its next steps.
Membership was frozen
Relations between Armenia, Russia, and the CSTO deteriorated following the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, after which Yerevan formally requested support from its allies.
Following this process, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan repeatedly criticized the CSTO for not assisting Yerevan.
Pashinyan described the organization as a “bubble alliance,” claiming it was “planning a war” against Armenia alongside Baku.
Last February, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced that Armenia had frozen its participation in the CSTO. By May, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the country would refuse to finance the organization’s activities.
Intelligence report points in the same direction
In January of this year, a public report released by the Armenian Foreign Intelligence Service stated that the country has no intention of returning to full participation in the CSTO in the near future.
The report noted, “We find it highly unlikely that the reasons that led to Armenia suspending its membership will change in 2025. Based on this situation, the organization’s prestige continues to be seriously questioned and has become a ’cause for reflection’ for other member countries.”
Kirill Dmitriev, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), announced that the internal trade volume among BRICS countries has reached $1 trillion.
In a statement on his Telegram channel, Dmitriev noted that surpassing this significant milestone confirms the strengthening of economic ties between member states and the bloc’s growing role in shaping the new global economic architecture.
He also emphasized that Russia continues to strengthen trade relations, particularly through the BRICS Business Council, in line with the directives of President Vladimir Putin.
BRICS’ share will continue to grow, Putin says
During a plenary session at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin recalled that at the beginning of the 21st century, BRICS countries accounted for only one-fifth of the global economy, whereas today this figure has reached 40%.
The Russian leader stated that this share will continue to grow, describing it as a “medical fact.” According to Putin, this growth will primarily be driven by the countries of the Global South.
In April, Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia, also said that the BRICS countries, operating on principles of consensus, have become a key force in the world economy.
BRICS expansion agenda
Initially composed of five countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—BRICS expanded in 2024 with the inclusion of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Ethiopia, and Egypt.
In January of this year, Indonesia became the bloc’s tenth full member.
Chinese President Xi Jinping will not attend the upcoming BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro next week.
According to multiple sources cited by the South China Morning Post on Tuesday, this marks the first time Xi will miss the gathering of leaders from major emerging economies.
Officials familiar with the matter stated that Beijing informed the Brazilian government of a scheduling conflict. Premier Li Qiang is expected to lead the Chinese delegation in Xi’s place, a similar arrangement to the 2023 G20 summit in India.
Chinese officials involved in the preparations suggested Xi’s absence is due to his two meetings with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva within the past year. The first occurred during the G20 summit and a state visit to Brasília last November, while the second took place at the China-CELAC forum in Beijing this May.
Xi has never before missed a BRICS summit. In 2023, he was scheduled to deliver a speech at the meeting in South Africa but, at the last minute, sent Commerce Minister Wang Wentao instead. Beijing provided no official explanation for the change.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi participated in BRICS meetings virtually, with Russia hosting in 2020 and China in 2021.
On Tuesday, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry told the Post it “would not comment on the internal deliberations of foreign delegations.” The Chinese embassy in Brazil did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
However, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun told the Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.Paulo, “information regarding participation in the summit will be shared at the appropriate time.” Guo added that China supports Brazil’s BRICS presidency and aims to “promote deeper cooperation” among member nations. “In a volatile and turbulent world, the BRICS countries are maintaining their strategic resolve and working together for global peace, stability, and development,” he said.
In Brasília, officials have not concealed their disappointment regarding Xi’s absence. A source informed the Post that Lula had traveled to Beijing in May as a “show of goodwill” and had hoped “the Chinese president would reciprocate the gesture by attending the Rio summit.”
There was also speculation that Lula’s invitation to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a state dinner after the BRICS summit may have influenced Beijing’s decision, as Xi might have been “perceived as a supporting actor” at the event.
Lula’s special adviser for international relations, Celso Amorim, met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, where he clearly expressed Brazil’s desire to host Xi. “I told them, ‘BRICS without China is not BRICS,'” Amorim stated, recalling that then-President Hu Jintao attended the first BRICS summit in Brazil despite a major earthquake in China at the time. “He only stayed for one day, but he came.”
Amorim emphasized the particular importance of Xi’s attendance in the current global context, citing the “US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization” as a “violation of international rules.”
Premier Li is expected to arrive in Brazil next weekend for the summit, which is scheduled for July 6 and 7 in Rio.
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