Those who oppose normalization with Syria: The United States, the Pentagon-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is active in Idlib and Aleppo outskirts and which Turkey considers a terrorist organization, some groups within the Free Syrian Army (FSA) …

U.S. Department spokesman Ned Price said: “We do not support countries upgrading their relations or expressing support to rehabilitate the brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad.” But let us note that there have been no loud objections from senior U.S. officials, senators, and European capitals. Çavuşoğlu, who is set to visit the United States on January 18, said, “The United States did not say ‘Why do you hold meetings?’ but we understand that they oppose to normalization.”

From the side of Syrian organizations, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, leader of the HTS terror coalition, released a four-minute video titled ‘We will not compromise.’ “Talks between the Syrian regime and its Russian ally with the Turkish side represent a serious deviation from our goals,” he said.

The Syrian Democratic Council, which serves as the political framework of the separatist structure in Syria (YPG/PYD/SDF), also called on the “opposition” to the Ankara-Damascus alliance to unite: “We call on the forces of revolution and opposition to oppose and destroy the alliance between Turkey and Damascus, to unite against tyranny and those who sell the blood of Syrians for their interests.”

Abdullah Gedo of the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), withing the circle of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), said the Syrian opposition would be uncomfortable with taking Ankara-Damascus rapprochement to the political level.

Protests were held in many FSA and HTS-controlled settlements in the north of Syria under oath of allegiance to the so-called ‘Syrian revolution.’

The remaining “Syrian opposition”

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met with the President of the Syrian National Coalition Al-Meslet, the President of the Syrian Negotiation Commission Bader Jamous and the Prime Minister of the Syrian Interim Government Abdurrahman Mustafa. “We reiterated our support for the Syrian opposition and the Syrian people in line with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254,” he said.

It is possible to infer some sort of uneasiness from Salem Al-Meslet’s statement, “Turkey is a strong ally of the Syrian revolution and opposition forces. I expect Turkey will remain so in all international decisions on the Syrian issue, especially the Geneva Resolutions 2118 and 2254.”

Resolution 2254 calls for the formation of a “unity government” to be followed by elections. Damascus, however, is not willing to give administration space to opposition groups that are no longer able to seize the state with their armed forces.

Although adjectives such as ‘Prime Minister of the Interim Government’ are used, this political fiction has no practical equivalent in Syria. Although it seems to be one of Ankara’s main priorities for these groups to find a place in a possible Syrian peace, apparently this is not a realistic approach and that these structures are a ‘trump card’ to be discarded at a certain stage of the negotiations.

It became clear in last autumn’s SNA-HTS clashes that efforts to bring countless undisciplined groups together and turn the FSA into the ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) were also in vain. Already after 2016, the role of the FSA was shaped in line with Ankara’s policy change, from overthrowing Assad to quickly fighting the PKK’s Syrian extension.

Why should Damascus share its authority with a structure that will be overthrown as soon as the TAF withdraws its support? It is clearly possible to interpret Syria’s demand for “TAF’s withdrawal from Syria” as “TAF is supporting the parallel armed force that wants to be a partner in my authority. I don’t want to share my sovereignty.”

What is Syria’s FSA plan?

A source from Damascus, who is in contact with the Syrian security bureaucracy, said that Syria raised the following demands on the FSA during the talks: “We have a clear path in the talks, we have some conditions. There are certain groups. These are no different from ISIS. We want Turkey to declare them a terrorist organization. And that won’t be easy.”

The source continued: “Turkey is not willing to make concessions from the FSA in the negotiations. Turkey is officially calling for joint action against the YPG. Damascus has no objection to this. However, Turkey also needs to take steps on certain issues.”

A report on the Middle East Eye website, based on Turkish officials, claimed that Turkey did not accept the request from Damascus to “declare some groups a terrorist organization.”

A source from Syria, who informed Harici, said that Damascus has plans for the future of the various armed groups that have rebelled against FSA and the administration, and quoted the following notes:

“One: According to Damascus, a large section of the FSA can benefit from the amnesty laws.

Two: Damascus does not expect the extradition to Syria of criminals who run criminal networks and are involved in illegal activities.

Three: FSA militants can join the 5th Corps, which was established with Russia’s guarantee of security in reconciliation negotiations with the opposition.”

Expectations from the Arab world

Stating that “the atmosphere of optimism prevails in Damascus” regarding the negotiation process, the source added that Syria is “balancing” relations with Iran and “counting days” to open up to the Arab world.

Noting that the reports of “cleaning the army” published in the Turkish press regarding the recent appointments in the Syrian army do not reflect the truth, the source said that these appointments are a routine process that is carried out every six months.

Damascus continues its ‘normalization’ tours not only with Turkey but also with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed met with Syrian Leader Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Traffic is also heavy on the Syria-Saudi Arabia lane. It can be said that he wants to feel the support of the Arab world behind Damascus in normalization with Turkey.

The United States is doing everything to slow down the flow of the river…

In addition to the Caesar Act sanctions, Washington’s main goal, which aggravated the sanctions on Syria with the Captagon Act, is to Iraqize the Syrian state structure. It is possible to summarize what the U.S. understands by the ‘political solution in Syria’ as an autonomy in which the PYD can find a legal sphere of existence or as options for the federation where local governments are strong. It seems unlikely that Ankara will approve this plan under any circumstances.

The dismantling of Iran’s land logistics system from Iraqi territory to the east of the Euphrates and from there to Lebanon is also among the priorities of the United States and Israel. In other words, we can say that for a possible normalization, Iran will be tried to be removed from Syria and Washington will continue to tighten the sanctions until it includes autonomy.

Now, Astana partner Iran has not been involved in Ankara-Damascus meeting yet. For Tehran, which frequently give advises through official dialogues, the east of the Euphrates and the passageways are very important because they are the window to Lebanon. It is also unrealistic for Damascus to approve the proposals by pushing its foul-weather friend Iran completely out of the game. However, Syria does not want to be seen as fully engaged in Iranian politics as a state.

For now, Ankara’s operation demand has been replaced by dialogue and diplomatic traffic, which all sides are watching closely. As we get closer to the final agreement and the parameters of the possible rapprochement become clear, what lies beneath the objections and reactions will come to the surface. In this context, the year 2023 is decisive for Turkey-Syria relations. With the meeting of foreign ministers in January, the state-to-state dialogue and diplomacy line will be strengthened.

To summarize, 2023 is a candidate year for the transition from non-state actors to interstate relations. The possible resistance of the groups that do not want to lose their wartime ‘state-like’ status strengthens the possibility of opening a final bloody page in the Syrian book…