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Trump’s challenges and Palestinians’ decisive choices

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In light of Trump’s escalating statements, which fit into a carefully calculated context, they cannot be viewed as random but rather as part of a well-planned strategy. His aim is to put all parties, whether Palestinians or regional states, in a difficult position, where any concession becomes an additional gain for Israel. Within this context, Washington partially relinquishes its role in managing the situation in favor of Tel Aviv, enabling the latter to achieve regional gains and complete the objectives of its aggressive war on Palestinians through other means. Amid these developments, Palestinians face a critical crossroads, which became evident after the ceasefire, placing the Palestinian cause before two main paths.

One possibility is preserving Palestinian existence, ensuring unity, national identity, and political sovereignty through a Palestinian-led initiative that asserts the establishment of a Palestinian state. This path would reinforce national cohesion, institutional integrity, and unified decision-making while integrating into the regional framework to counter final liquidation efforts targeting the Palestinian cause.

The other trajectory leads to sliding into fragmentation and collapse, as elimination projects are not confined to a specific limit but may push Palestinian aspirations for liberation into directions that contradict the essence of the national project. This would lead to deeper divisions, political nihilism, and the erosion of the Palestinian cause’s historical and civilizational depth, ultimately turning it into a burden on regional security and global peace rather than a legitimate national liberation movement grounded in historical rights and international agreements.

These decisive choices take shape as the true nature of Israeli policies becomes increasingly evident, bolstered by full American support. This reality positions them as a direct threat to international peace and security while also violating the fundamental principles of the international order established since World War II.

The Zionist right has capitalized on the events of October 7 to construct a new narrative claiming that resolving the conflict with the Palestinians is impossible. This approach is rooted in the “decisive victory” theory, officially adopted by certain Israeli institutions since 2018 with the backing of extreme right-wing factions and full complicity from Netanyahu’s government. It denies the existence of the Palestinian people as a national entity with political rights and presents two options: extermination or forced displacement, all under the guise of maintaining the “purity of the Jewish state” within historic Palestine.

On the other side, regional and international actors, including those not aligned with Palestinian resistance, have insisted on an alternative narrative. They argue that these events did not emerge in isolation but underscore the urgent necessity of resolving the conflict through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The Israeli project of mass displacement and genocide recognizes that Palestinian resilience—despite war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and systematic starvation—threatens the very foundation of the Zionist project.

Historically, Palestinian political elites have lagged behind in adapting to shifting realities, missing significant opportunities. Today, however, circumstances are different. If Palestinians can withstand the ongoing crisis, whose dimensions are becoming clearer post-ceasefire, and if a solid regional bloc remains steadfast in its positions and fully aware of the dangers facing the region, a fundamental shift in the fate of the Palestinian cause and the region’s political landscape may take place.

This transformation is already visible in the increasing pace of regional coordination and efforts to bridge internal divides. The decline of rigid alignments based on positions toward Iran and the reassessment of regional stances on the Arab Spring mark the beginning of a new phase of political and strategic engagement.

Emerging geopolitical shifts may lead to solutions that recognize the historical rights of the Palestinian people, most notably the establishment of a Palestinian state. Such a development may not necessarily require direct negotiations with Israel at this stage, particularly given the dominance of the Zionist right in Israeli decision-making. However, Israeli security concerns will ultimately remain linked to the Palestinians, who will assert their conditions in any final settlement, ensuring that their fundamental rights remain non-negotiable.

This phase is marked by a growing recognition of the Palestinians’ legal and political status, making engagement with an already established Palestinian state unavoidable. If regional actors successfully support this trajectory, broader international backing could follow. Strong indicators of this shift include the emergence of a global coalition of nearly 100 countries, including the European Union, which has explicitly affirmed that its objective is resolving the conflict based on a two-state solution, as outlined in international law. In practice, this means enforcing the establishment of a Palestinian state, even if full recognition remains incomplete at this stage.

Although Palestinians do not yet fully control the territories administered by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza due to Israeli occupation, settlement expansion, and the Judaization of Jerusalem, their demographic resilience, international recognition, and commitment to resistance continue to strengthen their position in the struggle for complete liberation.

The greatest challenge to the Palestinian position remains the political division and continued efforts to separate Gaza from the West Bank. This fragmentation disrupts the coherence of Palestinian political institutions and governance, despite numerous agreements emphasizing the unity of Palestinian decision-making. However, these agreements have yet to be fully implemented, threatening Palestinian resilience and undermining the significant sacrifices made by the people. Additionally, division weakens regional support and forfeits the opportunity to leverage the current international momentum that could enhance Palestinian diplomatic and political standing.

Beyond internal divisions, regional transformations play a crucial role in shaping this landscape. Arab states are no longer in the same position as they were during the Nakba. Regardless of varying perspectives on their positions, they are now politically stable, with significant economic and military influence on the global stage.

Moreover, many states now view themselves as directly impacted by Israel’s war on Palestinians and by U.S. policies that enable Israeli aggression. Washington’s approach, aimed at imposing an outdated global dominance, has led several states—including those once classified as part of the “moderate Arab camp”—to seek greater strategic autonomy. No longer willing to comply unconditionally with American dictates that compromise their security and stability, they are exploring alternative pathways, emphasizing regional cooperation to counterbalance U.S.-Israeli ambitions.

These countries recognize their central role in the global power struggle, with the Arab region holding the world’s primary energy resources and serving as a key hub for international trade routes. Their geopolitical significance makes them essential players in shaping future global alignments.

The world is undergoing profound transformations, whose final outcomes remain uncertain. However, these shifts present significant opportunities for Palestinians while also posing substantial risks to marginalized populations, particularly those subjected to systemic oppression, with Palestinians at the forefront of this struggle. They have endured some of the most horrific massacres in modern history, yet they refuse to be seen merely as victims. Instead, they remain a nation that has resisted with resilience and upheld its rights despite the brutality of the occupation.

What remains is for the Palestinian elite to rise to the level of its people’s resilience by overcoming internal divisions and disputes, restructuring the Palestinian political landscape, unifying representative institutions and decision-making bodies, and adapting to regional and international transformations. This requires shifting from a reactive stance to proactive engagement—managing multiple strategic pathways and forging alliances that ensure the Palestinian presence is a decisive factor in any regional or international arrangements. Whether in relation to the Palestinian cause specifically or the broader geopolitical landscape, such an approach is essential for realizing national aspirations and translating them into tangible achievements on the ground.

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The Economic Dimension of US–China Rivalry

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Economic news plays an important role in understanding the direction of politics and foreign policy. The first signs of rising and declining powers, new alliances, and divisions within existing alliances often appear on the business pages. An article published in the Turkish newspaper Sözcü on October 18, 2026, under the headline “By the Time the US Noticed China’s Move, It Was Too Late: China Had Encircled the World with Banks,” contained important information illustrating the changing global balance of power in recent years. According to the article, four Chinese banks occupied the top four positions on the list of the world’s largest banks. The largest US bank could only rank fifth. The combined assets of China’s four leading banks exceeded $26 trillion.

China’s success in the banking sector, when considered alongside the number of Chinese companies among the world’s top 100 and top 500, the number of Chinese universities in the global top 100 and top 500, the number of patents registered in China, the number of Chinese billionaires, the pace of middle-class expansion in China, and the country’s production, investment, export, and trade capacity, reveals a very simple reality: the tremendous economic success China has achieved through a model defined as socialism with Chinese characteristics. China has become the world’s second-largest economy after the United States. In calculations based on purchasing power parity, it has already surpassed the US.

Let us recall that in 1990, the United States produced 5.4 times as much as China. Today, China has overtaken the US in manufacturing output. According to some experts, China will surpass the US and become the world’s largest economy by the mid-2040s. Today, China is the largest trading partner of approximately 150 countries and runs a trade surplus with 106 countries. In 2025, with a bilateral trade volume of $52.9 billion, China also became Türkiye’s largest trading partner.

China’s economic success is widely referred to around the world as the “Chinese miracle.” There is little the United States can do to counter China’s economic and foreign policy initiatives, advances, and breakthroughs.

During the Cold War, Henry Kissinger, the renowned American political scientist and foreign policy expert who served first as national security adviser and later as secretary of state, advocated a US rapprochement with China against the Soviet Union. In 1971, while serving as the president’s national security adviser, he helped initiate this process through what became known as “ping-pong diplomacy,” of which he was a principal architect. These steps paved the way for a thaw in relations and the eventual normalization of bilateral ties.

Later, some in the United States began to argue that Kissinger’s diplomatic strategy could be reversed to contain China’s rise. In other words, they believed that securing Russia’s support against China, just as Washington had once sought China’s support against the Soviet Union, would serve US interests.

But the world is no longer the same world, the United States is no longer the same United States, and China is no longer the same China. Therefore, such a strategy had no chance of succeeding. Its failure became evident across numerous regions, countries, and fronts. It was evident in Syria, in Ukraine, and in Iran.

US aggression further strengthened the already close relationship between Russia and China. Washington began experiencing growing difficulties with its European allies. Its lawlessness in Venezuela and, above all, its unconditional support for Israeli aggression further intensified already widespread anti-American sentiment around the world.

THE MAIN PILLARS OF US HEGEMONY

As we know, US hegemony rests on three fundamental pillars.

The first is the American economy, its industrial and technological capabilities, and the US dollar.

The second is American military power, including approximately 800 military bases of various sizes around the world, and particularly its air force and navy.

The third is the American cultural industry, the widespread use of the English language, American culture, music, cinema, lifestyle, academia, and think tanks—in short, the instruments of soft power and public diplomacy.

In other words, the United States is a highly influential imperialist power, relying on its navy and the dollar as instruments of hard power, and on its language and culture as instruments of soft power.

We also know that the decline of US economic power inevitably undermines its political influence and soft power. This naturally causes panic, anxiety, and concern in Washington.

The reasons behind America’s growing anxiety are not merely political, military, or diplomatic. More importantly, they are economic.

The United States failed to achieve its desired results through the measures it took against China in the form of trade wars and tariffs. China did not back down. It responded with countermeasures. The trade wars ultimately hurt the United States itself, as well as its European allies. Washington’s policies also failed to deliver the expected results in terms of inflation, employment, exports, and trade.

In short, just as its relative economic decline weakens the United States’ position in foreign policy, China’s economic and technological development strengthens its foreign policy position, international visibility, and global reputation.

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Notes from Germany: Lux in Tenebris

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Scene one: In one of Berlin’s polite neighbourhoods, three or four people with Ukrainian flags stand in front of the Russian House, whose lease has been cancelled. Similar figures can also be seen on the street outside the Russian Embassy, which is protected by iron railings. It is hardly a crowd to be taken seriously, yet its impact on German politics must be taken very seriously indeed. Whether you see clouds in the air or not, the sky is murky and the needle is swinging towards cold. Nobody pays any attention to the small group with Ukrainian flags; the German government, however, mistakes that indifference for a green light for war.

Scene two: Looking from cosmopolitan and chaotic Berlin to small but stark Magdeburg, things change. Beyond mere metaphor, there is a real scene before us: there, members of the AfD and the BSW are beaming at one another. Election results in the state of which the city is the capital are forcing “unity”. It is as if this were the address of hope against war, though not every war: the establishment of a weapons factory in the state by an Israeli company causes stomach ache among AfD members, yet they barely bat an eyelid. A few dozen people, whose numbers rarely change, never fail to applaud generously. The German mainstream media is also attentive; AfD members take care not to slip up.

Scene three: We are back in Berlin. The first taxi driver, as we usually encounter, is Turkish. He says he voted for “Elif”. Is there much talk that she will fail? He says he will withdraw his support. The magic word is “integration”; yet he is angry with the Germans, and the sense of being downtrodden persists. The driver changes, but the theme remains the same: a Yemeni migrant, in his broken German and English, immediately objects upon hearing “the Houthis” and starts listing: Umar ibn al-Khattab, Abu Bakr… Stirred-up regional tensions and the personal backgrounds of migrants are reproduced inside Germany. This pool holds not only dangers for the German state, but opportunities as well. Anyone who wishes can look at the “new Syria”, or at the Turk appointed to head domestic intelligence.

What is the AfD’s crime?

Thinking about what we saw and heard in Berlin and Magdeburg, one is forced to pause and wonder why, aside from “one or two minor things”, the AfD is at odds with the “establishment” at all.

Of course, it is no small matter: the Ukraine crisis and the possibility of a general European war keep Germany on edge. Although the migration issue has lost its former urgency, it still occupies a prominent place in all speeches by AfD members. On these two critical headings, the AfD remains, in part, the black sheep.

I say in part, because there are obvious signs of softening. Ask anyone in the AfD, and almost all agree that there is more than one AfD: there is a “West German” AfD that adopts a pro-NATO, pro-armament, and pro-war stance; and there is an East German AfD that submits a joint peace motion with the BSW. Indeed, according to some, there is also Björn Höcke’s ethno-nationalist (völkisch) AfD. Even the issue of “remigration” has become “nuanced” for a party that wants at least to strike a chord with German big capital: no more new migration, yes, but where should the line be drawn for older migrants? Many regard those who arrived after the 2015 crisis as “illegal”; yet some local AfD politicians are actively campaigning to win the votes of Turks, believing that Turks, just like themselves, are socially conservative. One reveals his enthusiasm by saying, “We want nothing to do with Shariaists, but there are even Turks who eat pork!” Another admits that the question of who will wash the dishes once the migrants leave is the elephant in the room.

Whichever way one looks at it, it is clear that the party in the West, at least, is CDU 2.0 (liberal, market-oriented, conservative), while the party in the East is more “social”. On peace with Russia, for instance, the Saxony-Anhalt branch appears to speak unequivocally. A similar attitude holds for the Russian-speaking German-Russian community in Berlin and, more broadly, in the state of Brandenburg. If we count everyone from the Russians who fled to Germany after the October Revolution, to those who arrived with the Red Army, Soviet citizens who settled in East Berlin, and ethnic Germans who came from the USSR after the counter-revolution, we arrive at a population of nearly 35,000. Local AfD politicians do not seem to look unkindly upon this community either.

Indeed, the AfD’s lack of hostility towards Russia and Russians is cited as proof that it is not fascist. After all, in the 20th century, the nemesis of German imperialism, and of Nazism which inherited its worst traits, was Russia. While one reason for the Nazi invasion of the USSR was a holy war against Bolshevism, another was the cleansing of its own east, its “living space”, of inferior Slavs.

Fine, then, but today, as German imperialism once again sets its sights eastward, if one leg of the stool is hostility towards Russia, the others are Germany’s rearmament, NATO, and relations with the US.

The AfD’s stance on Germany’s rearmament can, at best, be described as “kicking the ball around”. For example, AfD members in Magdeburg say “800 billion euros for rearmament is too much” (how much, for instance, would not be too much?), and are then forced to openly admit that there is no consensus within the party on this issue. A local politician in Berlin voices the fantasy, “Let’s have 20 nuclear bombs and no army”, but adds: “I am in a minority in the party!” In fact, Siegmund Ulrich, the lead candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, had already blurted out that alongside rearmament, they could use the army to chase away migrants.

Conscription and the improvement of the Bundeswehr’s domestic logistics and infrastructure are also among the policies the AfD advocates. Whenever armament, the militarization of culture, and the strengthening of the army are on the agenda, AfD members join the bandwagon, saying “we are a right-wing party”. The same softening trend is observed regarding the US and NATO. The term “transatlantic right”, popularized by the BSW’s Sevim Dağdelen in a recent article, appears to have been adopted even by some AfD members. The fact that senior AfD figures like Beatrix von Storch have become regulars in Washington, Elon Musk’s attendance at AfD congresses, and the shadow of JD Vance and his patron Peter Thiel over German-Austrian politics complicate the matter further. The Trump administration’s push to bring Germany forward while reducing its NATO commitments in Europe seems to have sparked a modest excitement among AfD members. Their outlook on the EU and NATO is being recalibrated, adapted to this new situation.

Add to this Israel, the untouchable of the “establishment”. For the most “advanced” AfD member, “Jews” and “Muslims” are equally guilty. Even stranger, however, is what was said immediately after the Saxony-Anhalt elections in the debate over the Elbit Systems factory, sparked once again by Ulrich firing the signal flare: the AfD lead candidate stated that they would not oppose factories built for “ammunition production” and tied the now-familiar “remigration” issue to the debate surrounding this Israeli arms company. Although AfD members in Magdeburg express doubts about the Elbit Systems factory, they have found a baffling side road: let us put whether to build the (Israeli) weapons factory to a referendum and ask the people! If the people say yes, they will not object to the weapons factory being built. The AfD member who is “personally opposed” to Elbit building a factory again admits that there is no unity within the party on this matter. Clearly, for a local AfD politician, the way out of an issue that is unpopular, especially in East Germany, lies through the arguments that “there is no unity in the party on that issue” yet “he himself is personally opposed”.

The Israeli influence is embodied in Maximilian Krah, once one of the party’s most prominent faces: sidelined after an aide working for him in the Bundestag was accused of being a “Chinese spy” and after he remarked that “not everyone who wore an SS uniform was automatically a criminal”, this AfD figure somehow suddenly became enamoured of Israel and rushed off to Tel Aviv. He guaranteed that they would continue to bear Germany’s responsibility for the Holocaust, tried to convince Israelis that antisemitism in Europe today comes not from the right but from the left, and added that he was certain the ice between the AfD and Israel would melt.

Speaking of Israel… The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which the AfD regards as a sister party and whose Saxony-Anhalt team visited it to benefit from its experience in government, along with its leader Herbert Kickl, are also among those recently dazzled by the Israeli sun. The Likudization of the European right does not sink in Lake Constance; it marches on.¹

Indeed, this issue of “buyability”, in both senses of the word, is throwing the AfD off balance. An AfD politician explaining his views on Berlin’s housing problem opposes the Left Party’s expropriation proposal with CDU-like ferocity, while listing as his solution the deportation of Ukrainian refugees and, nevertheless, the construction of new housing. Who, then, will build the new housing? The city of Berlin is in debt, and the AfD opposes new debt; it also opposes private investors building it. So what will happen? Cooperation with the CDU in Berlin’s neighbourhoods will presumably bear fruit here in the form of more market and deregulation.

BSW: Over, over, not over

The same indecisiveness exists in the BSW. Of course, the BSW’s situation cannot even be compared to that of the AfD: having barely scraped into parliament in Saxony-Anhalt, falling below the threshold in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, criticized for governing with the old/established parties in Brandenburg and Thuringia, and fracturing from within, the party is fighting a battle for survival.

Precisely for this reason, they see flirting with the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt as a kind of leverage. At least the state branch and certain intermediaries are pushing for this. While their similar stances on the Ukraine issue take concrete form in a joint motion, cooperation in the state could, for some, become a model at the federal level as well. The BSW’s lead candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, Claudia Wittig, plays to this with her constant smiling and nodding at AfD members. So do the anti-Americanism and the emphasis on German culture and what is German.

But which German? At the event in Magdeburg, an artist who appears to be close to the left quotes Brecht. Another prominent figure speaks of the German Hegel, of Aufheben, which we might translate as transcending by preserving, elevating by both retaining and negating its content, and of the unbreakable ties between patriotism and internationalism. He mediates with the AfD on behalf of migrants who speak German, pay their taxes in Germany, and obey German laws, pleading with them not to frighten these people by talking of remigration. The AfD member, meanwhile, says the left-right distinction means nothing; another likens Germany to “North Korea”. For whatever reason, while leftists deem it unnecessary to emphasize the left, right-wingers wink at a kind of right-wing international.

In the BSW, everyone is at odds with everyone else; nobody likes anybody. It is impossible to hear anything positive about co-chairs Amira Mohamed Ali or Fabio De Masi, even from people close to the BSW. Some are angry with Sahra Wagenknecht; others think Wittig is inadequate.

In fact, the experiment in Saxony-Anhalt oscillates on a scale between biting off more than one can chew and pure fantasy. Indeed, the party leadership has launched belated salvos against the possibility of being politically (and perhaps even organizationally) swallowed by the AfD. Leaders, led by Sevim Dağdelen, are trying to clarify their position by pointing to the AfD’s ethno-nationalist and transatlantic-right ties, as well as its stance against the welfare state.

But is it enough? Does viewing the AfD simply as a “political rival” allow one to understand this party’s specific historical role? Moreover, could the connection pulling the AfD towards the “establishment”, namely Israel, also be quietly and deeply reaching into the BSW? A journalist well-informed about the BSW reports, for instance, that certain shady characters hovering around the party are making moves to push steadfast anti-Israel figures like Sevim Dağdelen out of the organization by branding them “pro-Hamas”. Some declare the party finished, some think it will know how to rise just as it sank, and some even think the “left” of the Left Party and the “left” of the BSW could break away from their parties and form a new movement…

The (gloomy) sky over Berlin

To kill time, I step into a bookshop. Again to pass the time, I buy a book that catches my eye and begin reading. Its title is Beyond the Wall, by Katja Hoyer. No English-language book has ever told the history of the German Democratic Republic so vividly, someone says in the blurbs on the first page.

The colour palette is as follows: devout German communists rotting in Stalin’s prisons and Gulags; drunken Red Army soldiers on occupied Prussian soil, emboldened by their daily vodka rations, organizing mass rape sessions; the Ulbricht group, yes-men to Stalin and to the Red Army headquarters, the occupation authority in East Germany… and so it goes on. According to the author, Stalin, who met personally with the German delegation 11 times between 1945 and 1952, could not possibly have held these meetings out of any genuine interest in Germany’s political future; this was merely a sign of his distrust of his German comrades!

A complete waste of time. Yet it says something about the German intelligentsia and political class. This colourful history is, in reality, a bleak and putrid narrative of pessimism. In this history, there are no people rolling up their sleeves to leave the devastation of war behind and build a new country. It is a brand of nihilism incapable of understanding why the national anthem of the German Democratic Republic, beginning with “Auferstanden aus Ruinen” (Risen from Ruins), is still sung with longing today in the eastern German states, even by AfD members. One AfD adviser admits that Alice Weidel might say one thing today and something 180 degrees opposite next week. Indifference to Germany’s future has engulfed everything, even, in this context, the AfD.

On the other hand, the nihilism of the intelligentsia appears destined to lose against the hope pumped out by the AfD. The Germans call it Irrlicht; in folktales, a supernatural, even demonic quality is attributed to the false light that appears in marshes. The political nihilism into which Germany has sunk is elevating the AfD, which also feeds on nostalgia for East Germany.

Looking at the false light spread by the AfD, Brecht comes to mind once again. In one of his early plays, combining a critique of bourgeois morality with the biblical metaphor of “Light in Darkness” (Lux in Tenebris), Brecht left his protagonist, the bigoted Paul, standing outside a “brothel” in his neighbourhood to shelter from a storm. This polite gentleman, who had dedicated his life to fighting decay and darkness, suddenly found himself illuminated by the neon lights of the brothel right next to his own world, which he had thought so solid. And inspired by The Threepenny Opera, one might also think that to see the truth, one must look not at those in the light, but at those in the dark. As dark clouds gather once more in the German sky, thinking that optimism might be connected to our eyes adjusting to the dark could set our minds free.


¹ On this side of the lake, journalist Hüseyin Doğru is subjected to EU sanctions on the grounds of supporting the Palestinian resistance. Do not dismiss it as mere sanctions: Doğru cannot even use a credit card, his bank accounts are closed, he cannot pay his bills, and it is even uncertain whether he could return if he left the country. EU legislation practically buries sanctioned individuals alive.

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The Mecca Defence Agreement, the Ottoman Empire, and the facts

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Some who are thoroughly excited by the Mecca Defence Agreement, and certain people who believe Türkiye should take sides in the clashes between the Iranian-backed Houthis and Saudi Arabia, are once again dreaming dreams of conquest with reference to our Ottoman past. Whenever history is discussed, especially Turkish and Ottoman history, they invoke this widely repeated saying: “After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East and the Balkans never knew peace again.”

We know that there are always those who, proceeding from this premise, seek to re-establish the Ottoman Empire. And we do not forget that eminent historians immediately respond to these ignorant figures: “Whoever does not grieve over the collapse of the Ottoman Empire has no heart, and whoever wishes to re-establish it has no mind.”

For the world we live in is neither the world in which the Ottoman Empire rose, nor the world in which it fell. Both times and conditions have changed. More than 40 states now exist across the lands once ruled by the Sublime Porte; when taking into account the countries it temporarily ruled, seized, or held sway over, that number exceeds 50 according to some historians, and 60 or even 70 according to others.

It must be asked dispassionately:

Which of these states, and how many of their citizens, actually want the Ottoman Empire to rise again, or wish for the Turks who would lead this revived, re-established Ottoman Empire to come and govern them as well? For this purpose, how many of these states have come together and said to Türkiye, “Take the lead, revive the Ottoman Empire”?

Is it objectively possible in today’s world to establish such a multilingual, multireligious, multiconfessional, multinational, and multi-identity empire? As the former prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu once suggested, is it objectively plausible for Türkiye to establish and lead an Ottoman Commonwealth of Nations, just as the British established and led the Commonwealth of Nations? Does Türkiye possess such political and economic power, state capacity, and scale?

Do the states that emerged from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire have any such goal, desire, or expectation? Are regional and global conditions, or the balance of power, conducive to such an initiative? Long after the age of empires has drawn to a close, is it a realistic objective to bring the countries born of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse together under the umbrella of a federation or confederation?

How do those who claim such a desire exists in the Islamic world, the Arab world, and the Turkic world explain the rapprochement between the Central Asian Turkic states and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus; the Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian tensions across the Islamic world; the Abraham Accords; the indifference of Arab states to the Palestinian issue; and the fact that the TRNC is not recognized by a single Muslim country or a single Turkic state other than Türkiye?

Were Türkiye to put forward such an ambition, let alone Greece, Bulgaria, or Serbia, how would Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran react?

These questions could certainly be multiplied.

Yet history books contain ample evidence of how dreams conceived, and commentary made, in ignorance of history, geography, and economics ultimately turn out.

What matters in foreign policy is not indulging in fantasies, but remaining realistic.

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